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  Based	  on	  research	  in	  thirty-­‐eight	  archives	  and	  libraries	  in	  China,	  Hong	  Kong,	  Taiwan,	  Japan,	  Britain,	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  dissertation	  reconsiders	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  known	  as	  the	  "Cold	  War."	  It	  does	  so	  through	  synthesizing	  diplomatic	  and	  social	  history,	  as	  well	  as	  local	  and	  global	  history,	  arguing	  that	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  not	  a	  situation,	  but	  a	  lens	  through	  which	  many	  people	  observed	  world	  situations,	  less	  a	  geopolitical	  and	  ideological	  confrontation	  between	  the	  two	  superpowers	  than	  an	  imagined	  reality	  that	  functioned	  in	  restoring	  state	  order	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  recapturing	  and	  preserving	  social	  “harmony”	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  and	  overcoming	  diverse	  social	  and	  cultural	  conflicts	  at	  social	  and	  community	  levels—a	  mechanism	  of	  tranquilization	  that	  operated	  quite	  “well”	  during	  the	  so-­‐called	  Cold	  War	  period.	  	  The	  dissertation	  consists	  of	  three	  parts.	  The	  first	  examines	  the	  years	  between	  1945	  and	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  and	  argues	  that	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  this	  period	  remained	  a	  disputable	  discourse,	  only	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  worldviews	  due	  to	  its	  fragmented,	  nebulous,	  and	  discursive	  nature.	  The	  second	  focuses	  on	  the	  months	  in	  the	  summer	  and	  fall	  of	  1950	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  tracing	  how	  the	  imagined	  reality	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  solidified,	  and	  looking	  into	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  making	  of	  such	  a	  reality,	  through	  analyzing	  the	  interplay	  between	  state	  and	  
society	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  American	  and	  Chinese	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  policies	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  The	  third	  investigates	  the	  global	  phenomenon	  of	  social	  purges	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period,	  in	  which	  local	  actors—not	  only	  state	  officials	  but	  also	  ordinary	  people—stifled	  dissent	  and	  “purify”	  society	  under	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  East-­‐West	  confrontation,	  often	  choosing	  particular	  kinds	  of	  order	  and	  reality	  that	  lasted	  for	  decades	  to	  follow.	  	  In	  sum,	  through	  tracing	  the	  gigantic	  social	  construction	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  during	  the	  Korean	  Conflict,	  this	  study	  attempts	  to	  explain	  why	  such	  an	  imagined	  reality	  materialized	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	  particularly	  during	  the	  Korean	  War,	  why	  millions	  of	  people	  throughout	  the	  world	  participated	  in	  the	  making	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and,	  finally,	  what	  the	  Cold	  War	  truly	  was.
  
 iii 
BIOGRAPHICAL	  SKETCH	  	   Born	  and	  raised	  up	  in	  Osaka,	  Japan,	  Masuda	  Hajimu	  studied	  International	  Relations	  at	  Ritsumeikan	  University	  in	  Kyoto.	  After	  graduation,	  he	  worked	  as	  a	  journalist	  for	  a	  newspaper	  in	  Japan.	  He	  came	  to	  the	  United	  States	  in	  September	  2001,	  taught	  Japanese	  at	  an	  alternative	  high	  school	  in	  Southern	  California,	  and	  attended	  Northwest	  College,	  Powell,	  WY,	  and	  Rutgers	  University,	  New	  Brunswick,	  NJ,	  majoring	  in	  history	  and	  photography.	  At	  Cornell,	  Masuda	  received	  his	  M.A.	  in	  2008,	  and	  Ph.D.	  in	  2012,	  specializing	  in	  global	  and	  international	  history,	  with	  a	  primary	  focus	  on	  East	  Asia	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  author's	  name	  is	  a	  Japanese	  name;	  the	  family	  name	  is	  Masuda.	   	  
  
 iv 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
This	  dissertation	  is	  dedicated	  to	  my	  parents	  and	  wife.
  
 v 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	  	  Looking	  back	  at	  the	  years	  spent	  on	  my	  dissertation,	  I	  feel	  anew	  that	  I	  have	  been	  extremely	  fortunate	  to	  work	  with	  exceptional	  scholars	  and	  friends	  at	  Cornell.	  My	  advisor	  Fredrik	  Logevall	  always	  encouraged	  my	  ambitious	  project,	  read	  all	  drafts,	  chapter	  by	  chapter,	  and	  even	  section	  by	  section,	  participated	  in	  all	  of	  my	  presentations	  at	  Cornell,	  gave	  me	  straightforward	  and	  practical	  advice	  and	  constructive	  criticism,	  and	  maintained	  a	  high-­‐standard	  of	  accuracy	  and	  style	  in	  writing,	  providing	  me	  a	  model	  of	  a	  mentor	  and	  scholar.	  Chen	  Jian,	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  has	  provided	  a	  model	  of	  an	  international	  scholar	  who	  is	  active	  and	  enthusiastic	  in	  both	  research	  and	  lecturing,	  in	  both	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Professor	  Chen	  has	  rigorously	  read	  my	  writings	  since	  the	  time	  they	  were	  still	  term	  papers,	  and	  provided	  numerous	  comments	  on	  almost	  each	  page,	  often	  reminding	  me	  of	  various	  aspects	  I	  had	  overlooked.	  J.	  Victor	  Koschmann,	  from	  the	  viewpoint	  of	  an	  intellectual	  historian,	  always	  provided	  precious	  comments,	  with	  insights	  that	  would	  never	  have	  occurred	  to	  me	  otherwise,	  and	  assisted	  me	  in	  viewing	  and	  discussing	  my	  project	  in	  a	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  manner.	  Beyond	  my	  dissertation	  committee,	  I	  am	  particularly	  grateful	  to	  Walter	  LaFeber,	  Peter	  J.	  Katzenstein,	  and	  Katsuya	  Hirano,	  who	  read	  parts	  of	  the	  dissertation	  when	  they	  were	  still	  term	  or	  colloquium	  papers,	  and	  helped	  me	  to	  elaborate	  on	  ideas	  and	  sharpen	  arguments.	  	  	   If	  there	  is	  a	  single	  most	  important	  factor	  that	  helped	  me	  to	  think	  deeply	  and	  to	  continue	  to	  work	  on	  my	  project,	  it	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  diverse	  forums	  for	  discussions	  at	  Cornell.	  Among	  others,	  an	  interdisciplinary	  dissertation	  writing	  group	  
  
 vi 
that	  lasted	  almost	  three	  years	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  formulating	  my	  ideas	  and	  forcing	  me	  working	  on	  the	  dissertation	  to	  keep	  up	  with	  our	  regular	  meetings.	  This	  writing	  group	  provided	  priceless	  opportunities	  to	  test	  emerging	  ideas	  and	  arguments	  in	  front	  of	  members	  from	  diverse	  fields,	  such	  as	  literature,	  science	  and	  technology	  studies,	  and	  theater,	  film,	  and	  dance	  studies,	  as	  well	  as	  cultural	  and	  intellectual	  history.	  I	  am	  most	  indebted	  to	  the	  members	  of	  this	  group:	  Chris	  Ahn,	  Samson	  Lim,	  Honghong	  Tinn,	  and	  Akiko	  Ishii,	  as	  well	  as	  Chunyen	  Wang,	  who	  joined	  later.	  I	  thank	  the	  Society	  for	  the	  Humanities	  and	  the	  Institute	  for	  Comparative	  Modernities	  for	  providing	  funding	  to	  sustain	  our	  regular	  meetings	  and	  dinners	  for	  years.	  	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  I	  benefited	  from	  listening	  to	  diverse	  feedback	  and	  critiques	  I	  have	  received	  at	  number	  of	  the	  Americas	  Colloquium,	  Asian	  Colloquium,	  and	  professionalization	  workshop	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  History,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Peace	  Studies	  Program	  Dinner	  Seminar.	  Through	  my	  nine	  presentations	  at	  Cornell,	  	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  participants,	  in	  particular,	  Edward	  Baptist,	  Chen	  Jian,	  Sherman	  Cochran,	  Duane	  Corpis,	  Matthew	  Evangelista,	  Durba	  Ghosh,	  TJ	  Hinrichs,	  Katsuya	  Hirano,	  J.	  Victor	  Koschmann,	  Fredrik	  Logevall,	  Mary	  Beth	  Norton,	  Jon	  Parmenter,	  Judith	  Reppy,	  Naoki	  Sakai,	  Aaron	  Sachs,	  and	  Claudia	  Verhoeven,	  as	  well	  as	  Claudine	  Ang,	  Deokhyo	  Choi,	  Mari	  Crabtree,	  Brian	  Cuddy,	  Sean	  Fear,	  Noriaki	  Hoshino,	  Akiko	  Ishii,	  Christopher	  Jones,	  Peter	  Lavelle,	  Samson	  Lim,	  Daegan	  Miller,	  Jorge	  Rivera	  Marin,	  Mike	  Schmidli,	  Rebecca	  Tally,	  Christopher	  Tang,	  Irene	  Vrinte,	  Yuanchong	  Wang,	  We	  Jung	  Yi,	  and	  Taomo	  Zhou,	  for	  their	  comments	  on	  various	  portions	  of	  my	  dissertation.	  David	  S.	  Foglesong	  and	  Sato	  Shohei,	  though	  living	  far	  away	  from	  Ithaca,	  also	  read	  
  
 vii 
chapters	  and	  gave	  thorough	  feedback.	  Sujin	  Lee	  helped	  me	  to	  romanize	  Korean	  names.	  In	  addition	  to	  intellectual	  benefits,	  I	  am	  deeply	  indebted	  on	  more	  tangible	  levels	  to	  various	  fellowships	  that	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  me	  to	  concentrate	  on	  the	  dissertation	  for	  most	  of	  my	  time	  at	  Cornell.	  Indeed,	  I	  could	  not	  have	  completed	  the	  dissertation	  without	  generous	  support	  from	  the	  Peace	  Studies	  Program,	  East	  Asia	  Program,	  History	  Department,	  and	  Graduate	  School	  at	  Cornell.	  They	  have	  accommodated	  me	  with	  an	  inestimable	  blessing—time—that	  allowed	  my	  project	  to	  ripen,	  through	  providing:	  the	  Sage	  Fellowship	  in	  2005-­‐06,	  Fall	  2009,	  and	  Fall	  2011;	  the	  PSP	  Graduate	  Student	  Fellowship	  in	  Spring	  2007;	  the	  PSP	  Bluestone	  Fellowship	  in	  Spring	  2010;	  and	  the	  History	  Department’s	  Boldt	  Fellowship	  in	  Fall	  2008;	  and	  the	  EAP’s	  Robert	  J.	  Smith	  Fellowship	  in	  Fall	  2006,	  Spring	  2009,	  and	  Spring	  2011.	  The	  Society	  for	  Historians	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Relations	  (SHAFR)	  provided	  me	  a	  one-­‐year	  Dissertation	  Completion	  Fellowship	  in	  2010-­‐11,	  a	  crucial,	  privileged	  period,	  during	  which	  most	  of	  my	  dissertation	  chapters,	  which	  were	  still	  scattered	  pieces	  of	  writing,	  blended	  into	  an	  organically	  unified	  narrative.	  During	  this	  period,	  the	  Graduate	  School	  and	  East	  Asia	  Program	  generously	  provided	  funding	  for	  full	  tuition,	  enabling	  me	  to	  continue	  writing	  my	  dissertation	  at	  Cornell.	  	  Furthermore,	  a	  teaching	  assistant	  fellowship	  in	  2007-­‐08	  offered	  me	  not	  only	  full	  funding	  but	  also	  an	  invaluable	  opportunity	  to	  work	  with	  Professor	  Logevall	  on	  his	  survey	  courses	  on	  U.S.	  foreign	  relations	  history,	  which	  not	  only	  deepened	  my	  knowledge	  of	  the	  subject,	  but	  provided	  a	  model	  of	  lecturing	  at	  large	  class.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  financial	  support,	  Olin	  Library	  and	  the	  History	  
  
 viii 
Department	  equipped	  me	  with	  desks	  and	  offices,	  respectively,	  in	  which	  I	  spent,	  literally,	  most	  of	  my	  time,	  and	  wrestled	  with,	  first,	  a	  mountain	  of	  documents,	  and,	  second,	  the	  task	  of	  writing	  and	  rewriting.	  Michelle	  Nair	  and	  Barb	  Donnell	  helped	  me	  to	  secure	  places	  to	  work	  in	  the	  library	  and	  department,	  respectively.	  If	  I	  spent	  most	  of	  my	  time	  in	  my	  offices	  in	  Olin	  Library	  and	  McGraw	  Hall	  during	  the	  semesters,	  I	  spent	  all	  of	  summer	  and	  winter	  breaks	  for	  my	  research	  trips	  to	  thirty	  eight	  archives	  and	  libraries	  in	  China,	  Taiwan,	  Hong	  Kong,	  Japan,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Such	  an	  extensive	  and	  worldwide	  research	  would	  have	  been	  inconceivable	  without	  plentiful—indeed,	  more	  than	  two	  dozen—travel	  and	  research	  grants	  provided	  by:	  the	  Mario	  Einaudi	  Center	  for	  International	  Studies,	  East	  Asia	  Program,	  American	  Studies	  Program,	  Department	  of	  History,	  and	  Graduate	  School	  at	  Cornell.	  In	  particular,	  I	  am	  grateful	  to	  the	  Graduate	  School	  for	  their	  support	  of	  my	  study	  of	  Korean	  at	  Yonsei	  University	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2007;	  the	  EAP	  and	  Einaudi	  Center	  for	  enabling	  me	  to	  reside	  in	  Beijing	  and	  Tokyo	  for	  seven	  months	  from	  the	  summer	  of	  2008	  to	  early	  2009,	  during	  which	  I	  was	  able	  to	  conduct	  research	  in	  Beijing,	  Shanghai,	  Tianjin,	  Hong	  Kong,	  Changchun,	  Osaka,	  and	  Tokyo;	  American	  Studies	  Program	  and	  Graduate	  School	  for	  supporting	  my	  two-­‐month	  research	  trip	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2009	  to	  Norfolk,	  VA,	  Iowa	  City,	  IA,	  Independence,	  MO,	  Reno,	  NV,	  and	  Berkeley,	  CA—an	  8,000-­‐mile,	  cross-­‐continental	  round	  trip	  by	  car;	  and	  the	  Einaudi	  Center	  for	  proving	  funding	  for	  my	  research	  trip	  to	  Taipei	  and	  Tokyo	  in	  the	  winter	  of	  2009-­‐10.	  In	  addition,	  the	  American	  Studies	  Program,	  Graduate	  School,	  and	  SHAFR	  offered	  funding	  that	  enabled	  me	  to	  conduct	  research	  in	  London	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  2010.	  These	  “research”	  trips	  provided	  me	  not	  only	  fruitful	  outcomes	  in	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terms	  of	  research,	  but	  also,	  in	  many	  cases,	  a	  lot	  of	  fun	  in	  visiting	  new	  places,	  meeting	  new	  people,	  and	  eating	  new	  food,	  satisfying	  my	  almost-­‐innate	  taste	  for	  the	  joy	  of	  traveling	  and	  backpacking.	  	  	   In	  the	  course	  of	  these	  two	  dozen	  research	  trips,	  I	  have	  been	  indebted	  to	  numerous	  archivists,	  librarians,	  and	  scholars.	  In	  China,	  Shen	  Zhihua,	  Li	  Danhui,	  and	  Zhou	  Na	  at	  East	  China	  Normal	  University,	  Yu	  Qun	  and	  Zhang	  Yang	  at	  Northeast	  Normal	  University,	  and	  Xiao	  Jin	  at	  the	  Chinese	  University	  of	  Hong	  Kong,	  assisted	  my	  research	  in	  various	  ways.	  In	  particular,	  Shen	  Zhihua	  wrote	  reference	  letters	  and	  gave	  me	  precious	  advice	  on	  archival	  research	  in	  China.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  well,	  my	  research	  could	  not	  have	  been	  completed	  without	  the	  meticulous	  support,	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  intuition,	  of	  archivists.	  I	  am	  especially	  thankful	  to	  James	  W.	  Zobel	  at	  the	  MacArthur	  Memorial	  Archives,	  Norfolk,	  VA,	  and	  David	  Clark	  and	  Samuel	  Rushay	  at	  the	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library,	  Independence,	  MO.	  	  	   In	  the	  past	  five	  years,	  each	  chapter—in	  some	  chapters,	  each	  section—of	  my	  dissertation	  has	  been	  presented	  at,	  in	  total,	  nineteen	  academic	  conferences	  outside	  Cornell,	  including	  annual	  conferences	  at	  SHAFR,	  AAS,	  and	  NYCAS,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  number	  of	  graduate	  conferences	  and	  international	  conferences	  in	  Bristol,	  UK,	  Paris,	  France,	  Hangzhou,	  China,	  and	  many	  places	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Numerous	  people	  have	  attended	  my	  presentations,	  given	  both	  positive	  and	  critical	  feedback,	  and	  encouraged	  me	  in	  pursuing	  this	  project.	  I	  am	  deeply	  grateful	  to	  Michael	  Allen,	  Balogh	  H.Balogh,	  Mark	  Bradley,	  Gregg	  Brazinsky,	  Alexander	  Bukh,	  Julia	  C.	  Bullock,	  Adam	  Cathcart,	  Chen	  Jian,	  Brett	  de	  Bary,	  Mario	  Del	  Pero,	  Richard	  Filipink,	  late	  Ilya	  Gaiduk,	  James	  Z.	  Gao,	  Yanjie	  Gao,	  Hope	  M.	  Harrison,	  Laura	  Hein,	  Gail	  Hershatter,	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Christian	  A.	  Hess,	  Walter	  Hixson,	  Denise	  Y.	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  Minoru	  Iwasaki,	  Andrew	  Johns,	  Pierre	  Journoud,	  Vic	  Koschmann,	  Mark	  Kramer,	  Melvyn	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  Christopher	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  Leighton,	  Steven	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  Christian	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  Park	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  James	  Person,	  Sergey	  Radchenko,	  Wesley	  Sasaki-­‐Uemura,	  Shohei	  Sato,	  Thomas	  A.	  Schwartz,	  Franziska	  Seraphim,	  Naoko	  Shibusawa,	  Setsu	  Shigematsu,	  Sayuri	  Shimizu,	  Jason	  Scott	  Smith,	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  T.	  Sparrow,	  Lu	  Sun,	  Yuko	  Torikata,	  Kathryn	  Weathersby,	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  Yafeng	  Xia,	  Daqing	  Yang,	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  Salim	  Yaqub,	  and	  Marilyn	  Young,	  for	  their	  comments,	  critiques,	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  enthusiasm	  for	  my	  project.	  	  	  	   As	  an	  international	  student,	  I	  am	  most	  indebted	  to	  my	  language	  teachers	  in	  English,	  Chinese,	  and	  Korean	  in	  the	  past	  decade.	  I	  express	  sincere	  thanks	  to:	  Robert	  Stothart,	  Ingrid	  M.	  Arnesen,	  Stewart	  Markel,	  and	  Jay	  S.	  Winston.	  In	  particular,	  Jay,	  with	  meticulous	  eyes	  and	  care	  for	  style,	  patiently	  read	  all	  of	  my	  chapters,	  and	  helped	  me	  to	  sharpen	  their	  arguments,	  and	  forced	  me	  to	  clarify	  otherwise	  ambiguous	  points.	  Rob,	  a	  poet	  and	  my	  first	  ESL	  teacher	  at	  Northwest	  College,	  Powell,	  WY,	  read	  short	  pieces	  of	  writing	  and	  patiently	  corrected	  them	  every	  day	  throughout	  the	  summer	  of	  2003	  when	  I	  was	  struggling	  with	  leaning	  English.	  In	  a	  similar	  way,	  I	  am	  indebted	  to	  my	  Chinese	  teachers,	  Richard	  Simmons	  at	  Rutgers,	  and	  Frances	  Yufen	  Lee	  Mehta	  and	  Qiuyun	  Teng	  at	  Cornell.	  I	  also	  thank	  the	  teaching	  staff	  at	  summer	  language	  programs	  at	  Jilin	  University	  in	  Changchun,	  China,	  and	  Yonsei	  University	  in	  Seoul,	  South	  Korea,	  where	  I	  learned	  Chinese	  and	  Korean,	  respectively.	  	  The	  completion	  of	  this	  dissertation	  coincides	  with	  the	  close	  of	  my	  long	  journey	  in	  the	  United	  States	  before	  heading	  for	  Singapore	  to	  begin	  teaching	  as	  an	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assistant	  professor	  at	  National	  University	  of	  Singapore.	  Leaving	  a	  newspaper	  company	  in	  Japan	  in	  September	  2001,	  I	  arrived	  at	  Los	  Angeles	  on	  October	  7,	  2001,	  the	  day	  that	  the	  United	  States	  began	  bombing	  Afghanistan.	  While,	  at	  that	  time,	  I	  was	  inclined	  toward	  the	  idea	  of	  becoming	  a	  photo	  journalist	  and	  did	  not	  think	  about	  pursuing	  a	  Ph.D.	  in	  history,	  in	  retrospect,	  this	  dissertation	  might	  have	  taken	  root	  long	  before	  I	  came	  to	  Cornell.	  The	  seeds	  of	  this	  project,	  in	  effect,	  germinated	  through	  numerous	  communications	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  people	  concerning	  what	  was	  going	  on	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  September	  11,	  2001.	  In	  a	  sense,	  this	  dissertation	  is	  pretty	  much	  a	  product	  of	  the	  era.	  Thus,	  I	  feel	  indebted	  to	  various	  conversations	  before	  coming	  to	  Cornell,	  including	  those	  with	  my	  colleagues	  at	  Mainichi	  Shinbun	  [Mainichi	  Newspaper],	  Harriet	  Bloom-­‐Wilson,	  Richard	  Wilson,	  Mary	  Baumann,	  Steve	  Thulin,	  Woody	  Wooden,	  and	  Rob	  Stothart	  at	  Northwest	  College,	  as	  well	  as	  David	  Foglesong	  and	  Michael	  Adas	  at	  Rutgers	  University,	  New	  Brunswick,	  NJ.	  Above	  all,	  Akiko	  Ishii	  has	  contributed	  to	  my	  project	  enormously.	  Since	  we	  first	  met	  at	  a	  graduate	  seminar	  and	  together	  took	  on	  the	  role	  of	  discussants	  for	  a	  thick	  history	  book	  on	  Stalinism,	  I	  have	  been	  continually	  amazed	  by	  her	  intellectual	  ability	  in	  discussing	  history	  in	  a	  conceptual	  and	  abstract	  manner—an	  aspect	  I	  had	  totally	  neglected,	  previously.	  Since	  then,	  when	  coming	  up	  with	  new	  findings	  and	  arguments,	  I	  have	  always	  tested	  them	  with	  her;	  when	  she	  was	  excited,	  I	  developed	  them,	  and,	  if	  not,	  I	  throw	  them	  out.	  In	  this	  way,	  in	  all	  processes	  of	  conducting	  research,	  forming	  ideas,	  testing	  arguments,	  and	  writing	  and	  rewriting	  chapters,	  Akiko	  has	  been	  always	  the	  first	  and	  most	  candid—often	  most	  critical—listener	  and	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 1 
Introduction	  	   “If	  any	  one	  thing	  more	  than	  another	  could	  advance	  the	  cause	  to	  which	  the	  western	  nations	  are	  bending	  their	  efforts,	  it	  would	  be	  to	  stop	  describing	  it	  as	  the	  ‘cold	  war.’”	  So	  argued	  a	  cover	  article	  in	  the	  British	  Economist	  on	  May	  27,	  1950.	  It	  maintained	  as	  such	  because,	  whatever	  the	  term	  had	  meant	  	  when	  it	  first	  coined,	  it	  now	  had	  the	  effect	  in	  the	  public	  mind	  of	  making	  the	  western	  powers	  appear	  as	  the	  aggressor.1	  The	  article	  contended:	  	  [T]he	  policy	  to	  which	  the	  western	  powers	  are	  committed	  is	  not	  one	  that	  aims	  at	  fighting	  the	  Russian	  Communists	  and	  destroying	  their	  regimes;	  it	  is	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  such	  a	  war	  from	  breaking	  out	  and	  at	  reaching	  a	  modus	  vivendi	  with	  the	  Soviets.	  Its	  object	  is	  peace,	  not	  war;	  agreement,	  not	  conquest.	  […].	  The	  talk	  […]	  of	  a	  ‘cold	  war’	  is	  to	  confuse	  minds	  and	  darken	  counsel.	  It	  is	  time	  the	  western	  peoples	  dropped	  the	  term	  entirely	  from	  their	  political	  vocabulary	  and	  used	  instead	  a	  phrase	  […]	  that	  genuinely	  expresses	  their	  firm	  but	  pacific	  purposes.2	  	  	  Within	  a	  few	  years,	  if	  not	  months,	  such	  critiques	  disappeared.	  In	  this	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  the	  manner	  of	  spelling	  out	  the	  phenomenon	  changed	  as	  well;	  the	  situation	  that	  had	  been	  described	  “a	  cold	  war”	  or	  “the	  so-­‐called	  cold	  war”	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  came	  to	  be	  commonly	  known	  as	  “the	  Cold	  War”	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1950s.	  This	  transition	  from	  a	  lower-­‐	  to	  uppercase	  implies	  that	  the	  bi-­‐polar	  confrontation	  no	  longer	  represented	  a	  number	  of	  disputable	  opinions,	  but	  one	  that	  was	  now	  widely	  accepted	  as	  a	  substantial,	  irrefutable	  actuality	  of	  the	  world.	  This	  gradual	  revelation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  however,	  also	  suggests	  the	  constructed	  nature	  of	  the	  conflict	  that	  became	  “reality,”	  as	  opposed	  to	  something	  that	  existed	  as	  an	  objective	  situation	  immediately	  following	  World	  War	  II.	  	  How	  did	  such	  a	  “reality”	  become	  solidified	  in	  the	  postwar	  
                                                1	  “Our	  Weekly	  Letter,”	  No.	  17,	  June	  2,	  1950,	  Working-­‐Class	  Movement	  Library,	  Salford,	  U.K;	  “Peace	  versus	  Peace,”	  The	  Economist,	  May	  27,	  1950,	  1153-­‐54.	  2	  Ibid.	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era,	  and	  during	  the	  Korean	  War,	  in	  particular,	  and	  why?	  What	  was,	  after	  all,	  the	  so-­‐called	  Cold	  War?	  This	  dissertation	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  rewrite	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  through	  synthesizing	  social	  and	  diplomatic	  history,	  as	  well	  as	  local	  and	  global	  history.	  Based	  on	  archival	  research	  in	  thirty-­‐eight	  archives	  and	  libraries	  in	  China,	  Hong	  Kong,	  Taiwan,	  Japan,	  Britain,	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  study	  primarily	  focuses	  on	  the	  crucial	  moment	  of	  the	  Korean	  Conflict	  circa	  1950,	  and	  examines	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  local	  actors	  around	  the	  world—from	  elite	  policymakers	  to	  ordinary	  people—interpreted	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  through	  the	  lenses	  of	  their	  own	  local	  contexts,	  participated	  in	  a	  multilayered	  politics	  of	  knowledge	  production	  in	  their	  hometowns,	  and	  eventually	  paved	  the	  way	  toward	  maintaining	  a	  particular	  Cold	  War	  world,	  thereafter.3	  	  
                                                3	  The	  Korean	  War	  has	  been	  a	  topic	  for	  discussion	  for	  more	  than	  six	  decades.	  Early	  scholarship	  	  in	  the	  late	  1950s	  and	  early	  1960s	  tended	  to	  view	  it	  through	  a	  Cold	  War	  lens,	  and	  viewing	  it	  in	  the	  shadow	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  describing,	  thus,	  it	  as	  “America’s	  ‘Rhineland’”	  and	  a	  “limited	  war”	  that	  prevented	  World	  War	  III.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Robert	  E.	  Osgood,	  Limited	  War:	  The	  Challenge	  to	  American	  Security	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1957)	  and	  David	  Rees,	  Korea:	  The	  Limited	  War	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin's	  Press,	  1964).	  	  The	  experience	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  changed	  historians’	  attitudes.	  In	  light	  of	  Vietnam,	  the	  Korean	  War	  came	  to	  be	  reexamined,	  described,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Callum	  MacDonald,	  as	  the	  “war	  before	  Vietnam.”	  More	  critical	  toward	  U.S.	  intervention	  to	  Asia,	  the	  aspect	  of	  civil	  war	  in	  Korea	  became	  the	  central	  focus.	  This	  view	  was	  most	  powerfully	  expressed	  in	  Bruce	  Cumings’	  two-­‐volume	  work,	  as	  well	  as	  Allan	  Millett’s	  study	  on	  domestic	  struggles	  before	  1950	  and	  his	  two-­‐volume	  work	  on	  the	  conflict.	  See	  Bruce	  Cumings,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  Vol.	  I-­‐II	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1981-­‐1990);	  Callum	  MacDonald,	  Korea:	  The	  War	  Before	  Vietnam	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1986);	  John	  R.	  Merrill,	  Korea:	  The	  Peninsular	  Origins	  of	  the	  War	  (Newark:	  University	  of	  Delaware	  Press,	  1989),	  and	  Allan	  R.	  Millett,	  The	  War	  for	  Korea,	  Vol.	  I-­‐II	  (Lawrence,	  KS:	  University	  Press	  of	  Kansas,	  2005-­‐2010).	  	  The	  American	  side	  of	  story	  has	  been	  carefully	  examined	  from	  various	  angles;	  For	  the	  scholarship	  that	  scrutinized	  roles	  played	  by	  high-­‐ranking	  policymakers,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Glenn	  Paige,	  
The	  Korean	  Decision:	  June	  24-­‐30,	  1950	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1968);	  Ernest	  May,	  “Lesson”	  of	  the	  
Past:	  The	  Use	  and	  Misuse	  of	  History	  in	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1973);	  and	  Arnolda	  Offner,	  Another	  Such	  Victory:	  President	  Truman	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1945-­‐1953	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2002).	  For	  studies	  that	  explored	  the	  interconnection	  between	  domestic	  politics	  and	  the	  Korean	  War,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Rosemary	  Foot,	  The	  Wrong	  War:	  American	  
Policy	  and	  the	  Dimensions	  of	  the	  Korean	  Conflict,	  1950-­‐1953	  (Ithaca	  :	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1985)	  and	  Burton	  Kaufman,	  The	  Korean	  War:	  Challenges	  in	  Crisis,	  Credibility,	  and	  Command,	  2nd	  ed.	  (New	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                                                                                                                                            York:	  McGraw-­‐Hill	  Companies,	  1997	  [1986]).	  For	  studies	  directed	  toward	  a	  broader	  audience	  interested	  in	  military	  history,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  David	  Halberstam,	  The	  Coldest	  Winter:	  America	  and	  
the	  Korean	  War	  (New	  York:	  Hyperion,	  2007)	  and	  Max	  Hastings,	  The	  Korean	  War	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1987).	  For	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  see	  Chapter	  3.	  	  With	  the	  opening	  of	  archives	  in	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  the	  1990s,	  a	  new	  tide	  of	  scholarship	  emerged,	  often	  emphasizing	  the	  role	  played	  by	  Moscow.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  S.	  N.	  Goncharov,	  John	  Wilson	  Lewis,	  and	  Litai	  Xue,	  Uncertain	  Partners:	  Stalin,	  Mao,	  and	  the	  Korean	  War	  (Stanford,	  Calif.:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1993);	  V.	  M.	  Zubok	  and	  Konstantin	  Pleshakov,	  Inside	  the	  Kremlin's	  Cold	  
War:	  From	  Stalin	  to	  Khrushchev	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Vojtech	  Mastny,	  
The	  Cold	  War	  and	  Soviet	  Insecurity:	  The	  Stalin	  Years	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Anatoliĭ	  V.	  Torkunov,	  Chōsen	  sensō	  no	  nazo	  to	  shinjitsu:	  Kin	  Nissei,	  Sutārin,	  Mō	  Takutō	  no	  kimitsu	  
denpō	  ni	  yoru	  [The	  Myth	  and	  Truth	  of	  the	  Korean	  War:	  Based	  on	  Declassified	  Correspondence	  among	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung,	  Stalin,	  and	  Mao	  Zedong],	  Translation	  of	  Zagadochnaíà	  voĭna:	  koreĭskiĭ	  konflikt	  1950-­‐1953	  
godov	  (2000)	  by	  Shimotomai	  Nobuo	  (Tokyo:	  Sōshisha,	  2001);	  Kathryn	  Weathersby,	  “Soviet	  Aims	  in	  Korea	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  1945-­‐50:	  New	  Evidence	  From	  the	  Russian	  Archives,”	  
CWIHP	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  8.	  (November	  1993)	  and	  "'Should	  We	  Fear	  This?'	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Danger	  of	  War	  with	  America."	  CWIHP	  Working	  Paper,	  No.	  39	  (July	  2002);	  and	  Mansourov,	  Alexandre	  Y.	  “Stalin,	  Mao,	  Kim,	  and	  China’s	  Decision	  to	  Enter	  the	  Korean	  War,	  September	  16-­‐October	  15,	  1950.”	  CWIHP	  
Bulletin	  6/7	  (1995).	  	  With	  the	  opening	  of	  archives	  in	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  in	  the	  1990s,	  research	  on	  the	  Chinese	  side	  evolved	  rapidly,	  as	  well.	  Utilizing	  newly	  available	  documents,	  	  a	  number	  of	  Chinese	  scholars	  explicate	  the	  roles	  played	  by	  Beijing,	  in	  particular	  elaborating	  on	  Mao	  Zedong’s	  personality,	  ideology,	  and	  political	  considerations.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Chen	  Jian,	  China's	  Road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War:	  
The	  Making	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  Confrontation	  	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1994);	  Shu	  Guang	  Zhang,	  Mao's	  Military	  Romanticism:	  China	  and	  the	  Korean	  War,	  1950-­‐1953	  	  (Lawrence,	  KS:	  University	  Press	  of	  Kansas,	  1995);	  Shen	  Zhihua,	  Mao	  Zedong,	  Sidalin	  yu	  Chaoxian	  zhanzheng	  [Mao	  Zedong,	  Stalin,	  and	  the	  Korean	  War]	  (Guangzhou:	  Guangdong	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  2007);	  Yang	  Kuisong	  Mao	  Zedong	  yu	  Mosike	  di	  en	  en	  yuan	  yuan	  [Mao	  Zedong’s	  Indebtedness	  and	  Bitterness	  toward	  Moscow]	  (Nanchang:	  Jiangxi	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  1999),	  and	  Niu	  Jun,	  “The	  birth	  of	  the	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China	  and	  the	  road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War”	  in	  Melvyn	  P.	  Leffler	  and	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  Vol.	  1	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  221-­‐243.	  For	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  China	  and	  the	  Korean	  War,	  see	  Chapter	  4.	  	  With	  such	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  in	  the	  amount	  of	  declassified	  documents	  from	  former	  communist	  countries,	  the	  1990s	  observed	  the	  maturity	  of	  “international	  history”	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  generally	  concentrating	  on	  decisions	  and	  correspondences	  among	  high-­‐ranking	  policymakers,	  such	  as	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  Dean	  Acheson,	  Joseph	  Stalin,	  Mao	  Zedong,	  and	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung,	  a	  trend	  that	  developed	  with	  what	  was	  called	  “New	  Cold	  War	  history.”	  With	  its	  emphasis	  on	  contingency,	  human	  agency	  (leadership),	  and	  international	  aspects,	  work	  of	  this	  kind	  tended	  to	  challenge	  the	  previously	  dominant	  interpretation	  that	  described	  the	  Korean	  War	  more	  in	  terms	  of	  historical	  continuity,	  structural	  force,	  and	  domestic	  aspects.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  William	  Stueck,	  The	  Korean	  War:	  An	  
International	  History	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995)	  and	  	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis,	  We	  
Now	  Know;	  and	  Wada	  Haruki,	  Chōsen	  Sensō	  Zenshi	  [A	  Total	  History	  of	  the	  Korean	  War](Tōkyō:	  Iwanami	  Shoten,	  2002).	  	   Along	  with	  these	  developments	  in	  international	  approaches,	  other	  new	  kinds	  of	  research	  have	  blossomed	  in	  recent	  decades,	  shedding	  light	  on	  diverse	  topics	  such	  as	  social	  and	  cultural	  aspects,	  domestic	  political	  considerations,	  propaganda	  and	  mobilization,	  and	  ordinary	  people’s	  lives.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Thomas	  J.	  Christensen,	  Useful	  Adversaries:	  Grand	  Strategy,	  Domestic	  Mobilization,	  
and	  Sino-­‐American	  Conflict,	  1947-­‐1958	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  Paul	  G.	  Pierpaoli,	  Truman	  and	  Korea:	  The	  Political	  Culture	  of	  the	  Early	  Cold	  War	  (Columbia,	  Mo.:	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  1999);	  Steven	  Casey,	  Selling	  the	  Korean	  War:	  Propaganda,	  Politics,	  and	  Public	  Opinion	  
in	  the	  United	  States,	  1950-­‐1953	  (Oxford;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2008);	  Xiaobing	  Li	  and	  Richard	  A.	  Peters,	  Voices	  from	  the	  Korean	  War:	  Personal	  Stories	  of	  American,	  Korean,	  and	  Chinese	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My	  principal	  concern,	  thus,	  is	  not	  when	  the	  Cold	  War	  began	  or	  who	  initiated	  it,	  but	  literally	  how	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  produced	  and	  consolidated,	  and	  why.	  Therefore,	  my	  research	  investigates	  not	  only	  policymaking	  processes	  during	  this	  period,	  but	  the	  integral	  role	  of	  popular	  imagination	  in	  framing	  and	  conventionalizing	  this	  “reality,”	  inquiring	  into	  how	  such	  an	  imagined	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  fueled	  by	  fear,	  antagonism,	  images	  of	  enemies,	  and	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  eventually	  became	  the	  irrefutable	  actuality	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.	  In	  a	  sense,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  Cold	  War	  history	  that	  presupposes	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  To	  be	  precise,	  this	  is	  a	  history	  of	  a	  fantasy	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  with	  its	  focus	  on	  the	  
                                                                                                                                            
Soldiers	  (Lexington,	  KY:	  University	  Press	  of	  Kentucky,	  2004);	  and	  Philip	  West	  ed.,	  Remembering	  the	  
"Forgotten	  War":	  The	  Korean	  War	  Through	  Literature	  and	  Art	  (Armonk,	  N.Y.:	  M.E.	  Sharpe,	  2001).	  	   In	  contrast	  to	  the	  research	  on	  American,	  Russian,	  Chinese,	  and	  international	  aspects	  of	  the	  war,	  one	  crucial	  subject	  has	  lagged	  behind	  until	  recently:	  the	  Korean	  side.	  This	  situation	  improved	  dramatically	  in	  the	  last	  decade	  with	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  research,	  primarily	  in	  South	  Korea	  that	  scrutinized	  diverse	  experiences	  of	  Koreans	  during	  and	  after	  the	  war—that	  is,	  social	  history	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  The	  topics	  include,	  for	  instance,	  massacres,	  evacuation,	  occupation,	  and	  daily	  lives	  of	  ordinary	  Koreans	  during	  the	  war.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Kim	  Tong-­‐ch'un	  (Dong-­‐choon),	  Chŏnjaeng	  kwa	  
sahoe:	  uri	  ege	  Han'guk	  chŏnjaeng	  ŭn	  muŏt	  iŏnna?	  [War	  and	  Society:	  What	  was	  the	  Korean	  War	  for	  Us?]:	  (Paju,	  South	  Korea:	  Tolbegae,	  2006).	  A	  Japanese	  translation	  was	  published	  in	  2009;	  Chōsen	  
Sensō	  no	  Shakaishi:	  Hinan,	  Senryō,	  Gyakusatsu	  [A	  Social	  History	  of	  the	  Korean	  War:	  Evacuation,	  Occupation,	  Massacre],	  translation	  of	  	  (Tōkyō:	  Heibonsha,	  2008).	  	  An	  English	  translation	  was	  published	  in	  2009;	  The	  Unending	  Korean	  War:	  A	  Social	  History	  (Larkspur,	  CA:	  Tamal	  Vista,	  2009).	  Pak	  Myŏng-­‐nim	  (Park	  Myung-­‐lim),	  Hanʼguk	  1950:	  chŏnjaeng	  kwa	  pʻyŏnghwa	  [Korea	  1950:	  War	  and	  Peace]	  (Seoul,	  South	  Korea:	  Nanam	  Chʻulpʻan,	  2002).	  A	  Japanese	  translation	  was	  published	  in	  2004;	  
Sensō	  to	  Heiwa:	  Chōsen	  Hantō	  1950	  [War	  and	  Peace:	  The	  Korean	  Peninsula,	  1950](Tōkyō:	  Shakai	  Hyōronsha,	  2009).	  Hwang	  Sŏg-­‐yŏng	  [Seok-­‐yeong],	  Sonnim	  [The	  Visitors]	  (Seoul:	  Chʻangjak	  kwa	  pipʻyŏngsa,	  2001).	  A	  Japanese	  translation	  was	  published	  in	  2004;	  Sonnimu	  [The	  Visitors]	  (Tokyo:	  Iwanami	  shoten,	  2004).	  Also,	  see	  Charles	  K.	  Armstrong,	  The	  North	  Korean	  Revolution,	  1945-­‐1950	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2003);	  Bruce	  Cumings,	  Korea’s	  Place	  in	  the	  Sun	  (New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton,	  2005).	  	  	   For	  more	  detailed	  discussions	  of	  historiography	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  see	  Allan	  R.	  Millett,	  “The	  Korean	  War:	  A	  50-­‐Year	  Critical	  Historiography,”	  in	  The	  Journal	  of	  Strategic	  Studies,	  Vol.	  24,	  No.	  1	  (March	  2001).	  For	  the	  overview	  of	  Korean	  War	  literature	  and	  topics,	  see,	  for	  example,	  James	  I.	  Matray,	  Historical	  Dictionary	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  (New	  York:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  1991);	  Lester	  H.	  Brune,	  
The	  Korean	  War:	  Handbook	  of	  the	  Literature	  and	  Research	  (Westport,	  CT:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  1996);	  Paul	  M.	  Edwards,	  The	  Korean	  War:	  An	  Annotated	  Bibliography	  (Westport,	  CT:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  1998)	  and	  The	  Korean	  War:	  A	  Historical	  Dictionary	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  Scarecrow	  Press,	  2003),	  and	  Allan	  R.	  Millett,	  The	  Korean	  War:	  The	  Essential	  Bibliography	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Potomac,	  2007).	  While	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  Korean	  War	  itself	  as	  its	  broader	  effects—the	  materialization	  of	  the	  Cold	  War—during	  that	  period,	  it	  intends	  to	  incorporate	  various	  findings	  and	  approaches	  presented	  in	  existing	  literature	  on	  the	  Korean	  War.	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materialization	  of	  the	  conflict,	  which	  was	  brought	  about	  globally	  and	  simultaneously	  in	  the	  postwar	  world.4	  The	  methodology	  used	  and	  questions	  raised	  in	  this	  project	  differ	  significantly	  from	  those	  of	  most	  existing	  scholarship.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  Cold	  War	  has	  now	  developed	  into	  a	  subject	  of	  study	  not	  only	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  diplomatic	  history	  and	  political	  science,	  but	  in	  social	  and	  cultural	  history,	  as	  well	  as	  literature,	  film,	  art,	  rhetoric,	  and	  communications	  studies.	  Scholarship	  in	  the	  former	  set	  of	  field	  has	  addressed	  the	  subject	  through	  elucidating	  the	  roles	  of	  states	  and	  policymakers—the	  traditional	  strength	  of	  diplomatic	  history:	  investigating	  policymakers’	  intentions	  and	  calculations.	  In	  the	  latter	  field,	  scholars	  have	  examined	  and	  analyzed	  images,	  identities,	  and	  the	  many	  forms	  of	  cultural	  production	  shaped	  by	  the	  Cold	  War.5	  As	  prominent	  historian	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  Melvyn	  Leffler	  has	  lamented,	  however,	  these	  areas	  of	  scholarship	  have	  been	  developing	  rather	  separately	  without	  examination	  of	  the	  links	  between	  them.6	  	  In	  recent	  decades,	  scholarship	  on	  the	  Cold	  War	  has	  further	  proliferated	  with	  the	  spread	  of	  international	  and	  transnational	  approaches	  based	  on	  multilingual	  research,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  deepening	  of	  cultural	  approaches	  exploring	  issues	  of	  race,	  gender,	  emotions,	  and	  so	  forth,	  both	  of	  which	  have	  significantly	  informed	  my	  
                                                4	  For	  earlier	  discussions	  of	  the	  imagined	  nature	  of	  the	  war,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Mary	  Kaldor,	  The	  
Imaginary	  War:	  Understanding	  the	  East-­‐West	  Conflict	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Blackwell,	  1990).	  	  5	  An	  enormous	  amount	  of	  scholarship	  exists,	  but,	  for	  the	  former,	  see,	  for	  example,	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis,	  
We	  Now	  Know:	  Rethinking	  Cold	  War	  History	  (New	  York,	  1997);	  Melvyn	  Leffler,	  Preponderance	  of	  
Power:	  National	  Security,	  the	  Truman	  Administration,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Stanford,	  1992);	  and	  Walter	  LaFeber,	  America,	  Russia,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1945-­‐2006,	  10th	  ed.	  (Boston,	  2008	  [1967]).	  For	  the	  latter,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Elaine	  Tyler	  May,	  Homeward	  Bound:	  American	  Families	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  Era	  (New	  York,	  1988);	  and	  Stephen	  J.	  Whitfield,	  The	  Culture	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  2nd	  ed.	  (Baltimore,	  1996).	  6	  Melvyn	  Leffler,	  “New	  Approaches,	  Old	  Interpretations,	  and	  Prospective	  Reconfigurations,”	  in	  Michael	  Hogan	  ed.,	  America	  in	  the	  World:	  The	  Historiography	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Relations	  Since	  
1941	  (New	  York,	  1995).	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thinking	  and	  research	  agenda.7	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  trends,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  revival	  of	  domestic-­‐political	  approaches,8	  as	  well	  as	  a	  methodological	  contention	  urging	  the	  need	  to	  “take	  off”	  the	  Cold	  War	  lens.9	  In	  short,	  the	  field	  of	  diplomatic	  history,	  once	  described	  as	  boring	  and	  uncreative,	  is	  now	  becoming	  a	  vibrant	  field	  with	  diverse	  approaches	  and	  viewpoints.	  Yet,	  even	  with	  the	  development	  of	  such	  new	  trends	  in	  recent	  years,	  the	  gap	  Leffler	  identified	  has	  tended	  toward	  widening	  and	  solidifying,	  rather	  than	  being	  bridged.10	  	  Thus,	  there	  remains	  an	  opportunity	  to	  synthesize	  diverse	  approaches,	  and	  to	  examine	  reciprocal	  interactions	  between	  policymakers’	  decision-­‐making	  processes,	  domestic	  politics,	  socio-­‐cultural	  environments,	  and	  the	  daily	  life	  of	  everyday	  people,	  on	  a	  worldwide	  scale	  and	  through	  a	  multilingual	  method.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  forge	  bridge	  among	  these,	  four	  interrelated	  sets	  of	  questions	  run	  through	  this	  narrative.	  
                                                7	  For	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  internationalization	  approach,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  
Cold	  War:	  Third	  World	  Interventions	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  Our	  Times	  (New	  York,	  2005)	  and	  Zachary	  Karabell,	  Architects	  of	  Intervention:	  The	  United	  States,	  the	  Third	  World,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1946-­‐1962	  (Baton	  Rouge,	  LA,	  1999).	  While	  differing	  in	  terms	  of	  topic,	  see,	  also,	  Mark	  Atwood	  Lawrence,	  
Assuming	  the	  Burden:	  Europe	  and	  the	  American	  Commitment	  to	  War	  in	  Vietnam	  (Berkeley,	  2005),	  Matthew	  Connelly,	  A	  Diplomatic	  Revolution:	  Algeria’s	  Fight	  for	  Independence	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  
Post-­‐Cold	  War	  Era	  (New	  York,	  2002),	  and	  Erez	  Manela,	  The	  Wilsonian	  Moment:	  Self-­‐Determination	  
and	  the	  International	  Origins	  of	  Anticolonial	  Nationalism	  (New	  York,	  2007).	  For	  the	  deepening	  of	  cultural	  approach,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Thomas	  Borstelmann,	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  Color	  Line:	  American	  
Race	  Relations	  in	  the	  Global	  Arena	  (Cambridge,	  MA,	  ,	  2003),	  and	  Mary	  L.	  Dudziak,	  Cold	  War	  Civil	  
Rights:	  Race	  and	  the	  Image	  of	  American	  Democracy	  (Princeton,	  2002).	  8	  For	  instance,	  see	  Campbell	  Craig	  and	  Fredrik	  Logevall,	  America's	  Cold	  War:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Insecurity	  (Cambridge,	  MA,	  2009);	  Fredrik	  Logevall,	  Choosing	  War:	  The	  Lost	  Chance	  for	  Peace	  and	  the	  Escalation	  
of	  War	  in	  Vietnam	  (Berkeley,	  2001);	  and	  Andrew	  L.	  Johns,	  Vietnam's	  Second	  Front:	  Domestic	  Politics,	  
the	  Republican	  Party,	  and	  the	  War	  (Lexington,	  KY,	  2010).	  9	  Matthew	  Connelly,	  "Taking	  Off	  the	  Cold	  War	  Lens:	  Visions	  of	  North-­‐South	  Conflict	  During	  the	  Algerian	  War	  for	  Independence,"	  American	  Historical	  Review	  105,	  no.	  3	  (2000):	  739-­‐769.	  10	  There	  has	  been	  a	  call	  for	  new	  research	  to	  forge	  bridges	  between	  politics	  and	  diplomacy	  and	  culture	  and	  society.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Patrick	  Major	  and	  Rana	  Mitter,	  “East	  is	  East	  and	  West	  is	  West?	  Towards	  a	  Comparative	  Socio-­‐Cultural	  History	  of	  the	  Cold	  War”	  in	  Major	  and	  Mitter	  ed.,	  Across	  the	  Blocs:	  Cold	  
War	  Cultural	  and	  Social	  History	  (Portland,	  WA,	  2004),	  1-­‐18.	  Exemplary	  work	  that	  combined	  an	  international	  approach	  with	  analysis	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  contexts	  includes,	  Mark	  Bradley,	  
Imagining	  Vietnam	  and	  America:	  The	  Making	  of	  Postcolonial	  Vietnam,	  1919-­‐1950	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  NC,	  2000);	  Jeremi	  Suri,	  Power	  and	  Protest:	  Global	  Revolution	  and	  the	  Rise	  of	  Detente	  (Cambridge,	  MA,	  2003);	  and	  Gregg	  Brazinsky,	  Nation	  Building	  in	  South	  Korea:	  Koreans,	  Americans,	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  a	  
Democracy	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  NC:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2007).	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First,	  focusing	  on	  domestic	  politics	  is	  an	  effective	  starting	  point.	  As	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  including	  Campbell	  Craig	  and	  Fredrik	  Logevall	  have	  pointed	  out,	  domestic	  considerations,	  such	  as	  partisan	  politics	  and	  electoral	  campaigns,	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  on	  the	  making	  of	  America’s	  Cold	  War	  strategies	  in	  the	  later	  1940s	  and	  early	  1950s.11	  To	  what	  extent	  can	  we	  find	  a	  similar	  pattern	  in	  other	  countries	  at	  that	  time?	  While	  the	  interplay	  between	  domestic	  politics	  and	  international	  politics	  is,	  by	  now,	  generally	  accepted,	  how	  can	  we	  demonstrate	  it,	  and	  in	  what	  way	  did	  domestic	  and	  global	  affairs	  interconnect	  and	  interact	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  solidification	  of	  the	  Cold	  War?12	  	  This	  first	  set	  of	  questions	  leads	  to	  the	  second	  set,	  concerned	  with	  society	  and	  culture	  underneath	  domestic	  politics.	  After	  all,	  no	  political	  decisions	  existed	  in	  a	  vacuum;	  all	  political	  struggles	  are	  contingent	  historically,	  and	  constructed	  socially	  and	  culturally.	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  is	  a	  point	  that	  has	  been	  raised	  since	  the	  1970s	  by	  numerous	  scholars,	  including	  Akira	  Iriye,	  Michael	  H.	  Hunt,	  and	  Peter	  J.	  Katzenstein,	  to	  name	  a	  few.13	  And,	  indeed,	  much	  scholarship	  has	  explored	  intersections	  between	  
                                                11	  Craig	  and	  Logevall,	  America's	  Cold	  War;	  Fredrik	  Logevall,	  "A	  Critique	  of	  Containment."	  Diplomatic	  
History	  28,	  no.	  4	  (2004):	  473-­‐499;	  Robert	  David	  Johnson,	  Congress	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006);	  and	  Melvin	  Small,	  Democracy	  &	  Diplomacy:	  The	  Impact	  of	  
Domestic	  Politics	  on	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1789-­‐1994	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  12	  Connelly,	  A	  Diplomatic	  Revolution,	  ix;	  Jack	  Snyder,	  Myths	  of	  Empire:	  Domestic	  Politics	  and	  
International	  Ambition	  (Ithaca,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1993);	  Robert	  Dallek,	  The	  American	  Style	  
of	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Cultural	  Politics	  and	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (New	  York:	  Knopf,	  1983).	  13	  Akira	  Iriye,	  “Culture	  and	  International	  History,”	  in	  Michael	  J.	  Hogan	  and	  Thomas	  G.	  Paterson.	  ed.,	  
Explaining	  the	  History	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Relations	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  241-­‐256;	  Michael	  H.	  Hunt,	  Ideology	  and	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1987).	  Peter	  J.	  Katzenstein	  ed.,	  The	  Culture	  of	  National	  Security	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  Also,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Jessica	  C.	  E.	  Gienow-­‐Hecht,	  Culture	  and	  International	  History	  (New	  York:	  Berghahn	  Books,	  2003);	  Christian	  G.	  Appy,	  Cold	  War	  Constructions:	  The	  Political	  Culture	  of	  United	  
States	  Imperialism,	  1945-­‐1966	  (Amherst:	  University	  of	  Massachusetts	  Press,	  2000);	  Frank	  Costigliola,	  “Reading	  for	  Meaning:	  Theory,	  Language,	  and	  Metaphor,”	  in	  Hogan	  and	  Paterson	  ed.,	  Explaining	  the	  
History	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Relations,	  279-­‐303;	  Andrew	  J.	  Rotter,	  "Empires	  of	  the	  Senses:	  How	  Seeing,	  Hearing,	  Smelling,	  Tasting,	  and	  Touching	  Shaped	  Imperial	  Encounters,"	  Diplomatic	  History,	  Volume	  35,	  Issue	  1	  (January	  2011):	  3-­‐19.	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culture	  and	  politics,	  particularly	  shedding	  light	  on,	  for	  instance,	  political	  impact	  on	  cultural	  production	  and	  social	  life,14	  policymakers’	  effort	  to	  manipulate	  political	  culture,15	  and	  long-­‐standing	  cultural	  tradition	  and	  historical	  continuity	  beneath	  political	  affairs.16	  	  Yet,	  as	  Leffler	  has	  lamented,	  few	  have	  aimed	  at	  integrating	  studies	  of	  culture	  and	  society	  with	  politics	  in	  a	  way	  that	  	  explains	  processes	  of	  policymaking	  and	  foreign	  strategies	  in	  a	  particular	  moment.17	  In	  what	  way,	  indeed,	  did	  cultural	  and	  social	  forces	  appear	  and	  function	  in	  politics,	  particularly	  on	  the	  level	  of	  decision	  making?	  While	  policymakers	  might	  be	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  their	  positions	  in	  conducting	  political	  campaigns,	  propaganda,	  and	  educational	  programs,	  culture	  is	  not	  the	  product	  of	  these.	  Nor	  does	  it	  simply	  exist	  “out	  there,”	  as	  it	  is.	  	  A	  culture,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  a	  literary	  critic	  Lionel	  Trilling,	  “is	  not	  a	  flow,	  not	  even	  a	  confluence;	  the	  form	  of	  its	  existence	  is	  struggle,	  or	  at	  least	  debate—it	  is	  nothing	  if	  not	  a	  dialectic.”18	  Then,	  the	  old	  but	  still	  valid	  questions	  are:	  To	  what	  extent	  did	  historical	  and	  cultural	  elements	  in	  society	  at	  a	  particular	  moment	  of	  emerge	  and	  play	  roles	  in	  influencing	  
                                                14	  Christina	  Klein,	  Cold	  War	  Orientalism:	  Asia	  in	  the	  Middlebrow	  Imagination,	  1945-­‐1961	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2003);	  JoAnne	  Brown,	  “‘A	  is	  for	  Atom,	  B	  is	  for	  Bomb’:	  Civil	  Defense	  in	  American	  Public	  Education,	  1948-­‐1963,”	  Journal	  of	  American	  History,	  Vol.	  75,	  No.1	  (June	  1988);	  May,	  
Homeward	  Bound;	  and	  Whitfield,	  The	  Culture	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  15	  Walter	  Hixson,	  Parting	  the	  Curtain:	  Propaganda,	  Culture,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1945-­‐1961	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin’s	  Press,	  1997);	  Kenneth	  A.	  Osgood,	  Total	  Cold	  War:	  Eisenhower's	  Secret	  Propaganda	  Battle	  
at	  Home	  and	  Abroad	  (Lawrence,	  KS:	  University	  of	  Kansas,	  2006);	  and	  Kenneth	  A.	  Osgood,	  “Hearts	  and	  Minds:	  The	  Unconventional	  Cold	  War,”	  Journal	  of	  Cold	  War	  Studies,	  4.2	  (2002).	  16	  Westad,	  The	  Global	  Cold	  War;	  Michael	  Adas,	  Dominance	  by	  Design:	  Technological	  Imperatives	  and	  
America's	  Civilizing	  Mission	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2006);	  and	  Anders	  Stephenson,	  Manifest	  Destiny:	  American	  Expansionism	  and	  the	  Empire	  of	  Right	  (New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  1995).	  	  17	  A	  few	  successful	  works	  include,	  for	  instance,	  John	  Fousek,	  To	  Lead	  the	  Free	  World:	  American	  
Nationalism	  and	  the	  Cultural	  Roots	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  NC,	  2000);	  Seth	  Jacobs,	  America's	  
Miracle	  Man	  in	  Vietnam:	  Ngo	  Dinh	  Diem,	  Religion,	  Race,	  and	  U.S.	  Intervention	  in	  Southeast	  Asia	  (Durham,	  NC,	  2004);	  Kristin	  Hoganson,	  Fighting	  for	  American	  Manhood:	  How	  Gender	  Politics	  Provoked	  
the	  Spanish-­‐American	  and	  Philippine-­‐American	  Wars	  (New	  Haven:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  18	  Lionel	  Trilling,	  The	  Liberal	  Imagination	  (1950),	  cited	  in	  James	  T.	  Patterson,	  Grand	  Expectations:	  The	  
United	  States,	  1945-­‐1974	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  12.	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the	  course	  of	  diplomatic	  and	  international	  history?	  In	  particular,	  what	  roles	  were	  played	  by	  these	  in	  the	  making	  and	  consolidation	  of	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  world	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period?	  	  This	  second	  set	  of	  inquiries	  further	  leads	  us	  to	  the	  third	  set,	  regarding	  carriers,	  the	  micro	  component	  of	  society	  and	  culture—the	  people.	  As	  political	  scientist	  Richard	  Bensel	  points	  out,	  the	  reproduction	  of	  culture	  through	  time	  mostly	  depends	  on	  preferences	  and	  choices	  made	  by	  numberless,	  nameless	  people,	  who	  are	  often	  unaware	  that	  they	  are	  responsible	  for	  maintaining,	  choosing,	  and	  changing	  the	  culture	  to	  which	  they	  belong.19	  Then,	  the	  questions	  are:	  What	  were	  such	  preferences	  and	  choices	  of	  ordinary	  people	  at	  the	  time	  that	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  emerged	  in	  the	  postwar,	  particularly	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period?	  How	  did	  they	  behave	  and,	  in	  many	  cases,	  even	  take	  an	  advantage	  of	  situations?	  The	  point	  here	  is,	  as	  political	  scientist	  Stuart	  Kaufman	  points	  out,	  not	  so	  much	  about	  people’s	  “objective”	  interests,	  as	  their	  attitudes	  and	  the	  myths	  and	  symbols	  that	  influenced	  those	  attitudes.20	  In	  a	  similar	  tone,	  eminent	  Cold	  War	  historian	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis	  urged,	  “[W]e	  have	  to	  take	  seriously	  what	  they	  at	  that	  time	  believed.”21	  In	  another	  article,	  he	  elaborates	  on	  this	  point	  in	  detail:	  There	  is	  […]	  confusion	  about	  the	  proper	  scope	  and	  content	  of	  international	  history.	  If,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  we	  confine	  it	  to	  what	  leaders	  said	  and	  did	  to	  one	  another,	  then	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  it	  differs	  from	  the	  old	  diplomatic	  history	  most	  of	  us	  have	  long	  since	  rejected.	  If,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  expands	  to	  take	  into	  account	  masses	  as	  well	  as	  elites,	  then	  it	  will	  have	  to	  grapple	  with	  what	  was	  in	  their	  minds	  and	  what	  determined	  their	  actions	  […].	  So	  what	  did	  
                                                19	  Richard	  Bensel,	  quoted	  in	  Masuda	  Hajimu,	  “Rumors	  of	  War:	  Immigration	  Disputes	  and	  the	  Social	  Construction	  of	  American-­‐Japanese	  Relations,	  1905-­‐1913.”	  Diplomatic	  History	  33:	  1	  (Jan.	  2009):	  4.	  20	  Stuart	  J.	  Kaufman,	  Modern	  Hatreds:	  The	  Symbolic	  Politics	  of	  Ethnic	  War	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  221.	  21	  Gaddis,	  We	  Now	  Know,	  287.	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ordinary	  people	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  really	  think?	  Perhaps	  we	  should	  ask	  them.22	  	  As	  these	  scholars	  advocate,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  cast	  light	  on	  popular	  myths	  and	  emotions	  among	  ordinary	  people	  at	  that	  time,	  not	  merely	  as	  effects	  of,	  but	  rather	  as	  
factors	  creating	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.23	  Such	  examination	  of	  everyday	  people’s	  voices	  and	  behaviors	  would	  enable	  us	  to	  analyze	  the	  societies	  and	  cultures	  they	  made,	  social	  orders	  they	  composed,	  and	  domestic	  politics	  in	  which	  they	  took	  part.	  	   We	  might	  be	  able	  to	  conclude	  out	  series	  of	  questions	  at	  this	  point,	  if	  this	  were	  a	  study	  of	  a	  pre-­‐modern	  society,	  or	  even	  of	  a	  nineteenth	  century	  society,	  when	  ordinary	  people	  had	  relatively	  less	  contact	  with	  the	  “outer”	  world	  beyond	  their	  society.	  Nevertheless,	  such	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  a	  study	  of	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century.	  This	  is	  because,	  in	  the	  era	  of	  globalization,	  peoples’	  voices	  and	  emotions	  easily	  cross	  national	  boundaries,	  affecting	  and	  being	  affected	  by	  one	  another,	  and	  changing	  on	  their	  own,	  often	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  progress	  of	  foreign	  events.	  The	  fourth	  set	  of	  questions,	  thus,	  is:	  To	  what	  extent	  did	  global	  and	  transnational	  factors	  have	  effects	  on	  peoples’	  lives	  in	  societies?	  In	  what	  way	  did	  domestic	  events	  have	  far-­‐reaching	  effects	  on	  the	  attitudes	  of	  people	  living	  in	  distant	  places?	  What	  happened	  in	  domestic	  and	  international	  politics	  through	  the	  processes	  of	  locals’	  observations	  of	  global	  events,	  such	  as	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  Korean	  War?	  	  
                                                22	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis,	  “On	  Starting	  All	  Over	  Again:	  A	  Naïve	  Approach	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,”	  in	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad	  ed.	  Reviewing	  the	  Cold	  War:	  Approaches,	  Interpretations,	  and	  Theory	  (Portland,	  OR:	  F.	  Cass,	  2000),	  36.	  23	  Much	  of	  the	  existing	  scholarship	  on	  the	  Korean	  War	  period	  has	  tended	  to	  rule	  out	  everyday	  people	  and	  their	  imaginations	  from	  its	  analyses,	  or	  otherwise	  depicted	  them	  as	  objects	  to	  be	  manipulated.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Steven	  Casey,	  Selling	  the	  Korean	  War:	  Propaganda,	  Politics,	  and	  Public	  Opinion	  in	  the	  
United	  States	  (New	  York,	  2008);	  Paul	  G.	  Pierpaoli,	  Truman	  and	  Korea:	  The	  Political	  Culture	  of	  the	  Early	  
Cold	  War	  (Columbia,	  1999).	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Studies	  on	  “globalization”	  have	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  active	  actors	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  such	  as	  the	  global	  transfer	  and	  high-­‐mobility	  of	  people,	  goods,	  and	  capital.	  But	  equally,	  or,	  arguably,	  more,	  essential	  were	  the	  passive	  actors	  in	  the	  phenomenon,	  the	  large	  majorities	  of	  populations,	  who	  stayed	  within	  their	  boundaries,	  while	  facing	  the	  spread	  of	  news,	  ideas,	  and	  emotions	  across	  borders.	  Such	  numerous	  local	  actors	  experiencing	  the	  waves	  of	  globalization	  at	  home	  were	  no	  less	  important	  than	  global	  and	  transnational	  actors,	  such	  as	  missionaries,	  immigrants,	  travelers,	  merchants,	  teachers,	  and	  international	  students.	  This	  was	  because	  it	  was	  they,	  the	  large	  majorities	  in	  societies,	  who	  stayed	  at	  home,	  and	  who	  symbolically	  associated	  foreign	  affairs	  with	  local	  events	  through	  local	  lenses,	  playing	  significant	  roles	  in	  limiting	  the	  range	  of	  probable	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  policies	  administrators	  could	  pursue.24	  	  	   This	  final	  set	  of	  inquiries,	  on	  global	  and	  transnational	  factors,	  thus,	  eventually	  leads	  back	  to	  the	  first,	  concerning	  domestic	  politics,	  forming	  a	  circle.	  These	  themes	  are	  not	  isolated	  from	  one	  another,	  but	  interlinked.	  The	  crux	  lies	  in	  the	  reevaluation	  of	  policymaking	  processes,	  society,	  culture,	  everyday	  people,	  and	  their	  mentalities,	  in	  a	  organically	  united	  manner	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  global	  history	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.	  This	  attempt	  to	  address	  each	  set	  of	  questions	  while	  forging	  bridges	  among	  them	  requires	  demanding,	  thought	  not	  contradictory,	  tasks	  for	  researchers	  because	  it	  necessitates	  investigation	  in	  two	  radically	  different	  directions.	  One	  involves	  going	  deep	  into	  the	  analysis	  of	  society	  and	  peoples’	  lives,	  exploring	  interconnections	  between	  politics	  and	  society,	  and	  between	  elite	  policymakers	  and	  
                                                24	  For	  this	  topic,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  a	  collection	  of	  articles	  in	  Anthony	  G.	  Hopkins	  ed.,	  Global	  History:	  
Interactions	  Between	  the	  Universal	  and	  the	  Local	  (London:	  Macmillan,	  2006).	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everyday	  people—a	  type	  of	  scholarship	  that	  entails	  both	  political/diplomatic	  and	  social/cultural	  history.	  The	  other	  involves	  expanding	  globally,	  tracing	  the	  interplay	  and	  a	  series	  of	  repercussions	  among	  societies	  and	  among	  peoples	  in	  distance	  places—a	  type	  of	  research	  that	  involves	  the	  integration	  of	  local	  and	  global	  history.	  	  	   That	  is	  why	  I	  had	  to	  visit	  more	  than	  three	  dozen	  archives	  and	  libraries	  in	  China,	  Taiwan,	  Japan,	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  addition	  to	  archives	  that	  primarily	  concentrate	  on	  centers	  of	  political	  power,25	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  conduct	  research	  in	  archives	  in	  which	  I	  could	  explore	  social	  movements,	  election	  campaigns,	  and	  ordinary	  people’s	  voices	  and	  behaviors.26	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  indispensable	  to	  read	  piles	  of	  local	  newspapers	  at	  a	  number	  of	  libraries	  and	  archives	  for	  each	  society	  to	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  social	  attitudes	  and	  “common	  sense”	  at	  the	  time	  in	  question	  in	  each	  place.27	  	  Such	  extensive	  research	  might	  have	  been	  inconceivable	  were	  it	  not	  for	  a	  dramatic	  change	  in	  research	  methodology	  experienced	  in	  recent	  years:	  the	  use	  of	  search	  engines	  before	  physically	  going	  to	  and	  within	  archives;	  the	  use	  of	  digital	  cameras	  in	  archives;	  the	  use	  of	  personal	  computers	  to	  organize	  digitally	  saved	  
                                                25	  Such	  archives	  include,	  for	  instance,	  National	  Archives,	  College	  Park,	  MD;	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Presidential	  Library,	  Independence,	  MO;	  Foreign	  Ministry	  Archives	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  Beijing;	  Diplomatic	  Record	  Office,	  Tokyo;	  and	  National	  Archives	  (formerly	  Public	  Record	  Office),	  Kew.	  26	  This	  kind	  of	  archives	  include,	  for	  instance,	  University	  Archives	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Iowa,	  Iowa	  City,	  IA;	  Archives	  of	  Labor	  and	  Urban	  Affairs	  at	  the	  Walter	  P.	  Reuther	  Library,	  Wayne	  State	  University,	  Detroit,	  MI;	  Tamiment	  Library	  &	  Robert	  F.	  Wagner	  Labor	  Archives	  at	  New	  York	  University,	  New	  York	  City,	  NY;	  Municipal	  Archives	  in	  Beijing,	  Shanghai,	  and	  Tianjin;	  Ohara	  Institute	  for	  Social	  Research	  at	  Hosei	  University,	  Tokyo;	  and	  Working	  Class	  Movement	  Library,	  Salford.	  27	  For	  variety	  of	  newspaper	  collections,	  I	  have	  used	  the	  following	  libraries	  and	  archives:	  Cornell	  University	  Olin	  and	  Kroch	  Libraries,	  Ithaca,	  NY;	  British	  Library	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  Colindale;	  National	  Library	  and	  Peking	  University	  Library	  in	  Beijing;	  Northeast	  Normal	  University	  Library	  and	  Jilin	  University	  Library	  Archives	  in	  Changchun;	  National	  Library	  and	  National	  Taiwan	  University	  Library	  in	  Taipei;	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room	  in	  National	  Diet	  Library,	  Tokyo	  Metropolitan	  Library,	  and	  University	  of	  Tokyo	  Library	  in	  Tokyo;	  Osaka	  Prefectural	  Central	  Library	  and	  Osaka	  Municipal	  Library	  in	  Osaka.	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documents;	  and	  the	  use	  of	  relatively	  inexpensive	  airline	  tickets.	  With	  the	  combination	  of	  the	  factors,	  we	  can	  now	  conduct	  research	  with	  huge	  amounts	  of	  primary	  materials	  in	  an	  efficient	  manner.	  This	  radical	  change	  in	  research	  method	  has	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  us	  to	  raise	  new	  kinds	  of	  questions	  in	  a	  new	  framework,	  enabling	  us	  to	  go	  beyond	  traditional	  boundaries.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  my	  research	  I	  have	  collected,	  to	  make	  a	  rough	  division,	  five	  categories	  of	  primary	  sources	  in	  archives	  and	  libraries	  in	  multiple	  societies.	  These	  include:	  articles	  and	  cartoons	  published	  in	  local	  newspapers;	  ordinary	  people’s	  letters	  and	  telegrams	  to	  politicians	  and	  local	  officials;	  collections	  of	  oral	  histories	  available	  in	  books,	  online,	  and	  in	  archives;	  intelligence	  reports,	  politicians’	  observations,	  and	  documents	  pertaining	  to	  police	  investigations	  concerning	  rumors	  and	  popular	  attitudes	  in	  society;	  and	  politicians’	  and	  high-­‐ranking	  governmental	  officials’	  correspondence	  regarding	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  policymaking.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  primary	  sources,	  I	  have	  used	  secondary	  sources	  extensively	  to	  cover	  other	  geographical	  regions	  and	  topics	  beyond	  conventional	  spheres	  of	  Cold	  War	  studies.	  	  Using	  such	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  sources,	  this	  project	  seeks	  to	  show	  the	  interplay	  between	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  Cold	  War	  logic	  and	  policy,	  and,	  eventually,	  the	  Cold	  War	  world	  itself.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  such	  “new”	  sets	  of	  actors	  and	  factors—along	  with	  the	  primary	  materials	  that	  elucidate	  them—as	  parts	  of	  analysis	  has	  important	  consequences	  for	  how	  we	  view	  the	  Cold	  War.	  These	  non-­‐traditional	  sources	  that	  I	  have	  gathered	  suggest	  that	  everyday	  people	  were	  hardly	  passive	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  practice	  of	  Cold	  War	  politics,	  and	  that	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  during	  this	  period	  was,	  in	  fact,	  shaped	  through	  interplay	  between	  foreign	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events	  and	  local	  interpretations,	  which	  were	  constantly	  mediated	  by	  domestic	  politics,	  social	  contexts,	  and	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  Based	  on	  these	  diverse	  sources,	  my	  study	  explicates	  interactive	  relationships	  among	  these	  various	  actors	  and	  factors.	  In	  short,	  such	  “new”	  sets	  of	  sources	  imply	  that	  studies	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  international	  history	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  contained	  either	  within	  spheres	  concentrating	  on	  governmental	  relations,	  or	  within	  the	  fields	  examining	  cultural	  production	  and	  daily	  lives	  of	  everyday	  people;	  these	  subjects	  are,	  by	  nature,	  inseparable;	  therefore,	  studies	  of	  them	  need	  to	  be	  synthesized.	  That	  is	  why	  I	  have	  titled	  my	  dissertation	  “Whispering	  Gallery”—a	  metaphor,	  borrowed	  from	  Woodrow	  Wilson—for	  the	  globalized,	  interconnected	  world,	  in	  which	  numberless,	  nameless	  people	  participated	  in	  whispering,	  or	  shouting,	  their	  impressions,	  which	  political	  leaders	  could	  not	  ignore.28	  	  The	  dissertation	  is	  organized	  chronologically	  and	  thematically.	  Chapter	  One,	  
“Across	  Borders,”	  examines	  the	  issue	  of	  relationality	  through	  tracing	  a	  series	  of	  unintended	  repercussions	  across	  Japan,	  China,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  years	  between	  1946	  and	  1950—such	  as	  the	  decisive	  defeat	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  in	  the	  1946	  midterm	  elections	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Reverse	  Course	  in	  Japan,	  and	  the	  escalation	  of	  student	  movements	  in	  China.	  This	  chapter	  contends	  that	  domestic	  politics	  had	  far-­‐reaching	  ramifications	  beyond	  borders,	  unintentionally	  contributing	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  Cold	  War	  logic.	  It	  argues	  that	  the	  
                                                28	  Woodrow	  Wilson,	  speech	  in	  Des	  Moines	  in	  September	  1919,	  quoted	  in	  David	  S.	  Foglesong,	  
America's	  Secret	  War	  against	  Bolshevism:	  U.S.	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Russian	  Civil	  War,	  1917-­‐1920	  (The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2001),	  1.	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“Cold	  War”	  in	  this	  period	  remained	  a	  disputable	  discourse,	  only	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  worldviews,	  due	  to	  its	  fragmented,	  nebulous,	  and	  discursive	  nature.	  	  
Chapter	  Two,	  “Local	  Translation,”	  looks	  at	  historical	  moments	  immediately	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  June	  and	  July	  of	  1950,	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  function	  of	  local	  translation	  through	  investigating	  ways	  in	  which	  local	  people	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  interpreted	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  based	  on	  their	  own	  local	  contexts.	  It	  shows	  how	  people	  in	  different	  places—such	  as	  East	  Asia,	  Southeast	  Asia,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  Europe,	  and	  the	  United	  States—could	  simultaneously	  witness	  the	  same	  events	  regardless	  of	  distance,	  and	  how	  they	  could	  “understand”	  the	  same	  situation	  in	  radically	  different	  ways.	  Examining	  such	  processes	  of	  local	  translation,	  the	  chapter	  traces	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  diverse	  understandings	  of	  “reality”	  became	  dominant	  in	  each	  society	  in	  dialogue	  between	  ongoing	  foreign	  events	  and	  local	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  contributing	  to	  the	  rapid	  solidification	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  logic	  and	  world.	  	  
Chapters	  Three,	  “Cold	  War	  Fantasy,”	  and	  Four,	  	  “War,	  Society,	  
Legitimacy,”	  analyze	  the	  interplay	  between	  state	  and	  society	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950	  through	  investigating	  policymaking	  processes	  in	  Washington	  and	  Beijing,	  focusing	  on	  the	  U.S.	  decision	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  northward	  in	  October	  7,	  1950,	  and	  China’s	  decision	  to	  enter	  the	  Korean	  War	  on	  October	  19,	  1950,	  respectively.	  Both	  chapters	  demonstrate	  that	  foreign	  policymaking	  processes	  were	  not	  isolated	  from	  domestic	  matrices,	  social	  politics,	  and	  the	  daily	  lives	  of	  everyday	  people.	  They	  show,	  rather,	  that	  both	  Washington	  and	  Beijing’s	  foreign	  policies	  were	  less	  about	  military	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and	  geopolitical	  strategy	  or	  the	  Cold	  War’s	  global	  struggles,	  than	  symbolic	  politics	  in	  attempts	  to	  dominate	  currents	  of	  public	  thought	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  	  
Chapter	  Five,	  “Politics	  of	  Truth	  Making,”	  looks	  into	  the	  period	  immediately	  following	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War	  between	  the	  fall	  of	  1950	  and	  spring	  of	  1951,	  tracing	  the	  materialization	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  world	  through	  examining	  the	  politics	  of	  truth-­‐making	  in	  Chinese	  and	  American	  societies—from	  the	  implementation	  of	  propaganda	  and	  mobilization	  at	  home	  to	  the	  conduct	  of	  military	  operations	  on	  the	  battlefields.	  It	  analyzes	  how	  and	  on	  what	  basis	  a	  dominant	  narrative	  of	  the	  East-­‐West	  confrontation	  was	  developed	  and	  solidified,	  arguing	  for	  the	  significant	  roles	  played	  by	  local	  preconceptions,	  namely	  racial	  prejudice	  and	  historical	  memories	  of	  colonialism	  in	  American	  and	  Chinese	  societies,	  respectively.	  This	  chapter	  maintains	  that	  the	  primary	  function	  of	  state	  efforts	  to	  create	  "truth"	  was	  not	  necessarily	  to	  create	  consensus	  or	  resolve	  disagreements	  in	  society,	  but	  to	  clarify	  dividing	  lines	  between	  “us”	  and	  “them.”	  
Chapters	  Six,	  “Between	  Mobilization	  and	  Participation,”	  and	  Seven,	  
“’Enemy	  Within	  Our	  Gates,’”	  explore	  ways	  in	  which	  such	  disagreements	  within	  societies	  were	  resolved	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  all	  at	  once	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period:	  suppression	  of	  counterrevolutionaries	  in	  China,	  the	  White	  Terror	  in	  Taiwan,	  the	  crackdown	  on	  “un-­‐Filipino”	  activities	  in	  the	  Philippines,	  the	  Red	  Purge	  in	  Japan,	  and	  anti-­‐communist	  movements	  in	  Western	  societies,	  such	  as	  anti-­‐striking	  and	  anti-­‐labor	  trends	  in	  Britain	  and	  McCarthyism	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Through	  close	  examination	  of	  these	  domestic	  purges	  and	  suppressions	  that	  erupted	  simultaneously	  circa	  1950-­‐51,	  this	  chapter	  describes	  all	  as	  parts	  of	  a	  global	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phenomenon,	  in	  which	  local	  actors	  utilized	  the	  logic	  of	  East-­‐West	  confrontation	  in	  domestic	  social	  conflicts	  and	  culture	  wars	  that	  had	  emerged	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  stifling	  dissent	  and	  “purifying”	  society,	  often	  choosing	  particular	  kinds	  of	  “order”	  and	  “reality”	  that	  lasted	  for	  decades	  to	  follow.	  	  Through	  highlighting	  ways	  in	  which	  socio-­‐political	  struggles	  were	  conducted	  and	  eventually	  integrated	  into	  the	  Cold	  War,	  these	  chapters	  contend	  that	  these	  local	  conflicts	  were	  not	  so	  much	  results	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  as	  usually	  discussed,	  but	  that	  each	  was	  itself	  part	  of	  the	  engine,	  a	  component,	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  actually	  contributing	  to	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  gigantic	  social	  construction,	  with	  the	  participation	  of	  ordinary	  people	  in	  their	  own	  “wars”	  fought	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  social	  order	  in	  each	  society.	  	  	   In	  short,	  my	  dissertation	  aims	  at	  challenging	  the	  standard	  narrative	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  that	  has	  been	  largely	  based	  on	  a	  geopolitical	  worldview	  and	  diplomatic	  history	  approach.	  Instead,	  through	  tracing	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  disputable	  discourse	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  used	  in	  domestic	  struggles	  and	  then	  ultimately	  became	  an	  irrefutable	  actuality	  of	  the	  postwar	  world,	  it	  intends	  to	  demonstrate	  local	  and	  societal	  construction	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  fantasy	  and	  world	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  Through	  investigating	  fragmented	  local	  struggles	  that	  were	  eventually	  (and	  mistakenly)	  interpreted	  as	  parts	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  this	  study	  reveals	  that	  the	  actual	  divides	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  existed	  not	  so	  much	  between	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  states	  but	  within	  each	  society,	  with	  each,	  in	  turn,	  requiring	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  the	  imagined	  reality	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  social	  and	  cultural	  order	  at	  home.	  It	  was	  such	  an	  ascent	  of	  domestic	  needs	  and	  beliefs	  in	  the	  imagined	  reality	  of	  the	  global	  Cold	  War	  
  
 18 
that	  made	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  realities	  invisible,	  and	  internally	  functioned	  to	  maintain	  and	  perpetuate	  the	  “real”	  Cold	  War	  for	  decades	  to	  follow.	  Before	  contemplating	  on	  such	  a	  global	  implication,	  however,	  let	  us	  begin	  our	  story	  through	  looking	  into	  a	  domestic	  contest	  on	  the	  ground—the	  midterm	  elections	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  November	  1946.	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Chapter	  1:	  Across	  Borders	  	  	  Our	  present	  world	  is	  one,	  inexorably	  one	  […].	  Our	  world	  is	  one	  because	  of	  the	  ever	  closer	  technological,	  economic,	  and	  sociological	  interrelation	  and	  interdependence	  of	  conditions	  and	  developments	  all	  over	  the	  globe.	  If	  we	  create	  or	  countenance	  misery	  and	  devastation	  on	  a	  large	  scale	  thousands	  of	  miles	  away,	  this	  will	  inevitably,	  sooner	  or	  later,	  react	  on	  conditions	  at	  home.	  The	  network	  of	  interconnections	  is	  so	  complex	  that	  it	  makes	  it	  impossible	  for	  any	  politician	  to	  foresee	  the	  consequences,	  the	  chain	  reactions,	  of	  his	  acts.1	  	  	   Erich	  Kahler,	  “Foreign	  Policy	  Today,”	  (1950)	  	  	  
The	  1946	  Midterm	  Election	  in	  the	  United	  States	  On	  Election	  Day,	  November	  5,	  1946,	  President	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  after	  casting	  his	  own	  vote	  in	  his	  hometown,	  Independence,	  Missouri,	  boarded	  a	  train	  headed	  back	  for	  Washington	  DC.	  Past	  midnight,	  he	  sat	  beside	  the	  Signal	  Corps	  radio,	  listening	  to	  the	  news	  reporting	  the	  disastrous	  Democratic	  defeat.	  Around	  2:15	  a.m.,	  the	  somber-­‐faced	  president	  abruptly	  turned	  off	  the	  radio,	  and	  went	  to	  bed	  without	  any	  comments	  to	  reporters	  on	  the	  coach.2	  At	  that	  very	  moment,	  in	  North	  Attleboro,	  Massachusetts,	  Joseph	  Martin’s	  small	  office	  was	  jammed	  with	  supporters	  and	  reporters.	  Martin,	  a	  Republican	  member	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Representative	  for	  twenty-­‐one	  years	  and	  minority	  leader	  for	  seven,	  was	  not	  worried	  about	  his	  own	  twelfth	  reelection	  campaign.	  His	  victory	  was	  assured.	  Rather,	  he	  and	  his	  small	  town	  supporters	  were	  waiting	  for	  news	  of	  national	  results.	  According	  to	  a	  reporter	  who	  was	  in	  the	  office	  that	  night,	  the	  states	  called	  Martin’s	  office	  one	  by	  one.	  Connecticut	  
                                                1	  Erich	  Kahler,	  “Foreign	  Policy	  Today,”	  Bulletin	  of	  the	  Atomic	  Scientists	  Vol.	  7	  No.	  12	  (December	  1950),	  356.	  2	  “Hot	  Night,”	  Time,	  November	  18,	  1946,	  23.	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called.	  Colorado	  called.	  Pennsylvania	  called.	  The	  Republican	  Headquarters	  in	  Washington	  DC	  called,	  too.	  By	  3	  a.m.,	  the	  news	  was	  certain:	  the	  Republicans	  had	  scored	  overwhelming	  victories	  across	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  meant	  Martin	  would	  be	  the	  next	  Speaker	  of	  the	  House.	  Republican-­‐friendly	  Time	  magazine	  trumpeted,	  “He	  could	  hear	  a	  horse	  galloping.”3	  For	  Republicans,	  the	  sound	  of	  galloping	  could	  be	  heard	  everywhere	  across	  the	  country;	  the	  party	  picked	  up	  fifty-­‐five	  seats	  in	  the	  House	  and	  thirteen	  in	  the	  Senate,	  and	  now	  counted	  twenty-­‐five	  governorships	  out	  of	  forty-­‐eight,	  including	  Ohio,	  Pennsylvania,	  California,	  and	  New	  York.	  While	  their	  takeover	  of	  the	  House	  had	  been	  widely	  predicted,	  Republicans	  succeeded	  in	  capturing	  both	  the	  House	  and	  the	  Senate,	  which	  meant	  control	  of	  Congress	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1932.4	  	  The	  Depression	  and	  World	  War	  II	  had	  prevented	  many	  dreams	  from	  coming	  true	  for	  a	  decade	  and	  a	  half.	  Then,	  victory	  in	  the	  war	  seemed	  to	  promise	  a	  rosier	  and	  brighter	  postwar	  future.	  The	  postwar	  world	  should	  be	  better	  and	  was	  expected	  to	  be,	  in	  a	  phrase	  of	  Life	  magazine,	  “full	  of	  air-­‐conditioned	  peace	  and	  electronically	  controlled	  plenty.”5	  What	  GIs	  and	  war	  workers	  dreamed	  of	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  life,	  equipped	  with	  an	  electronic	  iron	  ($10),	  toaster	  ($19),	  portable	  radio	  ($60),	  dual-­‐temp	  refrigerator	  ($199),	  General	  Electric	  television	  ($190),	  automatic	  washing	  machine	  ($241),	  and	  above	  all,	  an	  automobile,	  like	  the	  Mercury	  Convertible	  ($2,209).6	  All	  of	  this	  should	  be	  set	  in	  a	  new	  house,	  and	  that	  house	  should	  be	  a	  place	  
                                                3	  Newsweek,	  November	  18,	  1946,	  36-­‐37;	  “The	  Republican	  Era,”	  Life,	  November	  18,	  1946,	  31-­‐37.	  	  	  	  4	  Ibid.	  	  5	  “Dreams	  of	  1946,”	  Life,	  25	  November	  1946,	  60.	  6	  The	  prices	  of	  these	  good	  are	  taken	  from	  the	  following	  sources:	  “Dreams	  of	  1946,”	  Life,	  25	  November	  1946,	  60;	  Scott	  Derks	  ed.,	  Working	  Americans,	  1880-­‐1999	  Vol.	  I:	  The	  Working	  Class	  (Lakeville,	  CT:	  Grey	  House	  Pub.,	  2000-­‐2010),	  309,	  333;	  Working	  Americans,	  Vol.	  II:	  The	  Middle	  Class,	  298;	  Working	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for	  a	  new	  family	  including,	  of	  course,	  new	  babies.	  Nevertheless,	  real	  life	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	  was	  not	  so	  rosy,	  and	  many	  found	  that	  they	  would	  have	  to	  wait	  even	  longer.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  average	  salary	  for	  full-­‐time	  employees	  was	  still	  $2,473	  per	  year,	  meaning	  that	  just	  a	  portable	  radio	  cost	  nearly	  a	  third	  of	  a	  month’s	  income.7	  Much	  worse,	  the	  wartime	  planning	  economy	  was	  still	  in	  place,	  and	  many	  were	  not	  happy	  with	  continuing	  shortages,	  high	  prices,	  high	  taxes,	  and	  fixed	  wages,	  controlled	  by	  the	  government	  even	  though	  the	  war	  had	  ended	  more	  than	  a	  year	  earlier.8	  One	  magazine	  noted	  that	  the	  price	  of	  shoes	  for	  children	  reached	  $6	  to	  $7	  a	  pair,	  which	  would	  pinch	  large	  families,	  as	  would	  children’s	  clothes	  at	  double,	  or	  more	  than	  double,	  their	  prewar	  prices.9	  	  In	  addition	  to	  such	  economic	  hardship,	  the	  war	  and	  its	  end	  had	  brought	  radical	  social	  changes	  to	  American	  society,	  spurring	  diverse	  kinds	  of	  social	  conflicts	  at	  home.	  Most	  notable	  was	  the	  explosive	  increase	  in	  labor	  strife	  (Picture	  1).	  The	  wartime	  “no-­‐strike”	  pledge	  was	  past,	  and	  the	  massive	  waves	  of	  strikes	  had	  shaken	  the	  nation;	  in	  1946	  alone,	  4,985	  strikes	  took	  place	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  involving	  4.6	  million	  workers—a	  record	  high	  in	  the	  scale	  and	  number	  of	  strikes	  for	  all	  of	  U.S.	  history.10	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  these	  strikes	  were	  embraced	  and	  backed	  by	  enthusiastic	  community-­‐wide	  support,	  in	  some	  cases	  even	  spurring	  general	  strikes,	  signaling	  the	  labor	  possibly	  to	  be	  the	  new	  power	  in	  the	  postwar	  period.11	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
                                                                                                                                            
Americans,	  Vol.	  III:	  The	  Upper	  Class,	  287;	  and	  Working	  Americans,	  Vol.	  VII:	  Social	  Movements,	  310.	  7	  Derks	  ed.,	  Working	  Americans,	  Vol.	  II:	  The	  Middle	  Class,	  298-­‐299.	  	  	  	  8	  “Newsgram,”	  The	  U.S.	  News	  and	  World	  Reports,	  October	  25,	  1946,	  5-­‐6,	  11,	  and	  24-­‐25.	  9	  “Newsgram,”	  The	  U.S.	  News	  and	  World	  Reports,	  November	  1,	  1946,	  7.	  10	  Jack	  Metzgar,	  “The	  1945-­‐1946	  Strike	  Wave,”	  and	  Nicola	  Pizzolato,	  “Strikes	  in	  the	  United	  States	  Since	  World	  War	  II,”	  in	  The	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Strikes	  in	  American	  History	  (Armonk,	  NY:	  M.E.	  Sharpe,	  2009),	  222,	  226.	  	  11	  George	  Lipsitz,	  Rainbow	  at	  Midnight:	  Labor	  and	  Culture	  in	  the	  1940s	  (Urbana,	  IL:	  University	  of	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these	  strikes	  provoked	  frustration	  and	  even	  resentment.	  As	  Elizabeth	  Fones-­‐Wolf	  recounts,	  one	  business	  writer	  pungently	  wrote	  that	  what	  originally	  seemed	  “an	  inconvenient	  but	  more	  or	  less	  harmless	  series	  of	  industrial	  disputes	  has	  now	  become	  so	  widespread	  and	  so	  threatening	  as	  to	  look	  like	  nothing	  less	  than	  catastrophic	  civil	  war.”12	  	  Economic	  hardship	  and	  social	  unrest	  of	  these	  kind	  at	  home	  spurred	  popular	  frustration,	  playing	  a	  key	  role	  in	  bringing	  about	  the	  political	  shift	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.	  Sources	  of	  these	  frustrations	  were	  not	  outside	  but	  within	  the	  country.	  During	  the	  1946	  election	  campaigns,	  candidates	  were	  well	  aware	  that	  people	  were	  voting	  their	  irritations.	  They	  observed	  that	  voters	  were	  in	  an	  angry	  mood	  over	  domestic	  issues,	  such	  as	  shortages,	  labor	  strikes,	  and	  continuing	  economic	  controls	  by	  the	  government.13	  Domestic	  issues	  dominated	  the	  campaign,	  not	  foreign	  policy	  or	  the	  US-­‐USSR	  rivalry.	  Several	  magazines,	  such	  as	  the	  U.S.	  News	  and	  World	  Report,	  even	  declared	  that	  practically	  no	  candidate	  bothered	  to	  discuss	  foreign	  policy	  in	  1946.14	  A	  battle	  line	  in	  the	  election,	  thus,	  was	  the	  search	  for	  who	  and	  what	  was	  to	  blame	  for	  these	  unsatisfactory	  domestic	  situations	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.	  In	  the	  search	  for	  a	  “culprit,”	  candidates	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  what	  was	  really	  being	  criticized:	  the	  New	  Deal.	  	  
                                                                                                                                            Illinois	  Press,	  1994),	  115-­‐116.	  Melvyn	  Dubofsky	  and	  Foster	  Rhea	  Dulles,	  Labor	  in	  America:	  A	  History	  8th	  ed.	  (Wheeling,	  IL,	  Harlan	  Davidson,	  2010),	  324.	  	  	  12	  Elizabeth	  A.	  Fones-­‐Wolf,	  Selling	  Free	  Enterprise:	  The	  Business	  Assault	  on	  Labor	  and	  Liberalism,	  
1945-­‐60	  (Urbana,	  IL:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  1994),	  15.	  	  13	  “Newsgram,”	  The	  U.S.	  News	  and	  World	  Reports,	  October	  25,	  1946,	  5-­‐6,	  11,	  and	  24-­‐25.	  14	  “Key	  Issues	  in	  1946	  Election:	  Price	  Control	  at	  Top	  of	  List”	  in	  U.S.	  News	  and	  World	  Report,	  October	  25,	  1946.	  The	  magazine	  observed	  that	  interests	  in	  foreign	  policies	  occurred	  largely	  among	  Americans	  of	  foreign	  background,	  such	  as	  Poles,	  Germans,	  and	  Jews,	  “who	  are	  concerned	  over	  the	  turn	  of	  events	  in	  Europe.”	  Also,	  see	  “Daily	  Summary	  of	  Opinion	  Developments	  (hereafter	  DSOD),”	  October	  31,	  1946,	  Box	  3:	  “Daily	  Summary	  of	  International	  Topics	  and	  Foreign	  Policy,	  1946-­‐1948,”	  Office	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  Studies,	  1943-­‐1965	  (hereafter	  OPOS),	  Department	  of	  State,	  RG59,	  National	  Archives,	  College	  Park,	  MD	  (hereafter	  NA);	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In	  constructing	  images	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  as	  a	  major	  suspect	  for	  unsatisfactory	  postwar	  situations,	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II	  weighed	  heavily.	  Throughout	  the	  early	  1940s,	  motivations	  behind	  New	  Deal	  policies	  had	  been	  weakened	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  war	  simply	  created	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  jobs.	  Furthermore,	  during	  wartime,	  reform-­‐oriented	  New	  Deal	  policies	  in	  general—ranging	  from	  labor	  laws	  and	  anti-­‐trust	  laws,	  to	  child	  labor	  laws—came	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  obstacles	  to	  the	  war	  effort.	  As	  historian	  Richard	  Polenberg	  discusses,	  during	  World	  War	  II,	  popular	  sentiment	  maintained	  critical	  views	  toward	  New	  Deal	  policies:	  Reform	  and	  liberal	  principles	  were	  of	  secondary	  importance	  when	  what	  mattered	  was	  national	  defense.15	  In	  such	  context,	  even	  a	  liberal	  magazine	  like	  The	  New	  Republic	  did	  not	  hesitate	  to	  urge	  labor	  unions	  to	  turn	  away	  from	  their	  own	  immediate	  interests	  and	  look	  instead	  at	  national	  interests.16	  	  Such	  a	  war-­‐fostered	  image	  of	  “selfish”	  unions	  protected	  by	  New	  Deal	  laws	  lingered	  in	  the	  postwar	  period.	  At	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  Railroad	  Strike	  in	  May	  1946,	  President	  Truman,	  for	  instance,	  castigated	  the	  strikers	  for	  “plac[ing]	  their	  private	  interests	  above	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  nation.”17	  Learning	  that	  the	  workers	  nevertheless	  went	  on	  strike	  that	  night,	  Truman	  became	  furious	  and	  wrote	  a	  speech	  draft.	  Although	  the	  draft	  was	  not	  used,	  it	  portrayed	  the	  image	  of	  “selfish”	  unions	  that	  was	  shaped	  in	  the	  wartime	  and	  remained	  in	  the	  postwar	  years.	  He	  wrote:	  	  	  	  Every	  single	  one	  of	  the	  strikes	  and	  their	  demigog	  [sic]	  leaders	  have	  been	  living	  in	  luxury,	  working	  when	  they	  pleased	  and	  drawing	  from	  four	  to	  forty	  times	  the	  pay	  of	  a	  fighting	  soldier.	  […].	  Let’s	  give	  the	  country	  back	  to	  the	  people.	  Let’s	  put	  
                                                15	  Richard	  Polenberg,	  War	  and	  Society:	  The	  United	  States,	  1941-­‐1945	  (New	  York:	  J.	  B.	  Lippincott	  Company,	  1972),	  76-­‐79.	  	  	  16	  Polenberg,	  War	  and	  Society,	  92-­‐93.	  	  17	  Eric	  F.	  Goldman,	  The	  Crucial	  Decade-­‐And	  After:	  America,	  1945-­‐1960,	  2nd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Vintage	  Books,	  1960	  [1956]),	  23-­‐24.	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transportation	  and	  production	  back	  to	  work,	  hang	  a	  few	  traitors,	  and	  make	  our	  country	  safe	  for	  democracy.18	  	  Truman’s	  draft	  surely	  exaggerated	  workers’	  economic	  status.	  Yet,	  the	  fact	  that	  industrial	  labors	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	  actually	  had	  the	  highest	  real	  wages	  and	  relatively	  better	  working	  conditions	  lent	  credibility	  to	  such	  a	  description	  of	  “selfish”	  strikers.	  For	  example,	  railroad	  workers’	  and	  coal	  mining	  workers’	  total	  yearly	  incomes	  in	  1946	  were	  $3,055	  and	  $2,724,	  respectively,	  while	  public	  school	  teachers	  averaged	  $2,025,	  medical	  service	  workers	  (mainly	  nurses)	  $1,605,	  domestic	  workers	  $1,411,	  farm	  labor	  $1,394,	  and	  fishery	  workers	  $1,200.19	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  massive	  wave	  of	  strikes	  all	  over	  the	  country	  that	  year,	  which	  ended	  with	  an	  astonishing	  general	  strike	  in	  Oakland,	  California,	  indeed	  backfired	  for	  labor,	  making	  it	  more	  believable	  that	  labor	  activism	  would	  be	  “selfish.”	  When	  Oakland	  went	  on	  what	  was	  called	  “labor	  holiday”	  and	  the	  city	  lost	  control,	  the	  mayor,	  Herbert	  Beach,	  criticized	  the	  strike	  as	  an	  attempt	  “to	  push	  aside	  the	  government	  created	  by	  all	  the	  people”	  and	  “to	  substitute	  the	  physical	  force	  of	  mobs	  for	  that	  government.”20	  Even	  labor	  leaders	  were	  upset;	  one	  labor	  leader	  demanded	  members	  of	  his	  union	  back	  to	  work	  because	  the	  Oakland	  strike	  appeared	  to	  him	  “nothing	  but	  a	  revolution.”	  “It	  isn’t	  labor	  tactics.	  It’s	  revolutionary	  tactics,”	  he	  added.21	  Quite	  a	  few	  shared	  such	  a	  view.	  One	  New	  Jersey	  veteran	  wrote	  to	  Life:	  “So	  these	  are	  the	  ungrateful	  so-­‐and-­‐sos	  that	  we	  went	  out	  and	  fought	  a	  war	  for	  and	  our	  
                                                18	  Clark	  Clifford,	  “Serving	  the	  President:	  The	  Truman	  Years	  (1),”	  New	  Yorker,	  March	  25,	  1991,	  54-­‐55.	  Quoted	  in	  James	  T.	  Patterson,	  Grand	  Expectations:	  The	  United	  States,	  1945-­‐1974	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  48.	  19	  Derks	  ed.,	  Working	  Americans,	  Vol.	  II:	  The	  Middle	  Class,	  298-­‐299;	  Patterson,	  Grand	  Expectations,	  44.	  	  20	  Lipsitz,	  Rainbow	  at	  Midnight,	  150.	  	  21	  Ibid.	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shipmates	  and	  comrades	  died	  for!	  Oakland	  should	  hang	  its	  head	  in	  shame.”22	  A	  Chicago	  man	  wrote	  in	  a	  similar	  tone:	  “It	  made	  me	  sick	  to	  my	  stomach	  to	  see	  the	  stupidity	  and	  brutality	  shown	  in	  these	  strikers.	  They	  should	  be	  given	  a	  compulsory	  course	  in	  American	  history	  so	  that	  they	  would	  have	  a	  better	  appreciation	  of	  the	  principles	  and	  ideals	  behind	  the	  system	  they	  are	  endangering	  by	  their	  unthinking	  acts.”23	  	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  sense	  the	  lasting	  influence	  of	  war	  mentalities	  in	  these	  statements	  and	  letters.	  As	  in	  many	  other	  countries,	  the	  war	  had	  its	  own	  mechanism	  to	  produce	  ideal	  national	  images	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  past,	  future,	  and	  lofty	  purposes.	  Throughout	  the	  wartime	  period,	  Americans	  were	  told	  that	  they	  were	  “on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Right.”24	  Such	  emphasis	  was	  necessary	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  war,	  and	  ask	  individuals	  to	  sacrifice	  their	  own	  lives.	  If	  the	  war	  was	  lost,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan,	  such	  idealistic	  discourses	  of	  “justice”	  were	  simply	  discarded	  and	  disdained,	  and	  people	  tended	  to	  behave	  as	  if	  they	  had	  been	  deceived	  and	  lacked	  any	  choice	  before	  the	  war.	  When	  the	  war	  was	  won,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  what	  should	  one	  say	  to	  the	  war	  dead?	  The	  answer	  was:	  It	  was	  a	  just	  war	  and	  America	  was	  and	  would	  be	  on	  the	  right	  side.	  	  Therefore,	  these	  ideal	  images	  of	  America,	  whether	  they	  fit	  into	  a	  realistic	  picture	  of	  the	  society	  or	  not,	  should	  have	  come	  true	  under	  an	  idealized	  version	  of	  alleged	  “consensus,”	  and	  any	  doubt	  or	  disagreement	  was	  considered	  shameless	  and	  ignorant,	  and	  in	  need	  of	  correction.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  such	  correction,	  it	  is	  simply	  necessary	  to	  “hang	  a	  few	  traitors”	  to	  make	  the	  country	  “safe	  for	  democracy.”	  
                                                22	  Letter,	  Lloyd	  F.	  Kerr,	  “Letters	  to	  the	  Editor,”	  Life,	  January	  6,	  1947,	  4.	  	  23	  Letter,	  William	  Goodwin,	  “Letters	  to	  the	  Editor,”	  Life,	  January	  6,	  1947,	  3-­‐4.	  24	  Polenberg,	  War	  and	  Society,	  244.	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The	  logic	  of	  such	  discourses	  typically	  maintained	  that	  “Americans”	  would	  not	  criticize	  “our”	  own	  society	  and	  institutions	  if	  they	  were	  really	  “American.”	  If	  some	  did	  it	  anyway,	  “they”	  must	  be	  outsiders—perhaps,	  communists.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  as	  the	  victory	  in	  World	  War	  II	  brought	  confirmation	  to	  ever	  growing-­‐up	  nationalism	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  those	  who	  raised	  objections	  began	  to	  be	  fingered	  as	  “un-­‐American”	  and	  “communists”	  and,	  by	  the	  same	  token,	  New	  Deal	  policies	  and	  labor	  unions’	  activities	  were	  increasingly	  described	  as	  such.	  In	  such	  a	  process,	  it	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  labor	  activism	  had	  been	  increasingly	  identified	  with	  the	  results	  of	  communist	  infiltration.	  Asked	  about	  the	  labor	  strikes	  of	  1946,	  a	  woman	  responded:	  "I	  believe	  [Russia]	  is	  spreading	  communism	  here	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  […].	  She	  is	  doing	  it	  through	  secret	  channels.	  She	  is	  approaching	  us	  in	  fields	  where	  we	  are	  not	  the	  brightest,	  like	  unions	  where	  there	  are	  not	  too	  many	  thinking	  people,	  if	  any."25	  The	  result	  of	  such	  mounting	  anti-­‐labor	  frustration	  and	  resentment	  was	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Taft-­‐Hartley	  Act	  in	  1947.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  labor	  activism	  that	  flourished	  in	  1945-­‐1946	  did	  not	  suddenly	  dry	  up	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Republican	  victory	  in	  the	  1946	  midterm	  elections,	  nor	  was	  it	  destined	  to	  decline.	  Nor	  did	  the	  Taft-­‐Hartley	  Act	  all	  of	  a	  sudden	  dispirit	  workers	  and	  activists.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  law	  itself	  sparked	  waves	  of	  protest	  demonstrations	  in	  several	  states,	  and	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  law	  likewise	  touched	  off	  unauthorized	  walkouts	  of	  coal	  miners,	  paralyzing	  coal	  production.	  As	  historian	  George	  Lipsitz	  observes,	  in	  the	  late-­‐1940s,	  rank-­‐and-­‐file	  workers	  still	  
                                                25	  “Public	  Attitudes	  Toward	  Russia	  and	  United	  State-­‐Russian	  Relations,	  Part	  II:	  Attitudes	  and	  Beliefs	  About	  Russia,”	  April	  1947,	  Box	  40,	  “Survey	  Reports	  1947-­‐50,”	  Division	  of	  Public	  Studies,	  Bureau	  of	  Public	  Affairs,	  Department	  of	  State,	  RG59,	  NA.	  This	  research	  was	  conducted	  by	  the	  Survey	  Research	  Center	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Michigan	  between	  9	  December	  1946	  and	  11	  January	  1947.	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remained	  as	  willing	  to	  strike	  as	  they	  were	  in	  1946.	  In	  addition	  to	  such	  a	  “wildcat”	  tactics,	  some	  labor	  leaders	  and	  unions	  took	  another	  strategy,	  shifting	  their	  primary	  battlefield	  from	  the	  shop	  floor	  to	  the	  political	  arena—elections.	  	  Gearing	  up	  for	  the	  1948	  presidential	  elections,	  they	  worked	  with	  either	  Democrats	  or	  Progressives,	  hoping	  to	  elect	  a	  friendly	  congress	  and	  administration	  in	  Washington.	  This	  explains	  why,	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  “anti-­‐communist”	  calls	  developed	  more	  in	  response	  to	  domestic	  political	  and	  election	  issues	  than	  international	  affairs.	  The	  more	  labor	  unions	  became	  politicized,	  the	  more	  “anti-­‐communist”	  logic	  grew	  in	  local	  politics.	  In	  fact,	  “anti-­‐communist”	  issues	  in	  the	  United	  States	  heated	  up,	  first,	  in	  the	  areas	  where	  New	  Dealers	  and	  labor	  activists	  had	  been	  energetic	  in	  politics,	  such	  as	  California,	  Wisconsin,	  Ohio,	  Michigan,	  and	  Idaho,	  as	  candidates	  in	  these	  locations	  used	  “anti-­‐communist”	  logic	  as	  a	  political	  strategy	  to	  castigate	  New	  Deal	  reform-­‐oriented	  policies	  and	  labor	  activism.26	  	  Still	  more	  interesting,	  the	  development	  of	  “anti-­‐communist”	  campaigns	  overlapped	  with	  attacks	  on	  African	  Americans,	  civil	  rights	  activists,	  feminists,	  immigrants,	  gays	  and	  lesbians,	  and	  advocates	  for	  national	  health	  care,	  all	  of	  who	  brought	  social	  changes	  to	  postwar	  America	  in	  many	  ways,	  as	  radical	  workers	  did	  in	  their	  struggles.27	  The	  roughly	  three	  million	  African	  Americans	  who	  poured	  into	  
                                                26	  “Key	  Issues	  in	  1946	  Election:	  Price	  Control	  at	  Top	  of	  List,”	  The	  U.S.	  News	  and	  World	  Reports,	  October	  25,	  1946,	  25.	  	  27	  The	  literature	  in	  these	  topics	  is	  increasingly	  numerous	  in	  recent	  years.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Carol	  Anderson,	  Eyes	  Off	  the	  Prize:	  The	  United	  Nations	  and	  the	  African	  American	  Struggle	  for	  Human	  Rights,	  
1944-­‐1955	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003);	  Jeff	  Woods,	  Black	  Struggle,	  Red	  Scare:	  
Segregation	  and	  Anti-­‐communism	  in	  the	  South,	  1948-­‐1968	  (Baton	  Rouge,	  LA:	  Louisiana	  State	  University,	  2004);	  Shelton	  Stromquist,	  Labor's	  Cold	  War:	  Local	  Politics	  in	  a	  Global	  Context	  (Urbana,	  IL:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  2008);	  David	  K.	  Johnson,	  The	  Lavender	  Scare:	  The	  Cold	  War	  Persecution	  of	  
Gays	  and	  Lesbians	  in	  the	  Federal	  Government	  (Chicago,	  IL:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  2004);	  John	  D'Emilio,	  “The	  Homosexual	  Menace:The	  Politics	  of	  Sexuality	  in	  Cold	  War	  America,”	  in	  Kathy	  Lee	  Peiss,	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northern	  cities	  during	  wartime,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  million	  of	  women	  who	  took	  over	  traditionally	  male	  jobs	  at	  that	  time,	  posed	  seeds	  of	  new	  social	  conflicts	  and	  culture	  wars	  in	  the	  postwar	  era,	  bringing	  dreams	  and	  hopes	  to	  many,	  while	  triggering	  frustration	  and	  resentment	  for	  others.	  As	  we	  will	  examine	  in	  a	  later	  chapter,	  “anti-­‐communist”	  logic	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  adopted	  and	  spread	  to	  contain	  these	  social	  “problems”	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  that	  employed	  in	  curbing	  radical	  labor	  activism.	  	  This	  version	  of	  “anti-­‐communism”	  was	  concerned	  less	  with	  international	  affairs	  than	  with	  anything	  deemed	  “un-­‐American”—anything	  not	  typical	  in	  society	  at	  that	  time—which	  came	  to	  surface	  as	  aftereffects	  of	  radical	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  political	  transformations	  that	  became	  visible	  through	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  World	  War	  II.	  The	  “anti-­‐communist”	  logic	  in	  postwar	  America,	  in	  other	  words,	  became	  popular	  as	  method	  to	  solve—or	  suppress—social	  “problems”	  in	  the	  name	  of	  global	  affairs.	  To	  put	  it	  plainly,	  it	  was	  the	  use	  of	  nationalism	  to	  overcome	  social	  conflicts	  and	  to	  bring	  a	  “conflict-­‐free”	  and	  “harmonious”	  society	  at	  home.	  Seen	  in	  such	  a	  context,	  the	  development	  of	  “anti-­‐communist”	  sentiments	  in	  the	  United	  States	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  result	  of	  international	  situations	  but	  had	  its	  own	  domestic	  roots.	  	  It	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  “anti-­‐communist”	  issues	  first	  heated	  up	  among	  local	  politicians	  and	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  rather	  than	  in	  the	  Senate	  or	  White	  House.	  When	  the	  new	  80th	  Congress	  met	  in	  early-­‐January	  1947,	  Republican	  
                                                                                                                                            Christina	  Simmons,	  and	  Robert	  A	  Padgug	  eds.,	  Passion	  and	  Power:	  Sexuality	  in	  History	  (Philadelphia:	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  1989),	  226-­‐240;	  and	  Don	  Parson,	  “The	  Decline	  of	  Public	  Housing	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  the	  Red	  Scare,”	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  History,	  33,	  no.	  3	  (2007):	  400-­‐417.	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congressmen	  such	  as	  Fred	  Busbey	  of	  Illinois	  and	  Paul	  Shafer	  and	  Bartel	  Jonkman	  of	  Michigan	  jumped	  on	  anti-­‐New	  Deal	  and	  anti-­‐communist	  issues,	  calling	  for	  investigations	  of	  the	  State	  Department,	  Justice	  Department,	  and	  Chambers	  of	  Commerce,	  all	  of	  which	  had	  expanded	  through	  the	  New	  Deal	  and	  wartime	  periods,	  and	  all	  of	  which	  had	  been	  rumored	  to	  house	  large	  numbers	  of	  communists.28	  Their	  stance	  was	  understandable,	  particularly	  in	  view	  of	  the	  popularity	  of	  “anti-­‐communist”	  calls	  in	  Michigan	  and	  Illinois	  where	  labor	  strife	  had	  been	  fierce.	  Moreover,	  it	  was	  received	  well	  among	  Eastern	  European	  voters	  in	  these	  states.29	  Representative	  Shafer,	  who	  had	  been	  an	  editor	  and	  publisher	  of	  local	  newspapers	  in	  Michigan	  urged	  Secretary	  of	  State	  George	  Marshall	  to	  “clean	  house	  of	  the	  Communists,	  one-­‐worlders	  and	  multimillionaire	  playboy	  diplomats	  who	  have	  been	  using	  American	  funds	  indirectly	  to	  increase	  their	  family	  fortune.”30	  As	  the	  atmosphere	  in	  the	  House	  turned	  restive,	  Republican-­‐friendly	  Life	  magazine	  in	  March	  1947	  published	  names	  and	  pictures	  of	  thirty	  individuals	  suspected	  of	  being	  “communist	  sympathizers,”	  most	  of	  them	  simply	  involved	  in	  labor	  activism.31	  	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  deflect	  such	  censure	  at	  home,	  President	  Truman	  quickly	  announced	  two	  “anti-­‐communist”	  initiatives	  in	  March	  1947:	  the	  Federal	  Employee	  Loyalty	  Program	  and	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine,	  both	  of	  which	  now	  often	  believed	  as	  parts,	  or	  even	  as	  origins,	  of	  Truman’s	  Cold	  War	  strategy.	  The	  implementation	  of	  both	  programs,	  however,	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  domestic	  political	  considerations	  
                                                28	  “DSOD,”	  January	  27	  and	  29,	  1947,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	  29	  James	  T.	  Selcraig,	  The	  Red	  Scare	  in	  the	  Midwest,	  1945-­‐1955:	  A	  State	  and	  Local	  Study	  (Ann	  Arbor,	  1982).	  30	  “DSOD,”	  January	  17,	  1947,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA;	  See	  also	  “DSOD,”	  January	  27,	  1947,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	  31	  “The	  Infiltration	  Corps:	  Communists	  and	  Their	  Friends	  Hold	  Some	  Key	  Posts,”	  Life,	  March	  24,	  1947,	  34-­‐45.	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than	  international	  conflict.	  Concerning	  the	  Loyalty	  Program,	  Clark	  Clifford,	  one	  of	  Truman’s	  key	  advisers,	  recollected:	  	  It	  was	  a	  political	  problem.	  We	  did	  not	  believe	  there	  was	  a	  real	  problem.	  A	  problem	  was	  being	  manufactured.	  [...].	  We	  gave	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  thought	  to	  how	  to	  respond.	  We	  had	  a	  presidential	  campaign	  ahead	  of	  us	  and	  here	  was	  a	  great	  issue,	  a	  very	  damaging	  issue,	  so	  he	  set	  up	  this	  whole	  kind	  of	  machinery.32	  	  	  As	  Clifford	  recalls,	  the	  Truman	  administration	  set	  up	  the	  mechanism	  of	  the	  Loyalty	  Program	  not	  because	  it	  perceived	  actual	  security	  risks	  in	  the	  government	  but	  because	  it	  saw	  political	  opportunities	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  decisive	  defeat	  of	  Democratic	  Party	  in	  November	  1950.33	  In	  effect,	  it	  was	  part	  of	  long-­‐term	  election	  campaigns,	  not	  of	  Cold	  War	  strategy.	  A	  similar	  consideration	  worked	  when	  the	  administration	  prepared	  for	  the	  program	  calling	  for	  immediate	  economic	  and	  military	  aid	  to	  Greece	  and	  Turkey—known	  as	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine.	  The	  popularity	  of	  “anti-­‐communism”	  among	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  Americans	  had	  convinced	  the	  president	  of	  its	  usefulness	  as	  political	  tool,	  as	  historians	  Campbell	  Craig	  and	  Fredrik	  Logevall	  write,	  “even	  if	  it	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  Greece	  and	  Turkey.”34	  	  At	  this	  point,	  however,	  the	  consensus	  over	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  Cold	  War—written	  and	  conceived	  in	  capital	  letters	  as	  an	  obvious	  historical	  epoch—did	  not	  exist,	  and	  variety	  of	  futures	  seemed	  possible.	  The	  public	  was	  still	  widely	  divided	  over	  the	  president’s	  statement.	  According	  to	  opinion	  polls	  taken	  by	  the	  Gallup	  Poll	  and	  the	  
                                                32	  Carl	  Bernstein,	  Loyalties:	  A	  Son’s	  Memoir	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  1989),	  198,	  200.	  Quoted	  from	  Ellen	  Schrecker,	  “McCarthyism:	  Political	  Repression	  and	  the	  Fear	  of	  Communism,”	  Social	  
Research	  Vol.	  71,	  No	  3	  (2004),	  1046-­‐1047.	  33	  Ibid.	  	  34	  Campbell	  Craig	  and	  Fredrik	  Logevall,	  America’s	  Cold	  War:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Insecurity	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Belknap	  Press	  of	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  80.	  For	  details	  of	  American	  intervention	  in	  Greece,	  Howard	  Jones,	  “A	  New	  Kind	  of	  War”:	  America's	  Global	  Strategy	  and	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  in	  Greece	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1989).	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Public	  Opinion	  Quarterly,	  while	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  those	  who	  polled	  approved	  economic	  aid	  to	  Greece,	  more	  than	  half	  actually	  disagreed	  with	  sending	  military	  advisers	  to	  train	  the	  Greek	  army.35	  Not	  surprisingly,	  many	  could	  openly	  critique	  the	  president’s	  announcement.	  The	  world	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  remained	  one	  of	  number	  of	  opinions,	  not	  yet	  a	  “reality,”	  since	  it	  had	  not	  been	  known	  or	  shared	  widely.	  While	  the	  1946	  midterm	  election	  certainly	  highlighted	  the	  anti-­‐New	  Deal	  and	  anti-­‐communist	  trend	  in	  postwar	  American	  society,	  to	  which	  the	  Truman	  administration	  deftly	  reacted,	  it	  also	  stirred	  up	  controversy	  and	  disagreement.	  	  Nonetheless,	  such	  intense	  debate	  and	  such	  a	  fluid	  political	  situation	  in	  the	  United	  States	  had	  unintended	  repercussions	  beyond	  its	  borders,	  such	  as	  in	  Japan.	  
	  
U.S.	  Occupation	  of	  Japan	  and	  the	  Beginning	  of	  the	  Climate	  of	  Red-­‐Baiting	  	  The	  American	  occupation	  of	  Japan	  began	  in	  September	  of	  1945,	  and	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  General	  Headquarters	  (GHQ)	  in	  Tokyo	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Commander	  of	  Allied	  Powers	  (SCAP)—that	  is,	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur—had	  not	  created	  much	  significant	  controversy	  until	  early	  1946.	  The	  situation	  changed	  as	  the	  rise	  in	  popularity	  of	  Marxist	  agendas	  and	  labor	  activism	  became	  apparent	  in	  postwar	  Japan.36	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  leftist	  agendas	  had	  
                                                35	  According	  to	  Gallup	  Poll,	  75	  percent	  approved	  and	  25	  percent	  disapproved	  President’s	  program.	  According	  to	  Public	  Opinion	  Quarterly’s	  polls,	  56	  percent	  approved	  and	  32	  percent	  disapproved	  of	  the	  Truman	  Doctrine,	  and	  33	  percent	  approved	  and	  54	  percent	  disapproved	  sending	  U.S.	  military	  advisers	  to	  train	  the	  Greek	  royalist	  army.	  See	  “Aid	  to	  Greece,”	  The	  Gallup	  Poll,	  Vol.	  1,	  April	  4,	  1947,	  636;	  and	  Athan	  Theoharis,	  Seeds	  of	  Repression:	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  McCarthyism	  (Chicago,	  IL:	  Quadrangle,	  1971),	  197.	  	  36	  The	  term	  “SCAP”	  originally	  meant	  the	  title	  held	  by	  MacArthur.	  However,	  from	  the	  time	  of	  the	  U.S.	  occupation,	  the	  word	  “SCAP”	  was	  used	  to	  refer	  the	  offices	  of	  the	  occupation,	  including	  both	  civilians	  and	  military	  personnel,	  and	  thus	  I	  follow	  this	  custom.	  In	  this	  chapter	  I	  use	  the	  both	  terms	  “SCAP”	  and	  “GHQ”	  interchangeably.	  	  
  
 33 
overwhelming	  support;	  labor	  union	  membership	  quickly	  surpassed	  its	  prewar	  peak	  of	  400,000	  by	  the	  end	  of	  1945,	  and	  reached	  nearly	  5	  million	  by	  December	  1946.37	  Observing	  this	  rapid	  change	  in	  society,	  economist	  Arisawa	  Hiromi	  wrote	  in	  his	  diary	  on	  October	  13,	  1945,	  “Having	  heard	  everyone’s	  story,	  I	  felt	  that	  all	  intellectuals,	  journalists,	  politicians,	  either	  right	  wing	  or	  left	  wing,	  today	  look	  toward	  the	  Left,	  making	  a	  rush	  for	  more	  and	  more	  left.	  In	  such	  a	  tide	  of	  the	  time,	  where	  should	  I	  stand?	  What	  to	  say?”38	  	  Such	  a	  “left-­‐turn”	  was	  obvious	  even	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  and,	  as	  criticism	  toward	  the	  New	  Deal	  and	  alleged	  communist	  activities	  increased	  in	  the	  United	  States	  around	  the	  1946	  midterm	  elections,	  American	  observers	  began	  problematizing	  this	  “left-­‐turn”	  in	  Japan	  under	  the	  U.S.	  occupation.	  For	  many	  observers,	  the	  sudden	  development	  of	  labor	  unionism	  and	  the	  rapid	  spread	  of	  leftist	  influences	  could	  not	  be	  explained	  without	  thinking	  of	  either	  Soviet	  expansion	  into	  East	  Asia	  or	  communist	  infiltration	  within	  the	  SCAP.39	  However,	  a	  much	  more	  fundamental	  element	  in	  the	  popularity	  of	  leftist	  thoughts	  in	  postwar	  Japan	  was,	  rather,	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II	  for	  the	  Japanese	  people.	  First,	  during	  the	  war,	  only	  one	  group	  maintained	  opposition	  to	  the	  war—the	  
                                                37	  Howard	  Schonberger,	  Aftermath	  of	  War:	  Americans	  and	  the	  Remaking	  of	  Japan,	  1945-­‐1952	  (Kent,	  OH:	  Kent	  State	  University	  Press,	  1989),	  115;	  Andrew	  Gordon,	  The	  Wages	  of	  Affluence:	  Labor	  and	  
Management	  in	  Postwar	  Japan	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  8.	  Also,	  see	  Joe	  Moore,	  Japanese	  Workers	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Power,	  1945-­‐1947	  (Madison,	  WI:	  University	  of	  Wisconsin	  Press,	  1983).	  38	  Nakamura	  Takafusa,	  Showa-­‐shi	  [A	  History	  of	  Showa]	  Vol.	  2:	  1945-­‐1989	  (Tokyo:	  Toyo	  keizai,	  1993),	  393.	  39	  See,	  for	  instance,	  letter,	  Roy	  Howard	  to	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  January	  31,	  1946,	  Papers	  of	  Bonner	  F.	  Fellers	  (hereafter	  PBFF),	  Folder	  2,	  Box	  3,	  RG44a,	  MacArthur	  Memorial	  Archives,	  Norfolk,	  VA	  (hereafter	  MMA);	  letter,	  Norman	  Thomas	  to	  Bonner	  F.	  Fellers,	  May	  7,	  1946,	  PBFF,	  Folder	  1,	  Box	  5,	  RG44a,	  MMA.	  Also,	  see	  Life,	  December	  2,	  1946	  and	  Newsweek,	  January	  23,	  1947.	  Newsweek,	  in	  particular,	  heated	  up	  criticism	  through	  the	  years	  of	  1947-­‐1948.	  For	  the	  study	  of	  the	  “Japan	  Lobby,”	  gathered	  around	  the	  Newsweek	  magazine,	  see	  Schonberger,	  Aftermath	  of	  War,	  134-­‐160.	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Japanese	  Communist	  Party	  (JCP).	  	  This	  simple	  reality	  gave	  the	  JCP	  the	  ethical	  high	  ground	  after	  Japan’s	  defeat.	  In	  addition,	  the	  fact	  that	  hundreds	  of	  Japanese	  communists	  stuck	  to	  their	  anti-­‐war	  beliefs,	  despite	  harsh	  suppression,	  imprisonment,	  and,	  in	  many	  cases,	  torture	  throughout	  the	  war,	  made	  them	  appear	  like	  martyrs	  or	  saints	  in	  the	  postwar	  period.40	  This	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  for	  intellectuals,	  who	  surrendered	  their	  opinions	  in	  the	  wartime	  and	  cooperated	  in	  support	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  who	  felt	  a	  deep	  sense	  of	  remorse	  afterwards.	  For	  many,	  the	  communists’	  uncompromising	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  war	  appeared	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  “true”	  independence	  of	  mind—in	  the	  buzzwords	  of	  the	  time,	  a	  proof	  of	  subjectivity.41	  Furthermore,	  Marxist	  claims	  to	  a	  “scientific”	  approach	  to	  history	  and	  social	  problems	  appealed	  widely	  to	  people	  who	  were	  fed	  up	  with	  wartime	  spiritualism.42	  	  Broad	  support	  for	  leftist	  agendas	  in	  early	  postwar	  Japan,	  therefore,	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  result	  of	  the	  spread	  of	  Moscow’s	  influence;	  rather,	  it	  was	  locally	  adapted	  in	  order	  to	  express	  local	  feelings—regret,	  irritation,	  and	  anger—about	  the	  war,	  and	  was	  utilized	  to	  compensate	  for	  unfilled	  desires	  for	  “subjectivity”	  during	  the	  war.	  As	  historian	  Oguma	  Eiji	  suggests,	  it	  is	  no	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  that	  all	  phenomena	  in	  postwar	  Japan	  grew	  in	  dialogue	  with	  wartime	  experience,	  remorse,	  and	  shame.	  In	  other	  words,	  many	  contemporary	  Japanese	  creatively	  (or	  mistakenly)	  translated	  and	  developed	  leftist	  agendas	  in	  dialogue	  with	  their	  own	  war	  experiences.	  	  
                                                40	  Oguma	  Eiji,	  “Minshu”	  to	  “Aikoku”:	  Sengo	  Nihon	  no	  nashonarisumu	  to	  kokyosei	  (Tokyo:	  Shinyosha,	  2002),	  175-­‐186.	  	  41	  For	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  the	  discourse	  of	  “subjectivity,”	  see	  J.	  Victor	  Koschmann,	  Revolution	  
and	  Subjectivity	  in	  Postwar	  Japan	  (Chicago,	  IL:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1996).	  42	  Ibid.	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A	  similar	  mechanism	  functioned	  in	  reinterpreting	  terms	  like	  “democracy”—a	  term	  known	  to	  many	  Japanese	  people	  since	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  but	  re-­‐introduced	  and	  popularized	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	  as	  a	  way	  to	  critique	  wartime	  values.43	  Through	  the	  local	  translation,	  the	  notion	  of	  democracy	  did	  not	  conflict	  with	  a	  Marxist	  agenda;	  both	  were	  adopted	  to	  critique	  wartime	  values.	  Such	  an	  indigenous	  blend	  of	  interpretations	  clearly	  appeared	  at	  a	  May	  Day	  demonstration	  in	  1946	  (Picture	  2).	  Among	  a	  “sea	  of	  red	  flags”	  with	  half	  a	  million	  men,	  women,	  and	  children	  gathered	  in	  front	  of	  the	  imperial	  palace	  in	  Tokyo,	  one	  participant	  explained	  why	  he	  attended	  the	  rally:	  “Because	  I	  believe	  that,	  in	  a	  democracy,	  power	  should	  belong	  to	  the	  people”.44	  On	  that	  day,	  demonstrators’	  primary	  demands	  were,	  as	  a	  young	  SCAP	  official	  observed,	  directly	  related	  to	  their	  daily	  life	  issues,	  such	  as	  food	  shortages	  and	  high	  prices,	  not	  so	  much	  ideological.45	  Such	  voices,	  feelings,	  and	  specific	  demands	  faded	  away	  when	  viewed	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  Although	  reports	  on	  Japan’s	  nationwide	  May	  Day	  demonstrations	  quickly	  appeared	  in	  newspapers	  and	  on	  radio	  shows,	  what	  dominated	  discourse	  in	  the	  American	  media	  was	  the	  “expanding	  role	  of	  Communism	  in	  Japan.”	  46	  In	  fact,	  when	  American	  news	  covered	  May	  Day	  demonstrations	  in	  Japan,	  participants’	  voices,	  subjective	  feelings,	  connotations,	  and	  local	  issues,	  were	  not	  conveyed.	  Several	  commentators	  rather	  wondered	  whether	  or	  not	  “in	  the	  nurturing	  of	  the	  
                                                43	  For	  the	  tremendous	  popularity	  of	  “democracy”	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  John	  Dower,	  
Embracing	  Defeat:	  Japan	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  World	  War	  II	  (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton,	  1999).	  	  44	  Mark	  Gayn,	  Japan	  Diary	  1945-­‐1948	  (New	  York:	  William	  Sloane	  Association,	  1948),	  196-­‐198;	  Dower,	  
Embracing	  Defeat,	  259-­‐63.	  	  	  45	  Thomas	  A.	  Bisson,	  Nihon	  senryo	  kaiso	  ki	  [A	  Memoir	  of	  Occupation	  of	  Japan],	  Nakamura	  Masanori	  and	  Miura	  Yoichi	  trans.	  (Tokyo:	  Sanseido,	  1983),	  May	  1,	  1946,	  74-­‐75.	  Bisson’s	  diary	  was	  published	  only	  in	  Japanese.	  46	  “Japan	  and	  Korea,	  No.	  8,”	  June	  18,	  1946,	  Box	  39,	  “Public	  Opinion	  on	  Foreign	  Countries	  and	  Regions,	  Japan	  and	  Korea,	  1945-­‐54,”	  OPOS,	  RG	  59,	  NA.	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Japanese	  labor	  movements”	  the	  American	  occupation	  had	  “bred	  something	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  Frankensteinian	  monster.”	  47	  Meanwhile,	  William	  Seabald,	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  Japan,	  similarly	  got	  wind	  of	  rumors	  in	  Tokyo	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  a	  large	  number	  of	  communists	  and	  leftists	  were	  active	  inside	  the	  General	  Headquarters	  under	  the	  guardianship	  of	  SCAP	  officials.48	  Rumors	  of	  this	  kind	  in	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States	  supplied	  a	  tailwind	  for	  bolstering	  a	  red-­‐baiting	  mood	  in	  the	  SCAP.	  “The	  newspapers	  are	  full	  of	  the	  anti-­‐Communist	  investigation	  and	  purges	  now	  going	  on	  in	  the	  States,	  especially	  in	  Congress,”	  wrote	  Charles	  Willoughby,	  Chief	  of	  the	  Military	  Intelligent	  Section—known	  as	  G2—in	  the	  General	  Headquarters	  in	  Tokyo.	  “This	  is	  as	  good	  a	  time,	  psychologically	  to	  revive	  our	  own	  situation”49	  Born	  in	  Heidelberg,	  Germany,	  immigrating	  to	  the	  United	  States	  when	  he	  was	  sixteen	  and	  growing	  up	  into	  a	  military	  officer,	  Willoughby	  described	  himself	  as	  a	  zealot	  of	  American	  values.	  He	  later	  recalled	  that	  he	  has	  absolute	  trust	  in	  the	  justice	  and	  truth	  of	  America	  and	  considered	  so-­‐called	  progressives,	  liberals,	  and	  communist	  sympathizers	  who	  criticized	  America	  his	  enemies.	  “On	  this	  point	  I	  do	  not	  yield	  an	  inch,”	  emphasized	  Willoughby.50	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  SCAP’s	  initial	  reform-­‐oriented	  policies	  looked	  like	  to	  him	  a	  result	  of	  communist	  manipulation,	  and,	  thus,	  in	  early	  1947,	  when	  the	  “anti-­‐communist”	  mood	  was	  growing	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  he	  found	  a	  chance	  to	  revive	  a	  critique	  of	  alleged	  leftist	  influence	  in	  the	  General	  Headquarters.	  	  
                                                47	  Ibid;	  “Japan	  and	  Korea,	  No.	  17,”	  March	  11,	  1947,	  Box	  39,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	  48	  William	  J.	  Seabald,	  Nihon	  senryo	  gaiko	  no	  kaiso	  [Memoir	  of	  Japanese	  Occupation	  Diplomacy]	  (Tokyo:	  Asahi	  shinbun,	  1966),	  40.	  49	  Correspondence,	  Charles	  A.	  Willoughby	  to	  G2	  Staffs,	  February	  9,	  1947,	  Papers	  of	  Charles	  A.	  Willoughby	  (hereafter	  PCAW),	  Folder	  3,	  Box	  18,	  RG	  23,	  MMA.	  	  50	  Charles	  A.	  Willoughby,	  Shirarezaru	  Nihon	  senryo:	  Wirobi	  kaikoroku	  [Occupation	  of	  Japan	  Unknown:	  Memoir	  of	  Willoughby]	  (Tokyo:	  Bancho	  shobo,	  1973),	  136-­‐37.	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It	  was	  a	  chance	  precisely	  because	  Willoughby	  and	  his	  staff’s	  earlier	  effort	  had	  not	  been	  so	  successful.	  The	  first	  short	  28-­‐page	  report,	  “Leftist	  Classification	  of	  Civilian	  Employees”	  did	  not	  capture	  much	  attention	  in	  September	  of	  1946.	  However,	  their	  tireless	  efforts	  eventually	  bore	  fruit	  with	  the	  retreat	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  in	  the	  midterm	  elections	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  a	  sea	  change	  that	  made	  his	  section’s	  intelligence	  report	  trendier	  and	  thicker.	  The	  second-­‐revised	  version	  of	  this	  report	  raised	  its	  tone	  with	  a	  new	  title,	  “Leftist	  Influence	  in	  Headquarters.”	  Then,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  February	  1947,	  a	  new	  third-­‐revised	  version,	  a	  110-­‐page	  study,	  appeared	  with	  a	  more	  eye-­‐catching	  title,	  “Leftist	  Infiltration	  into	  SCAP.”	  Willoughby’s	  correspondence	  during	  this	  period	  shows	  his	  unusual	  zeal	  bordering	  on	  paranoia.	  In	  drawing	  up	  a	  revised	  version	  of	  older	  studies	  that	  listed	  nine	  suspects,	  Willoughby	  did	  not	  hesitate	  to	  order	  some	  “facts”	  to	  be	  made	  up.	  He	  even	  wrote,	  “I	  am	  disappointed	  in	  the	  small	  number	  of	  cases.	  I	  thought	  there	  were	  21.	  We	  might	  as	  well	  list	  the	  other	  ‘suspects’	  as	  being	  under	  investigation.”51	  	  In	  addition	  to	  a	  political	  tailwind	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  excessive	  zeal	  of	  Willoughby	  and	  his	  staff,	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur’s	  opportunistic	  attitudes	  helped	  to	  foster	  the	  red-­‐baiting	  mood	  in	  the	  GHQ.	  As	  his	  close	  aides	  observed,	  MacArthur	  did	  not	  see	  the	  growing	  popularity	  of	  leftist	  thoughts	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  Japan	  at	  all,	  and	  in	  fact	  stated	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  labor	  unions	  in	  Japan	  was	  a	  favorable	  sign	  of	  a	  “liberal	  trend,”	  not	  a	  dangerous	  swing	  to	  the	  left	  as	  American	  observers	  described.52	  Then,	  a	  couple	  of	  questions	  arise:	  Why	  did	  
                                                51	  Correspondence,	  Willoughby	  to	  his	  staffs,	  February	  20,	  1947,	  PCAW,	  Folder	  3,	  Box	  18,	  RG23,	  MMA.	  	  52	  Roger	  Baldwin,	  “The	  Reminiscences	  of	  Roger	  Baldwin,	  Occupation	  of	  Japan,”	  27,	  Oral	  History	  Collection	  (hereafter	  OHC),	  Columbia	  University,	  New	  York	  City,	  NY.	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MacArthur,	  originally	  an	  ultra-­‐conservative	  and	  anti-­‐communist,	  eagerly	  encourage	  “liberal”	  trends	  in	  postwar	  Japan,	  particularly	  before	  1947?	  Why	  did	  MacArthur	  not	  actively	  try	  to	  prevent	  red	  hunting	  in	  the	  SCAP	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  1946,	  if	  he	  did	  not	  see	  any	  communist	  threat?	  A	  key	  to	  explaining	  his	  capricious	  attitudes	  is	  his	  sensitivity	  concerning	  his	  own	  public	  image	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  As	  American	  Ambassador	  William	  Seabald	  observed,	  the	  general	  was	  highly	  concerned	  with	  how	  he	  was	  viewed,	  and	  extremely	  sensitive	  to	  any	  sort	  of	  criticism.53	  In	  line	  with	  this,	  it	  made	  sense	  for	  him	  to	  support	  New	  Deal	  type	  policies	  in	  the	  early	  period	  of	  the	  occupation,	  as	  he	  believed	  that	  such	  policies	  were	  still	  popular	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Thus,	  after	  seeing	  the	  defeat	  of	  New	  Deal	  and	  loss	  of	  popularity	  of	  labor	  activism	  in	  the	  1946	  midterm	  elections,	  he	  had	  no	  reason	  to	  stick	  with	  such	  reform-­‐oriented	  policies.	  	  Such	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  the	  period	  between	  November	  1946	  and	  February	  1947.	  The	  landslide	  victory	  of	  the	  Republican	  Party	  in	  the	  midterm	  elections	  confirmed	  for	  many	  people	  that	  the	  next	  president	  would	  be	  a	  Republican,	  and	  that	  MacArthur	  would	  be	  a	  formidable	  candidate.	  In	  November	  1946,	  in	  fact,	  he	  began	  receiving	  letters	  and	  telegrams	  from	  supporters,	  ranging	  from	  ordinary	  people	  to	  ex-­‐president	  Herbert	  Hoover,	  many	  of	  whom	  had	  backed	  his	  unsuccessful	  candidacy	  in	  the	  1944	  presidential	  election.54	  These	  supporters	  now	  advised	  MacArthur	  to	  return	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  give	  a	  few	  talks	  in	  order	  to	  stir	  up	  the	  morale	  of	  the	  country.	  One	  Chicago	  man	  wrote	  to	  the	  General,	  informing	  him	  that	  he	  
                                                53	  According	  to	  Seabald,	  MacArthur	  even	  ordered	  subordinates	  to	  make	  a	  counterargument	  when	  a	  Shanghai	  newspaper	  criticized	  him.	  Seabald	  thought	  MacArthur	  was	  “oversensitive.”	  Seabald,	  Nihon	  
senryo	  gaiko	  no	  kaiso	  [Memoir	  of	  Japanese	  Occupation	  Diplomacy],	  94;	  Also,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Michael	  Schaller,	  Douglas	  MacArthur:	  The	  Far	  Eastern	  General	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1989)	  and	  Sodei	  Rinjiro,	  MacArthur	  no	  nisennichi	  [MacArthur’s	  Two	  Thousands	  Days]	  (Tokyo:	  Chuo	  koron,	  1976).	  54	  These	  letters	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  large	  quantity	  in	  Papers	  of	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  (hereafter	  PDM),	  Personal	  Correspondence,	  Box	  12	  (July-­‐December	  1946),	  RG10,	  MMA.	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already	  began	  the	  “Draft	  MacArthur	  Movement.”	  Likewise,	  a	  woman	  in	  Oregon	  confessed	  that,	  when	  she	  was	  praying,	  God	  gave	  her	  a	  vision	  of	  Christ,	  standing	  by	  MacArthur’s	  side,	  saying,	  “He	  is	  my	  man.	  […].	  I	  will	  stand	  beside	  him	  all	  the	  way.”55	  No	  less	  confident	  than	  this	  woman,	  MacArthur	  himself	  strongly	  believed	  that	  he	  could	  be	  the	  next	  president.	  Thus,	  he	  wanted	  to	  know	  which	  way	  the	  wind	  was	  blowing	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  the	  1946	  midterm	  election	  returns	  showed	  him,	  making	  his	  judgments	  on	  the	  course	  of	  U.S.	  occupation	  policy	  more	  capricious.56	  It	  was	  no	  wonder	  that	  MacArthur	  ordered	  the	  cancellation	  of	  a	  planned	  general	  strike	  in	  Japan	  in	  January	  1947	  after	  observing	  the	  election	  result	  and	  the	  backlash	  against	  the	  Oakland	  general	  strike	  in	  December	  1946.	  It	  was	  blindingly	  obvious	  that	  he	  would	  be	  harshly	  attacked	  in	  his	  homeland	  if	  he	  did	  not	  stop	  it.	  As	  various	  headwinds	  combined—from	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  in	  the	  midterm	  elections	  and	  the	  rapid	  increase	  of	  negative	  reports	  on	  the	  SCAP	  in	  the	  American	  media,	  to	  the	  escalation	  of	  red-­‐hunting	  within	  the	  General	  Headquarters,	  as	  well	  as	  MacArthur’s	  opportunistic	  attitude—it	  was	  no	  wonder	  that	  the	  SCAP’s	  young	  officials	  who	  had	  been	  promoting	  radical	  reform	  programs	  in	  Japan,	  and	  began	  to	  be	  criticized	  as	  “New	  Dealers,”	  gradually	  lost	  confidence	  in	  their	  reform	  programs.	  Theodore	  Cohen,	  a	  chief	  of	  a	  labor	  division	  in	  the	  SCAP,	  recalled	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  1946	  midterm	  election:	  “Labor	  was	  rejected.	  Business	  was	  in	  the	  saddle.”	  A	  graduate	  of	  Columbia	  University,	  where	  he	  specialized	  in	  Japanese	  labor	  
                                                55	  Letter,	  Joseph	  Savage	  to	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  December	  16,	  1946;	  Letter,	  Nellie	  Gordon	  Curtis	  to	  MacArthur,	  December	  14,	  1946,	  PDM,	  Box	  12,	  RG10,	  MMA.	  56	  Letter,	  Woodall	  Green	  to	  Bonner	  F.	  Fellers,	  April	  26,	  1947,	  PBFF,	  Folder	  12,	  Box	  2,	  RG44a,	  MMA.	  In	  this	  letter,	  MacArthur’s	  aide	  Colonel	  Green	  suggested	  that	  it	  would	  be	  important	  for	  Fellers	  to	  keep	  MacArthur	  posted	  on	  public	  opinion	  in	  the	  United	  States.	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history,	  and	  an	  enthusiastic	  supporter	  of	  New	  Deal	  policies,	  Cohen	  discerned	  that	  “Reforms	  and	  reformers	  lost	  prestige	  and	  even	  respectability,	  while	  many	  of	  the	  Headquarters	  brass	  cozied	  up	  to	  GHQ	  civilians	  with	  big	  business	  connections.”57	  	  Meanwhile,	  word	  spread	  among	  SCAP	  officials	  in	  Tokyo	  that	  getting	  jobs	  upon	  returning	  to	  Washington	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  difficult,	  as	  they	  were	  labeled	  "too	  New	  Dealish"	  or	  even	  “communistic.”58	  One	  ex-­‐SCAP	  member,	  looking	  for	  a	  job	  in	  Washington	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1948,	  for	  instance,	  found	  that	  his	  work	  experience	  at	  GHQ	  aroused	  “much	  hostility.”59	  The	  case	  of	  Andrew	  Grajdanzv	  (Grad)	  was	  even	  worse.	  Born	  in	  Siberia	  and	  spending	  almost	  all	  of	  his	  life	  in	  Harbin	  and	  Tianjin	  before	  coming	  to	  the	  United	  States	  in	  late	  1930s,	  Grad	  was	  Willoughby’s	  number	  one	  target,	  and	  had	  been	  placed	  under	  strict	  surveillance	  in	  1946.	  He	  was	  tailed,	  his	  room	  was	  secretly	  searched,	  and	  his	  letters	  were	  read,	  while	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  evidence	  that	  he	  had	  done	  anything	  wrong.	  A	  three-­‐week	  counter-­‐intelligence	  investigation	  found	  that	  he	  tended	  to	  eat	  by	  himself,	  stay	  at	  home,	  and	  visit	  the	  same	  places	  frequently.	  This	  last	  behavior	  did	  attract	  an	  investigator’s	  interest,	  but	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  he	  was	  regularly	  learning	  Japanese	  while	  teaching	  English.60	  Nevertheless,	  when	  he	  returned	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  he	  could	  not	  get	  a	  job	  in	  the	  governmental	  sector	  at	  all,	  due	  to	  rumors	  and	  attacks,	  despite	  his	  work	  experience	  in	  the	  SCAP	  and	  a	  Ph.D.	  in	  economics	  and	  fluency	  in	  Russian,	  Japanese,	  
                                                57	  Theodore	  Cohen,	  Remaking	  Japan	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1987),	  309-­‐11.	  	  58	  Bisson,	  Nihon	  senryo	  kaiso	  ki	  [A	  Memoir	  of	  Occupation	  of	  Japan],	  January	  20,	  1947,	  170.	  59	  Michael	  Schaller,	  The	  American	  Occupation	  of	  Japan:	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Cold	  war	  in	  Asia	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1985),	  131.	  60	  “Memorandum	  for	  Information,”	  September	  23,	  1946,	  PCAW,	  Box	  18,	  RG23,	  MMA.	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Chinese,	  and	  English.	  Eventually	  he	  studied	  library	  science,	  starting	  over	  completely,	  and	  got	  a	  job	  at	  a	  small	  local	  library.61	  	  Hearing	  of	  such	  experiences,	  many	  reformers	  simply	  became	  too	  discouraged	  to	  continue	  with	  their	  programs.	  62	  Many	  staff	  members	  decided	  to	  leave	  the	  SCAP	  in	  1947.	  One	  GS	  staff	  member,	  asked	  decades	  later	  if	  that	  atmosphere	  had	  any	  influence	  on	  him,	  said:	  “I	  think	  I	  became	  less	  enthusiastic	  about	  going	  on	  in	  the	  field	  […].	  [The	  climate]	  dampened	  my	  interest.	  I	  realized	  that	  you	  could	  not	  say	  just	  anything	  you	  wanted	  to.	  If	  you	  wanted	  to	  continue	  your	  career,	  you	  could	  not.”63	  Still	  in	  their	  thirties,	  talented	  and	  ambitious,	  many	  young	  SCAP	  officials	  wanted	  to	  return	  to	  and	  continue	  their	  careers	  in	  the	  United	  States.64	  As	  such,	  their	  choices	  were	  limited,	  and	  many	  compromised	  to	  reduce	  the	  tone	  of	  liberal	  reforms,	  adapting	  to	  the	  newly	  emerging	  political	  trend.	  SCAP	  officials’	  memoirs	  suggest	  that	  changes	  in	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  office	  policies	  were	  effects	  of	  their	  own	  fears	  and	  adaptations	  between	  the	  spring	  of	  1946	  and	  1947,	  a	  trend	  that	  accelerated	  following	  the	  1946	  midterm	  elections.	  These	  adaptations	  were	  not	  organized	  moves	  but	  made	  up	  of	  their	  own	  conscious	  and	  unconscious	  daily	  practices.	  This	  point	  sheds	  new	  light	  on	  the	  shift	  in	  U.S.	  occupation	  policy	  for	  Japan—commonly	  known	  as	  the	  “Reverse	  Course,”	  assumed	  to	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  years	  between	  late-­‐1948	  and	  1950.	  	  




Local	  Politics	  of	  the	  “Reverse	  Course”	  Conventionally,	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Reverse	  Course”—from	  the	  policy	  of	  reforming	  Japanese	  society	  to	  that	  of	  restoring	  the	  Japanese	  economy—has	  been	  explained	  as	  resulting	  from	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  This	  explanation	  maintains	  that,	  because	  the	  Cold	  War	  developed	  in	  Europe,	  Washington	  decided	  to	  take	  a	  tougher	  stance	  all	  over	  the	  world,	  including	  East	  Asia,	  thus	  abolishing	  various	  reform-­‐oriented	  policies	  and	  focusing	  more	  on	  rehabilitating	  the	  Japanese	  economy	  to	  use	  Japan	  as	  a	  fortress	  in	  East	  Asia	  against	  the	  threat	  of	  Soviet	  expansion.	  This	  popular	  view	  maintains	  that	  MacArthur	  opposed	  such	  a	  shift,	  but	  decisions	  made	  in	  Washington	  overrode	  the	  GHQ.	  The	  controllers,	  according	  to	  this	  narrative,	  were	  grand	  strategists	  in	  the	  State	  Department,	  such	  as	  George	  F.	  Kennan	  and	  Walton	  W.	  Butterworth,	  who	  took	  new	  positions	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1947	  as	  Director	  of	  the	  Policy	  Planning	  Staff	  and	  Head	  of	  the	  Far	  East	  Division,	  respectively,	  and	  began	  talking	  about	  developing	  Japan	  as	  a	  buffer	  state	  in	  East	  Asia.	  	  In	  fact,	  in	  October	  1948,	  Kennan	  wrote	  the	  NSC-­‐13,	  officially	  recommending	  changes	  in	  U.S.	  occupation	  policy	  for	  Japan,	  a	  document	  that	  often	  seen	  as	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  Reverse	  Course	  in	  Japan.	  The	  diplomat	  later	  recollected	  this	  proposal	  as	  his	  “most	  constructive	  contribution,”	  continuing	  in	  a	  self-­‐congratulatory	  tone,	  “On	  no	  other	  occasion,	  (except	  the	  Marshall	  Plan),	  did	  I	  ever	  make	  recommendations	  of	  such	  scope	  and	  import;	  and	  on	  no	  other	  occasion	  did	  my	  recommendations	  meet	  with	  such	  wide,	  indeed	  almost	  complete,	  acceptance.”65	  Emphasizing	  the	  unity	  and	  consistency	  of	  state	  power	  and	  high-­‐ranking	  policymakers,	  and	  showing	  a	  
                                                65	  For	  policymakers’	  side	  of	  the	  “Reverse	  Course,”	  see	  Schaller,	  The	  American	  Occupation	  of	  Japan,	  104;	  and	  George	  F.	  Kennan,	  Memoir	  1925-­‐1950	  (New	  York:	  Pantheon,	  1967),	  368-­‐96.	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seemingly	  clear	  and	  coherent	  image	  of	  the	  world	  situation,	  the	  story	  of	  the	  “Reverse	  Course	  originating	  from	  Washington’s	  Cold	  War	  strategy”	  has	  since	  become	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  in	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States.66	  Nevertheless,	  looking	  more	  closely,	  such	  a	  conventional	  model	  is	  inadequate	  to	  explain	  the	  phenomenon	  known	  as	  Reverse	  Course.	  First,	  the	  shift	  in	  tones	  of	  occupation	  policies	  began	  well	  before	  Washington	  explicated	  its	  policy	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1948.67	  As	  we	  have	  examined,	  changes	  in	  policies	  had	  already	  occurred	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1946	  in	  a	  more	  bottom-­‐up	  and	  fragmented	  way,	  as	  many	  SCAP	  officials	  personally	  adapted	  to	  the	  new	  political	  climate	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  fact,	  Theodore	  Cohen,	  who	  worked	  in	  the	  GHQ	  between	  1946	  and	  1950,	  recalled	  that	  there	  was	  nothing	  like	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  the	  GHQ	  changed	  its	  occupation	  policy	  because	  of	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  adding	  that	  such	  a	  scenario	  was	  too	  simplistic.68	  Furthermore,	  on	  the	  politicians’	  level	  beyond	  bureaucrats’	  discussions,	  the	  change	  in	  U.S.	  occupation	  policy	  for	  Japan	  was	  contemplated	  and	  adopted	  in	  1948,	  not	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  Cold	  War	  grand	  strategy,	  but	  for	  that	  of	  “trimming	  the	  budget”	  and	  “protecting	  American	  taxpayers.”69	  Needless	  to	  say,	  such	  emphasis	  on	  taxpayers	  came	  to	  surface	  in	  line	  with	  popular	  anti-­‐New	  Deal	  sentiments	  at	  that	  time,	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  with	  the	  1948	  presidential	  election.	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  Schaller,	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  of	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  as	  Amerasia,	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  and	  Mark	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In	  a	  sense,	  domestic-­‐political	  considerations	  were	  particularly	  important	  in	  terms	  of	  supporting	  the	  notion	  of	  rehabilitating	  Japan’s	  economy.	  In	  fact,	  the	  idea	  of	  shifting	  U.S.	  occupation	  policy	  for	  Japan	  had	  been	  widely	  discussed	  and	  had	  been	  popular	  among	  American	  newspapers	  and	  magazines	  since	  the	  summer	  and	  fall	  of	  1946,	  such	  as	  the	  Philadelphia	  Inquirer	  which	  endorsed	  the	  idea	  in	  September	  1946.70	  In	  this	  election	  period,	  particularly	  those	  of	  Republican-­‐leaned	  newspapers	  took	  on	  strident	  tones,	  criticizing	  the	  Department	  of	  State	  for	  allowing	  “New	  Dealish”	  policies	  in	  Japan,	  and	  demanding	  a	  shift	  in	  occupation	  policy	  well	  before	  bureaucrats	  formulated	  such	  policy.	  Seen	  in	  this	  way,	  Washington’s	  policymakers	  actually	  followed	  and	  endorsed	  what	  was	  already	  growing,	  rather	  than	  originating	  it	  as	  part	  of	  Cold	  War	  strategy.	  As	  such,	  the	  role	  of	  so-­‐called	  “grand	  strategy”	  of	  reversing	  U.S.	  policy	  for	  Japan,	  supposed	  to	  be	  thought	  up	  among	  few	  top	  elite	  officials	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  State,	  seems	  less	  vital	  than	  usually	  described.	  To	  be	  sure,	  a	  number	  of	  State	  Department	  officials	  worked	  out	  to	  modify	  the	  direction	  of	  occupation	  policy	  in	  the	  years	  around	  1948-­‐1949,	  producing	  significant	  changes	  in	  American	  policy	  toward	  Japan.	  Yet,	  such	  is	  still	  only	  one	  of	  many	  diverse	  and	  fragmented	  factors,	  which,	  in	  many	  different	  ways,	  contributed	  to	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  Reverse	  Course.	  Those	  include,	  for	  instance,	  personal	  adaptation,	  domestic	  politics,	  popular	  attitudes,	  and	  the	  political	  climate	  at	  that	  time.	  Examination	  of	  these	  diverse	  elements	  that	  shaped	  the	  Reverse	  Course	  is	  important	  for	  it	  clarifies	  the	  imaginary	  and	  constitutive	  nature	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  which	  is	  commonly	  believed	  to	  have	  been	  essential	  to	  the	  Reverse	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Course.	  Simply	  looking	  at	  the	  American	  side,	  the	  shift	  in	  U.S.	  policies	  seems	  more	  personal,	  fragmented,	  and	  domestic-­‐political,	  than	  strategic,	  systematic,	  and	  Cold	  War	  oriented.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  American	  side,	  however,	  there	  were	  much	  more	  fundamental	  factors	  in	  the	  shift	  of	  U.S.	  occupation	  policies—the	  Japanese	  elements.	  	  When	  we	  look	  at	  Japanese	  agency	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Reverse	  Course,	  the	  story	  of	  that	  phenomenon	  seems	  much	  more	  complicated.71	  In	  its	  local	  context,	  the	  Reverse	  Course	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  reflection	  of	  social	  politics	  of	  emerging	  grassroots	  conservatives	  in	  postwar	  Japan.	  It	  was	  a	  struggle	  between	  two	  radically	  different	  versions	  of	  “reality”—that	  is,	  contingent	  and	  continuous.	  One	  “reality”	  was	  that	  a	  large	  number	  of	  the	  Japanese	  people,	  particularly	  the	  young	  and	  urban,	  enthusiastically	  embraced	  postwar	  reforms	  following	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  As	  historian	  John	  Dower	  points	  out,	  many	  Japanese	  raised	  doubts	  about	  established	  orders	  and	  values,	  welcoming	  radical	  changes	  and	  reforms.72	  Nonetheless,	  for	  many,	  particularly	  the	  elderly	  and	  rural,	  who	  made	  up	  the	  majority	  at	  that	  time,	  early	  postwar	  reforms	  looked	  abnormal,	  and	  the	  Reverse	  Course	  appeared	  a	  return	  to	  “normalcy.”	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Reverse	  Course	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  process	  of	  local	  translation—in	  terms	  of	  creative	  interpretation	  in	  locals’	  own	  language—of	  foreign	  influences	  into	  Japanese	  contexts.	  In	  that	  sense,	  the	  Reverse	  Course	  was	  the	  process	  of	  localization	  of	  American	  occupation	  policies.	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This	  point	  should	  be	  clear	  when	  we	  look	  at	  how	  initial	  reform-­‐oriented	  policies	  were	  modified	  or	  discontinued.	  First,	  the	  policy	  of	  dissolving	  the	  zaibatsu	  was	  established	  in	  1946,	  and	  conducted	  initially	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  Anti-­‐Trust	  Division	  of	  the	  GHQ.	  It	  went	  slowly	  in	  the	  beginning	  because	  many	  of	  its	  staff	  came	  from	  American	  business	  circles,	  who	  disliked	  any	  state	  control	  over	  private	  companies.73	  Then,	  liberal	  members	  of	  the	  Government	  Section	  (GS)	  took	  control	  of	  the	  issue	  in	  early	  1946,	  which	  provoked	  bureaucratic	  and	  jurisdictional	  disputes	  between	  the	  two	  divisions.	  GS	  members	  gradually	  lost	  control	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  1947	  due	  to	  mounting	  criticism	  from	  both	  American	  and	  Japanese	  business	  circles	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  they	  were	  “New	  Dealish.”	  Eventually	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  companies	  were	  dissolved	  and	  most	  others	  were	  able	  to	  maintain	  their	  wartime	  forms,	  as	  conservative	  Japanese	  had	  hoped.	  	  The	  U.S.	  policy	  of	  harsh	  and	  punitive	  war	  reparations	  was	  planned	  and	  approved	  in	  the	  early	  period	  of	  the	  occupation,	  but	  eventually	  abolished	  altogether.74	  To	  begin	  with,	  many	  Japanese	  remembered	  World	  War	  II	  as	  the	  war	  against	  the	  United	  States	  and	  thus	  viewed	  themselves	  as	  merely	  “victims”	  of	  the	  war,	  rather	  than	  as	  aggressors	  in	  Asia.	  This	  framework	  attenuated	  an	  angle	  of	  reparation	  as	  a	  central	  issue	  of	  Japan’s	  war	  responsibility.	  In	  fact,	  except	  for	  a	  few	  intellectuals	  like	  a	  novelist	  Ara	  Masato,	  who	  had	  been	  problematizing	  the	  war	  responsibility	  of	  the	  literati,	  many	  economists	  and	  scholars	  tended	  to	  discuss	  the	  reparation	  issue	  only	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  rehabilitation	  of	  the	  Japanese	  economy,	  thus	  viewing	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reparation	  solely	  as	  a	  burden.	  Such	  economists’	  arguments	  seemed	  credible	  when	  they	  were	  used	  to	  explain	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Nazis	  as	  a	  result	  of	  heavy	  reparations	  on	  Germany	  after	  World	  War	  I.	  A	  notable	  social	  scientist	  Ouchi	  Hyoe,	  for	  instance,	  commented	  on	  war	  reparations	  that,	  due	  to	  Japan’s	  insolvency,	  there	  would	  be	  no	  way	  but	  to	  say	  “forgive	  us.”75	  Because	  the	  issue	  appeared	  for	  many	  solely	  as	  an	  economic	  one,	  the	  cancellation	  of	  war	  reparations	  did	  not	  come	  up	  as	  a	  “reverse	  course.”	  It	  went	  along	  perfectly	  with	  their	  wishes,	  particularly	  for	  conservatives	  and	  businessmen.	  Similarly,	  the	  tone	  of	  labor	  policy	  changed	  radically	  from	  encouraging	  labor	  activism	  to	  limiting	  and	  restricting	  it.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  domestic	  political	  shift	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  MacArthur’s	  adaptation	  to	  it,	  conservative	  Japanese	  politicians	  played	  roles	  in	  containing	  the	  power	  of	  labor,	  as	  well.	  For	  instance,	  MacArthur’s	  “directive”	  to	  Prime	  Minister	  Ashida	  Hitoshi	  in	  July	  1948	  to	  ban	  strikes	  among	  governmental	  workers	  is	  well-­‐known;	  yet,	  as	  historian	  Koseki	  Shoichi	  reveals,	  it	  was	  actually	  issued	  in	  response	  to	  a	  request	  from	  Ashida’s	  side	  to	  MacArthur	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  “stabilizing”	  society.76	  Japanese	  conservatives’	  strategy	  to	  use	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  GHQ	  to	  maintain	  social	  stability	  can	  be	  seen	  around	  the	  issue	  of	  communist	  activities	  in	  Japan,	  too.	  Although	  the	  policy	  of	  releasing	  Japanese	  communists	  from	  prisons	  was	  enacted	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  GHQ,	  such	  policy	  was	  literally	  reversed	  due	  to	  mounting	  objections	  from	  conservatives	  in	  both	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countries.	  Such	  an	  attack	  on	  communists	  was	  nothing	  new;	  a	  quarter-­‐century’s	  memories	  of	  communists	  in	  Japan	  as	  illegal	  at	  best	  and	  more	  commonly	  as	  sorts	  of	  gangsters,	  fanatics,	  or	  even	  epidemic	  diseases	  did	  not	  suddenly	  disappear	  from	  the	  minds	  of	  many	  people.	  	  	   As	  leftist	  agendas	  and	  labor	  activism	  were	  on	  defense,	  old	  bosses	  came	  back.	  The	  policy	  of	  purging	  former-­‐regime	  bosses	  and	  military	  officials—often	  called	  the	  “White	  Purge”	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  “Red	  Purge”	  years	  later—was	  executed	  by	  1946.	  However,	  it	  was	  gradually	  lifted	  through	  the	  tireless	  efforts	  of	  Japanese	  and	  American	  conservatives	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed,	  which	  bore	  fruit	  beginning	  in	  late-­‐1948	  with	  the	  release	  of	  A-­‐class	  war	  criminal	  suspects,	  such	  as	  Kishi	  Nobusuke,	  Kodama	  Yoshio,	  and	  Sasagawa	  Ryoichi.77	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  “White	  Purge”	  was	  not	  particularly	  effective	  because	  many	  purged	  persons	  could	  find	  “pride”	  in	  being	  expelled.	  One	  translator	  recalled	  that,	  when	  one	  was	  purged,	  people	  considered	  him	  to	  have	  been	  recognized	  by	  the	  GHQ	  as	  a	  “first	  rank	  citizen	  of	  Japan.”	  If	  one	  was	  not	  dismissed,	  people	  whispered,	  “He	  was	  such	  small	  people	  [sic],	  so	  that	  he	  was	  not	  even	  purged.”78	  This	  sort	  of	  local	  and	  social	  recognition	  helped	  to	  maintain	  old-­‐bosses’	  prestige	  in	  their	  communities.	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  the	  high	  respect	  they	  received	  when	  the	  “Reverse	  Course”	  resulted	  in	  their	  returning	  to	  their	  hometowns.	  
                                                77	  Nakamura	  Masanori,	  “Senryo	  toha	  nandatta	  noka	  [What	  was	  the	  Occupation?]”	  in	  Rekishigaku	  kenkyukai	  ed.,	  Senryo	  seisaku	  no	  tenkan	  to	  kowa	  [The	  Shift	  of	  Occupation	  Policy	  and	  the	  Peace	  Treaty],	  238.	  78	  Ai	  Kume,	  “The	  Reminiscences	  of	  Ai	  Kume,	  Occupation	  of	  Japan,	  1975,”	  23,	  OHC,	  Columbia	  University.	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The	  clearest	  example	  of	  the	  Reverse	  Course	  as	  a	  return	  to	  “normalcy”	  was	  the	  revival	  of	  conservative	  Japanese	  politicians	  and	  bureaucrats,	  who	  had	  believed	  that	  SCAP	  programs	  were	  too	  far	  on	  the	  left.	  As	  they	  became	  accustomed	  to	  the	  U.S.	  occupation,	  these	  Japanese	  actors	  learned	  how	  to	  behave	  and	  take	  advantage	  of	  factional	  disputes	  in	  the	  GHQ.	  Prime	  Minister	  Yoshida	  Shigeru,	  for	  example,	  continuously	  stressed	  the	  size	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  communist	  influence	  in	  Japan.	  In	  his	  dozens	  of	  letters	  to	  MacArthur,	  he	  repeatedly	  brought	  up	  the	  political	  and	  economical	  instability	  of	  his	  government.	  Once	  he	  learned	  that	  this	  strategy	  was	  effective	  in	  slowing	  down,	  or	  even	  canceling,	  early	  reform	  policies,	  Yoshida	  and	  conservatives	  repeatedly	  used	  similar	  anti-­‐communist	  language	  to	  achieve	  domestic	  and	  personal	  goals.79	  This	  was	  exactly	  what	  East	  Asia	  expert	  Owen	  Lattimore	  had	  predicted	  and	  worried	  about	  in	  late	  1945,	  stating	  that	  the	  Japanese	  would	  use	  the	  threat	  of	  revolution	  to	  stampede	  the	  Americans,	  and	  that	  the	  United	  States,	  afraid	  of	  the	  specter	  of	  revolution,	  would	  eventually	  abandon	  radical	  programs.80	  	  Briefly	  examining	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Reverse	  Course,”	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  was	  solely	  directed	  from	  Washington	  as	  part	  of	  Cold	  War	  strategy.	  At	  its	  core,	  the	  phenomenon	  was	  more	  local,	  personal,	  and	  fragmented,	  although	  such	  messy	  minor	  factors	  were	  often	  hidden	  under	  the	  mantle	  of	  a	  heroic,	  clear,	  and	  seemingly	  coherent	  narrative	  of	  American	  Cold	  War	  strategy.	  In	  fact,	  it	  was	  the	  Japanese	  newspaper	  Yomiuri	  Shinbun	  that	  gave	  the	  name	  of	  “Gyaku	  kosu	  
                                                79Bisson,	  Nihon	  senryo	  kaiso	  ki	  [A	  Memoir	  of	  Occupation	  of	  Japan],	  June	  9,	  1946,	  94-­‐95;	  Dower,	  Empire	  
and	  Aftermath,	  295;	  and	  Yoshida	  Shigeru,	  Kaiso	  junen	  [Recollections	  of	  Ten	  Years]	  (Tokyo:	  Shinchosha,	  1957)	  .	  Also,	  see	  Seabald’s	  memoir,	  Nihon	  senryo	  gaiko	  no	  kaiso	  [Memoir	  of	  Japanese	  
Occupation	  Diplomacy],	  82.	  80	  Schaller,	  The	  American	  Occupation	  of	  Japan,	  36.	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[reverse	  course]”	  to	  various	  shifts	  in	  U.S.	  occupation	  policies	  and	  activities,	  and	  published	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  “Toto	  taru	  gyaku	  kosu	  [Rushing	  Reverse	  Course]”	  in	  1951,	  combining	  fragmented	  stories	  as	  if	  they	  had	  a	  single	  root.	  This	  view	  permeated	  Japan,	  and	  indeed	  extended	  beyond	  its	  borders.	  Several	  countries	  in	  East	  Asia	  and	  the	  Pacific,	  such	  as	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand,	  and	  the	  Philippines,	  were	  similarly	  alarmed	  by	  the	  shift	  in	  U.S.	  occupation	  policy.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  this	  emerging	  trend	  disturbed	  tens	  of	  thousands	  in	  China.	  	  	  
Memories	  of	  War	  and	  Chinese	  Reactions	  to	  the	  Perceived	  “Reverse	  Course”	  	  “It	  is	  an	  iron	  fact	  that	  the	  American	  imperialists	  are	  helping	  Japan.	  It	  is	  a	  100-­‐percent	  fact	  that	  we	  do	  not	  need	  even	  to	  discuss.	  The	  fact	  of	  America’s	  restoring	  of	  Japan	  creates	  a	  grave	  threat	  for	  China.	  All	  Chinese	  must	  raise	  an	  objection	  to	  it.	  It	  is	  very	  strange	  that	  the	  government	  remains	  hostile	  to	  such	  patriotic	  movements.”	  So	  said	  one	  speaker	  in	  one	  of	  many	  anti-­‐American	  forums	  in	  Shanghai	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1948.81	  Whatever	  the	  real	  factors	  were,	  the	  shift	  in	  U.S.	  occupation	  policy	  for	  Japan	  was	  readily	  felt	  across	  the	  sea	  in	  the	  years	  between	  1946	  and	  1948,	  and	  sparked	  popular	  outcries,	  which	  were	  widely	  known	  as	  “fan	  MeifuRi	  [Opposing	  the	  U.S.	  support	  of	  Japan].”	  As	  in	  Japan,	  many	  Chinese	  viewed	  the	  “Reverse	  Course”	  as	  a	  deliberate	  reversal	  in	  America’s	  Asian	  strategy	  that	  indicates	  a	  coherent	  intention	  to	  rehabilitate	  the	  Japanese	  economy,	  revive	  conservative	  elements,	  and	  use	  Japan	  as	  a	  fortress	  to	  invade	  China.	  In	  Shanghai	  where	  the	  movements	  first	  became	  popular,	  
                                                81	  “Shanghaishi	  jinchaju	  zhengzhichu	  guanyu	  Shanghai	  gongyun	  xueyun	  qingkuan	  huibian	  ziliao	  [Shanghai	  Police	  Department	  Political	  Section’s	  Collection	  of	  Documents	  Regarding	  the	  Situation	  of	  Shanghai	  Labor	  and	  Student	  Movements]	  (Hereafter	  “Shanghai	  gongyun	  xueyun	  qingkuan”),”	  Q131-­‐6-­‐530,	  the	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Shanghai,	  PRC	  (hereafter	  SMA).	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for	  instance,	  approximately	  15,000	  college	  and	  high-­‐school	  students	  joined	  a	  demonstration	  on	  May	  4,	  1948,	  against	  American	  policy	  in	  Japan	  (Picture	  3).	  Such	  demonstrations	  evoked	  sympathies	  nationwide,	  in	  Beiping	  (Beijing),	  Tianjin,	  Kunming,	  Guangzhou,	  Xiamen,	  and	  Changchun,	  bringing	  various	  existing	  anti-­‐government	  and	  anti-­‐American	  movements	  together	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  fan	  
MeifuRi,	  which	  generated	  a	  base	  for	  long-­‐lasting	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments.82	  	  Because	  of	  the	  extremely	  fast	  and	  vigorous	  development	  of	  these	  movements,	  many	  contemporaries,	  particularly	  Nationalist	  members	  and	  sympathizers,	  as	  well	  as	  American	  observers,	  believed	  that	  communist	  propaganda	  and	  manipulation	  created	  them.	  After	  observing	  the	  spread	  of	  student	  movements	  nationwide,	  for	  instance,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  [Jiang	  Jieshi]	  angrily	  wrote	  in	  his	  diary	  that	  communist-­‐supported	  “professional	  students”	  had	  instigated	  other	  students.	  Based	  on	  this	  viewpoint,	  police	  departments	  in	  cities	  were	  ordered	  to	  investigate	  and	  make	  lists	  of	  such	  “professional	  students”	  stirring	  the	  movements.83	  The	  American	  ambassador	  to	  China,	  J.	  Leighton	  Stuart	  agreed	  to	  the	  Generalissimo,	  attributing	  the	  students’	  and	  intellectuals’	  opposition	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  communists’	  “engineering	  and	  manipulation.”	  	  Likewise,	  the	  Consul	  General	  in	  Shanghai,	  John	  Cabot,	  stated	  that	  students	  who	  took	  an	  anti-­‐American	  stance	  were	  deceived	  by	  “sinister	  propaganda.”84	  	  
                                                82	  Hong	  Zhang,	  America	  Perceived:	  The	  Making	  of	  Chinese	  Images	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  1945-­‐1953	  (Westport,	  CN:	  Greenwood	  Press,	  2002),	  125-­‐27.	  	  	  	  83	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  May	  28,	  1946,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  Diaries	  (hereafter	  CKSD),	  Box	  46,	  Hoover	  Institution	  Archives	  (hereafter	  HIA),	  Stanford	  University,	  Stanford,	  CA.	  Beipin	  shi	  jingcha	  ju	  guanyu…	  cha	  xuesheng	  wei	  fanfuRi	  qunzhong	  youxing…deng	  xunling	  [Beijing	  Police	  Department	  regarding	  directives	  on…examining	  students	  attending	  mass	  demonstrations],”	  13,	  J183-­‐2-­‐29849,	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Beijing,	  PRC	  (hereafter	  BMA).	  84	  Hong	  Zhang,	  America	  Perceived,	  127-­‐28.	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However,	  the	  development	  of	  fan	  MeifuRi	  and	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  during	  this	  period	  were	  not	  simply	  products	  of	  communist	  orders,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  (CCP)	  took	  full	  advantage	  of	  the	  situation	  and	  greatly	  benefited	  from	  the	  political	  climate	  the	  movement	  fostered.85	  First	  and	  foremost,	  objections	  to	  U.S.	  occupation	  policy	  for	  Japan	  actually	  began	  in	  Nationalist-­‐Party	  (GMD)-­‐leaning	  newspapers	  and	  non-­‐partisan	  newspapers	  in	  Shanghai	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1946.	  One	  major	  newspaper	  that	  touted	  non-­‐partisanship,	  Da	  Gong	  Bao,	  asserted	  that,	  despite	  a	  radical	  transformation	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  the	  system	  of	  Japanese	  militarism	  and	  its	  economic	  infrastructure	  still	  firmly	  existed.86	  An	  editorial	  in	  July	  1946	  argued:	  	  Japan	  made	  a	  mistake.	  Yet,	  it	  has	  not	  collapsed	  and	  does	  not	  have	  [an	  internal]	  war,	  and	  the	  country	  has	  now	  devoted	  itself	  to	  the	  task	  of	  reconstruction.	  This	  race	  still	  has	  power.	  Deep	  down,	  the	  Japanese	  do	  not	  respect	  China,	  as	  was	  made	  clear	  by	  some	  arrogant	  words	  of	  repatriated	  soldiers	  when	  they	  left	  China—“We	  will	  come	  back	  in	  twenty	  years.”	  Under	  the	  moderate	  U.S.	  occupation	  policy,	  the	  old	  forces	  of	  Japan	  wore	  the	  mantle	  of	  democracy,	  and,	  surely,	  some	  part	  of	  the	  militarists	  and	  
zaibatsu	  were	  cleaned	  up.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  democratic	  forces	  in	  Japan	  are	  still	  weak,	  and	  all	  of	  the	  reforms	  remain	  incomplete	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  emperor	  and	  senior	  statesmen	  […].	  Although	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  retaliate	  against	  Japan,	  the	  questions	  of	  how	  to	  eradicate	  Japanese	  militarism,	  and	  how	  to	  guide	  Japan	  to	  follow	  the	  road	  of	  democracy	  should	  be	  the	  most	  important	  tasks	  for	  postwar	  Chinese	  diplomacy.87	  	  
Da	  Gong	  Bao’s	  attitude	  was	  shared	  by	  another	  popular	  independent	  newspaper	  in	  Shanghai,	  Fei	  Bao:	  “MacArthur	  is	  too	  generous.	  The	  Japanese	  are	  maneuvering	  him	  deviously	  and	  trying	  to	  restore	  themselves,”	  adding	  that	  the	  emperor	  should	  bear	  
                                                85	  For	  the	  overview	  of	  student	  movements,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Jeffrey	  Wasserstrom,	  Student	  Protests	  in	  
Twentieth-­‐Century	  China:	  The	  View	  from	  Shanghai	  (Stanford,	  1991).	  Besides	  pro-­‐government	  and	  anti-­‐government	  factions	  within	  student	  movements,	  Wasserstrom	  argues	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  students	  circa	  1947	  claimed	  that	  they	  were	  not	  supporters	  of	  either	  side	  but	  neutral	  critics	  of	  both	  the	  parties.	  Wasserstrom,	  Student	  Protests	  in	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  China,	  241.	  	  86	  Da	  Gong	  Bao	  (Shanghai),	  July	  5,	  1946,Northeastern	  Normal	  University	  Library	  (hereafter	  NNUL),	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  87	  Da	  Gong	  Bao	  (Tianjin),	  July	  25,	  1946,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	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the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  war,	  and	  that	  Japan	  should	  pay	  reparations	  to	  China.88	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  fan	  MeifuRi	  movements	  in	  May	  1948,	  Da	  Gong	  Bao	  similarly	  raised	  its	  voice,	  saying,	  “The	  threat	  is	  extremely	  grave	  for	  China.	  If	  Japan	  would	  re-­‐arm,	  then	  naturally	  China	  would	  be	  the	  target	  of	  an	  attack.	  We	  need	  to	  firmly	  oppose	  [America’s	  restoring	  of	  Japan].”89	  It	  was	  no	  wonder	  that	  the	  paper	  vehemently	  opposed	  Leighton	  Stuart’s	  statement	  attributing	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  movements	  to	  a	  communist	  plot.90	  	  Not	  only	  communist	  sympathizers	  but	  also	  Nationalist	  sympathizers	  disagreed	  with	  Stuart’s	  view.	  Although	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek’s	  tolerant	  and	  moderate	  policy	  toward	  Japan—	  the	  “return	  good	  for	  evil”	  policy—had	  been	  praised	  since	  the	  surrender	  of	  Japan,	  disagreements	  from	  within	  came	  to	  the	  surface	  as	  the	  news	  of	  “America’s	  policy	  of	  rebuilding	  Japan”	  continued	  to	  spread.	  Even	  the	  Nationalist	  Party’s	  official	  organ,	  Zhongyang	  Ribao,	  expressed	  dissatisfaction	  in	  April	  of	  1948.91	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  nevertheless,	  publicly	  reconfirmed	  his	  support	  for	  American	  policy	  in	  the	  following	  month,	  further	  exacerbating	  dissatisfaction	  among	  party	  members	  and	  their	  sympathizers,	  such	  as	  intellectuals	  and	  businessmen.	  	  Such	  discord	  within	  the	  party	  could	  be	  seen	  in	  one	  of	  the	  protest	  forums	  in	  Shanghai.	  A	  student	  asked:	  “Why	  does	  today’s	  government	  agree	  to	  the	  American	  policy	  of	  building	  Japan?”	  One	  panelist,	  a	  specialist	  of	  international	  relations	  and	  a	  GMD	  member	  for	  twenty	  years,	  replied:	  “In	  fact,	  governmental	  officials	  are	  not	  
                                                88	  Fei	  Bao	  (Shanghai),	  March	  19,	  1947,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC;	  Fei	  Bao,	  September	  15,	  1947,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  	  	  	  89	  Da	  Gong	  Bao	  (Shanghai),	  May	  11,	  1948,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  	  90	  Da	  Gong	  Bao	  (Shanghai),	  June	  5,	  1948;	  Da	  Gong	  Bao	  (Tianjin),	  June	  19,	  1948,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  	  91	  Zhongyang	  Ribao	  (Nanjing),	  April	  11,	  1948,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	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necessarily	  all	  agreeing	  to	  that	  policy.	  I	  have	  many	  friends	  in	  political	  and	  military	  circles	  who	  are	  deeply	  concerned	  about	  this	  issue.	  They	  have	  lots	  of	  thinking	  in	  their	  hearts,	  while	  not	  speaking	  out	  publicly.”92	  One	  who	  spoke	  out	  at	  that	  time	  was	  the	  Vice	  President	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  China,	  Li	  Songren,	  who	  was	  known	  for	  his	  critical	  attitudes	  toward	  American	  policy.	  Also,	  many	  businessmen,	  who	  were	  not	  typically	  communist	  sympathizers,	  lined	  up	  to	  take	  part	  in	  the	  fan	  MeifuRi	  movements.	  One	  businessman	  stated	  in	  another	  forum,	  “We	  need	  to	  oppose	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  of	  helping	  Japan	  because	  the	  policy	  is	  wrong	  and	  because	  it	  would	  pose	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people.”	  He	  asserted,	  “Opposing	  the	  [American	  policy	  of]	  restoring	  Japan	  is	  patriotic;	  not	  opposing	  it	  is	  a	  betrayal	  of	  our	  country!”93	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  Communist	  Party	  had	  been	  encouraging	  anti-­‐government	  and	  anti-­‐American	  demonstrations,	  actively	  intervening	  and	  promoting	  student	  movements.	  The	  CCP,	  in	  fact,	  had	  decided	  to	  take	  an	  anti-­‐American	  stance	  by	  July	  1946,	  and	  pronounced	  its	  opposition	  to	  the	  American	  policy	  of	  rebuilding	  Japan	  in	  July	  1947,	  according	  to	  the	  Shanghai	  Police	  Department’s	  confidential	  investigation.94	  However,	  this	  kind	  of	  opposition	  was	  not	  particularly	  unique	  to	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  A	  number	  of	  independent	  newspapers,	  like	  Da	  Gong	  Bao	  and	  Fei	  
Bao,	  had	  expressed	  a	  similar	  view,	  and	  it	  was	  quite	  well-­‐received	  by	  that	  time.	  In	  addition,	  dissenting	  opinions	  concerning	  the	  shift	  in	  U.S.	  policy	  were	  observed	  not	  
                                                92	  Meng	  Xianzhang,	  June	  3,	  1948,	  in	  “Jiaoda	  tongxun	  [Shanghai	  Jiaotong	  University	  Report],”	  D2-­‐0-­‐898,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  	  93	  Chen	  Shutong,	  May	  26,	  1948,	  in	  “Shanghai	  gongyun	  xueyun	  qingkuan	  [The	  Situation	  of	  Shanghai	  Labor	  and	  Student	  Movements],”	  Q131-­‐6-­‐530,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  94	  “1947	  niandu	  Shanghai	  xueyun	  ciliao	  [Materials	  on	  Shanghai	  Student	  Movements	  in	  1947],”	  Q131-­‐6-­‐464,	  SMA;	  Zuo	  Shuangwen	  and	  Chen	  Wei,	  1948	  nian	  “fan	  MeifuRi”	  yundong	  ji	  qi	  yu	  guoming	  zhengfu	  de	  hudong	  [“The	  Movements	  of	  Opposing	  the	  U.S.	  Support	  of	  Japan	  in	  1948	  and	  Its	  Interactions	  with	  the	  Nationalist	  Government”],”	  Guangdong	  shehui	  kexue	  6	  (2006),	  101-­‐106.	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only	  in	  China	  but	  also	  in	  countries	  far	  beyond	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  CCP,	  including	  the	  Philippines,	  Australia,	  and	  New	  Zealand.95	  Given	  the	  growing	  opposition	  among	  GMD	  members	  and	  sympathizers,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  in	  other	  countries,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  attribute	  the	  development	  of	  the	  fan	  MeifuRi	  movements	  solely	  to	  the	  CCP’s	  propaganda	  and	  mobilization.	  Rather,	  it	  is	  more	  reasonable	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Communist	  Party	  quickly	  and	  aptly	  adapted	  itself	  to	  popular	  mentalities	  of	  that	  period.	  	   If	  Communist	  Party	  control	  did	  not	  explain	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  fan	  MeifuRi	  movements	  and	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  in	  this	  period,	  what	  factors	  could	  help	  render	  an	  account?	  The	  key	  was	  anti-­‐colonial	  sentiments	  on	  the	  part	  of	  millions	  of	  Chinese	  people—more	  specifically,	  again,	  their	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  This	  explains	  why	  similar	  sentiments	  were	  observed	  in	  several	  countries	  in	  the	  Asia-­‐Pacific	  region,	  and	  why	  such	  feelings	  were	  strongest	  in	  China.	  For	  many	  Chinese,	  World	  War	  II	  meant	  the	  War	  Against	  Japan—the	  war	  in	  which	  millions	  of	  Chinese	  perished,	  evoking	  countless	  images	  of	  brutal	  Japanese	  imperialism	  and	  of	  its	  slaughter	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people.	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  fan	  MeifuRi	  movements	  developed	  so	  quickly	  and	  widely	  because	  the	  change	  in	  U.S.	  occupation	  policy	  for	  Japan	  was	  observed	  through	  memories	  of	  Japanese	  imperialism.	  To	  spread	  such	  sentiments	  nationwide,	  the	  CCP	  should	  not	  have	  needed	  any	  propaganda	  or	  manipulation;	  after	  all,	  it	  was	  the	  Japanese	  military	  that	  invaded	  the	  country,	  including	  thousands	  of	  small	  towns	  and	  villages,	  conducting	  the	  operations	  the	  Chinese	  called	  “kill	  all,	  plunder	  all,	  and	  burn	  all,”	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people.	  	  
                                                95	  Hong	  Zhang,	  America	  Perceived,	  140.	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   Memories	  of	  the	  war	  were	  everywhere	  (Picture	  4).	  Writers	  and	  journalists	  in	  newspapers	  and	  magazines,	  as	  well	  as	  panelists,	  moderators,	  and	  students	  in	  many	  forums	  and	  demonstrations,	  almost	  all	  referred	  to	  their	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  war	  when	  they	  expressed	  harsh	  critiques	  of	  American	  policy	  in	  Japan.	  One	  fan	  
MeifuRi	  forum,	  held	  on	  June	  3,	  1948,	  actually	  began	  with	  a	  one-­‐minute	  silence	  for	  the	  war	  dead.	  Then,	  a	  moderator	  addressed	  to	  the	  audience	  of	  3,500,	  including	  prominent	  guests,	  such	  as	  the	  mayor	  of	  Shanghai,	  Wu	  Guozhen,	  as	  well	  as	  scholars,	  businessmen,	  and	  other	  Nationalist	  Party	  members:	  	  	  During	  the	  eight	  years	  of	  the	  War	  Against	  Japan,	  we,	  each	  of	  us,	  deeply	  experienced	  the	  cruelty	  of	  Japanese	  fascism.	  Through	  our	  own	  eyes,	  we	  saw	  our	  fathers	  and	  brothers	  die	  beneath	  the	  sword	  of	  Japanese	  fascism,	  and	  saw	  our	  sisters	  violated	  by	  Japanese	  fascism,	  and	  our	  houses	  were	  demolished.	  But	  in	  the	  end	  we	  won	  a	  victory.	  This	  victory	  was	  won	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  thousands	  and	  millions	  of	  Chinese	  people’s	  lives.	  	  Today,	  even	  before	  the	  bloodstain	  gets	  dry,	  Japanese	  fascism	  has	  been	  reviving	  with	  the	  help	  of	  American	  imperialism.96	  	  In	  this	  forum,	  eight	  speakers,	  including	  this	  moderator,	  gave	  speeches;	  not	  one	  failed	  to	  refer	  to	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  the	  previous	  war.	  In	  another	  forum,	  on	  May	  26,	  1948,	  seventeen	  panelists—including	  the	  widow	  of	  renowned	  	  novelist	  Lu	  Xun,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  economist,	  chemist,	  historian,	  businessman,	  journalist,	  and	  various	  lawyers,	  editors,	  professors,	  and	  others—spoke,	  and	  again	  everyone	  alluded	  to	  their	  war	  experiences	  as	  grounds	  for	  opposition	  to	  American	  policy	  in	  Japan.97	  	  Throughout	  this	  period,	  such	  “anti-­‐American”	  calls	  were	  usually	  anti-­‐American	  “policy”	  and	  anti-­‐American	  “government”	  supporting	  Japan,	  but	  not	  yet	  really	  “anti-­‐America”	  or	  “anti-­‐Americans.”	  What	  these	  appeals	  commonly	  shared	  
                                                96	  Wu	  Zhendong,	  June	  3,	  1948,	  in	  “Shanghai	  gongyun	  xueyun	  qingkuan	  [The	  Situation	  of	  Shanghai	  Labor	  and	  Student	  Movements],”	  Q131-­‐6-­‐530,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	  The	  full-­‐text	  of	  the	  forum,	  including	  questions	  and	  answers	  between	  students	  and	  guests,	  was	  recorded	  by	  three	  stenographers.	  	  97	  The	  detail	  of	  the	  forum	  on	  May	  26,	  1948	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  “Shanghai	  gongyun	  xueyun	  qingkuan	  [The	  Situation	  of	  Shanghai	  Labor	  and	  Student	  Movements],”	  Q131-­‐6-­‐530,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	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was,	  rather,	  skepticism	  and	  distrust	  toward	  Japan	  due	  to	  bitter	  memories	  of	  the	  war.	  Some	  speakers	  in	  these	  forums	  even	  spared	  time	  to	  state	  that	  their	  “anti-­‐American”	  views	  represented	  opposition	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  particularly	  concerning	  its	  policy	  in	  Japan,	  but	  not	  toward	  the	  “American	  people”	  in	  general.98	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  although	  independent	  newspapers	  and	  GMD-­‐leaning	  local	  papers	  continued	  to	  criticize	  the	  Nationalist	  government’s	  weak	  diplomacy	  and	  the	  American	  policy	  of	  restoring	  Japan,	  at	  the	  core	  of	  these	  critiques	  lay	  deep	  skepticism	  toward	  Japan,	  rather	  than	  toward	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  United	  States	  was	  criticized	  because	  it	  appeared	  to	  be	  “supporting	  Japanese	  imperialism	  and	  conservative	  elements,”	  and	  the	  GMD	  was	  condemned	  for	  following	  the	  American	  policy	  without	  expressing	  any	  sign	  of	  independent	  opinions.99	  	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  discern	  the	  specter	  of	  Japanese	  imperialism	  still	  lingering	  beneath	  the	  development	  of	  the	  fan	  MeifuRi	  movements.	  As	  in	  many	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II	  set	  overall	  contexts	  in	  China,	  through	  which	  every	  contemporary	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  affair	  was	  observed.	  This	  effect	  was	  particularly	  strong	  in	  political	  and	  social	  arenas,	  and	  this	  point	  provides	  a	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  spread	  of	  anti-­‐government	  and	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  during	  the	  Chinese	  Civil	  War.	  	  	  
Anti-­‐Government	  and	  Anti-­‐American	  Sentiments	  
                                                98	  Such	  remarks	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  both	  of	  forums	  on	  May	  26	  and	  June	  3,	  1948.	  “Shanghai	  gongyun	  xueyun	  qingkuan	  [The	  Situation	  of	  Shanghai	  Labor	  and	  Student	  Movements],”	  Q131-­‐6-­‐530,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	  99	  Da	  Gong	  Bao,	  (Shanghai),	  June	  11,	  1947,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  See	  also	  Tillman	  Durdin’s	  article,	  “U.S.	  Help	  to	  Japan	  Is	  Alarming	  China,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  November	  2,	  1946.	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The	  Chinese	  Civil	  War	  between	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  and	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party,	  which	  resumed	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1946,	  was,	  of	  course,	  fought	  on	  battlefields.	  Seen	  purely	  in	  terms	  of	  military	  capability,	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  forces	  surpassed	  those	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  roughly	  four	  to	  one.100	  Not	  surprisingly,	  the	  war,	  in	  the	  beginning,	  evolved	  in	  a	  way	  advantageous	  to	  Nationalist	  forces;	  they,	  in	  fact,	  captured	  the	  CCP’s	  base	  camp,	  Yanan,	  in	  1947,	  and,	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  1948,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  could	  say	  bombastically	  that	  they	  would	  be	  able	  to	  sweep	  out	  all	  communists	  within	  a	  year.	  Nonetheless,	  GMD	  forces	  suffered	  decisive	  defeats	  later	  in	  that	  year,	  eventually	  causing	  them	  to	  retreat	  to	  Taiwan	  in	  1949.	  How	  did	  this	  happen?	  Why	  did	  the	  tide	  of	  war	  turn	  to	  become	  advantageous	  to	  the	  Communist	  forces	  in	  the	  end?101	  The	  key	  to	  these	  questions	  involves	  the	  particular	  nature	  of	  this	  
                                                100	  Amako	  Satoshi,	  Chuka	  jinmin	  kyowa	  koku	  shi	  [A	  History	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China]	  (Tokyo:	  Iwanami	  shoten,	  2005	  [1997]);	  For	  the	  best	  overview	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Civil	  War,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  Decisive	  Encounters:	  The	  Chinese	  Civil	  War,	  1946-­‐1950	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  	  101	  Scholars	  have	  presented	  diverse	  perspectives	  to	  explain	  the	  communist	  victory	  in	  China.	  In	  particular,	  the	  roles	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	  people	  have	  been	  among	  the	  most	  controversial	  topics.	  Some	  scholars	  have	  stressed	  grassroots	  agency,	  focusing	  on	  either	  peasants’	  nationalism,	  their	  acceptance	  of	  CCP	  programs,	  or	  their	  defense	  of	  their	  own	  local	  economies.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  respectively,	  Chalmers	  Johnson,	  Peasant	  Nationalism	  and	  Communist	  
Power:	  The	  Emergence	  of	  Revolutionary	  China	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1962),	  and	  Mark	  Selden,	  The	  Yenan	  Way	  in	  Revolutionary	  China	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1971),	  and	  Ralph	  Thaxton,	  Salt	  of	  the	  Earth:	  The	  Political	  Origins	  of	  Peasant	  Protest	  and	  Communist	  Revolution	  in	  
China	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1997).	  Maurice	  Meisner,	  among	  them,	  provides	  perhaps	  the	  most	  populist	  approach,	  highlighting	  popular	  support	  and	  participation	  in	  revolutionary	  struggles.	  Meisner,	  Mao’s	  China	  and	  After:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1999	  [1977]).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  other	  scholars	  have	  underscored	  the	  crucial	  roles	  of	  the	  CCP	  in	  the	  creation,	  organization,	  and	  maintenance	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Revolution.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Frederick	  C	  Teiwes,	  Politics	  &	  purges	  in	  China:	  Rectification	  and	  the	  Decline	  of	  Party	  Norms,	  1950-­‐1965	  (Armonk,	  NY:	  M.E.	  Sharpe,	  1979),	  Steven	  Levine,	  Anvil	  of	  Victory:	  The	  Communist	  Revolution	  in	  Manchuria,	  
1945-­‐1948	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1987);	  Odoric	  Wou,	  Mobilizing	  the	  Masses:	  
Building	  Revolution	  in	  Henan	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1994);	  Joseph	  K.S.	  Yick,	  Making	  
urban	  revolution	  in	  China:	  the	  CCP-­‐GMD	  struggle	  for	  Beiping-­‐Tianjin,	  1945-­‐1949	  (Armonk,	  NY:	  M.E.	  Sharpe,	  1995);	  and	  James	  Gao,	  The	  Communist	  Takeover	  of	  Hangzhou:	  The	  Transformation	  of	  City	  and	  
Cadre,	  1949-­‐1954	  (Honolulu:	  University	  of	  Hawaii	  Press,	  2004).	  Among	  them,	  Steven	  Levine,	  for	  example,	  criticizes	  the	  term	  “peasant	  revolution”	  as	  misleading,	  and	  highlights	  Communist	  Party’s	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war.	  It	  was	  fought	  not	  only	  on	  battlefields	  but	  also	  within	  society	  over	  a	  sense	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  authority,	  and	  such	  “battles”	  were	  no	  less	  important	  than	  real	  combat	  in	  the	  Civil	  War.	  After	  all,	  many	  cities	  surrendered	  to	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  without	  fierce	  battles.	  What	  mattered	  in	  the	  war	  was	  the	  politics	  of	  trust	  among	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  population.	  In	  such	  battle,	  “minxin”—literally,	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  people—was	  crucial.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  neither	  anti-­‐GMD-­‐government	  nor	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  began	  in	  ideological	  confrontation.	  Many	  people’s	  problems	  with	  the	  Nationalist	  government	  were	  more	  local	  and	  specific.	  Take	  Shanghai	  as	  an	  example.	  A	  minor	  problem	  might	  have	  been	  only	  about	  a	  local	  public	  policy,	  as	  one	  “reactionary”	  wall-­‐scribbling	  read:	  “Government	  officials,	  you	  don’t	  need	  to	  ride	  trains	  and	  go	  to	  dance	  halls;	  please	  come	  to	  the	  streets,	  and	  look	  at	  the	  piles	  of	  trash.”102	  Yet	  even	  such	  complaints	  were	  rather	  severely	  cracked	  down	  upon.	  Two	  high-­‐school	  students	  in	  Shanghai,	  for	  instance,	  were	  given	  a	  two-­‐year	  jail	  sentence	  with	  a	  three-­‐year	  suspension	  for	  putting	  seven	  “reactionary”	  posters	  on	  the	  wall.103	  A	  playwright	  was	  put	  under	  police	  surveillance	  because	  his	  scenarios	  stressed	  the	  
                                                                                                                                            organizational	  and	  military	  capabilities	  as	  the	  primary	  factor	  for	  their	  victory.	  Levine,	  Anvil	  of	  Victory,	  243-­‐48.	  	  	  	  Furthermore,	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad	  carefully	  traces	  military	  history	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Civil	  War,	  arguing	  that	  the	  communist	  victory	  was	  not	  a	  predetermined	  conclusion,	  at	  least,	  until	  the	  PLA	  gained	  decisive	  victories	  on	  battlefields	  in	  1948.	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  Decisive	  Encounters:	  The	  Chinese	  
Civil	  War,	  1946-­‐1950	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  For	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  existing	  literature,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Westad,	  Decisive	  Encounters,	  383-­‐401.	  	  	  102	  “Shanghaishi	  jinchaju	  guanyu	  shichaju	  ling	  ge	  fenju	  chudong	  zhuyi	  Zhonggong	  dixia	  dang	  zai	  gongren	  xuesheng	  deng	  huodong	  xunling	  [Shanghai	  Police	  Department’s	  Instruction	  to	  Branch	  Offices	  to	  Pay	  Attention	  to	  the	  Underground	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  in	  Labor	  and	  Student	  Activities]	  (Hereafter	  “Zhonggong	  dixia	  dang	  zai	  gongren	  xuesheng	  deng	  huodong”),”	  Q144-­‐4-­‐1,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	  103	  “Shanghai	  gaodeng	  teshu	  xingshi	  fating	  panjue	  [A	  Judgment	  at	  the	  Shanghai	  High	  Special	  Criminal	  Court],”	  May	  29,	  1948,	  Q189-­‐1-­‐60,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	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violence	  of	  American	  soldiers	  stationed	  in	  China	  and	  depicted	  scenes	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  government	  fawning	  on	  Americans.104	  	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  keep	  order,	  the	  Shanghai	  city	  government	  banned	  hundreds	  of	  newspapers,	  magazines,	  maps,	  and	  books,	  with	  titles	  such	  as	  Ideal	  Marriage,	  
American	  Public	  Opinions,	  and	  Several	  Problems	  in	  the	  History	  of	  Chinese	  Society.105	  Likewise,	  one	  school	  administrator	  ordered	  tighter	  controls	  concerning	  popular	  songs	  on	  campus	  that	  would	  “instigate	  disorder,	  and	  intend	  to	  destroy	  society	  and	  state.”106	  None	  of	  these	  controls,	  however,	  seemed	  effective;	  in	  many	  cases,	  they	  simply	  backfired.	  After	  all,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  crack	  down	  on	  popular	  sentiments.	  Posters	  expressing	  complaints	  and	  discontent	  toward	  the	  government	  were	  rampant.107	  Arrests	  of	  “reactionary”	  college	  and	  high	  school	  students	  only	  aroused	  much	  larger	  protest	  movements	  on	  the	  side	  of	  students,	  while	  causing	  morality	  and	  justice	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  local	  offices	  to	  deteriorate.108	  The	  surveillance	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  dramatist	  only	  found	  that	  he	  frequently	  had	  parties	  at	  night,	  and	  that,	  actually,	  many	  of	  his	  guests	  were	  GMD	  naval	  officers.109	  And,	  the	  banning	  of	  books	  provoked	  slogans	  like	  “We	  Have	  Freedom	  to	  Read!”110	  
                                                104	  “Qudi	  fanMei	  xiju	  gequ	  xunling	  [An	  Instruction	  to	  Crack	  Down	  anti-­‐America	  Dramas	  and	  Songs],”	  February-­‐April,	  1947,	  Q131-­‐4-­‐187,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	  105	  “Shanghaishi	  shehuiju	  guanyu	  chajin	  jinbu	  shukan	  2	  [Shanghai	  Social	  Department;	  Cracking	  down	  Progressive	  Books	  and	  Journals],”	  14-­‐31,	  Q6-­‐12-­‐167,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	  	  106	  “Jiang	  wei	  jingbei	  silingbu	  daibu	  Shanghai	  gaoxueyuen	  xuesheng	  youguan	  cailiao	  [The	  Materials	  Related	  with	  Jiang	  Jieshi’s	  False	  Security	  Police	  Headquarter	  Arresting	  Shanghai	  College	  Students],	  1947-­‐1949,”	  Q246-­‐1-­‐240,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	  	  107	  “Zhonggong	  dixia	  dang	  zai	  gongren	  xuesheng	  deng	  huodong	  [The	  Underground	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  in	  Labor	  and	  Student	  Activities],”	  Q144-­‐4-­‐1.	  3.	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	  108	  “‘Huai	  zhengfu’	  bixu	  gaizu	  [‘Broken	  Government’	  Needs	  to	  Reorganize],”	  in	  Wencui,	  Vol.	  40,	  July	  23,	  1946,	  D2-­‐0-­‐798,	  SMA;	  “Lun	  MeidifuRi	  de	  yinmou	  [Discussing	  the	  Plot	  of	  American	  Imperialist	  Helping	  of	  Japan]	  ”	  D2-­‐0-­‐753,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	  109	  	  “Qudi	  fanMei	  xiju	  gequ	  xunling	  [An	  Instruction	  to	  Crack	  Down	  anti-­‐America	  Dramas	  and	  Songs],”	  February-­‐April,	  1947,	  Q131-­‐4-­‐187,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	  110	  	  “1947	  niandu	  Shanghai	  xueyun	  ziliao	  [Materials	  on	  Shanghai	  Student	  Movements	  in	  1947],”	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The	  GMD’s	  crackdown	  was	  particularly	  shocking	  because	  it	  occurred	  during	  one	  of	  the	  most	  liberal-­‐democratic	  moments	  in	  modern	  China	  history.	  In	  Shanghai	  alone,	  the	  period	  following	  the	  defeat	  of	  Japan	  observed	  the	  blooming	  of	  hundreds	  of	  new	  magazines	  and	  newspapers,	  which	  provided	  forums	  for	  free	  and	  open	  exchanges	  of	  views.	  These	  new	  voices	  boldly	  expressed	  their	  hopes	  for	  democracy,	  freedom,	  and	  equality,	  thus	  often	  openly	  taking	  confrontational	  positions	  against	  the	  GMD	  government.111	  Among	  these,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  active	  and	  prominent	  media	  at	  that	  time	  was	  a	  weekly	  magazine,	  Guancha	  [Observation],	  which	  was	  established	  by	  a	  journalist,	  Chu	  Anpin,	  in	  September	  1946.	  From	  the	  time	  of	  its	  establishment,	  the	  magazine	  demanded	  the	  realization	  of	  a	  liberal	  and	  democratic	  government,	  and	  continued	  to	  express	  its	  support	  for	  the	  fan	  MeifuRi	  student	  movements,	  opposing	  to	  the	  GMD	  government’s	  oppressive	  policy.112	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  even	  during	  the	  GMD’s	  suppression,	  quite	  a	  few	  Nationalist	  Party	  members	  also	  shared	  and	  valued	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  free	  and	  open	  debates.	  A	  Shanghai	  mayor,	  Wu	  Guozhen,	  who	  later	  became	  a	  governor	  of	  Taiwan	  after	  the	  GMD’s	  evacuation,	  participated	  in	  some	  of	  student	  forums	  in	  June	  1948,	  where	  both	  Nationalist	  and	  Communist	  party	  members	  were	  present.	  In	  one	  of	  them,	  it	  was	  actually	  students	  who	  got	  excited	  and	  beaten	  the	  mayor,	  who	  actually	  ordered	  solders	  around	  him	  not	  to	  open	  fire	  on	  
                                                                                                                                            Q131-­‐6-­‐464,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	  111	  Wencui,	  Vol.	  40,	  July	  23,	  1946,	  D2-­‐0-­‐798-­‐2,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC;	  Kubo	  Toru,	  Chugoku	  kin	  gendai	  
shi	  Vol.	  4:	  Shakai	  shugi	  heno	  chosen	  [Modern	  Chinese	  History	  Vol.	  4:	  A	  Challenge	  for	  Socialism]	  (Tokyo:	  Iwanami	  shoten,	  2011),	  9.	  112	  “Beiping	  xuesheng	  beibu	  beishi	  ji	  [Report	  on	  Beijing	  students	  who	  were	  arrested	  and	  released],”	  
Guancha,	  Vol.	  3,	  Issue	  7,	  October	  3,	  1947,	  D2-­‐0-­‐2182-­‐19,	  SMA;	  “Ji	  Beiping	  xuesheng	  fanfuRi	  tuji	  da	  youxing	  [Report	  on	  Beijing’s	  mass	  demonstrations	  of	  opposing	  supporting	  Japan],”	  Vol.	  4,	  Issue	  17,	  April	  11,	  1948,	  D2-­‐0-­‐2193-­‐13,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	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students.113	  This	  episode	  suggests	  that,	  however	  repressive	  GMD’s	  rule,	  there	  was	  a	  room	  for	  discussion	  which	  was	  still	  possible	  at	  that	  time.	  	  As	  such,	  even	  GMD-­‐leaning	  newspapers	  began	  critiquing	  the	  Nationalist	  Party’s	  rule.	  A	  small	  local	  newspaper	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Jilin	  in	  the	  northeast,	  Lao	  Baixing	  
Ribao,	  for	  instance,	  continued	  to	  demand	  democratic	  reforms	  of	  the	  government,	  while	  maintaining	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  stance,	  often	  appealing	  to	  communist	  soldiers	  not	  to	  waste	  life.	  Yet,	  the	  paper	  published	  articles	  sympathetic	  to	  student	  movements,	  praising	  them	  as	  “patriotic	  movements,”	  thus	  taking	  a	  critical	  stance	  toward	  both	  parties.114	  Likewise,	  Fei	  Bao	  in	  Shanghai,	  while	  maintaining	  a	  pro-­‐Nationalist	  tone	  in	  this	  period,	  often	  made	  fun	  of	  the	  slow	  pace	  of	  governmental	  reforms,	  as	  in	  one	  political	  cartoon	  showing	  the	  many	  privileges	  and	  exceptions	  that	  governmental	  “reform”	  could	  not	  regulate	  (Picture	  5).115	  It	  argued	  that	  people	  were	  losing	  their	  trust	  in	  the	  GMD	  government	  due	  to	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  economy,	  and	  the	  prevalence	  of	  many	  forms	  of	  corruption,	  concluding	  that	  the	  prestige	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  had	  been	  declining.116	  While	  Fei	  
Bao’s	  pro-­‐Nationalist	  tone	  did	  not	  change,	  its	  editorial	  claimed,	  “Those	  who	  win	  the	  hearts	  of	  the	  people	  gain	  ascendancy,	  while	  those	  who	  lose	  them	  die	  out!”117	  The	  
                                                113	  “Shanghai	  shi	  jingcha	  ju	  zhenya	  1948	  nian	  nei	  xuesheng	  yungdong	  qingkuang	  huibian	  [Shanghai	  Police	  Department’s	  collection	  regarding	  the	  situations	  of	  suppressing	  student	  movements	  in	  1948]”	  Q131-­‐6-­‐466,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC..	  114	  Laobaixing	  Ribao	  (Jilin),	  January	  18,	  1947,	  February	  7,	  1947,	  and	  March	  19	  and	  23,	  1947,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  	  115	  Fei	  Bao	  (Shanghai),	  October	  24,	  1947,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  	  116	  Fei	  Bao	  (Shanghai),	  October	  25,	  1947,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  	  117	  Fei	  Bao	  (Shanghai),	  October	  2,	  1947,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	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paper	  added:	  “The	  hearts	  of	  the	  people	  are	  most	  difficult	  to	  control	  and	  to	  force.	  Earlier	  to	  win	  them,	  the	  more	  advantageous	  the	  position	  will	  be.”118	  	  The	  GMD	  leadership	  almost	  ignored	  such	  voices,	  while	  the	  CCP	  leadership	  might	  have	  been	  more	  sensitive	  to	  them.	  When	  Zhou	  Enlai	  repeatedly	  wrote	  memorandums	  on	  how	  to	  win	  people’s	  hearts,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  in	  fact,	  simply	  lamented	  in	  his	  diary	  about	  the	  “stupidity	  and	  ignorance	  of	  his	  400	  million	  population.”119	  For	  Nationalist	  Party	  leaders,	  popular	  sentiments	  could	  not	  be	  seen	  anything	  but	  reflections	  of	  communist	  propaganda	  and	  manipulation,	  although	  frustrations	  and	  complaints	  about	  the	  government	  were,	  in	  fact,	  more	  fragmented	  and	  local,	  rather	  than	  ideological.	  As	  the	  GMD	  leadership	  continued	  to	  treat	  popular	  attitudes	  accordingly,	  and	  continued	  to	  crack	  down	  on	  any	  dissenters	  as	  such,	  it	  was	  no	  wonder	  that	  the	  government	  quickly	  lost	  popular	  support.	  Much	  worse	  for	  the	  GMD	  government,	  their	  oppressive	  policy	  reminded	  many	  of	  similar	  conduct	  by	  the	  Japanese	  police	  and	  military	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  The	  more	  the	  GMD	  resembled	  Japanese	  militarists,	  the	  more	  quickly	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  decayed.	  	  Anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  developed	  in	  this	  period	  in	  a	  similar	  manner.	  Previously	  favorable	  images	  of	  the	  United	  States	  began	  to	  deteriorate	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	  for	  various	  reasons.	  One	  was,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  that	  the	  U.S.	  government	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  supporting	  and	  re-­‐arming	  Japan.	  The	  other	  was	  Washington’s	  continuous	  support	  for	  the	  increasingly	  unpopular	  and	  suppressive	  GMD	  government,	  which	  culminated	  with	  the	  China	  Aid	  Act	  authorized	  by	  U.S.	  Congress	  in	  April	  1948.	  
                                                118	  Fei	  Bao	  (Shanghai),	  November	  10,	  1948,	  NNUL,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  119	  Kubo,	  Shakai	  shugi	  heno	  chosen	  [A	  Challenge	  for	  Socialism],	  3-­‐4;	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  June	  27,	  1948,	  CKSD,	  Box	  46,	  HIA,	  Stanford,	  CA.	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Another	  might	  have	  been	  the	  influx	  of	  American	  import	  goods	  into	  Chinese	  cities,	  which	  were	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  dominating	  the	  market	  and	  marginalizing	  domestic	  merchandise.	  	  Another	  arguably	  most	  important	  factor	  was	  thousands	  of	  local	  conflicts	  arising	  between	  local	  Chinese	  residents	  and	  American	  soldiers	  stationed	  in	  China	  in	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  period.	  One	  of	  these,	  the	  Shen	  Chong	  incident,	  for	  instance,	  involved	  the	  alleged	  rape	  of	  a	  Chinese	  college	  student	  by	  an	  American	  marine	  in	  December	  1946,	  which	  triggered	  widespread	  protest	  movements	  in	  urban	  areas	  all	  over	  China.120	  As	  historian	  Hong	  Zhang	  makes	  clear,	  however,	  while	  anti-­‐American	  protest	  rallies	  nationwide	  were	  surely	  built	  on	  the	  alleged	  rape	  of	  a	  Chinese	  female,	  actually,	  they	  were	  not	  really	  about	  that	  particular	  incident.	  In	  fact,	  slogans	  at	  these	  rallies	  read:	  “China	  is	  not	  a	  colony;	  why	  does	  America	  stay	  in	  China?”	  and	  “Defend	  China’s	  Independence	  and	  Freedom.”121	  What	  many	  people	  expressed	  in	  protest	  rallies	  was	  not	  simply	  about	  a	  particular	  incident,	  but	  what	  it	  symbolized.	  	  Each	  incident	  was	  problematized	  not	  because	  it	  was	  particularly	  important,	  but	  because	  it	  was	  considered	  symbolic	  of	  a	  larger	  pattern—namely,	  colonialism.	  In	  this	  process,	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  the	  War	  Against	  Japan	  played	  key	  roles.	  After	  all,	  conflicts	  between	  American	  soldiers	  and	  the	  Chinese	  residents	  evoked	  many	  people’s	  sympathies	  because	  they	  were	  reminded	  of	  similar	  and	  ubiquitous	  conflicts	  between	  Japanese	  soldiers	  and	  the	  Chinese.	  The	  Shen	  Chong	  incident,	  for	  example,	  reminded	  many	  of	  the	  Japanese	  atrocities	  against	  females	  during	  the	  
                                                120	  Hong	  Zhang,	  America	  Perceived,	  77-­‐111;	  Ronald	  Spector,	  In	  the	  Ruins	  of	  Empire:	  The	  Japanese	  
Surrender	  and	  the	  Battle	  for	  Postwar	  Asia	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  2007),	  264-­‐68.	  121	  “1947	  niandu	  Shanghai	  xueyun	  ziliao	  [Materials	  on	  Shanghai	  Student	  Movements	  in	  1947],”	  128,	  Q131-­‐6-­‐464,	  SMA.	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war.122	  Furthermore,	  the	  fact	  of	  American	  occupation	  of	  Japan	  and	  the	  southern	  part	  of	  Korea,	  combined	  with	  allegations	  concerning	  U.S.	  policies	  for	  restoring	  and	  re-­‐arming	  Japan,	  caused	  many	  people	  to	  fear	  a	  repeat	  of	  the	  foreign	  invasion.	  	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  in	  China	  developed	  as	  American	  actions	  were	  gradually	  seen	  as	  overlapping	  with	  images	  of	  Japanese	  imperialism	  in	  the	  wartime.123	  Anti-­‐American	  feelings	  were	  quickly	  and	  widely	  “understood”	  and	  accepted	  by	  thousands	  of	  Chinese	  because	  of	  anti-­‐colonial	  sentiments—more	  specifically,	  because	  of	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  the	  War	  Against	  Japan	  that	  were	  so	  intense	  and	  cruel.	  In	  short,	  the	  development	  of	  anti-­‐government	  and	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  in	  postwar	  China	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  local	  wariness	  and	  historical	  context	  based	  on	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II	  than	  with	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  propaganda	  or	  Moscow’s	  international	  plots.	  A	  parallel	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  spread	  of	  anti-­‐Soviet	  sentiments	  among	  the	  Chinese	  in	  a	  similar	  period,	  which	  culminated	  in	  large	  demonstrations	  of,	  reportedly,	  4,000	  to	  10,000	  students	  day	  after	  day,	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  other	  cities	  in	  February	  of	  1946,	  demanding	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  Soviet	  forces	  from	  the	  northeastern	  region.124	  	  Such	  anti-­‐colonial	  feelings	  among	  the	  Chinese	  people	  also	  explain	  why	  the	  Reverse	  Course	  in	  Japan	  aroused	  such	  extreme	  reactions	  in	  China.	  The	  Japan	  issue	  
                                                122	  “Lun	  ‘fanMei’	  yu	  ‘Zhong-­‐Mei	  chuantong	  youyi’	  [Discuss	  ‘anti-­‐America’	  and	  ‘Sino-­‐America	  traditional	  friendship’],”	  Xin	  Wenhua,	  Vol.	  3,	  Issue	  6,	  February	  5,	  1947,	  D2-­‐0-­‐427-­‐1,	  SMA.	  	  123	  Such	  associations	  can	  be	  seen	  various	  “reactionary”	  scribblings	  and	  rumors.	  “Zhonggong	  dixia	  dang	  zai	  gongren	  xuesheng	  deng	  huodong	  xunling	  [The	  Underground	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  in	  Labor	  and	  Student	  Activities],”	  May	  26,	  1947,	  Q144-­‐4-­‐1,	  SMA;	  “1947	  niandu	  Shanghai	  xueyun	  ziliao	  [Materials	  on	  Shanghai	  Student	  Movements	  in	  1947],”	  Q131-­‐6-­‐464,	  SMA,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  124	  “Shanghai	  shi	  jinchaju	  Hongkou	  	  fengju	  zhengzhi	  zu	  guanyu	  diaocha	  zhong	  xiao	  xuesheng	  zai	  Sulian	  lingshi	  guan	  menwai	  youxing	  shiwei	  [Shanghai	  Police	  Department	  Hongkou	  branch	  office	  political	  group’s	  document	  regarding	  investigation	  on	  junior-­‐	  and	  high-­‐school	  students’	  demonstrations	  outside	  of	  a	  gate	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Consulate],”	  February	  23-­‐	  February	  26,	  1946,	  Q146-­‐2-­‐73,	  SMA,	  Changchun,	  PRC;	  See,	  also,	  Wasserstrom,	  Student	  Protests	  in	  Twentieth-­‐Century	  China,	  247-­‐250.	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served	  as	  a	  catalyst,	  evoking	  bitter	  war	  memories	  and	  anti-­‐imperial	  feelings,	  while	  sharpening	  daily	  frustration	  toward	  the	  local	  government	  and	  generating	  the	  basis	  for	  long-­‐lasting	  anti-­‐government	  and	  anti-­‐American	  feelings.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  shift	  in	  U.S.	  occupation	  policy	  in	  Japan	  became	  a	  litmus	  test	  between	  the	  two	  opposing	  parties	  over	  their	  legitimacy	  and	  authority.	  Because	  of	  deep	  memories	  of	  the	  war,	  the	  Japan	  issue	  caused	  cracks	  to	  appear	  in	  the	  Nationalist	  Party,	  undermining	  trust	  in	  the	  GMD	  government	  from	  within,	  while	  the	  Communist	  Party	  greatly	  benefited	  from	  the	  political	  emotions	  that	  evolved	  during	  the	  fan	  MeifuRi	  movements.	  	  It	  is	  ironic	  that	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  people,	  particularly	  intellectuals,	  businessmen,	  students,	  and	  other	  urbanites,	  who	  sought	  more	  democracy,	  freedom,	  and	  equality,	  stood	  against	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  while	  keeping	  in	  step	  with	  a	  Communist	  Party	  that	  was,	  in	  the	  end,	  more	  brutal	  and	  oppressive.	  Nonetheless,	  appealing	  for	  democracy	  and	  freedom	  in	  anti-­‐Nationalist	  and	  anti-­‐American	  rallies	  was	  no	  contradiction	  in	  the	  postwar	  years,	  particularly	  in	  view	  of	  the	  ruthless	  GMD’s	  rules,	  U.S.	  support	  for	  the	  Nationalist	  Party,	  and	  memories	  of	  Japanese	  imperialism	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  	  
American	  Reactions	  to	  the	  Chinese	  Civil	  War	  and	  Its	  Aftermath	  	   On	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  earth,	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  however,	  these	  complicated	  aspects	  of	  the	  fan	  MeifuRi	  movements	  and	  the	  Chinese	  Civil	  War—domestic	  politics,	  social	  contexts,	  and	  memories	  of	  the	  War	  Against	  Japan—were	  largely	  omitted,	  and	  usually	  only	  a	  simplified	  version	  was	  reported:	  the	  expansion	  of	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communist	  influence	  in	  East	  Asia.	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  were	  quite	  a	  few	  reports	  that	  attempted	  to	  call	  attention	  to	  social	  and	  historical	  backgrounds	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Revolution	  and	  its	  aftermath.125	  Yet,	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  magazines	  and	  newspapers	  ascribed	  the	  decay	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  regime	  simply	  to	  propaganda	  and	  manipulations	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party,	  or	  even	  the	  Kremlin,	  similar	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  attributed	  the	  popularity	  of	  leftist	  thought	  in	  Japan	  solely	  to	  communist	  expansion	  and	  “socialistic”	  SCAP	  occupation	  policies.126	  	  In	  the	  period	  between	  late-­‐1947	  and	  mid-­‐1948,	  the	  China	  issue	  evolved	  into	  a	  non-­‐partisan	  topic,	  as	  members	  of	  both	  parties	  and	  their	  sympathizers	  used	  quite	  similar	  language.	  Henry	  Luce’s	  pro-­‐Republican	  Life	  and	  Time	  magazines,	  for	  example,	  maintained	  some	  of	  the	  most	  hawkish	  attitudes	  among	  major	  media.127	  Born	  in	  Shandong,	  China,	  in	  a	  Presbyterian	  missionary	  family,	  Luce	  maintained	  a	  strong	  desire	  to	  “save”	  China,	  remained	  an	  ardent	  anti-­‐communist	  throughout	  his	  life,	  and	  believed	  in	  the	  role	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy,	  a	  theme	  he	  delineated	  in	  his	  famous	  article	  in	  1941,	  “The	  American	  Century.”128	  Luce’s	  influential	  magazines	  continuously	  criticized	  the	  Truman	  administration	  for	  being	  too	  slow	  and	  too	  willing	  to	  compromise,	  asserting,	  “While	  the	  U.S.	  talks	  about	  reform,	  the	  communists	  
                                                125	  Tillman	  Durdin	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  warned	  in	  late	  1946	  about	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Japan	  issue	  as	  becoming	  an	  ingredient	  in	  the	  development	  of	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  in	  China.	  Similarly,	  American	  Consul	  General	  in	  Tianjin,	  Robert	  Smyth,	  described	  the	  escalation	  of	  anti-­‐American	  feelings	  as	  general	  feelings	  rather	  than	  resulting	  from	  communist	  manipulations.	  Hong	  Zhang,	  America	  
Perceived,	  99,	  107,	  and	  124.	  	  126	  “The	  Red	  Shadow	  Lengthens	  over	  China,”	  Life,	  29	  November	  1948,	  31.	  	  127	  For	  the	  detail	  of	  the	  life	  of	  Henry	  Luce,	  see	  Robert	  E.	  Herzstein,	  Henry	  R.	  Luce,	  Time,	  and	  the	  
American	  Crusade	  in	  Asia	  (New	  York,	  2005).	  	  128	  Henry	  R.	  Luce,	  “The	  American	  Century,”	  Life,	  February	  17,	  1941,	  61-­‐65.	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are	  winning	  the	  war.”129	  Of	  course,	  this	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  Democrats	  and	  their	  sympathizers	  supported	  the	  government’s	  China	  policy;	  pro-­‐Democratic	  Newsweek,	  for	  instance,	  maintained	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  not	  permit	  all	  of	  China	  to	  go	  Communist.	  A	  Catholic	  and	  far	  more	  nationalistic	  magazine,	  America,	  often	  used	  frank	  but	  stereotypical	  words,	  as	  it	  urged	  support	  for	  the	  GMD	  government	  to	  “save”	  China	  from	  becoming	  a	  “Far	  Eastern	  puppet	  of	  the	  Kremlin.”130	  Decisive	  communist	  victories	  in	  China	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1948	  incited	  many	  writers	  to	  amplify	  the	  tone	  of	  their	  critiques	  on	  the	  China	  issue.	  Irritated	  by	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  war,	  America	  magazine	  ardently	  asserted,	  “There	  is	  only	  one	  policy	  for	  America	  to	  adopt	  toward	  China:	  immediate	  and	  effective	  aid,	  whatever	  it	  costs	  to	  halt	  Communism.”131	  By	  this	  time,	  quite	  a	  few	  local	  politicians	  in	  many	  states,	  particularly	  members	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  began	  connecting	  their	  domestic	  anti-­‐communist	  appeals	  with	  the	  China	  issue,	  urging	  the	  federal	  government	  to	  “save”	  China.	  By	  early	  1949,	  fifty-­‐one	  congressmen	  formed	  a	  supra-­‐partisan	  group,	  arguing	  that	  a	  communist	  victory	  would	  pose	  a	  “grave	  threat”	  to	  U.S.	  national	  security.132	  One	  of	  them,	  John	  McCormack,	  the	  Democratic	  Representative	  from	  Massachusetts,	  took	  a	  firm	  stand	  in	  the	  House:	  “We	  cannot	  let	  China	  become	  subject	  to	  Communist	  government.”133	  Likewise,	  Minnesota	  Republican	  Walter	  Judd	  urged	  in	  the	  House	  prevention	  of	  China	  “falling”	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  communists,	  
                                                129	  “China,”	  Life,	  15	  March	  1948,	  36.	  	  130	  “DSOD,”	  August	  7,	  1947,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	  131	  “DSOD,”	  December	  30,	  1948,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	  	  	  132	  “DSOD,”	  February	  16,	  1946,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	  For	  more	  detailed	  accounts	  on	  American	  reactions	  to	  the	  Chinese	  Revolution,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Nancy	  Bernkopf	  Tucker,	  Patterns	  In	  the	  Dust:	  
Chinese-­‐American	  Relations	  and	  the	  Recognition	  Controversy,	  1949-­‐1950	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1983).	  	  133	  “DSOD,”	  February	  15,	  1949,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	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saying,	  “No	  matter	  how	  costly	  it	  is	  and	  dangerous	  to	  carry	  out	  this	  policy,	  if	  China	  goes	  down,	  the	  program	  will	  cost	  us	  in	  the	  tens	  of	  billions	  of	  dollars”134	  Such	  a	  rigid	  claim	  grew	  even	  firmer	  after	  the	  total	  defeat	  of	  GMD	  forces.	  With	  mounting	  critical	  remarks	  such	  as	  “Who	  Lost	  China?”	  and	  “Soft	  on	  Communism,”	  the	  “loss”	  of	  China	  was	  traumatic	  for	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Democrats	  for	  decades	  to	  come,	  although	  the	  basic	  formula—active	  America	  and	  passive	  China—has	  not	  been	  questioned	  until	  recently.135	  During	  this	  period,	  journalistic	  and	  sensational	  accounts	  from	  China	  were	  abundant.136	  Nonetheless,	  they	  were	  delivered	  and	  understood	  through	  local	  worldviews	  based	  on	  domestic	  memories	  and	  experiences	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Here	  appears,	  again,	  the	  legacy	  of	  World	  War	  II	  for	  Americans.	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  was	  no	  “postwar	  American”	  mentality,	  which	  can	  be	  illustrated	  in	  a	  monolithic	  way,	  because	  people’s	  experiences	  and	  memories	  differed	  so	  widely	  depending	  on	  age,	  gender,	  race,	  and	  where	  and	  how	  they	  experienced	  the	  war.	  That	  said,	  however,	  examining	  widespread	  views	  regarding	  China,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  notice	  several	  dominant	  attitudes	  considered	  “common”	  at	  that	  time.	  First,	  a	  peculiar	  sense	  of	  omnipotence	  could	  not	  be	  concealed.	  While	  the	  “loss”	  of	  China	  was	  frequently	  discussed,	  the	  question	  itself	  was	  delusive	  and	  even	  arrogant;	  how	  could	  Americans	  “lose”	  a	  country	  they	  had	  never	  governed	  or	  possessed?	  137	  While	  many	  magazines	  
                                                134	  “DSOD,”	  November	  17,	  1948,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	  	  135	  Craig	  and	  Logevall,	  America’s	  New	  Cold	  War,	  102-­‐105,	  135.	  	  136	  Such	  catchy	  titles	  include:	  “Red	  Shadow	  Lengthens	  over	  China,”	  “Dunkirk	  in	  the	  Pacific,”	  “The	  Fall	  of	  Mukden,”	  “Last	  Look	  at	  Peipin	  [Beijing],”	  and	  “Red	  Advance	  Brings	  Shanghai	  Panic.”	  All	  from	  the	  
Life	  magazine	  in	  between	  1948	  and	  1949.	  137	  For	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  the	  so-­‐called	  “loss”	  of	  China,	  see	  a	  series	  of	  articles	  in	  Diplomatic	  
History,	  Vol.	  21,	  No.	  1	  (Winter	  1997),	  71-­‐115,	  written	  by	  Warren	  I.	  Cohen,	  Chen	  Jian,	  John	  W.	  Garver,	  Michael	  Sheng,	  and	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad.	  Also,	  see	  Thomas	  J.	  Christensen,	  “A	  ‘Lost	  Chance’	  for	  What?	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insisted	  firmly	  that	  Americans	  could	  not	  “permit	  all	  of	  China	  to	  go	  Communist,”	  from	  the	  beginning,	  why	  did	  the	  Chinese	  need	  America’s	  “permission”?	  Yet,	  such	  claims	  did	  not	  sound	  strange	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  After	  all,	  the	  United	  States	  won	  the	  war,	  and	  saved	  the	  world	  (it	  was	  believed).	  Why	  not	  save	  China?	  Even	  Walter	  Lippmann,	  one	  of	  the	  representative	  intellectuals	  of	  the	  day,	  did	  not	  hesitate	  to	  ask,	  “Why	  at	  the	  zenith	  of	  American	  power	  was	  American	  influence	  in	  China	  paralyzed?”138	  Beneath	  irritation	  of	  this	  kind	  underlay	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  righteousness,	  which	  had	  been	  promoted	  during	  the	  war	  and	  consolidated	  after	  victory.	  Second,	  the	  other	  side	  of	  such	  illusions	  of	  omnipotence	  and	  righteousness	  was	  the	  incapacitating	  of	  “others,”	  particularly	  Asians.	  As	  journalist	  Harold	  Isaacs	  observed,	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  Americans	  viewed	  China	  as	  “a	  country	  we	  have	  always	  helped”	  and	  the	  Chinese	  as	  “a	  people	  to	  be	  helped.”139	  If	  the	  Chinese	  did	  not	  act	  as	  Americans	  wished,	  they	  were	  simply	  considered	  “puppets	  of	  the	  Kremlin.”140	  Third,	  the	  basic	  worldview	  in	  which	  such	  a	  sense	  of	  omnipotence	  was	  grounded	  was	  the	  ideology	  of	  global	  geopolitics,	  which	  tended	  to	  make	  sweeping	  generalizations	  about	  the	  “world.”	  The	  image	  of	  geopolitics,	  to	  be	  sure,	  was	  as	  old	  as	  the	  history	  of	  war,	  but	  the	  point	  here	  is	  its	  extension	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  not	  just	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  geographic	  extent—global—but	  also	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  depth	  into	  diverse	  social	  
                                                                                                                                            Rethinking	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐PRC	  Confrontation,”	  Journal	  of	  American-­‐East	  Asian	  Relations	  4	  (Fall	  1995):	  249–78.	  138	  “DSOD,”	  September	  6,	  1949,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	  	  139	  Harold	  Isaacs,	  Scratches	  on	  Our	  Minds:	  American	  Images	  of	  China	  and	  India	  (New	  York:	  John	  Day	  Company,	  1958),	  193.	  See	  also	  T.	  Christopher	  Jespersen,	  American	  Images	  of	  China,	  1931-­‐1949	  (Stanford,	  CA:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  	  140	  Similar	  view	  was	  used	  for	  Japan,	  too.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  “DSOD,”	  December	  17,	  1948,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	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layers	  among	  millions	  of	  ordinary	  people.	  Such	  a	  seemingly	  international	  perspective	  simply	  assumed	  that	  what	  happened	  in	  one	  place	  should	  happen	  in	  the	  same	  way	  in	  other	  parts,	  as	  well,	  ignoring	  various	  local	  complications	  and	  historical	  contexts.141	  Having	  fought	  and	  won	  the	  world	  war	  between	  “Fascism	  and	  Freedom”	  in	  Europe	  and	  Asia-­‐Pacific,	  such	  a	  sweeping	  “global”	  view	  appeared	  natural	  and	  intelligible,	  although	  such	  a	  perspective	  was	  no	  more	  than	  a	  local	  belief	  in	  the	  United	  States.142	  	   When	  the	  China	  issue	  was	  reported	  on	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  news	  was	  conveyed	  through	  these	  local	  lenses—that	  is,	  the	  ideology	  of	  international	  geopolitics,	  intense	  nationalism,	  and	  beliefs	  in	  omnipotence	  on	  the	  side	  of	  “us”	  and	  impotence	  on	  the	  side	  of	  “others.”	  This	  explains	  why	  anti-­‐American	  student	  movements	  in	  China	  were	  almost	  completely	  ignored	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  To	  begin	  with,	  the	  ideology	  of	  geopolitics	  naturally	  presupposed	  conflicts	  between	  states,	  and	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  see	  the	  development	  of	  internal	  decay	  and	  domestic	  discord.	  Thus,	  as	  internal	  opposition	  was	  simply	  viewed	  as	  the	  conduct	  of	  enemy	  agents,	  Chinese	  student	  movements	  were	  seen	  merely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  communist	  propaganda.	  In	  addition,	  this	  widespread	  sense	  of	  self-­‐righteousness	  and	  nationalism	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  listen	  to	  criticism	  from	  outside.	  Questions	  or	  protests	  shouted	  on	  the	  streets	  in	  China	  were	  viewed	  not	  as	  proper	  opinions	  to	  be	  considered	  but	  conduct	  instigated	  by	  the	  enemy.	  Finally,	  as	  the	  reverse	  side	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  omnipotence,	  “others”	  were	  assumed	  to	  be	  incapable,	  not	  proactive	  and	  subjective	  actors	  who	  had	  their	  own	  voices	  and	  thoughts;	  they	  were	  simply	  deemed	  either	  “people	  to	  be	  
                                                141	  See,	  for	  instance,	  “DSOD,”	  December	  9,	  1948,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	  	  142	  “DSOD,”	  December	  9	  and	  17,	  1948,	  Box	  3;	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	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helped”	  or	  “Kremlin	  puppets.”	  In	  short,	  the	  China	  issue	  was	  interpreted	  through	  such	  local	  contexts	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  “understood”	  accordingly.	  In	  a	  sense,	  reality	  did	  not	  really	  change	  understandings;	  rather,	  the	  frame	  of	  understandings	  shaped	  “reality.”	  	  
	  
Various	  Futures	  Still	  Possible	  	  There	  were	  differing	  viewpoints	  at	  this	  point,	  however.	  It	  would	  be	  simplistic	  to	  view	  American	  society	  as	  free	  of	  disagreements.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  reactions	  to	  the	  China	  issue,	  for	  instance,	  while	  the	  defeat	  of	  GMD	  forces	  in	  1948	  surely	  confirmed	  beliefs	  in	  the	  “spread	  of	  Communist	  influence	  in	  East	  Asia,”	  many	  observers—including	  scholars,	  journalists,	  politicians,	  and	  even	  everyday	  people—could	  openly	  argue	  against	  such	  a	  popular	  worldview.	  One	  example	  was	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace,	  former	  vice	  president	  under	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  and	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Progressive	  Party	  and	  candidate	  for	  the	  presidential	  elections	  in	  1948.	  Having	  grown	  up	  in	  a	  farm	  village	  in	  Iowa,	  Wallace	  was	  an	  active	  protagonist	  of	  populist	  movements,	  proclaiming	  himself	  a	  true	  believer	  in	  “people.”	  While	  Henry	  Luce	  envisaged	  the	  “American	  Century,”	  Wallace	  imagined,	  as	  the	  title	  of	  his	  book	  indicated,	  “The	  Century	  of	  the	  Common	  Man.”143	  Thus,	  he	  passionately	  argued,	  “The	  Chinese	  fiasco	  illustrates	  the	  complete	  bankruptcy	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  Unless	  Chiang’s	  regime	  is	  replaced	  by	  a	  people’s	  government,	  […]	  the	  great	  bulk	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people	  will	  hate	  the	  very	  words	  ‘America’	  and	  ‘United	  States’	  for	  generations	  to	  come.”144	  	  
                                                143	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace,	  The	  Century	  of	  the	  Common	  Man	  (New	  York:	  Reynal	  and	  Hitchcock,	  1943).	  	  144	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace,	  “American	  Fiasco	  in	  China,”	  New	  Republic,	  July	  5,	  1948,	  11.	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Openly	  defying	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  insisting	  on	  cooperation	  with	  people	  in	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  the	  presence	  of	  Henry	  Wallace	  in	  the	  national	  political	  scene	  itself	  suggests	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  American	  politics	  in	  the	  late	  1940s.145	  While	  almost	  no	  one	  expected	  his	  victory	  in	  the	  1948	  elections,	  Wallace	  was	  not	  a	  minor	  bubble	  candidate;	  major	  newspapers	  and	  radio	  programs	  paid	  attention	  to	  and	  reported	  on	  him,	  which	  would	  scarcely	  be	  imaginable	  in	  the	  1952	  presidential	  elections.146	  Even	  given	  his	  bitter	  defeat,	  Wallace	  supporters	  did	  not	  suddenly	  disappear.	  Quite	  to	  the	  contrary,	  progressives	  in	  1949	  actually	  attempted	  to	  set	  a	  new	  tone	  in	  calling	  for	  a	  re-­‐mobilization	  of	  the	  Progressive	  Party	  in	  preparation	  for	  the	  1950	  midterm	  elections.147	  While	  the	  party	  had	  suffered	  financial	  difficulties,	  its	  secretary	  could	  still	  say	  that	  “the	  spirit	  of	  our	  people	  is	  wonderful.”148	  	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  liberals	  and	  leftists	  were	  still	  able	  to	  publicly	  express	  opposition	  to	  mainstream	  viewpoints.	  Regarding	  the	  China	  issue,	  a	  major	  liberal	  magazine	  The	  Nation,	  for	  instance,	  could	  maintain	  in	  December	  1948,	  “We	  must	  not	  be	  misled	  by	  pleas	  to	  ‘aid’	  or	  to	  ‘save’	  China,”	  arguing	  against	  the	  idea	  of	  giving	  military	  assistance	  to	  the	  GMD	  government,	  which	  “the	  Chinese	  people	  came	  to	  despise.”149	  Likewise,	  a	  renowned	  Harvard	  historian,	  John	  K.	  Fairbank,	  was	  able	  to	  
                                                145	  Craig	  and	  Logevall,	  America’s	  Cold	  War,	  76-­‐77;	  Robert	  David	  Johnson,	  Congress	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  xvi-­‐xvii.;	  Jonathan	  Bell,	  The	  Liberal	  State	  on	  Trial:	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  American	  Politics	  in	  the	  Truman	  Years	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  121-­‐159;	  and	  Zachary	  Karabell,	  The	  Last	  Campaign:	  How	  Harry	  Truman	  Won	  the	  1948	  Election	  (New	  York:	  Knopf,	  2000).	  146	  Craig	  and	  Logevall,	  America’s	  Cold	  War,	  135.	  	  147	  Memorandum,	  September	  3,	  1949,	  Papers	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  Folder	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  Folder	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urge	  readers	  to	  look	  at	  the	  actual	  situation	  in	  China:	  “The	  United	  States	  must	  make	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  Chinese	  communist	  movement	  and	  the	  Chinese	  social	  revolution.	  This	  means	  that	  American	  policy	  must	  be	  to	  align	  ourselves	  more	  positively	  and	  actively	  with	  social	  change	  in	  China	  of	  the	  type	  we	  really	  believe	  in,	  even	  though	  we	  find	  ourselves	  running	  parallel	  to	  Chinese	  Communism.”150	  Along	  the	  same	  lines,	  commentator	  Samuel	  Grafton	  was	  more	  explicit	  and	  went	  further	  in	  saying,	  “The	  funny	  thing	  is	  our	  relations	  with	  Communist	  China,	  far	  from	  provoking	  a	  new	  world	  war	  may,	  if	  we	  are	  smart	  and	  realistic,	  give	  us	  some	  valuable	  experience	  in	  how	  to	  get	  along	  with	  the	  Communist	  world.”151	  	  This	  kind	  of	  attitude,	  urging	  cooperation	  with	  Communist	  China	  was,	  in	  fact,	  not	  limited	  to	  liberals	  and	  progressives.	  Even	  the	  pro-­‐Republican	  and	  pro-­‐business	  magazine,	  U.S.	  News	  and	  World	  Report,	  observed	  in	  February	  1949	  that	  American	  recognition	  of	  Communist	  China	  was	  “ultimately	  to	  be	  expected.”152	  Similarly,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dean	  Acheson,	  often	  deemed	  one	  of	  the	  most	  hawkish	  “Cold	  Warriors,”	  was	  actually	  considering	  in	  early	  1949	  recommending	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  eventually	  recognize	  Mao’s	  regime.153	  Contrary	  to	  the	  later	  image	  of	  Dean	  Acheson	  as	  a	  primary	  architect	  of	  the	  global	  Cold	  War,	  the	  Acheson	  of	  early	  1950	  actually	  urged	  that	  Americans	  should	  not	  regard	  Asia	  in	  the	  same	  light	  as	  Europe—a	  suggestion	  which	  would	  be	  almost	  unimaginable	  for	  the	  Acheson	  of	  the	  
                                                150	  “DSOD,”	  December	  30	  1948,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	  	  151	  “DSOD,”	  December	  10	  1948,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	  	  152	  “DSOD,”	  February	  3	  1949,	  Box	  3,	  OPOS,	  RG59,	  NA.	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years	  that	  followed,	  implying	  the	  existence	  of	  heterogeneity	  and	  flexibility	  in	  the	  political	  scene	  of	  the	  early	  postwar	  period.154	  	  Thus,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  simply	  view	  the	  period	  between	  1945	  and	  1950	  as	  a	  prelude,	  a	  transitional	  period	  leading	  to	  the	  era	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  McCarthyism.	  Because	  we	  know	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed,	  we	  tend	  to	  draw	  a	  straight	  line	  between	  such	  “similar”	  events	  over	  time.	  Yet,	  the	  explosion	  of	  anti-­‐communist	  sentiment	  was	  neither	  predestined	  nor	  inevitable.	  Unlike	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  following	  years,	  acts	  of	  expressing	  disagreement	  and	  discontent	  were	  still	  quite	  common.	  Indeed,	  bearing	  in	  mind	  the	  extremes	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  McCarthyism	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  anti-­‐communist	  movements	  in	  the	  late-­‐1940s	  were	  somehow	  different;	  they	  seem	  to	  have	  been	  rather	  nonchalant	  and	  even	  casual.	  	   As	  discussed	  earlier,	  the	  first	  big	  wave	  of	  “anti-­‐communist”	  movements	  in	  postwar	  America	  came	  with	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	  in	  the	  1946	  midterm	  election	  as	  domestic	  political	  tactics.	  No	  wonder	  that	  the	  new	  80th	  Congress	  in	  January	  1947	  witnessed	  an	  explosion	  of	  anti-­‐communist	  appeals	  and	  anti-­‐State	  Department	  calls	  by	  several	  congressmen,	  mainly	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  such	  as	  Fred	  Busbey	  of	  Illinois,	  and	  Paul	  Shafer	  and	  Bartel	  Jonkman	  of	  Michigan.155	  Nevertheless,	  their	  claims	  did	  not	  really	  mark	  an	  era,	  which	  would	  inspire	  terms	  like	  “Busbeyism,”	  “Shaferism,”	  or	  “Jonkmanism,”	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  their	  anti-­‐communist	  and	  anti-­‐State	  Department	  claims	  were	  almost	  identical	  to	  those	  of	  a	  Wisconsin	  Senator	  years	  later.	  Instead	  of	  making	  an	  epoch,	  they	  were	  criticized	  for	  
                                                154	  Dean	  Acheson,	  Press	  Club	  Speech	  and	  his	  reply	  to	  questions,	  January	  12,	  1950,	  Papers	  of	  John	  S.	  Service	  (hereafter	  PJSS),	  Folder	  2,	  Carton	  2:	  “Secretary	  of	  State,	  Dean	  Acheson	  1950-­‐1965,”	  BANC	  MSS	  87/21,	  The	  Bancroft	  Library,	  University	  of	  California,	  Berkeley	  (hereafter	  BLUC).	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  “DSOD,”	  December	  1946	  to	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their	  groundless	  allegations.	  The	  Washington	  Star,	  for	  instance,	  denounced	  one	  of	  them,	  Republican	  Paul	  Shafer,	  as	  making	  “reckless”	  claims,	  and	  declared	  that	  the	  congressman	  “offered	  not	  a	  shred	  of	  substantiating	  evidence	  for	  his	  insinuations.”156	  	   Actually,	  this	  was	  the	  kind	  of	  criticism	  Senator	  Joseph	  McCarthy,	  Republican	  of	  Wisconsin,	  faced	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1950.	  Although	  McCarthy	  gave	  his	  (in)famous	  speech	  in	  February,	  declaring	  that	  205	  communists	  had	  infiltrated	  the	  State	  Department,	  the	  Senator	  was	  initially	  more	  criticized	  than	  believed.157	  One	  White	  House	  staff	  member,	  for	  instance,	  observed	  in	  April	  1950	  that	  McCarthy	  was	  losing	  credibility	  because	  he	  could	  not	  offer	  any	  evidence.158	  Even	  Republican-­‐friendly	  Life	  magazine	  castigated	  McCarthy,	  as	  did	  its	  sister	  publication	  Time.	  After	  ignoring	  his	  charges	  for	  two	  months,	  an	  editorial	  in	  Life	  insisted	  that	  there	  was	  a	  right	  way	  and	  a	  wrong	  way	  to	  fight	  Communism,	  and	  that	  McCarthy’s	  was	  the	  wrong	  one.	  “What	  you	  can	  best	  do	  for	  America	  and	  for	  American	  principles	  is	  not	  to	  join	  in	  the	  McCarthy	  lynching	  bee,”	  proclaimed	  the	  magazine.	  Likewise,	  the	  Congressional	  Subcommittee	  on	  the	  Investigation	  of	  Loyalty	  of	  State	  Department	  Employees,	  commonly	  known	  as	  the	  Tydings	  Committee,	  which	  was	  organized	  in	  March	  to	  investigate	  McCarthy’s	  charges,	  publicly	  concluded	  in	  early-­‐June	  1950	  that	  not	  one	  of	  the	  persons	  accused	  was	  either	  a	  “disloyal	  employee	  or	  a	  Communist.”159	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  “DSOD,”	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  and	  20,	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  Scare	  in	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  1945-­‐1960	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  Hill,	  NC:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1999),	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  body	  of	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  on	  this	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  literature	  review,	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  Chapter	  7.	  For	  more	  detailed	  historiographical	  discussion,	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  Ellen	  Schrecker,	  “McCarthyism	  and	  the	  Red	  Scare,”	  in	  Jean-­‐Christophe	  Agnew	  and	  Roy	  Rosenzweig,	  A	  
Companion	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  (Malden,	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  Blackwell,	  2006),	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  Ayers,	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  in	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  A.	  Ayers,	  Robert	  Ferrell	  ed.	  (Columbia,	  MO:	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  1991),	  April	  29,	  1950,	  348-­‐349.	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  “McCarthy	  and	  the	  Past,”	  Life,	  April	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  Tydings	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  S.	  Truman,	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  Research	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   By	  the	  same	  token,	  while	  the	  “anti-­‐communist”	  wave	  had	  been	  spreading	  in	  higher	  education	  nationwide,	  it	  provoked	  protest	  rallies	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  To	  be	  sure,	  various	  universities,	  such	  as	  the	  University	  of	  Washington,	  Oregon	  State	  College,	  and	  Purdue	  University,	  had	  approved	  the	  firing	  of	  “communist”	  professors	  by	  late	  1949.160	  At	  Cornell	  University,	  President	  Edmund	  Ezra	  Day	  asserted,	  “communists	  are	  not	  free	  mentally,	  not	  are	  they	  honest.”161	  Yet,	  such	  “anti-­‐communist”	  calls	  simultaneously	  triggered	  resistance,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  seen	  at	  the	  University	  of	  California,	  Berkeley,	  where	  reportedly	  more	  than	  2,500	  students	  and	  professors	  rallied	  in	  April	  of	  1950	  against	  the	  university’s	  policy	  of	  a	  loyalty	  oath	  for	  the	  entire	  faculty.162	  Bearing	  in	  mind	  that	  these	  statements	  and	  activities	  became	  almost	  impossible	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  anticommunist	  sentiment	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  the	  postwar	  years	  between	  late-­‐1945	  and	  early-­‐1950	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  period	  before	  something	  fundamentally	  changed.	  Various	  versions	  of	  future	  still	  seemed	  possible	  and	  realistic	  in	  American	  society.	  	   Such	  a	  statement	  was	  applicable	  in	  China	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  1950,	  as	  well.	  At	  the	  moment	  of	  its	  establishment,	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  was	  not	  yet	  a	  socialist	  or	  communist	  state.	  Nor	  did	  Beijing	  secure	  social,	  political,	  and	  economic	  
                                                                                                                                            Independence,	  MO	  (hereafter	  HSTL).	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  “University	  of	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  of	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  Faculty	  Members,”	  March	  22,	  1949,	  San	  Francisco	  Examiner,	  Box	  1,	  McCarthy	  Era	  Newspaper	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  M0186,	  Special	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  Stanford	  University,	  Stanford,	  CA	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  SCSU).	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  detailed	  discussion	  on	  McCarthyism	  and	  higher	  education,	  see	  Ellen	  W.	  Schrecker,	  No	  Ivory	  Tower:	  McCarthyism	  and	  the	  Universities	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1986).	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  “Cornell	  President	  Calls	  Reds	  Teachers	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  April	  6,	  1949,	  San	  Francisco	  Examiner.	  Box	  1,	  SCSU.	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  Deadlock	  on	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  April	  7,	  1950,	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  Student	  Rally	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  Stand,”	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  Box	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  M0186;	  also,	  see,	  Schrecker,	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control	  over	  the	  entire	  country	  from	  the	  outset.	  While	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party,	  needless	  to	  say,	  took	  crucial	  and	  central	  roles,	  it	  did	  pay	  significant	  attention	  to	  bringing	  together	  diverse	  political	  forces	  beyond	  the	  party	  line.	  This	  was	  not	  just	  a	  pose	  to	  deflect	  criticism.163	  Also,	  it	  was	  not	  just	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  intentions	  of	  Moscow.164	  Practically	  speaking,	  the	  CCP,	  which	  had	  grown	  out	  of	  and	  ruled	  primarily	  rural	  areas,	  lacked	  experiences	  in	  administrating	  cities,	  and	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  govern	  the	  entire	  country	  without	  cooperating	  with	  various	  non-­‐communist	  forces,	  as	  well	  as	  ex-­‐GMD	  officials	  and	  their	  former	  sympathizers.	  After	  all,	  as	  political	  scientist	  Kenneth	  Lieberthal	  summarized,	  China	  could	  be	  captured	  from	  the	  countryside	  but	  it	  could	  be	  governed	  only	  from	  the	  cities.165	  In	  short,	  to	  administer	  the	  country,	  the	  CCP	  had	  to	  soften	  its	  political	  agenda.	  	  	  The	  ideas	  proclaimed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  founding	  were,	  thus,	  based	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  New	  Democracy,	  not	  the	  Soviet	  communist	  model.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  Mao	  Zedong	  emphasized	  in	  early	  June	  1950,	  “Some	  people	  believe	  that	  we	  can	  eliminate	  capitalism	  and	  achieve	  socialism	  immediately,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  error,	  and	  would	  not	  fit	  to	  the	  conditions	  of	  our	  country.”166	  The	  fact	  that	  quite	  a	  few	  non-­‐communist	  leaders	  participated	  in	  the	  central	  and	  local	  governments	  demonstrates	  the	  same	  idea.	  The	  Beijing	  leadership	  recognized	  that	  it	  would	  take	  a	  “quite	  a	  long	  time”—perhaps	  15	  
                                                163	  Frederick	  C.	  Teiwes,	  “Establishing	  and	  Consolidating	  of	  the	  New	  Regime,”	  in	  Denis	  Twitchett	  and	  John	  K.	  Fairbank	  ed.,	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  China	  Vol.	  14:	  The	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  Part	  I:	  The	  
Emergence	  of	  Revolutionary	  China,	  1949-­‐1965	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1987),	  77.	  	  164	  Hua-­‐yu	  Li,	  Mao	  and	  Economic	  Stalinization	  of	  China,	  1948-­‐1953	  (Lanham,	  MD:	  Rawman	  and	  Littlefield	  Pub.,	  2006),	  3-­‐4,	  60-­‐64.	  165	  Kenneth	  Lieberthal,	  Governing	  China:	  From	  Revolution	  through	  Reform	  2nd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton,	  2004	  [1995]),	  85.	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  zhuangkuang	  de	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  improvement	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  and	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  June	  6,	  1950,	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  Mao	  Zedong	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  [A	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  of	  Mao	  Zedong	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  Establishment	  of	  the	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  Vol.	  1	  (Beijing:	  Zhongyang	  wenxian	  chubanshe,	  1987),	  394.	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years—before	  moving	  on	  to	  the	  nationalization	  of	  private	  industries	  and	  socialization	  of	  agriculture.167	  The	  radical	  shift	  in	  Beijing’s	  policies	  that	  took	  place	  around	  1951-­‐1953	  did	  not	  appear	  on	  the	  horizon	  yet.	  Nor	  was	  it	  ordained	  nor	  intended	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  1950.	  In	  other	  words,	  however	  short	  it	  was,	  the	  period	  between	  late	  1949	  and	  early	  1950	  was	  a	  moment	  before	  something	  fundamentally	  changed.	  As	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  “reality”	  was	  still	  nebulous,	  and	  various	  version	  of	  future	  seemed	  possible	  in	  Chinese	  society,	  as	  well.	  	  	   If	  nothing	  unusual	  had	  happened	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  the	  CCP	  might	  have	  continued	  to	  take	  on	  moderate	  policies	  both	  in	  rural	  and	  urban	  areas.	  Not	  having	  consolidated	  power	  yet,	  the	  Party’s	  New	  Democracy	  lines	  would	  have	  lasted	  a	  little	  longer	  as	  scheduled,	  and	  the	  Beijing	  leadership	  might	  not	  have	  chosen	  radical	  agendas	  as	  it	  did	  after	  1953.	  In	  fact,	  the	  radical	  revolution	  might	  have	  been	  slowed	  down,	  or	  even	  de-­‐mobilized,	  as	  Liu	  Shaoqi	  repeatedly	  advised	  the	  cadres	  in	  Tianjin	  and	  other	  cities	  in	  1949-­‐1950.168	  To	  be	  sure,	  critiques	  and	  challenges	  toward	  such	  moderate	  policies	  began	  coming	  to	  the	  surface,	  and	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  such	  moderate	  policies	  might	  have	  been	  abandoned	  anyway,	  sooner	  or	  later.	  Even	  so,	  the	  rebound	  to	  the	  revolutionary	  line	  might	  be	  happened	  in	  a	  more	  soft-­‐landing	  way,	  and	  the	  dark	  days	  of	  harsh	  and	  ruthless	  suppressions	  might	  not	  have	  come,	  or,	  at	  least,	  could	  have	  been	  postponed	  a	  little	  bit.	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  Tiantsin,	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  (Stanford,	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  University	  Press,	  1980),	  40-­‐52;	  Ezra	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  in	  a	  
Provincial	  Capital,	  1949-­‐1968	  (Cambridge,	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  University	  Press,	  1969),	  95-­‐97;	  Frederick	  C.	  Teiwes,	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  and	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  of	  the	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Such	  “what	  if”	  history	  might	  be	  applicable	  to	  other	  societies,	  too.	  In	  Japan,	  for	  instance,	  the	  conservative	  backlash,	  which	  later	  called	  the	  Reverse	  Course,	  had	  already	  begun	  and	  various	  reform	  programs	  had	  been	  delayed	  or	  even	  begun	  fading	  away.	  However,	  such	  a	  current	  of	  backlash	  also	  functioned	  to	  renew	  opposition,	  particularly	  among	  the	  labor,	  youth,	  urbanites,	  and	  intellectuals,	  who	  had	  been	  seriously	  taking	  up	  postwar	  reforms.	  Workers	  continued	  to	  fight	  back.	  Students	  began	  lining	  up	  demonstrations	  against	  a	  series	  of	  conservative	  rebounds,	  describing	  those	  as	  a	  return	  to	  wartime.	  Many	  intellectuals	  also	  actively	  participated	  in	  public	  debates,	  mapping	  out	  and	  publicizing	  their	  own	  agendas	  for	  the	  future	  of	  their	  country,	  as	  Maruyama	  Masao	  and	  a	  group	  of	  intellectuals	  announced	  their	  vision	  for	  unarmed	  neutrality.	  If	  nothing	  unusual	  happened	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  these	  substantial	  struggles	  and	  weighty	  debates	  in	  Japan	  might	  have	  continued	  for	  much	  longer,	  possibly	  restricting	  the	  Yoshida	  administration’s	  policy	  of	  a	  separate	  peace	  and	  military	  alliance	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  Nor	  would	  Japan	  have	  conducted	  re-­‐armament,	  which	  it	  began	  in	  July	  1950,	  establishing	  the	  National	  Police	  Reserve.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  in	  Europe,	  Germany’s	  re-­‐armament	  might	  have	  been	  similarly	  delayed	  much	  longer	  due	  to	  persistent	  opposition	  from	  France,	  which	  actually	  changed	  its	  attitude	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950.	  Various	  international	  alliances	  of	  the	  day,	  such	  as	  NATO,	  thus,	  would	  have	  developed	  considerably	  differently	  from	  the	  ways	  they	  did.	  Within	  the	  United	  States,	  too,	  if	  nothing	  unusual	  happened	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  the	  dark	  days	  of	  McCarthyism	  might	  not	  have	  come,	  or,	  at	  least,	  could	  have	  been	  postponed	  for	  some	  time.	  The	  name	  of	  McCarthy	  might	  be	  forgotten,	  like	  those	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of	  many	  of	  his	  colleagues,	  such	  as	  Paul	  Shafer	  of	  Michigan.	  Children	  might	  not	  have	  needed	  to	  practice	  air	  raids	  drills	  in	  elementary	  schools,	  with	  the	  comical	  song,	  “Duck	  and	  Cover.”169	  Nor	  would	  children	  in	  New	  York	  State	  have	  had	  to	  wear	  identification	  tags	  in	  case	  of	  their	  deaths	  from	  an	  atomic	  attack.170	  Perhaps,	  Mike	  Hammer,	  the	  main	  character	  in	  best-­‐selling	  hard-­‐boiled	  fiction,	  would	  not	  have	  needed	  to	  change	  his	  targets	  from	  street	  gangs	  to	  “Commies.”	  171	  Likewise,	  Hollywood	  might	  not	  have	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  mass-­‐produce	  tales	  of	  the	  red	  scare,	  which	  it	  did,	  producing	  about	  200	  such	  films	  in	  1951-­‐1953.	  Furthermore,	  the	  NSC-­‐68,	  which	  historian	  Walter	  LaFeber	  called	  the	  “American	  blueprint	  for	  waging	  the	  Cold	  War,”	  might	  have	  been	  shelved	  and	  not	  seen	  the	  light	  of	  day.	  The	  Cold	  War,	  above	  all,	  might	  not	  have	  been	  conventionalized,	  remaining	  merely	  one	  disputable	  worldview,	  if	  nothing	  unusual	  happened	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950.	  With	  the	  cooling	  down	  of	  the	  Berlin	  blockade	  in	  1949,	  the	  situation	  we	  now	  call	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  second-­‐half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  might	  have	  been	  developed	  to	  a	  situation	  called	  “Cold	  Peace.”	  To	  be	  an	  irrefutable	  “reality”	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  particular	  worldview	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  needed	  to	  be	  socially	  accepted	  by	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  	  Yet,	  such	  something	  happened	  thousands	  of	  miles	  from	  the	  United	  States	  and	  from	  Europe.	  The	  event	  itself	  might	  not	  have	  been	  as	  significant	  as	  many	  people	  thought	  at	  that	  time.	  It	  became	  important	  because	  millions	  and	  millions	  of	  people	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Chapter	  1:	  Pictures	  
	  
Pictures	  1	  	  Picture	  1:	  “United	  Packinghouse	  workers	  demonstrating	  against	  layoff”	  1946	  United	  States	  












Picture	  2:	  	  	  “Crowds	  during	  May	  Day	  Celebration”	  May	  1,	  1946	  Tokyo,	  Japan	  	  Life	  Pictures	  	  




Picture	  3-­‐1:	  	  	  “Students	  from	  Chiao	  Tung	  Univ.	  during	  Anti-­‐American	  	  demonstration,	  heavily	  armed	  police	  try	  to	  keep	  peace,”	  	  June	  1948	  Shanghai,	  China	  Time	  and	  Life	  Pictures	  	  
	  	  
Source:	  http://images.google.com/hosted/life/l?imgurl=f2bd4f70aaffaa1d	  
Photographer:	  Jack	  Birns	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Picture	  3-­‐2:	  	  	  “Students	  from	  Chiao	  Tung	  Univ.	  during	  Anti-­‐American	  demonstration,”	  June	  1948	  Shanghai,	  China	  Time	  and	  Life	  Pictures	  	  
	  	  
Source:	  http://images.google.com/hosted/life/l?imgurl=ef05e9a20e631ab7	  
Photographer:	  Jack	  Birns	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Picture	  4:	  	  “Anti-­‐American	  posters	  at	  Chiao	  Tung	  Univ.”	  June	  1948,	  Shanghai,	  China	  Time	  and	  Life	  Pictures	  	  
	  




Picture	  5:	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Chapter	  2:	  Local	  Translation	  	  	  	   Like	  sailing,	  gardening,	  politics,	  and	  poetry,	  law	  and	  ethnography	  are	  crafts	  of	  place:	  they	  work	  by	  the	  light	  of	  local	  knowledge.	  […].	  Whatever	  else	  anthropology	  and	  jurisprudence	  may	  have	  in	  common—vagrant	  erudition	  and	  a	  fantastical	  air—they	  are	  alike	  absorbed	  with	  the	  artisan	  task	  of	  seeing	  broad	  principles	  in	  parochial	  facts.	  “Wisdom,”	  as	  an	  African	  proverb	  has	  it,	  “comes	  out	  of	  an	  ant	  heap.”1	   	  Clifford	  Geertz,	  Local	  Knowledge	  (1983)	  	  	  	  
The	  Outbreak	  of	  the	  War	  	   Captain	  Joseph	  Darrigo	  awoke	  before	  dawn	  on	  Sunday	  morning	  on	  June	  25,	  1950	  to	  the	  sound	  of	  artillery	  shells	  whistling	  over	  his	  head.	  The	  only	  American	  officer	  on	  the	  north	  edge	  of	  the	  old	  capital	  of	  Kaesong	  (Gaeseong)	  just	  south	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel,	  the	  captain	  jumped	  from	  his	  bed,	  clad	  only	  in	  his	  trousers,	  and	  ran	  from	  the	  house.	  Once	  outside,	  Darrigo	  leapt	  into	  a	  jeep	  and	  drove	  south	  into	  Kaesong.	  His	  car	  came	  under	  arms	  fire	  upon	  reaching	  the	  center	  of	  town,	  but	  he	  managed	  to	  escape	  without	  injury,	  and	  thus	  got	  out	  of	  town	  and	  continued	  southward.	  In	  few	  hours,	  without	  much	  fighting,	  Kaesong	  was	  occupied	  by	  forces	  of	  the	  Democratic	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  [hereafter	  North	  Korea].2	  Only	  forty	  miles	  to	  the	  south,	  the	  fall	  of	  Seoul	  followed	  in	  a	  similar	  manner	  within	  few	  days.	  The	  Information	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Korea	  [hereafter	  South	  Korea]	  broadcast	  over	  radio	  on	  June	  27	  that	  all	  government	  staff,	  from	  President	  Yi	  Sung-­‐man	  (Yi	  Seung-­‐man)	  on	  down,	  were	  at	  their	  desks	  as	  usual,	  and	  that	  the	  congress	  likewise	  had	  decided	  that	  the	  capital	  was	  to	  be	  defended	  at	  all	  costs,	  appealing	  to	  citizens	  of	  
                                                1	  Clifford	  Geertz,	  Local	  Knowledge:	  Further	  Essays	  in	  Interpretive	  Anthropology	  (New	  York,	  1983).	  2	  Robert	  Sawyer,	  Military	  advisors	  in	  Korea:	  KMAG	  in	  Peace	  and	  War	  (Washington	  DC,	  1962),	  115.	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Seoul	  to	  trust	  their	  government	  and	  to	  defend	  their	  own	  workplaces	  to	  the	  last.3	  This	  was,	  however,	  not	  true.	  The	  president	  had	  already	  evacuated	  Seoul	  before	  dawn	  on	  that	  day,	  almost	  completely	  unnoticed.	  Discovering	  this	  fact	  in	  the	  morning,	  high-­‐ranking	  officials	  and	  statesmen	  hurriedly	  left	  Seoul,	  as	  well.4	  By	  the	  morning	  of	  June	  28,	  North	  Korean	  forces	  had	  occupied	  the	  capital	  and	  their	  flags	  fluttered	  at	  poles	  everywhere.	  In	  a	  mood	  of	  panic,	  South	  Korean	  forces	  blew	  up	  the	  huge,	  0.7-­‐mile-­‐long,	  Han	  River	  Bridge	  in	  hopes	  of	  stopping	  North	  Korean	  forces	  at	  the	  river.	  However,	  at	  that	  point,	  the	  majority	  of	  South	  Korean	  forces	  were	  still	  to	  the	  north	  of	  the	  river.	  Much	  worse,	  when	  the	  dynamite	  exploded	  and	  the	  bridge	  shattered,	  many	  cars	  and	  people	  were	  still	  on	  the	  bridge,	  evacuating	  southward	  from	  Seoul.	  In	  an	  instant,	  all	  hell	  broke	  loose	  in	  the	  river.	  One	  American	  official	  estimated	  that	  five	  to	  eight	  hundred	  people	  died	  in	  moments;	  another	  said	  that	  more	  than	  four	  thousand	  were	  on	  the	  bridge	  at	  that	  time.5	  Tragedies	  of	  this	  kind	  immediately	  following	  North	  Korea’s	  attack	  have	  been	  described	  repeatedly	  in	  mainstream	  historical	  narratives	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  In	  line	  with	  this,	  in	  South	  Korea,	  the	  conflict	  has	  traditionally	  been	  called	  “The	  6.25	  War,”	  stressing	  how	  unexpected	  North	  Korean	  attack	  was,	  how	  unprepared	  South	  Korean	  and	  American	  forces	  were,	  and	  how	  confusedly	  and	  desperately	  people	  escaped	  from	  the	  conflict	  that	  suddenly	  broke	  out	  on	  the	  day	  of	  June	  25,	  1950—an	  image	  of	  
                                                3	  Kim	  Song-­‐chil,	  Souru	  no	  jinmingun:	  Chosen	  Senso	  ka	  ni	  ikita	  rekishi	  gakusha	  no	  nikki	  [The	  People’s	  Army	  in	  Seoul:	  The	  Diary	  of	  a	  Historian	  who	  Lived	  Under	  the	  Korean	  War](Tokyo,	  1996),	  21.	  Kim	  Song-­‐chil	  kept	  his	  diary	  until	  he	  was	  killed	  in	  1951.	  	  4	  Park,	  Myung-­‐lim,	  Sensō	  to	  Heiwa:	  Chōsen	  Hantō	  1950	  [War	  and	  Peace:	  The	  Korean	  Penninsula	  1950]	  Yoshinobu	  Mori	  trans	  (Tōkyō:	  Shakai	  Hyōronsha,	  2009),	  131.	  5	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon	  (Tong-­‐ch'un).	  Chōsen	  Sensō	  no	  Shakaishi	  :	  Hinan,	  Senryō,	  Gyakusatsu	  [A	  Social	  History	  of	  the	  Korean	  War:	  Evacuation,	  Occupation,	  Massacre]	  (Tōkyō:	  Heibonsha,	  2008),	  124-­‐25.	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which	  fits	  perfectly	  with	  the	  conventional	  narrative	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  as	  the	  first	  “hot”	  war	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.6	  	  Nonetheless,	  much	  more	  has	  to	  be	  examined	  and	  explained.	  There	  were,	  in	  fact,	  far	  more	  diverse	  reactions	  and	  interpretations	  immediately	  following	  North	  Korea’s	  attack.	  Many	  people,	  needless	  to	  say,	  received	  a	  shock,	  hurriedly	  fleeing	  from	  Seoul	  to	  the	  south	  (Picture	  1).	  Yet,	  many	  other	  people,	  especially	  those	  who	  had	  been	  engaged	  in	  student,	  peasant,	  or	  various	  kinds	  of	  leftist	  movements,	  and	  thus	  had	  been	  harshly	  suppressed	  under	  the	  Yi	  Sung-­‐man	  government,	  North	  Korea’s	  attack	  did	  not	  particularly	  signify	  a	  moment	  of	  evacuation;	  it	  appeared,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  beginning,	  as	  the	  start	  of	  a	  “good”	  era.7	  One	  student	  in	  Seoul	  wrote	  excitedly	  immediately	  after	  the	  attack:	  Finally,	  the	  despot	  Yi	  Sungman	  is	  kicked	  out	  from	  Seoul.	  Usurping	  dictatorial	  power	  through	  taking	  mean	  advantage	  of	  people’s	  ignorance	  and	  inability,	  Yi	  Sungman	  is	  the	  enemy	  of	  our	  people.	  How	  exhilarating	  if	  he	  will	  be	  chastised	  even	  just	  once.	  Yi	  Sungman’s	  country	  is	  a	  country	  of	  torture.	  We	  have	  to	  record	  his	  torture,	  so	  that	  it	  will	  be	  remembered	  by	  later	  generations.8	  	  	  Still,	  however,	  many	  others	  were	  not	  nearly	  so	  enthusiastic	  about	  North	  Korea’s	  invasion.	  Nor	  were	  they	  particularly	  surprised	  about	  nor	  afraid	  of	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war.	  Kim	  Song-­‐chil	  (Kim	  Seong-­‐chil),	  a	  history	  professor	  at	  National	  Seoul	  University,	  wrote	  in	  his	  diary	  after	  coming	  back	  from	  a	  walk	  with	  his	  children	  on	  June	  28:	  	  
                                                6	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  has	  been	  the	  focal	  point	  of	  scholarship	  for	  decades.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Bruce	  Cumings,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  (Princeton,	  1981-­‐1990);	  Allan	  Millet,	  The	  War	  for	  
Korea	  (Lawrence,	  KS,	  2005-­‐2010);	  William	  Stueck,	  The	  Korean	  War:	  An	  International	  History	  (Princeton,	  1995);	  Sergei	  Goncharov	  et	  al.,	  Uncertain	  Partners	  :	  Stalin,	  Mao,	  and	  the	  Korean	  War	  (Stanford,	  1993).	  For	  Koreans’	  various	  responses,	  see	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon,	  Chōsen	  Sensō	  no	  Shakaishi	  and	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim,	  Sensō	  to	  Heiwa:	  Chōsen	  Hantō	  1950.	  7	  Kim	  Song-­‐chil,	  July	  2,	  1950,	  38.	  8	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon,	  138.	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[The	  North	  Korean	  soldiers]	  have	  a	  hard	  northwestern	  accent,	  but	  they	  are	  our	  kind,	  sharing	  language,	  customs,	  and	  blood.	  Somehow	  they	  do	  not	  look	  like	  the	  enemy.	  They	  look	  more	  like	  brothers	  who	  left	  home	  and	  lived	  far	  away,	  just	  making	  a	  visit	  after	  a	  long	  absence.	  Nobody	  feels	  enmity	  when	  seeing	  them	  smiling	  and	  talking	  calmly.9	  	  Kim	  Song-­‐chil’s	  attitude	  was	  not	  particularly	  exceptional.	  As	  sociologist	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon	  points	  out,	  residents	  of	  Seoul	  and	  peasants	  in	  neighboring	  areas	  were	  not	  necessarily	  in	  a	  panic,	  and	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  them	  decided	  to	  stay.10	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  when	  news	  of	  the	  invasion	  arrived	  at	  the	  capital	  and	  the	  radio	  broadcast	  a	  command	  for	  military	  officials	  to	  return	  to	  their	  troops,	  a	  baseball	  game	  continued	  playing	  at	  Seoul	  Stadium.11	  	  	  
Fear	  of	  World	  War	  III	  The	  moment	  of	  attack	  was	  shared	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  earth	  almost	  immediately.	  Viewed	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  however,	  the	  situation	  looked	  far	  more	  grim,	  because	  North	  Korea’s	  attack	  was	  assumed	  to	  be	  a	  direct	  challenge	  from	  Moscow,	  against	  which	  Americans	  should	  stand	  firmly.	  Although	  many	  Americans	  might	  not	  have	  known	  much	  about	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula,	  details	  of	  geography	  or	  culture	  did	  not	  really	  matter.	  The	  significant	  point	  was	  that	  the	  “enemy”	  had	  come	  to	  attack.	  Based	  on	  this	  view,	  many	  Americans	  took	  to	  their	  pens,	  sending	  messages	  to	  the	  president.	  In	  just	  four	  days	  following	  the	  North	  Korean	  attack,	  the	  White	  House	  received	  approximately	  900	  telegrams	  and	  276	  letters,	  which,	  like	  a	  flood,	  continued	  to	  arrive	  every	  single	  day	  for	  the	  next	  several	  months,	  with	  the	  majority	  asking	  the	  
                                                9	  Kim	  Song-­‐chil,	  June	  28,	  1950,	  26.	  10	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon	  categorizes	  this	  ruling	  circles	  as	  including,	  for	  instance,	  military,	  police,	  and	  government	  officials,	  as	  well	  as	  ex-­‐Japanese	  collaborators,	  businessmen,	  landowners,	  Christians,	  and	  refugees	  from	  the	  North.	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon,	  109-­‐110,	  166.	  11	  Ibid,	  109-­‐110.	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president	  to	  take	  a	  tougher	  stance,	  some	  proudly	  and	  others	  more	  in	  a	  panic.12	  A	  man	  in	  Indianapolis	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  White	  House	  on	  July	  25:	  	  Communism	  is	  a	  bad	  thing	  and	  must	  be	  met	  with	  strong	  measures,	  since	  that	  is	  the	  only	  thing	  they	  understand	  or	  respect.	  […]	  I’m	  convinced	  that	  we	  are	  never	  going	  to	  have	  any	  peace	  until	  that	  “hell	  hole”	  in	  Russia	  is	  cleared	  out.	  Let’s	  take	  the	  offensive.	  We	  have	  been	  sitting	  back	  waiting	  and	  spending	  ourselves	  into	  bankruptcy,	  the	  Russians	  definitely	  have	  the	  upper	  hand	  in	  this	  sort	  of	  game.	  The	  longer	  we	  wait	  the	  stronger	  they	  will	  get	  and	  by	  the	  same	  token	  we	  will	  grow	  weaker.13	  	  	  Similarly,	  an	  Oklahoma	  man,	  urged:	  “Dear	  Mr.	  Truman.	  I	  don’t	  know	  much	  about	  the	  war	  but	  I	  want	  to	  know	  what	  you	  think	  of	  this.	  Why	  don’t	  you	  load	  up	  a	  few	  B-­‐29s	  with	  Atomic	  Bombs,	  fly	  over	  to	  Russia	  and	  let	  them	  drop.	  It’s	  an	  awful	  thing	  to	  do.	  But	  if	  we	  don’t	  do	  it	  first	  Russia	  will.”14	  A	  mother	  in	  Plainfield,	  New	  Jersey,	  resolutely	  informed	  the	  president:	  “My	  husband	  served	  overseas	  in	  the	  second	  war.	  My	  son	  is	  1A	  Plus	  for	  the	  third	  if	  the	  blunders	  of	  Manchuria,	  Ethiopia,	  and	  Czechoslovakia	  are	  repeated.”15	  	  Glancing	  over	  hundreds	  of	  these	  letters,	  one	  would	  easily	  notice	  that	  the	  majority	  never	  mention	  “Korea”	  at	  all.	  Most,	  instead,	  focus	  on	  the	  “Kremlin”	  and	  “Stalin,”	  implying	  that	  many	  Americans	  assumed	  that	  the	  Korean	  War	  began	  with	  Soviet	  forces’	  invasion	  on	  June	  25,	  1950,	  and	  that	  North	  Koreans	  were	  viewed	  merely	  as	  tools	  of	  Moscow,	  with	  North	  Korea’s	  attack	  seen	  as	  having	  been	  made	  at	  
                                                12	  Memorandum,	  From	  William	  J.	  Hassett	  to	  Charles	  Ross,	  29	  June	  1950,	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Papers	  (Hereafter	  HSTP),	  Official	  File:	  471-­‐B,	  Korean	  Emergency.	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library	  (hereafter	  HSTL),	  Independence,	  MO;	  Paul	  G.	  Pierpaoli,	  Jr.	  Truman	  and	  Korea:	  The	  Political	  Culture	  of	  the	  Early	  Cold	  War	  (Columbia,	  MO:	  University	  of	  Missouri	  Press,	  1999),	  36.	  13	  Letter,	  J.	  L.	  Showalter	  to	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  (hereafter	  HST),	  July	  25,	  1950,	  HSTP:	  Official	  File,	  471-­‐B,	  Miscellaneous.	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  MO.	  14	  Letter,	  Jimmy	  Balter	  to	  HST,	  June	  27,	  1950,	  HSTP:	  Official	  File,	  471-­‐B,	  Miscellaneous,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  MO.	  	  	  	  15	  Letter,	  Jean	  Cottrell	  Fleischman	  to	  HST,	  June	  26,	  1950,	  HSTP:	  Official	  File,	  471-­‐B,	  Miscellaneous,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  MO.	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the	  instruction	  of	  Joseph	  Stalin	  (Picture	  2).16	  While	  significant	  numbers	  of	  people	  disagreed	  with	  this	  viewpoint	  as	  this	  chapter	  examines	  below,	  in	  general,	  many	  viewed	  the	  Korean	  War	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Kremlin’s	  “carefully	  laid	  scheme,”	  which	  meant	  for	  many	  Americans,	  the	  opening	  phase	  of	  war	  between	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  United	  States.17	  Chicago	  Daily	  News	  journalist	  Keyes	  Beech’s	  observation	  on	  July	  1,	  1950,	  therefore,	  appeared	  neither	  strange	  nor	  absurd	  when	  he	  reported	  back	  from	  Seoul:	  “I	  have	  a	  feeling	  that	  I	  have	  just	  witnessed	  the	  beginning	  of	  World	  War	  III.”18	  	  The	  initial	  strategy	  of	  the	  United	  States	  concerning	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  was	  formulated	  within	  such	  an	  environment.	  Just	  enjoying	  a	  vacation	  in	  his	  hometown,	  Independence,	  Missouri,	  on	  the	  night	  of	  June	  24,	  President	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  at	  its	  very	  outset	  did	  not	  see	  the	  situation	  as	  a	  burning	  issue.	  Rather,	  he	  remarked	  to	  an	  aide	  that	  he	  would	  not	  cut	  short	  his	  visit	  to	  Independence	  “unless	  something	  developed,”	  because	  it	  would	  alarm	  the	  people.19	  What	  changed	  his	  attitude	  by	  the	  next	  morning,	  however,	  were	  close	  communications	  with	  officials	  and	  politicians	  in	  Washington,	  including	  a	  telephone	  conversation	  with	  Dean	  Acheson	  and	  a	  forwarded	  memo	  from	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  a	  Republican	  and	  advisor	  to	  the	  president,	  who	  was,	  coincidently,	  visiting	  Seoul	  and	  Tokyo	  at	  that	  time,	  and	  
                                                16	  Political	  cartoon,	  “Push-­‐Button	  Warfare,”	  U.S.	  News	  and	  World	  Report	  (21	  July	  1950),	  12;	  Also	  a	  similar	  cartoon	  appeared	  in	  “Where	  Next?”	  Ithaca	  Journal	  (8	  July	  1950).	  17	  Drew	  Pearson,	  “President	  Needs	  All	  Help	  in	  Crisis,”	  24	  July	  1950,	  Washington	  Post.	  Some	  magazines,	  for	  example,	  U.S.	  News	  and	  World	  Report,	  again	  and	  again	  warned	  of	  the	  possibility	  that	  World	  War	  III	  would	  occur	  in	  August	  1950	  in	  their	  August	  11th	  and	  18th	  issues.	  	  	  18	  Steven	  Casey,	  Selling	  the	  Korean	  War:	  Propaganda,	  Politics,	  and	  Public	  Opinion	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  
1950-­‐1953	  (New	  York,	  2008),	  43.	  	  19	  Eben	  Ayers	  Diary,	  June	  25,	  1950,	  in	  Robert	  Ferrell	  ed.,	  Truman	  in	  the	  White	  House:	  The	  Diary	  of	  
Eben	  A.	  Ayers	  (Columbia,	  MO:	  University	  of	  Missouri,	  1991),	  353.	  Washington’s	  swift	  and	  decisive	  decision	  to	  dispatch	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  Korea	  and	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait	  has	  been	  well	  known.	  For	  example,	  Glenn	  Paige,	  The	  Korean	  Decision:	  June	  24-­‐30,	  1950	  (New	  York:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  1968),	  and	  William	  Stueck,	  The	  Korean	  War.	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frankly	  recommended	  that	  Washington	  use	  military	  forces	  in	  Korea.20	  Having	  had	  communications	  with	  officials	  in	  Washington,	  Truman	  quickly	  modified	  his	  stance,	  asserting,	  “If	  we	  are	  tough	  enough	  now	  […],	  they	  won’t	  take	  any	  next	  steps.	  But	  if	  we	  just	  stand	  by,	  they’ll	  move	  into”	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  in	  the	  future.21	  Interpreting	  North	  Korea’s	  attack	  as	  a	  clear	  sign	  of	  communist	  aggression	  controlled	  by	  Moscow,	  the	  Truman	  administration	  decided	  to	  dispatch	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  Korea	  and	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait.22	  In	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  itself	  was	  not	  big	  news,	  but	  America’s	  intervention	  in	  Korea	  and	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait	  created	  complex	  repercussions.	  Immediately	  following	  the	  American	  intervention,	  rumors	  in	  the	  northeast	  maintained	  that	  “Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  has	  already	  landed	  nine	  divisions	  in	  South	  Korea.	  Now	  both	  American	  and	  Japanese	  forces	  have	  entered	  the	  war,	  and	  World	  War	  III	  will	  be	  inescapable.	  Shenyang	  cannot	  avert	  air	  raids.”23	  In	  Tianjin,	  a	  rumor	  at	  the	  end	  of	  June	  predicted	  that	  a	  world	  war	  would	  begin	  in	  the	  following	  September.	  In	  Kunming,	  in	  southwest	  China,	  local	  rumors	  had	  it	  that	  Ho	  Chi	  Mihn	  had	  already	  evacuated	  from	  Vietnam	  to	  Yunnan	  Province,	  that	  American	  forces	  would	  attack	  China	  from	  Vietnam,	  and	  that	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  had	  been	  flown	  to	  Tibet	  to	  command	  counterrevolutionary	  forces.24	  In	  Chongqing,	  one	  landlord	  suddenly	  
                                                20	  Telegram,	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  and	  John	  Allison	  to	  Dean	  Acheson	  and	  Dean	  Rusk,	  25	  June	  1950,	  George	  M.	  Elsey	  Papers	  (hereafter	  GMEP),	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  71,	  HSTL;	  “Acheson,	  Dean	  1950,”	  Box	  47,	  Seeley	  Mudd	  Manuscript	  Library	  (hereafter	  SMML),	  Princeton	  University,	  Princeton,	  NJ.	  21	  “President	  Truman’s	  Conversation	  with	  George	  M.	  Elsey,”	  26	  June	  1950,	  GMEP,	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  71,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  MO.	  22	  “Statement	  by	  the	  President,”	  27	  June	  1950,	  GMEP,	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  71,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  MO.	  23	  “Shenyang	  ge	  jieceng	  dui	  Chaoxian	  zhanzheng	  de	  fanying	  [Reactions	  of	  various	  sections	  in	  Shenyang	  toward	  the	  Korean	  War],”	  July	  13,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  Chinese	  University	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  [hereafter	  CUHK],	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  24	  “Guo	  neiwai	  dui	  Chaoxian	  zhanzheng	  he	  Chaoxian	  tanpan	  fanying	  [Responses	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	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stop	  renting	  his	  property	  in	  mid-­‐July;	  it	  turned	  out	  that	  he	  foresaw	  a	  rise	  in	  housing	  rents	  because	  many	  people	  living	  in	  the	  lower	  Yangtze	  River	  would	  have	  to	  evacuate	  to	  Chongqing	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  a	  general	  war.25	  In	  the	  Hualing	  district	  of	  Shanghai,	  locals	  gossiped	  that	  the	  Communist	  Party	  would	  have	  no	  way	  to	  survive	  if	  a	  world	  war	  were	  to	  break	  out,	  whispering	  that	  the	  CCP’s	  signature	  collecting	  campaigns	  would	  be	  no	  use	  at	  all.26	  Because	  of	  such	  fears	  of	  World	  War	  III,	  commodity	  prices	  quickly	  rose	  in	  most	  cities	  throughout	  China,	  while	  stock	  prices	  in	  Beijing,	  Shanghai,	  and	  Tianjin	  fell	  quickly.27	  In	  Tianjin,	  for	  instance,	  stock	  prices	  plummeted	  nearly	  a	  half,	  while	  observing	  the	  shot	  up	  of	  gold	  price	  133	  percent	  in	  the	  first	  week	  following	  the	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  the	  Korean	  War.28	  	  	  	  Observing	  the	  situation	  immediately	  following	  the	  American	  intervention	  into	  the	  Korean	  War,	  a	  communist	  official	  in	  Rehe,	  in	  northeast	  China,	  lamented,	  in	  a	  report	  written	  on	  July	  22,	  1950:	  	  The	  people’s	  minds	  appear	  to	  be	  in	  a	  state	  of	  sheer	  terror.	  Ordinary	  people	  do	  not	  trust	  the	  value	  of	  our	  paper	  money	  any	  more,	  rushing	  to	  buy	  gold	  and	  silver,	  leading	  to	  a	  surge	  in	  gold	  prices.	  People	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  our	  news	  reports	  of	  the	  victory	  of	  North	  Korean	  forces.	  […].	  There	  have	  been	  fears	  of	  [America’s]	  atomic	  attack,	  which	  
                                                                                                                                            toward	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  the	  Korean	  armistice],”	  July	  14,	  1950,	  No.	  116-­‐00085-­‐01,	  Foreign	  Ministry	  Archives	  (hereafter	  FMA),	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  	  25	  “Chongqing	  gongshang,	  wenhuajie	  dui	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  [Responses	  in	  business	  and	  literacy	  circles	  in	  Chongqing	  toward	  the	  current	  political	  situation],”	  July	  24,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  26	  “Zhonggong	  Shanghaishi	  jiaoqu	  gongzuo	  weiyuanhui	  guanyu	  Shanghaishi	  Hualongqu	  heping	  qianming	  yundong	  de	  gongzuo	  jianbao	  [CCP	  rural	  workings	  committee	  on	  peace	  signature	  campaigns	  at	  Hualong	  district	  in	  Shanghai],”	  July	  16,	  1950,	  A71-­‐2-­‐56-­‐9,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  	  27	  See	  various	  entries	  from	  local	  committee	  in	  early	  July	  1950	  in	  Neibu	  cankao,	  such	  as	  “Dulumen	  shengming	  fabiao	  hou	  Shanghai	  shichang	  qingkuang	  [The	  situation	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  market	  following	  the	  announcement	  of	  Truman	  statement],”	  July	  1,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  28	  “Jing-­‐shi	  gongshang	  jie	  dui	  muqian	  shiju	  fanying	  [The	  reactions	  toward	  current	  affairs	  among	  busines	  circle	  in	  Tianjin],”	  July	  5,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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have	  caused	  some	  to	  forecast	  the	  end,	  resulting	  in	  parties	  of	  heavy	  drinking	  and	  eating	  in	  some	  areas.	  Some	  say,	  “Let’s	  drink	  today	  all	  liquor	  we	  have	  today.”29	  	  Reactions	  of	  this	  kind	  were	  not	  the	  single	  mode	  of	  response.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  aforementioned	  feelings	  of	  fears	  and	  concerns,	  many	  people	  remained	  indifferent,	  while	  others	  hardened	  anti-­‐American	  and	  anti-­‐colonial	  sentiments	  as	  we	  will	  examine	  in	  detail	  below.	  Still,	  there	  were	  quite	  a	  few	  who	  were	  thrilled	  with	  the	  news.	  For	  those	  who	  had	  been	  skeptical,	  or	  even	  antagonistic,	  toward	  the	  communist	  regime,	  America’s	  intervention	  into	  Korea	  and	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait	  appeared	  as	  a	  rare	  opportunity	  to	  fight	  back.	  If	  anyone	  found	  a	  chance	  in	  this	  way,	  perhaps,	  no	  one	  exceeded	  the	  degree	  of	  zeal	  of	  members	  and	  sympathizers	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  (GMD)	  in	  Taiwan,	  who	  had	  evacuated	  the	  mainland	  only	  about	  half	  a	  year	  before.	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  for	  instance,	  wrote	  in	  his	  diary	  on	  July	  1:	  “The	  United	  States	  has	  already	  started	  World	  War	  III.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  our	  counteroffensive	  to	  the	  mainland,	  we	  need	  to	  study	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  can	  support	  South	  Korea.”30	  Two	  days	  later,	  Chiang	  made	  a	  speech	  in	  Taipei,	  declaring	  that	  the	  Korean	  War	  would	  be	  an	  opportunity	  not	  only	  to	  form	  a	  framework	  of	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Republic	  of	  China	  (Taiwan)	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  but	  also	  to	  form	  an	  alliance	  in	  East	  Asia	  against	  the	  threat	  of	  communism.31	  Along	  this	  line,	  the	  Korean	  War,	  defined	  by	  the	  Nationalist	  Party,	  appeared	  as	  a	  part	  
                                                29	  “Rehe,	  Jinzhou	  deng	  di	  ganbu	  qunzhong	  dui	  Chaoxian	  zhanshi	  de	  fanying	  [Reactions	  of	  cadres	  and	  people	  in	  Rehe	  and	  Jinzhou	  toward	  the	  Korean	  War],”	  July	  22,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  30	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  Diary,	  July	  1,	  1950,	  Box	  48,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  Diary	  (hereafter	  CKSD),	  Hoover	  Institute,	  Stanford	  University,	  Stanford,	  CA.	  	  31	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  “Hanzhan	  yu	  shijie	  jushi	  [The	  Korean	  War	  and	  World	  Situations],	  July	  3,	  1950”	  in	  
Fangong	  kang-­‐E	  zhong	  de	  Jiang	  zongtong	  [Generalissimo	  Chiang	  in	  the	  Opposing	  Communism	  and	  Resisting	  Russia	  (Movements	  of)	  	  ],	  42,	  Dangshiguan	  [Nationalist	  Party	  Archives]	  (hereafter	  NPA),	  Taipei,	  Taiwan;	  ““Zhongyang	  zhixing	  weiyuanhui	  tonggao	  [Announcement	  of	  the	  Central	  Committee	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  Party],”	  June	  30,	  1950,	  6-­‐41-­‐87:	  Central	  Reform	  Committee	  Archive,	  Zhongguo	  Guomingdang	  Records,	  Hoover	  Institute,	  Stanford	  University,	  CA.	  18).	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of	  the	  larger	  battles	  between	  Russians	  and	  Asians.	  The	  official	  GMD	  organ,	  
Zhongyang	  Ribao,	  for	  example,	  editorialized	  that	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war	  signified	  “another”	  invasion	  of	  Russian	  Imperialism	  in	  Asia,	  arguing	  that	  it	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  struggle	  between	  the	  Chinese	  people	  and	  Russian	  Imperialism,	  not	  that	  of	  Taiwan	  versus	  Mainland	  China.	  32	  Viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  marked	  a	  golden	  opportunity	  for	  Taiwan,	  with	  the	  United	  States	  on	  its	  side.	  On	  the	  same	  day	  he	  made	  his	  speech,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  actually	  informed	  MacArthur	  in	  full	  of	  high	  sprits	  that	  Taiwan	  could	  dispatch	  land	  troops	  to	  South	  Korea	  within	  five	  days.33	  One	  poet	  expressed	  such	  fervent	  hopes	  in	  a	  poem,	  entitled	  “A	  Signal	  of	  July,”	  immediately	  after	  the	  American	  intervention	  in	  Korea	  and	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait.	  It	  read:	  	  In	  the	  season	  of	  dense	  cloud	  A	  thunderbolt	  with	  anger	  sounds	  across	  the	  low	  sky	  of	  July	  A	  storm	  has	  come	  It	  is	  a	  signal	  not	  a	  prophecy	  Vibrant	  days	  Spirited	  hearts	  Every	  depressed	  life	  	   	   all	  becomes	  amazed	  and	  exuberant	  The	  song	  we	  passionately	  sing	  	  thunders	  out	  in	  July	  We	  will	  find	  a	  fruit	  that	  the	  storm	  shall	  drop	  off.34	  	  	  
                                                32	  “Edi	  you	  yi	  qinlue	  xingdong	  [Russia’s	  another	  invasion	  again],”	  Editorial,	  Zhongyang	  Ribao,	  June	  26,	  1950;	  and	  “Weihe	  hanjian	  biwang	  qinlue	  bi	  bai,”	  [Why	  traitor	  loses	  and	  invasion	  fails]”	  in	  Gaizao	  
[Reform]	  No.	  5	  (November	  1,	  1950),	  101-­‐4,	  Nationalist	  Party	  Archives,	  Taipei,	  Taiwan.	  33	  Memorandum,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  to	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  July	  3,	  1950,	  File	  3A,	  Box	  6,	  RG6:	  Records	  of	  General	  Headquarters,	  Far	  East	  Command,	  MacArthur	  Memorial	  Archives	  (hereafter	  MMA),	  Norfolk,	  VA.	  	  34	  Guo	  Sifen,	  “Haichao	  [Sea	  Tide]”	  in	  Ge	  Xianning	  ed.,	  Fan	  Gong	  Kang	  E	  Shixuan	  (Taipei,	  1952),	  41-­‐42.	  	  National	  Taiwan	  University	  Library,	  Taipei,	  Taiwan.	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Needless	  to	  say,	  such	  delighted	  reactions	  appeared	  only	  among	  Nationalist	  Party	  members	  and	  sympathizers	  who	  had	  just	  evacuated	  from	  the	  mainland.	  For	  them,	  the	  Korean	  War	  should	  not	  be	  a	  local	  war	  in	  Korea;	  it	  should	  be	  part	  of	  a	  global	  war,	  in	  which	  they	  had	  been	  taking	  part,	  and	  which	  would	  be	  a	  certain	  “signal”	  of	  fighting	  back,	  not	  an	  untrustworthy	  “prophecy.”	  Because	  the	  moment	  appeared	  to	  be	  such	  a	  rare	  opportunity	  for	  a	  counterattack,	  some	  even	  felt	  irritated	  with	  the	  pace	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  His	  offer	  of	  sending	  troops	  to	  Korea	  rejected	  by	  Washington,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  became	  increasingly	  impatient	  and	  distrustful	  toward	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  reached	  the	  peak	  by	  late	  July:	  “For	  these	  three	  years	  the	  United	  States	  has	  abandoned	  China,	  and	  taken	  a	  policy	  of	  supporting	  Japan.	  That	  policy	  in	  China	  and	  East	  Asia	  continues	  now.	  That	  is	  America’s	  crude	  and	  shortsighted	  strategy	  in	  East	  Asia.	  How	  can	  such	  a	  country	  lead	  the	  world?”35	  	  Hopes	  and	  disappointments	  of	  this	  kind	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  shared	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  earth.	  In	  Sofia,	  Bulgaria,	  for	  example,	  a	  British	  diplomat	  discerned	  a	  “good	  deal	  of	  excitement”	  among	  local	  residents	  immediately	  following	  the	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  Korea.	  According	  to	  his	  observation,	  some	  Bulgarians	  who	  bitterly	  opposed	  to	  the	  communist	  regime	  but	  saw	  no	  chance	  of	  upsetting	  it	  without	  a	  general	  upheaval	  were	  talking	  in	  elated	  and	  vengeful	  terms	  of	  such	  an	  upheaval	  having	  just	  begun.36	  As	  in	  Taiwan,	  much	  disappointment	  was	  observed	  among	  such	  Bulgarians,	  because	  an	  American	  radio	  program,	  the	  Voice	  of	  America,	  retained	  a	  
                                                35	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  Diary,	  July	  27,	  1950,	  Box	  48,	  CKSD,	  Hoover	  Institute,	  Stanford	  University,	  Stanford,	  CA.	  36	  Telegram	  (From	  Sofia,	  Bulgaria,	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK),	  July	  4,	  1950,	  in	  “Bulgarian	  reactions	  to	  situation	  in	  Korea,”	  FO371/87567,	  British	  National	  Archives	  (hereafter	  BNA),	  Kew,	  UK.	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low	  tone,	  instead	  of	  making	  bold	  and	  sensational	  comments.37	  Still,	  rumors	  in	  Rumania	  in	  mid-­‐July	  maintained	  that	  regular	  transport	  of	  guns	  westward	  was	  observed	  in	  Galati,	  situated	  in	  the	  Danube;	  that	  Russia	  had	  already	  demanded	  that	  Rumania	  invade	  Yugoslavia;	  and	  that	  there	  was	  “evidence”	  of	  road	  and	  rail	  movements	  of	  Rumanian	  and	  Russian	  troops	  near	  Bucharest.38	  In	  a	  fearful	  and	  suspicious	  frame	  of	  mind,	  the	  Norwegian	  Ambassador	  inquired	  of	  a	  British	  minister:	  “[A]ny	  information	  to	  suggest	  that	  Russians	  were	  making	  preparations	  […]	  elsewhere?”39	  Amid	  this	  climate	  of	  impending	  world	  war,	  even	  trivial	  daily	  occurrences	  appeared	  extremely	  serious.	  This	  was	  because	  there	  was	  a	  certain	  “common	  sense”	  about	  the	  situation—that	  North	  Korea’s	  attack	  was	  made	  under	  Stalin’s	  orders,	  that	  the	  Russians	  chose	  Korea	  merely	  as	  a	  test	  point,	  and	  that	  there	  could	  be,	  or	  must	  be,	  a	  similar	  and	  larger	  attack	  on	  Europe.40	  In	  short,	  many	  in	  Western	  Europe	  feared	  that	  the	  Korean	  War	  was	  merely	  a	  feint	  operation	  before	  a	  Russian	  attack	  on	  Europe,	  which	  could	  lead	  a	  general	  war	  between	  the	  East	  and	  West	  camps,	  or	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  III.	  That	  is	  why,	  like	  the	  Norwegian	  Ambassador,	  the	  Greek	  Ambassador	  in	  London	  enquired	  with	  the	  British	  Foreign	  Office	  in	  July	  about	  whether	  they	  had	  any	  information	  concerning	  Soviet	  intentions	  toward	  Greece.41	  
                                                37	  	  Ibid.	  38	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Telegram	  (From	  Bucharest,	  Rumania,	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK),	  July	  15,	  1950,	  in	  “Rumors	  of	  Rumanian	  war	  preparation,”	  FO371/88073,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  39	  Memorandum,	  “Conversation	  between	  the	  Minister	  of	  State	  and	  the	  Norwegian	  Ambassador,”	  June	  29,	  1950,	  in	  FO371/86538:	  “Norwegian	  Attitude	  towards	  Events	  in	  Korea,”	  BNA.	  40	  Memorandum	  (From	  Hague,	  Netherlands,	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK),	  July	  17,	  1950,	  in	  “Netherlands	  reaction	  to	  events	  in	  Korea	  and	  to	  world	  political	  moves	  relating	  to	  this	  crisis,”	  FO371/89330,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK;	  Also,	  “Conversation	  between	  the	  Minister	  of	  State	  (UK)	  and	  the	  Norwegian	  Ambassador,”	  June	  29,	  1950,	  in	  “Norwegian	  attitude	  towards	  events	  in	  Korea,”	  FO371/86538,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  41	  Memorandum,	  “Greece’s	  attitude	  to	  Korea	  and	  decision	  to	  send	  a	  battalion	  there,”	  July	  22,	  1950,	  in	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That	  is	  why	  many	  Swedish	  and	  other	  neighboring	  countries’	  youth	  appealed	  to	  Joseph	  Stalin,	  not	  the	  North	  Koreans	  or	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung	  (Kim	  Il-­‐seong),	  to	  stop	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  a	  rally	  held	  at	  Skarpnack,	  near	  Stockholm,	  Sweden,	  in	  the	  same	  month.42	  And	  that	  is	  why	  many	  in	  European	  countries	  perceived	  the	  Korean	  War	  as	  a	  warning	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  Europe	  in	  case	  of	  another	  world	  war,	  a	  way	  of	  thinking	  that	  opened	  the	  door	  for	  the	  re-­‐armament	  of	  West	  Germany.43	  	  Based	  on	  this	  viewpoint,	  a	  daily	  newspaper	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  Het	  Binnenhof,	  editorialized	  in	  mid	  July:	  	  The	  conclusion	  is	  that	  the	  West	  will	  have	  to	  direct	  all	  its	  energies	  to	  the	  strengthening	  of	  its	  defences,	  even	  though	  the	  war	  is	  not	  yet	  warm	  in	  the	  West.	  The	  people	  of	  the	  West,	  in	  their	  peace	  illusion,	  have	  dwelt	  too	  much	  on	  the	  past,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  Bonn	  and	  Tokyo	  still	  have	  no	  armies	  of	  their	  own	  with	  which	  if	  the	  necessity	  should	  arise	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  defence	  of	  Western	  democracy.	  If	  Korea	  teaches	  us	  that	  we	  have	  a	  lot	  to	  do	  in	  a	  short	  space	  of	  time,	  and	  if	  we	  react	  accordingly,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  in	  the	  long	  run	  the	  Korean	  conflict	  will	  have	  had	  a	  beneficial	  influence.44	  	  	  Observing	  the	  development	  of	  discussions	  of	  European	  defense,	  a	  special	  correspondent	  for	  the	  Japanese	  Asahi	  Shinbun	  reported	  from	  Paris	  on	  July	  29	  that	  the	  war	  in	  Korea	  had	  been	  dominating	  the	  front	  pages	  of	  French	  newspapers	  for	  more	  than	  a	  month,	  adding	  that	  it	  had	  been	  a	  long	  time,	  if	  ever	  before,	  since	  Europeans	  paid	  such	  careful	  and	  continuous	  attention	  to	  the	  Far	  East.	  The	  
                                                                                                                                            FO371/87710:	  “Korea	  Situation:	  Greek	  Government,”	  BNA	  42	  Memorandum	  (From	  Stockholm,	  Sweden,	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK),	  July	  19,	  1950,	  in	  “Norwegian	  attitude	  towards	  events	  in	  Korea,”	  FO371/86538,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  43	  “London	  Press	  Service:	  Diplomatic	  Summary,”	  August	  22,	  1950,	  in	  “China:	  political	  Situation,”	  DO133/22,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK;	  Memorandum,	  Allen	  W.	  Dulles	  to	  John	  F.	  Dulles,	  “Memo	  from	  Conrad	  Adenauer,”	  September	  8,	  1950,	  Papers	  of	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  Box	  47,	  Mudd	  Library,	  Princeton	  University,	  Princeton,	  New	  Jersey;	  also,	  for	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  West	  Germany’s	  re-­‐armament,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Otake	  Hideo,	  Saigunbi	  to	  Nashonarizumu	  [Rearmament	  and	  Natiaonalism]	  (Tokyo:	  Chuo	  Koronsha,	  1988),	  18-­‐22.	  	  	  	  44	  Memorandum	  (From	  Hague,	  Netherlands,	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK),	  July	  17,	  1950,	  in	  “Netherlands	  reaction	  to	  events	  in	  Korea	  and	  to	  world	  political	  moves	  relating	  to	  this	  crisis,”	  FO371/89330,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	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correspondent	  concluded,	  “With	  the	  incident	  occurring	  in	  a	  remote	  peninsular	  in	  the	  Far	  East,	  Europe	  is	  keeping	  step	  with	  the	  world,	  and	  opened	  a	  new	  page	  of	  postwar	  history.”45	  	  Just	  across	  the	  sea	  from	  the	  burning	  peninsula,	  Japan,	  too,	  opened	  a	  new	  page	  of	  postwar	  history	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  Immediately	  following	  the	  North	  Korean	  attack,	  some	  experienced	  soldiers	  reportedly	  volunteered	  for	  the	  support	  of	  South	  Korea.	  Radicals,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  responded	  that	  the	  same	  pattern	  would	  occur	  in	  Japan	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  They	  happily	  spread	  rumors	  that	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  was	  approaching,	  and	  would	  conquer	  Japan	  in	  a	  few	  years.46	  A	  renowned	  intellectual,	  Takeuchi	  Yoshimi,	  succinctly	  summarized	  the	  atmosphere	  at	  that	  moment:	  “In	  the	  year	  of	  1950,	  war	  and	  revolution	  was	  not	  prediction	  but	  reality.	  The	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  was	  established	  in	  the	  previous	  year,	  and	  the	  Korean	  War	  occurred	  in	  that	  year.	  Many	  believed	  a	  revolution	  in	  Japan	  was	  inevitable.	  I	  wonder	  that	  no	  one	  at	  that	  time	  expected	  tranquility	  ten	  years	  hence.”47	  Like	  in	  Europe,	  such	  a	  turbulent	  mood	  boosted	  discussions	  of	  Japan’s	  re-­‐armament,	  which	  became	  the	  central	  issue	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed.	  Within	  weeks	  of	  North	  Korea’s	  attack,	  a	  renowned	  international	  law	  scholar,	  Yokota	  Kisaburo,	  for	  instance,	  wrote	  an	  article,	  titled	  “The	  Crisis	  of	  World	  War	  III	  and	  National	  Security	  of	  Japan,”	  arguing	  that	  the	  attack	  should	  not	  be	  seen	  solely	  as	  North	  Korea’s	  action,	  
                                                45	  “Chosen	  no	  doran	  to	  Oushu	  [The	  War	  in	  Korea	  and	  Europe],”	  July	  29,	  1950,	  Asahi	  Shinbun.	  46	  Letter,	  Chiba	  Kiyoshi	  to	  Ashida	  Hitoshi,	  Papers	  of	  Ashida	  Hitoshi	  (hereafter	  PAH),	  Correspondence	  File,	  No.	  266.	  National	  Diet	  Library;	  Asahi	  Shinbun,	  July	  5,	  1950.	  	  47	  Oguma	  Eiji,	  Oguma	  Eiji,	  “Minshu”	  to	  “Aikoku”:	  Sengo	  Nihon	  no	  nashonarisumu	  to	  kokyosei	  
[“Democracy”	  and	  Patriotism:	  Nationalism	  and	  Publicness	  in	  Postwar	  Japan](Tokyo,	  2002),	  342.	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that	  World	  War	  III	  was	  possible,	  and	  that	  Japan	  would	  need	  to	  establish	  a	  concept	  of	  national	  defense	  in	  a	  “realistic”	  manner.48	  Yokota’s	  view	  was	  backed	  by	  conservatives,	  such	  as	  Baba	  Tsunego,	  president	  of	  Yomiuri	  Shinbun,	  who	  frankly	  wrote	  that	  “The	  roar	  of	  gunfire	  in	  Korea	  awoke	  us	  from	  a	  five-­‐year	  dream	  of	  peace	  in	  Japan.	  […].	  Nobody	  can	  guarantee	  that	  Japan	  will	  not	  experience	  the	  same	  fate	  when	  we	  see	  the	  North	  Korean	  army’s	  surprise	  attack,	  as	  well	  as	  wartime	  chaos	  in	  Korea	  today.”49	  	   Amid	  such	  a	  radicalization	  and	  polarization	  of	  political	  viewpoints	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  those	  disappointed	  were	  a	  group	  of	  people,	  including	  both	  conservatives	  and	  leftists,	  who	  had	  been	  advocating	  the	  unarmed	  neutrality	  of	  Japan	  and	  its	  comprehensive	  peace	  treaty	  concerning	  World	  War	  II.	  Some,	  of	  course,	  continued	  to	  argue,	  or	  even	  radicalized,	  the	  same	  line,	  but	  many	  thought	  that	  the	  line	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  hold	  anymore.	  For	  them,	  a	  world	  war	  between	  the	  two	  camps,	  the	  possibility	  of	  which	  they	  had	  dismissed,	  was	  occurring	  a	  stone’s	  throw	  from	  Japan.	  One	  popular	  intellectual,	  Shimizu	  Ikutaro,	  lost	  patience,	  writing	  only	  few	  words	  in	  his	  diary	  on	  the	  day	  after	  the	  attack:	  	  “What	  nonsense.”50	  	  He	  later	  recalled	  that	  he	  felt	  absurd	  because	  all	  of	  his	  efforts	  for	  the	  unarmed	  neutrality	  of	  Japan	  and	  its	  comprehensive	  peace	  treaty	  had	  come	  to	  nothing	  since,	  he	  believed,	  the	  basic	  premise	  of	  US-­‐USSR	  coexistence	  was	  undercut	  with	  the	  
                                                48	  Yokota	  Kisaburo,	  “Dai	  san	  ji	  sekai	  taisen	  no	  kiki	  to	  Nihon	  no	  anzen	  hosho	  [The	  Crisis	  of	  World	  War	  III	  and	  the	  National	  Security	  of	  Japan],”	  Yomiuri	  Shinbun,	  July	  30,	  1950.	  	  49	  Baba,	  Tsunego,	  “Five	  Years	  Since	  the	  End	  of	  the	  War,”	  Yomiuri	  Shinbun,	  August	  13,	  1950.	  	  50	  Shimizu	  Ikutaro,	  “Waga	  jinsei	  no	  danpen	  [Scraps	  of	  My	  Life],”	  in	  Shimizu	  Ikutaro	  chosaku	  shu	  [The	  
Collection	  of	  Shimizu	  Ikkutaro],	  Vol.	  14	  (Tokyo:	  Kodansha,	  1993),	  337.	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outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  “The	  co-­‐existence,”	  he	  wrote,	  “was	  destroyed	  by	  the	  Socialist	  forces.”51	  	  Yokota	  and	  Shimizu’s	  statements	  appeared	  neither	  peculiar	  nor	  off	  base	  from	  the	  “common”	  view	  at	  that	  time.	  In	  Tokyo,	  in	  Shanghai,	  in	  Taipei,	  In	  Chicago,	  in	  Sofia,	  in	  Athens,	  in	  the	  Hague,	  and	  in	  many	  places	  of	  throughout	  the	  world,	  millions	  of	  people	  would	  have	  agreed	  that	  they	  were	  witnessing	  the	  opening	  of	  a	  general	  war	  between	  the	  USSR	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  meant,	  for	  many,	  the	  beginning	  of	  World	  War	  III.	  As	  such,	  Nobel-­‐prize	  winning	  British	  philosopher	  Bertrand	  Russell	  felt	  able	  to	  declare	  solemnly	  his	  prophecy	  at	  the	  end	  of	  June	  1950:	  “The	  world	  has	  already	  entered	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  a	  global	  crush.	  If	  war	  breaks	  out,	  it	  flares	  up	  both	  in	  Asia	  and	  Europe	  simultaneously.”52	  
	  
Local	  Needs:	  Nation	  Building	  The	  discourse	  of	  World	  War	  III,	  however,	  was	  more	  a	  figment	  of	  the	  imagination	  and	  product	  of	  fear	  than	  reality,	  as	  was	  the	  world	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  that	  was	  established	  on	  the	  former.	  It	  was	  based	  more	  on	  existing	  frameworks	  of	  understanding	  founded	  on	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  other	  local	  historical	  contexts	  than	  actual	  situations	  in	  Korea	  at	  that	  time.	  In	  fact,	  as	  recent	  studies	  have	  shown,	  Stalin	  did	  not	  order	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung	  to	  attack	  the	  South	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  inciting	  World	  War	  III,	  although	  he	  was	  surely	  responsible	  for	  irresponsibly	  
accepting	  Kim’s	  persistent	  pleas.53	  The	  primary	  propelling	  force	  for	  North	  Korea’s	  
                                                51	  Ibid,	  338.	  52	  Bertrand	  Russell,	  Sun,	  Sydney,	  June	  29,	  1950.	  Quoted	  in	  Mainichi	  Shinbun,	  July	  1,	  1950.	  	  53	  Contents	  of	  communications	  among	  Stalin,	  Mao,	  and	  Kim	  have	  been	  well-­‐examined	  and	  published	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invasion,	  among	  many	  other	  factors,	  was	  not	  so	  much	  Joseph	  Stalin,	  as	  widely	  believed	  at	  that	  time	  and	  since,	  but	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung,	  who	  had	  been	  advocating	  a	  concept	  of	  “Namjin	  [Southward	  March]”	  for	  years.54	  Except	  for	  a	  few	  ebullient	  rhetorical	  slogans,	  Stalin,	  in	  his	  actual	  behavior	  and	  policymaking,	  remained	  cautious	  in	  not	  inciting	  war	  with	  Western	  forces	  in	  either	  Europe	  or	  Asia,	  in	  particular	  avoiding	  a	  direct	  confrontation	  with	  the	  United	  States.55	  President	  Truman,	  too,	  despite	  widely	  spread	  fear	  (and	  hope)	  in	  China	  and	  other	  places,	  did	  not	  consider	  expanding	  the	  war	  to	  mainland	  China,	  let	  alone	  planning	  another	  world	  war.56	  In	  short,	  the	  leaderships	  of	  the	  two	  “camps”	  did	  not	  have	  a	  plan	  for	  another	  world	  war.	  Nonetheless,	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  discourse	  of	  World	  War	  III	  increasingly	  gained	  great	  verisimilitude	  worldwide	  simultaneously,	  as	  did	  the	  imagined	  reality	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Why?	  It	  seemed	  so	  because	  these	  discourses	  proved	  flexible	  utility	  and	  adaptability	  for	  many	  different	  reasons	  in	  many	  places	  of	  the	  globe.	  	  	  In	  South	  Korea,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  itself	  did	  not	  necessarily	  appear	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  World	  War	  III	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  conflict.	  Not	  only	  that,	  it	  was	  not	  really	  a	  surprising	  bolt	  out	  of	  blue.	  The	  South	  Korean	  Army’s	  intelligence	  
                                                                                                                                            in	  various	  formats.	  Most	  notably,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  CWIHP’s	  Bulletins,	  Working	  Papers,	  and	  digital	  archives	  online	  at	  <	  http://www.wilsoncenter.org/digital-­‐archive>.	  Also,	  Shen	  Zhihua	  has	  translated	  numerous	  Russian	  documents	  into	  Chinese	  and	  published	  them	  in	  Taiwan;	  Shen	  Zhihua,	  Chaoxian	  
Zhanzheng:	  Eguo	  Danganguan	  de	  jiemi	  wenjian	  [The	  Korean	  War:	  Declassified	  Documents	  from	  Russian	  Archives],	  3	  Vols	  (Taipei:	  Zhongyang	  yanjiuyuan	  jindaishi	  yanjiusuo,	  2003).	  	  54	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon,	  35.	  	  55	  For	  instance,	  see,	  Kathryn	  Weathersby,	  "'Should	  We	  Fear	  This?'	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Danger	  of	  War	  with	  America."	  CWIHP	  Working	  Paper,	  No.	  39	  (July	  2002),	  19;	  and	  Vojtech	  Mastny,	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  Soviet	  
Insecurity:	  The	  Stalin	  Years	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  1996.	  Some	  scholars	  have	  depicted	  more	  aggressive	  image	  of	  Stalin;	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Vladislav	  Zubok	  and	  Constantine	  Pleshekov,	  Inside	  
the	  Kremlin's	  Cold	  War:	  From	  Stalin	  to	  Khrushchev	  (Cambridge,	  1996)	  and	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis,	  We	  Now	  
Now:	  Rethinking	  Cold	  War	  History	  (New	  York,	  1997).	  56	  Truman	  was,	  in	  fact,	  quite	  reluctant	  even	  to	  accept	  the	  bombing	  of	  Dandong	  in	  August	  of	  1950	  for	  the	  fear	  of	  provoking	  war	  with	  China.	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officers	  had	  been	  warning	  of	  a	  conventional	  military	  attack	  from	  North	  Korea	  since	  the	  end	  of	  1949.57	  In	  addition,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Defense	  and	  Acting	  Prime	  Minister,	  Shin	  Sung-­‐mo	  publicly	  warned	  on	  May	  10,	  1950	  of	  the	  concentration	  of	  North	  Korean	  troops	  at	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  with	  “apparent	  intention	  to	  attack”	  the	  South,	  and,	  a	  few	  days	  later,	  the	  Chief	  of	  General	  Staff	  issued	  a	  similar	  statement	  after	  visiting	  to	  the	  38th	  Parallel.58	  Furthermore,	  while	  the	  war	  began	  with	  the	  North	  Korean	  invasion	  of	  the	  South,	  it	  could	  have	  occurred	  just	  the	  opposite	  way.	  President	  Yi	  Sung-­‐man,	  in	  fact,	  had	  been	  advocating	  a	  concept	  of	  “Bukbeol	  [Northward	  Conquest]”	  for	  years,	  pleading	  with	  Washington	  for	  more	  military	  supplies,	  including	  long-­‐range	  artillery,	  combat	  airplanes,	  and	  patrol	  ships,	  in	  hopes	  of	  taking	  over	  the	  northern	  area	  of	  the	  peninsula.59	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  in	  late	  June	  of	  1950,	  days	  before	  the	  North’s	  attack,	  Yi	  Sung-­‐man	  appealed	  in	  person	  to	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  that	  South	  Korea	  would	  launch	  the	  offensive	  to	  take	  over	  North	  Korea	  within	  a	  year,	  and	  that	  it	  could	  be	  completed	  within	  a	  few	  days	  because	  the	  people	  of	  North	  Korea	  would	  rise	  up	  against	  the	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung	  regime.	  President	  Yi	  even	  asserted	  that	  South	  Korea	  would	  do	  it	  with	  or	  without	  support	  from	  Washington,	  adding	  that	  an	  attempt	  to	  unify	  Korea	  would	  not	  be	  an	  act	  of	  “aggression.”60	  	  	   Put	  simply,	  North	  and	  South	  Korea	  had	  each	  been	  proclaiming	  for	  years	  the	  plans	  of	  “Namjin	  [Southward	  March]”	  and	  “Bukbeol	  [Northern	  Conquest],”	  respectively.	  The	  historical	  background	  for	  this	  situation	  was	  that	  Korea	  had	  been	  in	  
                                                57	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon,	  102-­‐103.	  58	  Memorandum,	  Seoul	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK	  (May	  23,	  1950)	  in	  FO	  371/84078:	  “Communism	  in	  Korea,”	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  According	  to	  this	  British	  memorandum,	  the	  “American	  experts”	  dismissed	  these	  warnings	  because	  “in	  their	  opinion	  the	  available	  information	  does	  not	  justify	  such	  statements.”	  59	  Memorandum,	  William	  	  D.	  Mathews	  to	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  June	  21,	  1950,	  Box	  49,	  Papers	  of	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  Princeton	  University,	  Princeton,	  NJ.	  	  	  60	  Ibid.	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a	  civil	  war	  situation,	  alongside	  recent	  years’	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  internal	  guerilla	  warfare	  and	  insurgencies,	  including	  the	  Cheju	  (Jeju)	  Incident	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1948,	  the	  Yeosu-­‐Suncheon	  Uprisings	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1948,	  and	  social	  unrest	  in	  every	  province	  in	  South	  Korea	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed.	  In	  addition,	  numerous	  skirmishes	  along	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  occurred	  before	  June	  25,	  1950,	  as	  well.61	  Observing	  turbulence	  in	  the	  South,	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung	  might	  have	  believed,	  as	  Yi	  Sung-­‐man	  assumed	  the	  opposite	  situation,	  that	  the	  people	  in	  South	  Korea	  would	  rise	  up	  against	  the	  Yi’s	  regime	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  North	  Korean	  leadership	  might	  have	  considered	  their	  economic	  and	  industrial	  strength	  before	  the	  Korean	  War	  period.	  After	  all,	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  legacy	  of	  Japanese	  colonialism,	  the	  basic	  infrastructure	  in	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  was	  located	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel.	  Over	  ninety	  percent	  of	  the	  country’s	  hydro-­‐electric	  power	  was	  generated	  in	  the	  North	  and	  none	  of	  this	  was	  available	  to	  the	  South.	  Ninety-­‐five	  percent	  of	  the	  country’s	  iron	  and	  steel	  production	  facilities,	  seven	  out	  of	  eight	  major	  cement	  facilities,	  and	  the	  greater	  part	  of	  its	  chemical	  industries	  (notably	  fertilizers),	  as	  well	  as	  its	  only	  petroleum	  processing	  plant,	  were	  all	  situated	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel.	  In	  addition,	  seventy-­‐five	  percent	  of	  Korea’s	  coal	  and	  sixty-­‐five	  percent	  of	  its	  timber	  lay	  north	  of	  the	  parallel,	  and,	  thus,	  were	  no	  longer	  accessible	  from	  the	  South.62	  A	  British	  diplomat	  in	  Seoul	  concluded	  in	  his	  
                                                61	  For	  these	  local	  struggle	  derived	  from	  the	  postwar	  division	  of	  the	  penninsula,	  for	  incetance,	  see	  works	  of	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon,	  Bruce	  Cumings,	  John	  Merrill,	  and	  Allan	  Millet	  among	  others.	  On	  the	  revolutionary	  movements	  in	  the	  North,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Charles	  K.	  Armstrong,	  The	  North	  Korean	  
Revolution,	  1945-­‐1950	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  For	  the	  Cheju	  Incident,	  in	  particular,	  see,	  the	  six-­‐volume	  investigative	  reports	  by	  a	  local	  newspaper	  in	  Cheju,	  Saishūtō	  Yonsan	  Jiken	  [The	  Cheju	  Island	  4.3	  Incident]	  (Tōkyō:	  Shinkansha,	  1994).	  Also,	  see	  Mun	  Gyonsu,	  Saishūtō	  yon	  san	  jiken	  [The	  Cheju	  Island	  4.3	  Incident]	  (Tōkyō:	  Heibonsha,	  2008).	  62	  Memorandum,	  “Annual	  political	  report	  for	  Korea,	  1949,”	  Seoul	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK	  (January	  30,	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report	  in	  January	  1950	  that	  “It	  seems	  that	  the	  balance	  of	  strength	  between	  the	  north	  and	  the	  south	  is	  now	  somewhat	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  north.”63	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  it	  is	  not	  particularly	  surprising	  that	  North	  Korea	  seized	  the	  initiative	  before	  the	  development	  of	  South	  Korea.	  	  	  	   Viewed	  from	  Korea,	  therefore,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  conventional	  warfare	  on	  June	  25,	  1950,	  was	  not	  really	  the	  “beginning”	  of	  the	  war,	  but	  a	  culmination	  of	  civil	  war	  struggles,	  or	  even	  a	  continuation	  of	  anti-­‐colonial	  battles	  that	  had	  been	  continuing	  for	  decades	  since	  the	  Japanese	  colonial	  period.	  That	  is	  why	  many	  Koreans	  viewed	  the	  day	  as	  coming	  “at	  last,”	  instead	  of	  “out	  of	  blue.”	  Listening	  to	  the	  news,	  a	  poet	  Jo	  Ji-­‐hun	  shouted,	  “The	  day	  that	  has	  to	  come	  once	  has	  finally	  arrived	  today!”64	  Likewise,	  Korean	  historian	  Kim	  Song-­‐chil	  wrote	  in	  his	  diary	  on	  June	  26,	  1950,	  “Killing	  among	  the	  same	  bloodline,	  which	  has	  frightened	  us	  for	  five	  years,	  has	  come	  at	  last.”65	  These	  reactions	  were	  not	  particularly	  unusual,	  and,	  thus,	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  Seoul	  residents,	  including	  businessmen,	  industrialists,	  and	  intellectuals,	  did	  not	  flee	  from	  Seoul.66	  In	  the	  southern	  areas	  of	  South	  Korea,	  as	  well,	  some	  peasants	  simply	  continued	  their	  work	  in	  the	  fields,	  even	  though	  they	  knew	  that	  North	  Korean	  forces	  were	  moving	  southward;	  they	  reportedly	  thought	  that	  soldiers	  would	  not	  harm	  them	  because	  “they	  were	  the	  same	  blood,	  after	  all.”67	  	  	   The	  fact	  that	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  did	  not	  evacuate	  southward,	  of	  course,	  did	  not	  indicate	  their	  support	  for	  the	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung	  regime	  or	  communist	  
                                                                                                                                            1950)	  in	  FO371/84053,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  	  63	  Ibid.	  	  64	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim,	  236,	  239-­‐240.	  65	  Kim	  Song-­‐chil,	  June	  27,	  1950,	  17.	  	  66	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon,	  136.	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon	  has	  examined	  various	  cases	  of	  people	  who	  decided	  not	  to	  evacuate	  from	  Seoul.	  	  	  67	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon,	  110.	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ideology.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  neither	  peasant	  revolts	  nor	  partisan	  uprisings	  occurred	  in	  South	  Korea,	  even	  when	  North	  Korea	  extended	  its	  domain	  near	  Pusan	  (Busan),	  at	  the	  southern	  tip	  of	  the	  peninsula.68	  Choices	  made	  by	  people	  to	  stay,	  to	  evacuate,	  or	  to	  join	  the	  North/South	  Korean	  forces	  were	  made,	  in	  many	  cases,	  not	  so	  much	  through	  ideological	  and	  political	  beliefs	  as	  coincidental	  and	  contingent	  factors,	  such	  as	  family	  and	  friendship	  ties,	  neighborhood	  relationships,	  or	  simply	  being	  forced	  by	  hunger.69	  	  Many	  residents	  changed	  their	  political	  agendas	  overnight	  without	  much	  effort.	  The	  historical	  background	  for	  this	  might	  be,	  at	  least	  partly,	  the	  legacy	  of	  Japanese	  colonialism,	  which	  ruled	  Korea	  for	  more	  than	  three	  decades.	  Because	  of	  this	  experience,	  as	  sociologist	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon	  argues,	  Koreans	  rarely	  had	  strong	  feelings	  of	  patriotism	  toward	  “state”	  or	  “ruler”	  until	  the	  Korean	  War	  period.	  In	  short,	  the	  attachments	  they	  had	  involved	  more	  about	  ethnic	  categories,	  like	  “Korean”	  in	  contrast	  to	  “Japanese”	  or	  “Chinese,”	  not	  so	  much	  about	  “state,”	  like	  North	  Korea	  or	  South	  Korea.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  fervent	  modern	  nationalism	  among	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  people,	  the	  ruling	  circles	  might	  have	  lacked	  a	  sense	  of	  public-­‐mind,	  instead	  managing	  the	  newly	  established	  country	  for	  their	  own	  personal	  ambitions	  and	  benefits.70	  It	  was	  no	  wonder	  that	  the	  Yi	  Sung-­‐man	  regime	  had	  grown	  increasingly	  unpopular	  due	  to	  its	  oppression,	  corruption,	  and	  abuse	  of	  power.	  By	  the	  year	  of	  1950,	  police	  control	  had	  been	  tightened	  over	  the	  daily	  lives	  of	  ordinary	  people,	  and	  
                                                68	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim,	  174.	  69	  See,	  for	  example,	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim,	  556-­‐58.	  70	  Memorandum,	  “Annual	  Report	  for	  Korea,	  1949,”	  Seoul	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK,	  January	  30,	  1950	  in	  FO371/84053,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	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numerous	  arrests	  were	  made	  under	  the	  National	  Security	  Law.	  Much	  worse,	  torture	  was	  regularly	  applied	  to	  those	  arrested	  on	  political	  and	  other	  charges,	  and	  “died	  under	  torture”	  became	  a	  routine	  entry	  in	  the	  police	  record.71	  In	  early	  1950,	  a	  British	  diplomat	  observed	  the	  situation	  in	  South	  Korea	  as	  such:	  The	  abuses	  of	  authority	  are	  many	  and	  seldom	  neglected,	  and	  the	  corruption	  and	  oppression	  of	  the	  police	  has	  become	  an	  outstanding	  feature	  of	  the	  life	  of	  the	  country.	  […].	  The	  Government	  indeed	  finds	  itself	  in	  a	  perplexing	  predicament,	  for	  without	  employing	  harsh	  repressive	  measures,	  it	  cannot	  withstand	  communism,	  and	  yet	  these	  very	  measures…make	  new	  converts	  to	  the	  communist	  cause.72	  	  	  Under	  such	  a	  regime,	  it	  was	  no	  wonder	  that	  some	  wondered	  if	  it	  was	  good	  or	  bad	  to	  perpetuate	  the	  Yi	  Sung-­‐man	  regime.	  Hearing	  news	  on	  coming	  of	  the	  South	  Korean	  army	  with	  the	  support	  of	  U.N.	  forces,	  Kim	  Tae-­‐gil,	  a	  professor	  at	  Ewha	  Women’s	  University,	  was	  actually	  concerned	  because	  “it	  was	  not	  clear	  which	  side	  was	  our	  forces	  and	  which	  side	  was	  enemies.’”73	  As	  these	  observations	  show,	  popular	  support	  for	  the	  regime	  was	  thin,	  and	  the	  project	  of	  “nation-­‐building”	  campaigns	  had	  been	  unsuccessful	  before	  the	  summer	  of	  1950.	  	   This	  was	  exactly	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  Yi	  Sung-­‐man	  regime’s	  problem	  in	  the	  pre-­‐Korean	  War	  period.	  There	  was	  not	  a	  sense	  of	  “nation-­‐state”	  with	  the	  fervent	  nationalism	  among	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  people	  that	  characterizes	  a	  modern	  state.	  It	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  President	  Yi	  Sung-­‐man,	  immediately	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  conflict,	  viewed	  the	  situation	  as	  representing	  the	  “best	  opportunity	  for	  setting	  the	  Korean	  problem	  once	  and	  for	  all.”74	  The	  Korean	  War,	  in	  fact,	  provided	  opportunities	  to	  redefine	  a	  continuing	  civil	  war	  struggle	  as	  the	  forefront	  of	  World	  War	  III,	  which	  
                                                71	  Ibid.	  	  72	  Memorandum,	  Seoul,	  Korea,	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK,	  January	  30,	  1950,	  in	  FO371/84053:	  “Annual	  political	  report	  for	  Korea,	  1949,”	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  73	  Kim	  Dong-­‐choon,	  135-­‐36.	  	  74	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim,	  123.	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would	  produce	  a	  sense	  of	  “nation”	  among	  the	  people,	  thus,	  creating	  support	  for	  the	  regime.	  Seen	  this	  way,	  adopting	  World	  War	  III	  logic	  and	  Cold	  War	  worldview	  seemed	  to	  have	  its	  own	  local	  “merits”	  in	  South	  Korea,	  even	  though	  the	  war	  itself	  rooted	  in	  their	  civil	  war.	  	  Local	  adaptation	  of	  Cold	  War	  logic	  was	  nothing	  unique	  to	  South	  Korea.	  A	  similar	  use	  of	  “global”	  discourse	  in	  local	  nation	  building	  projects	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  other	  places,	  such	  as	  Taiwan,	  and	  newly	  born	  countries	  in	  South	  and	  Southeast	  Asia.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  was	  seen	  by	  GMD	  leadership	  in	  Taipei	  as	  a	  golden	  opportunity	  for	  a	  counteroffensive	  on	  the	  mainland.75	  Underneath	  the	  gallant	  cries	  of	  “Counterattack	  the	  Mainland,”	  however,	  there	  was	  a	  more	  practical	  aim—building	  political	  and	  social	  order	  in	  Taiwan.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  defeat	  of	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  was,	  of	  course,	  a	  heavy	  blow	  for	  the	  Nationalist	  Party,	  but,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  historian	  Wakabayashi	  Masahiro	  points	  out,	  the	  retreat	  to	  Taiwan	  provided	  GMD	  a	  chance	  to	  solidify	  their	  power	  base,	  because	  it	  freed	  them	  from	  the	  headaches	  of	  local	  politics,	  corrupt	  customs,	  and	  military	  cliques	  on	  the	  mainland,	  all	  of	  which	  had	  tormented	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  and	  his	  sympathizers	  for	  years.76	  Thus,	  quite	  similar	  to	  nation	  building	  efforts	  of	  former-­‐colonies	  in	  Asia,	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  had	  to	  create	  and	  solidify	  its	  own	  power	  in	  Taiwan	  under	  GMD	  rule.	  
                                                75	  For	  instance,	  the	  Central	  Executive	  Committee	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  on	  June	  30,	  1950,	  addressed	  that	  the	  Korean	  War	  would	  become	  a	  turning	  point,	  prompting	  to	  strengthen	  the	  U.S.-­‐Taiwan	  relationship	  and	  to	  form	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  united	  front	  in	  East	  Asia.	  See	  “Zhongyang	  zhixing	  weiyuanhui	  tonggao	  [Announcement	  of	  Central	  Executive	  Committee],”	  June	  30,	  1950,	  in	  6-­‐41-­‐87:	  The	  Papers	  of	  the	  Central	  Reform	  Committee,	  Hoover	  Institute,	  Stanford	  University,	  Stanford,	  CA.	  	  76	  Wakabayashi	  Masahiro,	  Taiwan	  (Tokyo:	  Chikuma	  shobo,	  2001).	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In	  fact,	  the	  common-­‐place	  slogan	  of	  “Counterattack	  the	  Mainland”	  was	  usually	  accompanied	  by	  others,	  like	  “Build	  Taiwan.”	  When	  we	  look	  closely	  at	  the	  party’s	  slogans	  at	  that	  time,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  emphasis	  was	  more	  on	  re-­‐building	  and	  maintaining	  social	  order	  at	  home.	  Often	  slogans	  maintained,	  “Stop	  Luxury	  and	  Extravagance,”	  “Be	  Punctual,”	  “Keep	  Order,”	  and	  so	  on.	  A	  local	  newspaper	  in	  a	  small	  city,	  Jiayi,	  Minsheng	  Ribao,	  reflected	  such	  a	  tendency.	  On	  August	  5,	  1950,	  the	  paper	  appealed	  to	  readers	  regarding	  the	  need	  to	  “Mobilize	  anti-­‐communism”	  and	  “Build	  Jiayi.”	  Going	  into	  specifics,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  emphasis	  was	  on	  the	  latter;	  urgent	  tasks	  that	  the	  newspaper	  listed	  included,	  for	  instance,	  1)	  planning	  of	  administrative	  districts	  for	  the	  city,	  2)	  establishment	  of	  schools,	  and	  3)	  rearrangement	  of	  the	  family	  registration	  system,	  and	  so	  on.77	  These	  socio-­‐political	  tasks	  and	  campaigns	  were	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  creating	  social	  and	  political	  order	  at	  home.	  More	  tellingly,	  the	  years	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  witnessed	  escalation	  of	  suppression	  of	  various	  minorities	  and	  dissidents,	  which	  later	  called	  the	  White	  Terror,	  which	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  a	  later	  chapter.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Korean	  War	  provided	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  build	  an	  “independent	  state”	  of	  Nationalist	  Taiwan,	  under	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	   Likewise,	  in	  the	  Philippines,	  a	  similar	  pattern	  appeared.	  Within	  weeks	  of	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  Philippines	  government	  swiftly	  declared	  its	  support	  for	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  even	  seized	  the	  opportunity	  to	  suppress	  various	  kinds	  of	  “anti-­‐government”	  factions	  in	  the	  islands.	  On	  July	  15,	  1950,	  the	  Mayor	  of	  Manila,	  Manuel	  de	  La	  Fuente,	  announced:	  	  
                                                77	  “Dongyuan	  fangong,	  jianshe	  jiayi,	  difang	  zizhi	  bi	  chenggong	  [Mobilize	  anti-­‐communism,	  built	  Jiayi;	  Local	  governing	  must	  succeed]	  ,”	  August	  5,	  1950,	  Minsheng	  Ribao,	  NTUL,	  Taipei,	  Taiwan.	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In	  view	  of	  the	  grave	  developments	  in	  the	  world	  situation	  today,	  it	  is	  indeed	  imperative	  for	  the	  Philippines	  Government	  to	  take	  all	  precautions	  necessary,	  as	  well	  as	  stricter	  measures	  against	  the	  world’s	  greatest	  threat.	  An	  extremely	  false	  and	  misleading	  ideology,	  communism,	  in	  the	  Philippines	  seeks	  to	  overthrow	  the	  democratic	  form	  of	  government	  that	  we	  all	  are	  enjoying	  now.78	  	  The	  mayor	  insisted	  on	  the	  outlawing	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  and,	  in	  addition,	  demanded	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  “Special	  Committee	  on	  Un-­‐Filipino	  Activities,”	  under	  which,	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed,	  various	  groups,	  from	  nationalists	  to	  anti-­‐Western	  and	  anti-­‐Japanese	  activists,	  were	  suppressed	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  a	  topic	  which	  we	  will	  revisit	  in	  a	  later	  chapter.	  In	  a	  slightly	  different	  fashion,	  Thailand	  also	  declared	  its	  support	  for	  the	  United	  States	  immediately	  following	  the	  North	  Korean	  invasion,	  with	  Premier	  Phibun	  Songkram	  asking	  Washington	  for	  additional	  military	  and	  economic	  aid.79	  These	  examples	  demonstrate	  that	  Cold	  War	  discourse	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  was	  adapted	  and	  utilized	  in	  various	  ways,	  depending	  on	  local	  needs.	  	  	  
Local	  Needs:	  Anti-­‐Colonialism	  The	  discourse	  of	  World	  War	  III	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  worldview	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  period	  proved	  its	  flexibility	  and	  utility	  in	  a	  similar	  nation-­‐building	  project	  in	  other	  newly	  born	  counties,	  through	  in	  quite	  different	  ways.	  In	  Indonesia,	  for	  instance,	  the	  tone	  toward	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  American	  involvement	  was	  far	  lower.	  Rather	  than	  a	  hardening	  of	  anti-­‐communist	  views,	  the	  Indonesian	  
                                                78	  “Report	  on	  the	  Illegality	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Philippines,”	  published	  on	  May	  15,	  1951	  by	  the	  Special	  Committee	  on	  Un-­‐Filipino	  Activities,	  in	  “Internal	  Affairs	  in	  the	  Philippines;	  Outlawing	  the	  Communist	  Party,”	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  79	  “Premier	  Discusses	  War,	  A-­‐Bomb,	  Nehru’s	  Plan”	  in	  the	  Bongkok	  Post,	  July	  21,	  1950,	  “Siamese	  reactions	  to	  events	  in	  Korea;	  Offer	  of	  food	  rice	  and	  troops	  for	  UN	  forces,”	  FO371/84362,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	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government	  expressed	  an	  unwillingness	  to	  take	  any	  role	  in	  this	  matter,	  and	  the	  local	  presses	  continued	  to	  urge	  aloofness	  from	  the	  conflict	  and	  from	  the	  East-­‐West	  confrontation.80	  A	  British	  official	  in	  Singapore	  analyzed	  this	  Indonesian	  neutralist	  attitude	  as	  arising	  from	  the	  need	  of	  a	  newly	  independent	  state	  to	  prove	  its	  own	  subjectivity	  to	  the	  world	  and	  to	  its	  own	  people.81	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  Korean	  War	  provided	  an	  opportunity	  to	  demonstrate	  independence	  by	  choosing	  not	  to	  align	  with	  any	  foreign	  power.	  Being	  neutral	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  world,	  thus,	  was	  useful	  to	  manifest	  its	  own	  independent	  judgment	  and	  to	  bolster	  legitimacy	  at	  home.	  The	  local	  and	  historical	  background	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  adaptation	  was	  general	  skepticism	  toward	  the	  West	  and	  anti-­‐colonial	  feelings	  in	  Indonesia.	  After	  all,	  independence	  was	  newly	  won,	  and	  many	  Indonesians	  were	  extremely	  sensitive	  to	  any	  attempt	  to	  restore	  direct	  or	  indirect	  rule	  by	  colonial	  powers	  in	  Asia.	  A	  reporter	  for	  the	  British	  Observer	  was	  keenly	  aware	  of	  this	  point:	  “People	  here	  think	  ‘anti-­‐imperialist’	  rather	  than	  ‘anti-­‐communist.’”	  According	  to	  this	  report	  on	  July	  15,	  hearing	  news	  of	  the	  American	  intervention	  in	  Korea,	  many	  Indonesians	  were	  growing	  concerned	  that	  Western	  imperialism	  would	  return	  to	  Asia	  in	  “the	  guise	  of	  anti-­‐communism.”82	  In	  fact,	  they	  feared,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  already	  been	  bolstering	  corrupt	  and	  reactionary	  regimes	  in	  Asia,	  including	  those	  of	  Yi	  Sung-­‐man	  in	  Korea,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  in	  Taiwan,	  and	  Bao	  Dai	  in	  Vietnam.83	  Based	  on	  similar	  
                                                80	  “Indonesian	  Government	  Statement	  on	  Korea,”	  June	  27,	  1950,	  in	  FO371/83725:	  “Indonesian	  attitude	  to	  the	  war	  in	  Korea,”	  BNA;	  Telegram,	  Jakarta	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK,	  June	  30,	  1950,	  in	  FO371/83725:	  “Indonesian	  attitude	  to	  the	  war	  in	  Korea,”	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  81	  Telegram,	  “Public	  Reactions	  to	  Korean	  Events,”	  Gorge	  Thompson,	  Malaya,	  to	  Colonial	  Office,	  UK,	  in	  CO537/5965:	  “Reactions	  in	  Federation	  of	  Malaya	  and	  Singapore	  to	  events	  in	  Korea,”	  BNA.	  	  82	  “Indonesian	  Wary	  About	  Korea,”	  Observer,	  July	  15,	  1950,	  in	  “Various	  reactions	  to	  events	  in	  Korea,”	  FO371/84529,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  83	  Ibid.	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skepticism	  toward	  the	  Western	  powers,	  in	  India,	  as	  well,	  Prime	  Minister	  Nehru	  was	  criticized	  for	  “joining	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  bloc.”84	  In	  short,	  locals’	  frameworks	  of	  understanding	  built	  on	  historical	  experiences	  and	  memories	  served	  as	  lenses	  through	  which	  foreign	  events	  were	  observed	  and	  understood.	  	  Such	  was	  the	  case	  for	  Middle	  Eastern	  countries,	  as	  well.	  Reactions	  in	  Egypt	  and	  neighboring	  countries	  might	  have	  made	  the	  Indonesian	  government’s	  distant,	  neutralist	  policy	  look	  milder.	  On	  June	  30,	  immediately	  following	  Washington’s	  announcement	  of	  its	  decision	  to	  dispatch	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  Korea,	  requesting	  for	  support	  from	  other	  countries,	  Egyptian	  Prime	  Minister	  Mustafa	  el-­‐Nahhas	  called	  a	  press	  conference	  and	  announced	  his	  government’s	  decision	  not	  to	  support	  the	  U.N.	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  on	  the	  Korean	  issue.	  He	  critiqued	  the	  U.S.	  and	  U.N.	  in	  a	  roundabout	  way,	  saying:	  	  In	  the	  past	  there	  have	  been	  causes	  of	  aggression	  against	  peoples,	  violations	  of	  sovereignty,	  and	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  territory	  of	  States	  members	  of	  the	  U.N.	  These	  aggressions	  and	  violations	  were	  submitted	  to	  the	  U.N.,	  which,	  contrary	  to	  what	  it	  is	  now	  doing	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Korea,	  took	  no	  action	  to	  stop	  them.85	  	  	  	  Cairo	  Radio	  was	  much	  more	  explicit	  and	  trenchant	  on	  the	  following	  day,	  harshly	  condemning	  American	  and	  British	  attitudes:	  “What	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  injustice	  in	  Korea	  and	  injustice	  in	  Egypt	  and	  Palestine?	  What	  is	  the	  difference	  between	  freedom	  in	  East	  Asia	  and	  freedom	  in	  West	  Asia?	  It	  is	  not	  a	  question	  of	  arms	  and	  military	  strength	  but	  of	  right	  and	  wrong.”86	  Apparently,	  the	  situation	  was	  
                                                84	  Extract	  from	  Newspaper	  in	  India,	  “Communist	  Party	  Chiefs	  Expected	  to	  Discuss	  Policy	  on	  Korea	  War,”	  July	  12,	  1950,	  in	  “Developments	  in	  Political	  Parties	  in	  India;	  Communist	  Activities	  in	  India,”	  DO133/133,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  85	  Telegram	  (From	  Alexandria,	  Egypt,	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK),	  July	  1,	  1950,	  in	  “Egyptian	  attitude	  towards	  Korea.	  Refusal	  to	  support	  UN	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  on	  Korea,”	  FO371/80396,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  86	  Excerpt	  from	  the	  Cairo	  Radio,	  July	  1,	  1950,	  in	  “Egyptian	  attitude	  towards	  Korea;	  Refusal	  to	  support	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observed	  and	  understood	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  their	  recent	  bitter	  defeat	  in	  the	  Arab-­‐Israel	  War	  (1948-­‐49),	  which	  was	  called	  the	  “Catastrophe”	  in	  Egypt	  and	  the	  “War	  of	  Independence”	  in	  Israel.	  Cairo	  Radio	  acrimoniously	  queried:	  	  [W]e	  ask	  the	  American	  gentlemen:	  Did	  you	  never	  think,	  when	  you	  supported	  Israel	  against	  the	  Arab	  states	  and	  inflicted	  injustice	  on	  Palestine	  and	  made	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  homeless,	  that	  the	  aggression	  in	  Palestine	  was	  worse	  than	  that	  in	  South	  Korea?	  In	  Korea,	  the	  invaders	  of	  Korea	  were	  Korean	  people,	  while	  in	  Palestine	  the	  invaders	  were	  intruders—foreigners	  and	  immigrants	  from	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe.87	  	  	  Underneath	  such	  a	  feeling	  of	  injustice,	  there	  existed	  a	  deeper	  distrust	  toward	  former-­‐colonial	  countries.	  The	  broadcast	  continued	  its	  question:	  	  We	  ask	  our	  friends,	  the	  British:	  Did	  you	  really	  believe,	  after	  denying	  Egypt	  and	  the	  Sudan	  their	  rights	  and	  after	  their	  many	  sacrifices	  during	  two	  Great	  Wars	  in	  which	  they	  stood	  at	  your	  side,	  that	  Egypt	  would	  support	  you?	  Did	  you	  really	  think	  that	  the	  Egyptian	  people	  would	  burn	  their	  fingers	  a	  third	  time	  to	  pull	  your	  chestnut	  out	  of	  the	  fire?88	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  disagreements	  with	  this	  view	  existed	  within	  the	  society,	  and	  some	  newspapers,	  such	  as	  Al	  Mokattam,	  urged	  Egypt	  to	  join	  in	  support	  for	  the	  United	  States	  against	  communist	  aggression.	  However,	  many	  others	  advocated	  for	  outright	  neutrality	  in	  the	  Korean	  War,	  with	  a	  virulent	  anti-­‐Western	  tone.89	  	  Such	  an	  attitude	  was	  shared	  in	  other	  Arab	  countries	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  In	  Baghdad,	  Iraq,	  for	  instance,	  almost	  all	  newspapers	  reportedly	  supported	  the	  Egyptian	  attitude	  of	  non-­‐alignment,	  and	  in	  Damascus,	  Syria,	  too,	  most	  newspapers	  expressed	  skepticism,	  if	  not	  distrust,	  toward	  the	  “purity”	  of	  American	  aims	  in	  the	  Korean	  Conflict,	  charging	  that	  Americans	  sought	  only	  their	  own	  interests,	  
                                                                                                                                            UN	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  on	  Korea,”	  FO371/80396,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  87	  Excerpt	  from	  the	  Cairo	  Radio,	  July	  1,	  1950,	  in	  “Egyptian	  attitude	  towards	  Korea.	  Refusal	  to	  support	  U.N.	  Security	  Council	  Resolution	  on	  Korea,”	  FO371/80396,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  88	  Ibid.	  	  89	  Telegram	  (From	  Alexandria,	  Egypt,	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK),	  July	  4,	  1950,	  “Egyptian	  attitude	  towards	  Korea;	  Refusal	  to	  support	  UN	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  on	  Korea,”	  FO371/80396,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	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disregarding	  human	  rights.90	  As	  these	  examples	  show,	  existing	  local	  anti-­‐colonial	  sentiments	  played	  unmistakable	  roles	  in	  observing	  and	  understanding	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  many	  ex-­‐colonies	  in	  Asia	  and	  Middle	  East.	  Because	  Korea	  was	  a	  colony	  of	  the	  Japanese	  empire,	  and	  because	  Korea	  was	  occupied	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  many	  observers	  in	  ex-­‐colonies	  deemed	  the	  situation	  in	  Korea	  as	  overlapping	  with	  their	  own	  struggles	  at	  home.	  	  	   Nowhere	  does	  this	  description	  fit	  more	  closely	  than	  in	  China,	  which	  had	  suffered	  from	  Western	  and	  Japanese	  colonial	  rule	  for	  more	  than	  a	  century.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  popular	  fear	  of	  World	  War	  III	  and	  distrust	  toward	  the	  Communist	  Party	  immediately	  following	  the	  American	  intervention	  were	  unmistakable.	  Simultaneously,	  however,	  American	  intervention	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  revived	  a	  surge	  in	  genuine	  anti-­‐colonial	  and	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  among	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  people,	  even	  to	  a	  degree	  that	  went	  beyond	  the	  CCP’s	  party	  line.	  Such	  a	  tendency	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  various	  ways.	  One	  involves	  the	  increase	  in	  trivial	  local	  disputes	  between	  Chinese	  and	  American	  residents,	  incidents	  of	  a	  kind	  that	  many	  Chinese	  most	  likely	  had	  to	  suffer	  in	  silence	  in	  the	  past.	  For	  instance,	  on	  July	  15,	  an	  American	  male	  teacher	  at	  a	  middle	  school	  in	  Wuchang	  was	  exposed	  to	  ridicule	  for	  homosexual	  activity	  with	  his	  students.91	  On	  August	  5,	  an	  American	  in	  Jiangxi	  Province	  was	  accused	  of	  “letting”	  his	  dog	  bite	  a	  Chinese	  student	  on	  the	  thigh.92	  In	  September,	  a	  
                                                90	  Memorandum	  (From	  Baghdad,	  Iraq,	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK),	  July	  3,	  1950,	  in	  “Arab	  States	  views	  on	  the	  situation	  in	  Korea,”	  FO371/81920,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK;	  Telegram	  (From	  Damascus,	  Syria,	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK),	  July	  13,	  1950,	  in	  “Syrian	  reaction	  to	  UN	  Security	  Council	  resolution	  on	  Korea,”	  FO371/82793,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  91	  “Guanyu	  SWuchang	  Wenhua	  Zhongxue	  meiji	  jiaoshi	  jijian	  xuesheng	  an	  [On	  the	  case	  of	  an	  American	  teacher’s	  homosexual	  activities	  at	  the	  Wenhua	  High	  School	  in	  Wuchang],”	  July	  15,	  1950,	  No.	  118-­‐00346-­‐08,	  FMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  92	  “Guanhyu	  Jiangxi	  Nankangxian	  renmin	  fayuan	  guanyu	  Meiguo	  qiaomin	  zong	  quan	  yaoren	  an	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female	  professor	  at	  Nanjing	  Jinling	  University	  was	  pilloried	  for	  her	  “distortion”	  of	  modern	  Chinese	  history.93	  What	  is	  most	  interesting	  about	  these	  incidents	  is	  not	  so	  much	  their	  accuracy	  or	  inaccuracy,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  suddenly	  being	  exposed	  in	  this	  short	  period.	  	  More	  than	  that,	  intriguingly,	  the	  communist	  authorities,	  in	  these	  cases,	  devoted	  themselves	  to	  smothering	  fires.	  In	  the	  first	  case,	  for	  example,	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  sought	  to	  end	  the	  dispute	  by	  expelling	  the	  accused	  teacher	  and	  directing	  local	  authorities	  not	  to	  prolong	  the	  matter	  any	  further.94	  In	  the	  second	  case,	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  urged	  a	  local	  court,	  which	  had	  given	  the	  man	  a	  three-­‐month	  jail	  sentence,	  to	  mitigate	  this	  punishment.95	  In	  another	  case,	  concerning	  American	  Christian	  missionaries,	  Beijing	  issued	  a	  directive	  to	  local	  committees	  at	  the	  end	  of	  July,	  urging	  them	  not	  to	  interfere	  with	  missionaries’	  daily	  activities,	  instructing	  them	  not	  to	  confuse	  China’s	  anti-­‐imperialist	  stance	  with	  policies	  concerning	  religion.96	  These	  examples	  show	  that	  anti-­‐American	  feelings	  emerged	  and	  grew	  in	  society	  spontaneously	  along	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  and	  that	  the	  central	  authority	  did	  not	  necessarily	  take	  on	  an	  active	  role	  in	  shaping	  anti-­‐American	  sentiment	  at	  that	  time.	  	  
                                                                                                                                            panjue	  [On	  the	  case	  of	  People’s	  Court	  in	  Jiangxi	  Nankan	  prefecture	  regarding	  an	  American	  letting	  his	  dog	  bite	  a	  Chinese	  student	  on	  the	  thigh],”August	  5,	  1950,	  	  No.	  118-­‐00346-­‐07,	  FMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  93	  Changjiang	  Ribao,	  September	  7,	  1950.	  	  94	  “Guanyu	  SWuchang	  Wenhua	  Zhongxue	  meiji	  jiaoshi	  jijian	  xuesheng	  an	  [On	  the	  case	  of	  an	  American	  teacher’s	  homosexual	  activities	  at	  the	  Wenhua	  High	  School	  in	  Wuchang],”	  July	  15,	  1950,	  No.	  118-­‐00346-­‐08,	  FMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  95	  “Guanhyu	  Jiangxi	  Nankangxian	  renmin	  fayuan	  guanyu	  Meiguo	  qiaomin	  zong	  quan	  yaoren	  an	  panjue	  [On	  the	  case	  of	  People’s	  Court	  in	  Jiangxi	  Nankan	  prefecture	  regarding	  an	  American	  letting	  his	  dog	  bite	  a	  Chinese	  student	  on	  the	  thigh],”	  August	  5,	  1950,	  No.	  118-­‐00346-­‐07,	  FMA,	  PRC.	  96	  “Guanyu	  fanmei	  yao	  qianshe	  zongjiao	  de	  zhishi	  [Directive	  that	  anti-­‐America	  need	  not	  to	  involve	  in	  religion],”	  July	  30,	  1950,	  No.	  118-­‐00227-­‐04,	  FMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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In	  fact,	  Beijing	  remained	  remarkably	  cautious	  in	  its	  stance	  toward	  the	  Korean	  War.	  Beijing	  was	  not	  a	  primary	  planner	  at	  the	  time	  of	  North	  Korea’s	  attack	  on	  the	  South.	  As	  historians	  Shen	  Zhihua	  and	  Niu	  Jun	  point	  out,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  itself	  did	  not	  draw	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  communist	  leadership	  at	  first.9798	  Such	  a	  restrained	  attitude	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  (CCP)	  was	  observable	  in	  its	  official	  and	  semi-­‐official	  newspapers.	  The	  Communist	  Party’s	  organ,	  
Renmin	  Ribao,	  for	  instance,	  maintained	  a	  restrained	  attitude	  regarding	  news	  on	  the	  Korean	  War	  from	  its	  outbreak	  until	  the	  fall	  of	  1950.	  Several	  political	  cartoons	  published	  in	  the	  paper	  between	  July	  19	  and	  23	  displayed	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  initial	  stance	  on	  the	  Korean	  War	  (Picture	  3).99	  In	  all	  of	  these	  four	  cartoons,	  a	  common	  theme	  was	  Koreans’	  fighting	  against	  American	  imperialism;	  Chinese	  soldiers,	  or	  other	  Chinese	  people,	  never	  appeared	  in	  these	  cartoons.	  	  Similarly,	  a	  poem	  in	  Renmin	  Ribao	  on	  July	  23	  read,	  “Salute	  the	  Brave	  Korean	  People’s	  Army!”	  A	  headline	  concerning	  a	  student	  demonstration	  against	  American	  intervention	  read,	  “Beijing	  Students	  Unfold	  Various	  Campaigns,	  Cheer	  on	  the	  Korean	  People,	  Oppose	  the	  American	  Invasion.”100	  These	  articles	  also	  implied	  that,	  although	  the	  Chinese	  people	  were	  opposed	  to	  U.S.	  intervention	  and	  thus	  respected	  North	  
                                                97	  Niu	  Jun,	  Reisenki	  Chugoku	  gaiko	  no	  seisaku	  kettei	  [Policymaking	  of	  Chinese	  Diplomacy	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  Period]	  (Tokyo,	  2007);	  Niu	  Jun,	  “Yueguo	  San-­‐ba	  xian—Political-­‐military	  considerations	  and	  the	  fixation	  of	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  Resist-­‐America-­‐and-­‐Assist-­‐Korea	  War,”	  Zhonggong	  dangshi	  yanjiu	  [CCP	  Historical	  Studies]	  (2002);	  Shen	  Zhihua,	  “Chaoxian	  Zhanzheng	  yanjiu	  zongshu:	  Xin	  cailiao	  he	  xin	  kanfa	  [Summary	  of	  Korean	  War	  Studies:	  New	  Materials	  and	  New	  Perspectives],”	  Zhonggong	  dangshi	  
yanjiu	  [CCP	  Historical	  Studies]	  (1996);	  Chen	  Jian,	  China’s	  Road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War:	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  
Sino-­‐American	  Confrontation	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1994);	  and	  Chen	  Jian,	  “China’s	  Changing	  Aims	  during	  the	  Korean	  War,	  1950-­‐1951,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  American-­‐East	  Asian	  Relations	  1	  (Spring	  1992).	  	  98	  Scholars	  focusing	  on	  the	  cold	  war	  aspect	  have	  tended	  to	  stress	  China’s	  role	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  For	  instance,	  see	  William	  Stueck,	  The	  Korean	  War;	  Vladislav	  Zubok	  and	  Konstantin	  Pleshakov,	  Inside	  the	  Kremlin's	  Cold	  War;	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis,	  We	  Now	  Know	  among	  others.	  	  	  99	  Renmin	  Ribao,	  July	  19	  and	  23,	  1950.	  	  100	  Renmin	  Ribao,	  July	  23	  and	  25,	  1950.
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Korea’s	  struggle,	  the	  Chinese	  people	  were	  still	  the	  third	  party	  in	  the	  Korean	  War.	  In	  fact,	  among	  thirty-­‐five	  slogans	  for	  the	  yearly	  celebration	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  in	  early	  August,	  “Oppose	  the	  American	  Invasion!”	  and	  “Salute	  the	  Korean	  People’s	  Army!”	  appeared	  only	  as	  the	  twentieth	  and	  twenty-­‐first	  slogans,	  tagged	  on	  far	  behind	  domestic	  slogans	  such	  as	  “Prepare	  to	  Effectuate	  Land	  Reform!”	  and	  “Suppress	  Rebels	  and	  Reactionaries!”101	  This	  attitude	  indicated	  Beijing’s	  stance	  during	  the	  early	  summer	  of	  1950,	  carefully	  avoiding	  an	  open,	  direct	  confrontation	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  Semi-­‐official	  newspapers,	  such	  as	  Guangming	  Ribao,	  published	  by	  the	  Democratic	  Parties	  Coalition	  kept	  in	  step	  with	  Renmin	  Ribao’s	  official	  line,	  although	  there	  were	  still	  some	  differences	  in	  degree	  of	  enthusiasm.	  For	  example,	  on	  August	  6,	  1950,	  Guangming	  Ribao	  carried	  a	  photo	  essay,	  titled,	  “Unite	  Whole	  People,	  Liberate	  Taiwan,	  Liberate	  Tibet.”	  On	  that	  page,	  another	  small	  headline	  read,	  “Salute	  the	  Brave	  Korean	  People’s	  Army!”102	  A	  subtle	  implication	  of	  these	  headlines	  was	  that	  Korea	  was	  still	  carefully	  differentiated	  from	  the	  Chinese	  people’s	  initiative.	  Although	  
Guangming	  Ribao	  took	  a	  slightly	  more	  aggressive	  stance,	  and	  used	  harsh	  words	  regarding	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  anti-­‐American	  feelings,	  the	  paper	  seldom	  walked	  out	  of	  step.	  Jiefang	  Ribao,	  a	  party	  paper	  published	  in	  Shanghai,	  was	  even	  more	  reticent	  in	  terms	  of	  Chinese	  commitment	  to	  Korea.	  The	  headline	  of	  an	  article	  on	  the	  yearly	  celebration	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  PLA	  in	  early	  August	  read,	  “We	  are	  waiting	  for	  an	  order	  to	  march	  on	  Taiwan!”	  but	  did	  not	  mention	  Korea	  at	  all.103	  A	  political	  
                                                101	  Renmin	  Ribao,	  July	  29,	  1950.	  	  102	  Guangming	  Ribao,	  August	  6,	  1950.	   	  103	  Jiefang	  Ribao,	  August	  1,	  1950.	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cartoon	  on	  August	  30	  was	  more	  revealing;	  in	  the	  picture,	  lightning	  of	  “protest”	  pierce	  the	  “Mei-­‐di	  [American	  imperialism]”	  of	  General	  MacArthur	  (Picture	  4).104	  The	  point	  is	  that	  the	  lightning	  is	  labeled,	  simply,	  “voices	  of	  protest;”	  there	  is	  not	  even	  a	  sword	  or	  spear.	  In	  short,	  in	  early	  summer	  of	  1950,	  official	  and	  semi-­‐official	  newspapers	  carefully	  depicted	  China	  as	  a	  third	  party	  in	  the	  Korean	  War,	  suggesting	  a	  reticent	  stance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Communist	  Party	  on	  that	  issue.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  quite	  different	  attitudes	  can	  be	  found	  in	  various	  local	  newspapers,	  which	  tended	  to	  use	  more	  aggressive	  languages	  that	  went	  far	  beyond	  the	  party	  line.105	  These	  papers,	  particularly	  those	  issued	  by	  local	  publishers,	  tended	  to	  deliver	  more	  detailed	  everyday	  news	  at	  home	  with	  stronger	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments.	  Although	  Chinese	  public	  opinion	  has	  been	  viewed	  as	  monolithic	  under	  the	  tight	  control	  of	  CCP	  propaganda	  and	  mobilization	  programs,	  in	  reality,	  heterogeneity	  can	  be	  observed.	  In	  terms	  of	  anti-­‐American	  feelings,	  popular	  attitudes	  often	  exceeded	  the	  party	  line.	  One	  point	  of	  contrast,	  compared	  to	  the	  official	  stance,	  was	  the	  papers’	  depiction	  of	  China	  as	  an	  important	  participant	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  conflict.	  	  For	  example,	  CCP’s	  regional	  newspaper,	  Changjiang	  Ribao	  in	  Wuhan	  published	  a	  letter	  from	  three	  high	  school	  students	  right	  after	  Truman’s	  announcement,	  discussing	  American	  intervention	  and	  asserting	  that	  they	  would	  not	  surrender	  in	  the	  face	  of	  enemy	  attack.106	  Another	  reader’s	  letter	  on	  July	  20	  
                                                104	  Jiefang	  Ribao,	  August	  30,	  1950.	  105	  For	  the	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  local	  newspapers	  in	  China,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Godwin	  Chu,	  Francis	  Hsu	  ed,	  Moving	  Mountain:	  Cultural	  Change	  in	  China	  (Honolulu:	  the	  University	  Press	  of	  Hawaii,	  1979),	  78;	  Alan	  Liu,	  Mass	  Politics	  in	  the	  People’s	  Republic:	  State	  and	  Society	  in	  
Contemporary	  China	  (Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  1996).	  106	  Changjiang	  Ribao,	  July	  4,	  1950,	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straightforwardly	  called	  on	  the	  Chinese	  to	  “attack	  our	  common	  enemy!”	  107	  Likewise,	  
Changchun	  Xinbao,	  a	  local	  newspaper	  in	  Changchun,	  published	  a	  reader’s	  letter	  to	  Korean	  soldiers	  on	  July	  28,	  praising	  North	  Korean’s	  war	  efforts:	  “When	  you	  are	  fighting,	  we	  will	  not	  neglect	  even	  a	  minute!”108	  	  More	  telling	  is	  a	  cartoon	  published	  in	  Changjiang	  Ribao	  in	  early	  August	  concerning	  American	  intervention	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  (Picture	  5);	  in	  the	  cartoon,	  a	  dog	  representing	  “American	  imperialism”	  is	  stabbed	  with	  a	  sword	  representing	  the	  “Korean	  people”	  from	  the	  left,	  and	  multiple	  swords	  representing	  “Chinese	  people,”	  “Vietnamese	  people,”	  and	  “Filipino	  people”	  from	  the	  right.109	  Dongbei	  Ribao	  similarly	  featured	  a	  cartoon	  portraying	  the	  situation	  even	  more	  clearly	  (Picture	  6).110	  The	  interesting	  point	  is	  that	  these	  cartoons	  in	  local	  newspapers	  depicted	  bayonets	  and	  swords	  against	  the	  United	  States,	  not	  just	  the	  “voices	  of	  protest”	  seen	  in	  the	  central	  organ.	  	  	   These	  examples	  show	  quite	  complex	  popular	  attitudes	  in	  Chinese	  society,	  which	  was	  not	  monolithic	  at	  all.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  there	  was	  a	  rise	  in	  skepticism	  and	  doubt	  toward	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  there	  was	  a	  surge	  in	  Anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  on	  the	  ground.	  Such	  feelings	  developed	  through	  local	  interpretations	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  American	  intervention,	  based	  on	  historical	  experiences	  and	  memories.	  As	  in	  Indonesia	  and	  Middle	  Eastern	  countries,	  the	  historical	  legacy	  of	  colonialism	  played	  roles	  in	  framing	  contemporary	  foreign	  events.	  In	  this	  process,	  the	  Beijing	  authority	  often	  took	  on	  the	  roles	  of	  
                                                107	  Changjiang	  Ribao,	  20	  and	  23	  July	  1950.	  	  108	  Changchun	  Xinbao,	  July	  28,	  1950.	  	  109	  Changjiang	  Ribao,	  4	  and	  11	  August	  1950.	  	  110	  Dongbei	  Ribao,	  31	  July	  1950.	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soothing	  volatile	  popular	  anti-­‐foreign,	  anti-­‐colonial	  sentiments,	  which	  largely	  grew	  up	  on	  their	  own,	  not	  necessarily	  as	  products	  of	  CCP	  mobilization	  and	  propaganda.	  Such	  a	  metamorphosis	  of	  domestic	  attitudes	  later	  posed	  a	  dilemma	  for	  the	  Beijing	  leadership	  when	  the	  CCP	  faced	  the	  issue	  of	  entering	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  which	  we	  will	  examine	  in	  a	  later	  chapter.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  such	  an	  entangled	  interplay	  between	  state	  policymaking,	  social	  attitudes,	  and	  historical	  contexts	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  another	  primary	  participant,	  the	  United	  States,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  	  	  
Local	  Needs:	  Probing	  “Americaness”	  From	  the	  beginning,	  the	  Truman	  administration’s	  choice	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  was	  more	  about	  political	  decisions	  than	  military	  needs.	  Had	  it	  not	  had	  the	  discourse	  of	  World	  War	  III	  and	  its	  impact	  on	  domestic	  politics,	  the	  administration	  might	  not	  have	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  dispatch	  U.S.	  troops	  to	  Korea;	  after	  all,	  it	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  local,	  civil	  war,	  which	  would	  not	  pose	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  fact,	  quite	  a	  few	  governmental	  and	  military	  officials	  did	  not	  see	  American	  involvement	  as	  necessary.	  Paul	  Nitze,	  Director	  of	  the	  Policy	  Planning	  Staff,	  thought	  it	  unlikely	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  respond	  to	  the	  attack	  militarily,	  because	  the	  Joint	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  (JCS)	  had	  decided	  a	  few	  years	  earlier	  that	  South	  Korea	  was	  not	  within	  the	  perimeter	  of	  the	  area	  that	  was	  essential	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  United	  States.111	  Flying	  back	  to	  Washington	  D.C.	  from	  New	  Brunswick,	  Canada,	  
                                                111	  Paul	  Nitze,	  Transcript	  of	  the	  BBC	  interview,	  Paul	  H.	  Nitze	  Papers	  (Hereafter	  PHNP),	  Box	  130,	  Folder	  3	  “Korean	  War,”	  Library	  of	  Congress	  (Hereafter	  LC).	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  1949,	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  explained	  the	  defense	  line	  from	  the	  Aleutian	  Islands	  to	  Japan	  and	  Okinawa,	  and	  to	  Taiwan,	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where	  he	  was	  enjoying	  salmon	  fishing	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  attack,	  he	  was	  surprised	  by	  the	  top	  administration’s	  decision	  to	  enter	  the	  war.	  Likewise,	  General	  Bonner	  Fellers	  and	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Army	  Frank	  Pace,	  respectively,	  stated	  that	  the	  JCS	  and	  Defense	  Department	  had	  no	  idea	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  take	  military	  action	  until	  their	  conference	  with	  the	  President.112	  For	  these	  officials,	  the	  crisis	  was	  simply	  a	  military	  event	  on	  the	  distant	  Korean	  Peninsula,	  one	  detached	  from	  American	  security	  interests	  and	  one	  to	  which	  Americans	  would	  not	  need	  to	  react.	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Army	  Pace	  further	  clarified	  that	  the	  dispatch	  of	  U.S.	  troops	  was	  not	  based	  on	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense’s	  desire	  to	  do	  so,	  but	  its	  support	  for	  the	  “political	  policies”	  of	  the	  government.113	  	  What	  made	  Truman	  choose	  to	  dispatch	  U.S.	  troops	  to	  Korea	  were	  “common	  sensical”	  views	  in	  American	  society	  that	  he	  shared	  with	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  public	  at	  that	  time.	  One	  is	  the	  prevailing	  discourse	  of	  World	  War	  III	  and	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  built	  on	  the	  former.	  The	  other	  is	  common	  indifference	  toward	  Korea.	  No	  sooner	  had	  President	  Truman	  announced	  his	  support	  for	  South	  Korea	  than	  a	  resident	  of	  Dallas,	  Texas,	  was	  on	  the	  phone,	  asking	  his	  local	  newspaper,	  “Where	  is	  Korea,	  anyway?	  Are	  the	  people	  Indians	  or	  Japanese?	  And	  what	  time	  is	  it	  there?”114	  Like	  this	  man,	  even	  while	  their	  country	  occupied	  the	  southern	  half	  of	  the	  Korean	  
                                                                                                                                            Philippines,	  and	  Singapole.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  Dean	  Acheson	  delinated	  the	  same	  policy	  at	  the	  National	  Press	  Club	  speech	  on	  January	  12,	  1950.	  	  112	  Letter,	  Bonner	  Fellers	  to	  Robert	  A.	  Taft,	  19	  July	  1950,	  Robert	  A.	  Taft	  Papers	  (Hereafter	  RATP),	  “1950,	  Korea,”	  Box	  670,	  LC;	  “Memo	  of	  Conversation,”	  1	  July	  1950,	  JFDP),	  “Acheson,	  Dean	  1950,”	  Box	  47,	  Seeley	  Mudd	  Manuscript	  Library,	  Princeton	  University	  (Hereafter	  SMML),	  Princeton,	  NJ.	  Even	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  told	  a	  British	  journalist	  about	  a	  year	  before	  that	  the	  U.S.	  defense	  line	  ran	  through	  a	  chain	  of	  islands	  from	  the	  Philippines,	  Okinawa,	  and	  Japan,	  to	  the	  Aleutian	  Islands	  and	  Alaska.	  See	  William	  J.	  Seabald,	  diary,	  155.	  113	  Memorandum	  of	  Conversation	  among	  Dean	  Acheson,	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  and	  Frank	  Pace,	  July	  1,	  1950,	  Dean	  Acheson	  File,	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  Papers,	  Mudd	  Library,	  Princeton	  University,	  Princeton,	  New	  Jersey.	  (P2)	  114	  “War	  in	  Asia:	  the	  People,”	  Time,	  July	  10,	  1950,	  9.	  
  
 125 
Peninsula,	  many	  Americans	  did	  not	  pay	  much	  attention	  to	  Korea,	  and	  it	  had	  never	  been	  a	  subject	  of	  widespread	  intense	  popular	  interest	  in	  the	  United	  States	  before	  June	  25,	  1950.115	  When	  it	  was	  sporadically	  reported	  on,	  such	  as	  during	  the	  Cheju	  Incident	  of	  April	  1948	  and	  Yeosu-­‐Suncheon	  Uprisings	  in	  October	  1948,	  American	  newspapers	  and	  magazines	  tended	  to	  describe	  these	  events	  simply	  as	  “Soviet	  aggression	  on	  the	  march	  in	  Asia,”	  ignoring	  more	  complicated	  local	  struggles	  and	  history.116	  Based	  on	  this	  viewpoint	  and	  information,	  many	  Americans	  quickly	  came	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  North	  Korean	  invasion	  was	  conducted	  on	  the	  order	  of	  Moscow,	  and	  that	  Washington	  was	  correct	  in	  dispatching	  its	  military	  forces	  to	  Korea.	  Truman’s	  reading	  of	  domestic	  attitudes	  was	  accurate.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  initial	  support	  for	  the	  administration’s	  decision	  was	  overwhelming.	  A	  Gallup	  Poll	  revealed	  that	  81	  percent	  of	  those	  surveyed	  approved	  of	  the	  decision	  to	  send	  forces	  to	  Korea,	  with	  some	  13	  percent	  disapproving.117	  Major	  newspapers	  and	  magazines	  across	  the	  nation	  followed	  this	  current,	  as	  well.118	  This	  does	  not	  indicate,	  of	  course,	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  “consensus”	  in	  American	  society	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  conflict,	  quite	  a	  few	  people	  publicly	  disagreed	  with	  the	  mainstream	  viewpoint.	  A	  New	  York	  woman	  asked	  Truman,	  for	  instance,	  “What	  are	  we	  doing	  there?	  This	  is	  
                                                115	  See,	  for	  instance,	  “Korea,”	  November	  25,	  1946,	  in	  (National	  Archives	  51-­‐2);	  and	  November	  3,	  1948,	  (NA	  81).	  	  	  116	  “The	  insurrection	  in	  Southern	  Korea,”	  October	  25,	  1948,	  Minnesota	  Tribune.	  	  	  117	  “Monthly	  Survey	  of	  American	  Opinion	  on	  International	  Affairs,”	  No.	  110	  (June	  1950),	  The	  Office	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  Studies	  ed.,	  Department	  of	  State,	  Schuyler	  Foster	  Papers	  (Hereafter	  SFP),	  Box	  12,	  National	  Archives	  (Hereafter	  NA),	  College	  Park,	  MD;	  Another	  poll	  also	  showed	  that	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  those	  polled	  insisted	  that	  Russian	  expansion	  in	  Asia	  and	  Europe	  must	  be	  stopped.	  See,	  “Russia,”	  
The	  Gallup	  Poll,	  Vol.	  2,	  August	  4,	  1950,	  929.	  In	  the	  poll,	  68	  percent	  answered	  that	  Russian	  expansion	  in	  Asia	  and	  Europe	  must	  be	  stopped,	  while	  25	  percent	  replied	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  keep	  out	  of	  a	  major	  war.	  Also,	  79	  percent	  believed	  that	  “the	  United	  States	  should	  go	  to	  war	  with	  Russia	  if	  communist	  troops	  attack	  the	  American	  zone	  in	  Germany.”	  118	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  between	  June	  26,	  1950	  and	  September	  27,	  1950,	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  NA.	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clearly	  a	  civil	  war,	  and	  the	  U.N.	  Charter	  clearly	  states	  that	  there	  shall	  be	  no	  intervention	  in	  domestic	  situations.”119	  A	  New	  Jersey	  veteran	  likewise	  warned	  Washington	  not	  to	  repeat	  the	  same	  mistake	  that	  it	  made	  in	  China:	  “As	  in	  China,	  we	  support	  an	  admittedly	  corrupt	  and	  undemocratic	  regime	  more	  or	  less	  against	  the	  will	  of	  the	  people.”120	  As	  a	  New	  York	  man	  argued,	  these	  opinions	  were	  based	  on	  the	  observation	  that	  “revolts	  against	  tyranny	  and	  poor	  economic	  conditions	  [were]	  flaring	  throughout	  Asia,”	  and	  that	  “it	  would	  be	  over-­‐simplification	  to	  ascribe	  this	  unrest	  solely	  to	  communism.”121	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  the	  American	  Labor	  Party	  of	  New	  York	  City	  appealed	  in	  mid-­‐July,	  demanding	  the	  immediate	  withdrawal	  of	  American	  troops	  and	  arms	  from	  Korea.	  It	  argued,	  “American	  people	  are	  proud	  of	  always	  being	  on	  the	  side	  of	  people	  fighting	  for	  freedom.	  Yet,	  today,	  American	  boys	  are	  fighting	  against	  Korean	  people	  who	  want	  freedom	  and	  independence.”122	  	  Such	  a	  critique	  of	  the	  mainstream	  view	  was	  not	  necessarily	  rare	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  war.123	  In	  fact,	  a	  White	  House	  staff,	  George	  Elsey,	  observed	  in	  mid-­‐July	  that	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  Dean	  Acheson,	  and	  his	  colleagues	  “seemed	  panicked	  by	  the	  criticism,”	  which	  prompted	  the	  presidential	  speech	  to	  Congress	  in	  mid-­‐July,	  which	  re-­‐emphasized	  the	  need	  to	  dispatch	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  Korea.	  Fortunately	  for	  the	  president	  and	  members	  of	  the	  administration,	  these	  dissenting	  voices	  remained	  
                                                119	  Letter,	  Ann	  Ash	  to	  HST,	  July	  12,	  1950,	  HSTP,	  Official	  File:	  471-­‐B,	  Korean	  Emergency,	  HSTL.	  120	  Letter,	  Russell	  Ames	  to	  HST,	  July	  4,	  1950,	  HSTP,	  Official	  File:	  471-­‐B,	  Korean	  Emergency,	  HSTL.	  121	  Letter,	  Bernard	  N.	  Craven	  to	  HST,	  June	  30,	  1950,	  HSTP,	  Box	  1307,	  Official	  File	  471-­‐B,	  Korean	  Emergency,	  HSTL.	  122	  Letter,	  American	  Labor	  Party,	  NYC,	  to	  HST,	  Box	  1327,	  Official	  File	  471-­‐B,	  Korean	  Emergency,	  HSTP,	  HSTL.	  	  123	  Drew	  Pearson,	  “President	  Needs	  All	  Help	  in	  Crisis,”	  24	  July	  1950,	  Washington	  Post.	  See	  Student	  Research	  File	  “Korean	  War,”	  Box	  1.	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relatively	  in	  a	  minority	  position	  in	  the	  summer	  and	  fall	  of	  1950.	  Rather,	  in	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  conflict,	  Truman’s	  decision	  met	  overwhelming	  support.	  	  	   Behind	  such	  a	  profound	  public	  support	  was	  genuine	  fear	  of	  World	  War	  III,	  which	  can	  be	  observed	  in	  various	  ways	  in	  everyday	  people’s	  daily	  lives.	  Several	  popular	  magazines,	  for	  instance,	  had	  already	  featured	  simulations	  of	  the	  estimated	  damage	  of	  a	  nuclear	  attack	  on	  American	  cities,	  such	  as	  New	  York	  City.	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  notable	  examples	  were	  popular	  magazine	  Look’s	  article	  “How	  Prepared	  Are	  We	  If	  the	  Russians	  Should	  Attack?”	  published	  on	  June	  20,	  1950,	  as	  well	  as	  Collier’s	  fictional	  article	  “Hiroshima,	  U.S.A.”	  on	  August	  5,	  1950	  (Picture	  7),	  both	  of	  which	  caused	  considerable	  reactions	  among	  both	  governmental	  officials	  and	  the	  general	  public.124	  According	  to	  a	  Gallup	  Poll	  in	  August	  of	  1950,	  in	  fact,	  nearly	  two	  thirds	  of	  those	  polled	  actually	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  already	  in	  World	  War	  III,125	  and	  that	  the	  Russians	  would	  use	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  on	  American	  cities.126	  	  Memories	  of	  World	  War	  II	  were	  still	  fresh,	  and	  many	  housewives,	  who	  worried	  about	  the	  possible	  outbreak	  of	  a	  full-­‐scale	  war	  and	  subsequent	  scarcity	  of	  
                                                124	  “How	  Prepared	  Are	  We	  If	  Russian	  Should	  Attack?”	  Look	  (20	  June	  1950);	  John	  Lear,	  “Hiroshima,	  U.S.A.:	  Can	  Anything	  Be	  Done	  About	  It?”	  Collier’s	  (5	  August	  1950),	  11-­‐15,	  68-­‐69;	  “Week’s	  Mail,”	  
Collier’s,	  23	  September	  1950.	  	  	  125	  The	  Gallup	  Poll,	  “World	  War	  III”	  (19	  August	  1950),	  Vol.	  2,	  929.	  The	  poll	  was	  conducted	  between	  July	  30	  and	  August	  4.	  Also,	  another	  survey,	  held	  by	  the	  National	  Opinion	  Research	  Center	  revealed	  that	  fear	  of	  another	  world	  war	  had	  reached	  the	  highest	  point	  since	  1945;	  In	  June	  before	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war,	  merely	  17	  percent	  of	  those	  polled	  expected	  a	  general	  war	  within	  two	  years	  and	  61	  percent	  within	  ten	  years;	  in	  July	  after	  the	  invasion,	  however,	  54	  percent	  feared	  it	  would	  happen	  within	  two	  years	  and	  80	  percent	  within	  ten	  years.	  See	  Office	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  Studies	  (Graph	  2),	  Department	  of	  State,	  “Monthly	  Survey	  of	  American	  Opinion	  on	  International	  Affairs,”	  No.	  112	  (August	  1950),	  Schuyler	  Foster	  Papers,	  Box	  12,	  NA.	  126	  “Atom	  Bombs,”	  The	  Gallup	  Poll.	  Vol.	  2	  (2	  August	  1950).	  929.	  The	  original	  question	  was	  “Do	  you	  think	  Russia	  would	  use	  the	  atom	  bomb	  on	  American	  cities,	  or	  not.”	  This	  question	  was	  given	  only	  to	  those	  who	  believed	  that	  Russian	  had	  any	  atomic	  bombs	  (73%).	  Among	  those	  73%:	  “Yes,	  she	  would,”	  66	  %,	  “No,	  she	  would	  not,”	  4	  %,	  and	  “No	  opinion,”	  3	  %;	  “Atom	  Bombs,”	  The	  Gallup	  Poll.	  Vol.	  2	  (2	  August	  1950).	  929.	  The	  original	  question	  was	  “Do	  you	  think	  Russia	  has	  any	  atom	  bombs?”	  The	  answers	  were:	  “Yes,”	  73%,	  “No,”	  11	  %,	  and	  “Don’t	  know,”	  16	  %.	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goods,	  began	  hoarding	  commodities	  (Picture	  8).127	  Taking	  some	  extreme	  cases	  as	  examples,	  a	  New	  York	  housewife	  placing	  two	  large	  orders	  for	  sugar	  reportedly	  said,	  “I’m	  just	  trying	  to	  get	  some	  before	  hoarders	  buy	  it	  all.”128	  Another	  housewife	  in	  Bethesda,	  Maryland,	  with	  four	  new	  refrigerators	  in	  her	  kitchen	  reportedly	  complained	  when	  a	  dealer	  would	  not	  sell	  her	  two	  more.129	  These	  stories	  were	  extreme	  examples	  of	  hoarding	  based	  on	  the	  illusion	  of	  shortages.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  rapidly	  rising	  prices	  of	  commodities	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  nation-­‐wide	  scarcity	  actually	  did	  not	  occur.130	  But	  hysteria	  did.	  For	  instance,	  Joseph	  Bildner,	  president	  of	  Kings	  Super	  Markets	  in	  New	  Jersey,	  put	  2,400	  five-­‐pound	  bags	  on	  display	  in	  his	  Plainfield	  store	  to	  prove	  that	  there	  was	  plenty	  of	  sugar.	  In	  four	  hours,	  surprisingly,	  all	  six	  tons	  had	  been	  sold.131	  This	  phenomenon	  of	  hoarding	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950	  exemplified	  how	  widely	  anxiety	  and	  fear	  of	  war	  had	  spread	  throughout	  the	  country.	  	  More	  interesting	  than	  the	  act	  of	  hoarding	  were	  people’s	  reactions	  against	  hoarders.	  A	  reporter	  for	  the	  Atlanta	  Journal	  and	  Constitution,	  posing	  as	  a	  hoarder,	  walked	  into	  a	  local	  supermarket	  and	  ordered	  25	  cartons	  of	  cigarettes.	  The	  resulting	  article	  described	  how	  the	  “angry	  salesgirl	  glowered”	  at	  him	  and	  then	  “slowly	  began	  to	  stack	  up	  the	  cartons,	  counting	  each	  one	  in	  a	  voice	  that	  could	  be	  heard	  in	  every	  corner	  of	  the	  store.”132	  The	  article	  also	  illustrated	  how	  other	  customers	  raised	  their	  eyebrows	  at	  the	  reporter’s	  excessive	  shopping.	  As	  some	  political	  cartoons	  depicted,	  
                                                127	  Cartoon.	  “This	  Little	  Pig	  Went	  to	  Market.”	  Newsweek	  (7	  August	  1950).	  64.	  128	  “Hoarders	  at	  Work.”	  Newsweek	  (7	  August	  1950).	  64.	  129	  “The	  March	  of	  the	  News.”	  The	  U.	  S.	  News	  and	  World	  Report	  (25	  August	  1950).	  2.	  	  130	  “Impact	  of	  War:	  A	  Rush	  to	  Buy—But	  Most	  Thing	  Are	  Plentiful.”	  The	  U.	  S.	  News	  and	  World	  Report	  (14	  July	  1950).	  11.	  131	  “Sugar	  for	  All.”	  Newsweek	  (21	  August	  1950).	  70.	  	  132	  “Nobody	  Loves	  A	  Hoarder.”	  Life	  (21	  August	  1950).	  26-­‐27.	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people’s	  criticism	  of	  hoarders	  and	  their	  support	  for	  America’s	  intervention	  in	  Korea	  were	  interlinked	  (Picture	  9).133	  Hoarders	  were	  increasingly	  seen	  as	  selfish	  and	  unpatriotic.	  Ordinary	  people’s	  reactions	  to	  hoarders	  implied	  that	  these	  people	  knew	  how	  to	  behave	  and	  act	  when	  the	  nation	  was	  committed	  in	  battles	  overseas.	  In	  a	  sense,	  people	  mobilized	  themselves	  in	  their	  will	  to	  preserve	  the	  social	  interest	  of	  the	  nation.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  strong,	  even	  fanatical,	  support	  for	  the	  war,	  an	  interesting	  phenomenon	  occurred.	  One	  might	  expect	  that	  the	  public	  would	  oppose	  the	  increasing	  of	  taxes,	  the	  controlling	  of	  prices,	  and	  cooperation	  with	  a	  strict	  mobilization	  plan.	  Nonetheless,	  many	  American	  people	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950	  took	  to	  their	  pens	  to	  inform	  governmental	  officials	  and	  newspaper	  editors	  that	  they	  would	  gladly	  accept	  such	  obligations,	  and	  they	  went	  even	  further	  by	  urging	  an	  increase	  in	  taxes	  and	  a	  systematic	  mobilization	  of	  society	  for	  war.	  “If	  [price]	  ceilings	  are	  for	  our	  country’s	  best	  interest,	  we	  are	  for	  ceilings,”	  wrote	  one	  Minnesota	  businessman	  to	  Congress.	  A	  laundry	  owner	  in	  Colorado	  also	  entreated,	  “Permit	  me	  to	  urge	  the	  Government	  confiscation	  of	  all	  profits	  from	  industry.”	  A	  woman	  in	  Illinois	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  President	  on	  July	  17:	  “Let’s	  have	  complete	  mobilization	  now—to	  win	  in	  Korea	  as	  soon	  as	  possible,	  and	  to	  deter	  the	  Russians	  from	  attacking	  anywhere	  else	  in	  the	  world.	  We	  are	  very	  proud	  of	  your	  quick	  reaction	  to	  the	  North	  Korean	  aggression.”134	  A	  man	  in	  Michigan	  adamantly	  supported	  U.S.	  military	  
                                                133	  Saturday	  Evening	  Post	  (19	  August	  1950).	  10.	  Newsweek	  (14	  August	  1950).	  28.	  134	  Mary	  Whitman,	  Illinois,	  17	  July	  1950,	  Papers	  of	  Harry	  S.	  Truman:	  Official	  File,	  OF	  471-­‐B,	  Comments	  re.	  of	  President’s	  statement	  on	  June	  27	  re.	  Korean	  War.	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library	  (HSTL).	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intervention	  in	  Korea	  but	  was	  growing	  irritated	  with	  the	  slow	  pace	  of	  U.S.	  action.	  In	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  President	  on	  August	  16,	  he	  asserted:	  	  From	  the	  conversation	  I	  have	  with	  men	  on	  the	  street,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  American	  citizen	  is	  farther	  ahead	  in	  his	  thinking	  than	  you	  in	  Washington.	  We	  are	  ready	  and	  anxious	  for	  controls,	  rationing,	  priorities	  and	  all	  the	  other	  measures	  to	  help	  our	  poor	  boys	  in	  Korea.	  Let	  us	  put	  aside	  business-­‐as-­‐usual	  and	  show	  Russia	  that	  Communism	  is	  not	  the	  answer—that	  the	  American	  people	  willingly	  will	  work	  and	  sacrifice	  to	  retain	  their	  freedom.135	  	  These	  letters	  indicate	  some	  of	  the	  more	  vocal	  voices	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950.	  George	  Gallup	  similarly	  wrote	  that	  70	  percent	  of	  those	  asked	  would	  support	  higher	  taxes	  to	  build	  a	  larger	  army	  and	  navy.136	  To	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  pay	  defense	  costs,	  60	  percent	  suggested	  raising	  taxes	  and	  19	  percent	  proposed	  borrowing.	  Republican	  Representative	  from	  New	  York	  Jacob	  Javits	  was	  probably	  right	  to	  comment,	  “I	  think	  the	  American	  people	  are	  way	  ahead	  of	  their	  leaders	  in	  the	  things	  they	  are	  willing	  to	  do	  to	  defeat	  this	  communist	  menace	  as	  we	  see	  it	  in	  Korea.”137	  In	  the	  early	  phase	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  local	  and	  national	  statesmen	  were	  often	  urged	  by	  the	  public	  to	  confront	  the	  communist	  “threat”	  more	  decisively.	  Such	  popular	  political	  cultures	  in	  1950	  were	  based	  on	  local	  sentiments	  of	  distrust	  and	  fear	  toward	  the	  unknown	  others—communists.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  such	  an	  “anti-­‐communist”	  sentiments	  had	  local	  roots,	  but	  the	  outbreak	  and	  progress	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  further	  inflamed	  those	  feelings,	  symbolically	  and	  emotionally	  associating	  the	  foreign	  event	  with	  alleged	  expansion	  of	  communist	  influence	  at	  home.	  	  
                                                135	  A.	  L.	  Doenges	  to	  Harry	  Truman,	  16	  August	  1950,	  PHST:	  Official	  File,	  471-­‐B,	  Miscellaneous.	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library	  (HSTL).	  136	  John	  Fousek,	  To	  Lead	  the	  Free	  World:	  American	  Nationalism	  and	  the	  Cultural	  Roots	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  NC:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2000),	  168;	  “Defense	  Cost,”	  The	  Gallup	  Poll	  Vol.	  2	  (23	  August	  1950),	  934.	  137	  Congressional	  Record	  82nd,	  1st	  Session,	  1950,	  96,	  11519-­‐20	  quoted	  in	  Pierpaoli,	  Truman	  and	  Korea,	  35.	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In	  other	  words,	  Americans	  were	  fighting	  not	  only	  real	  battles	  in	  Korea	  but	  also	  an	  imaginary	  war	  that	  was	  generated,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  in	  their	  own	  imaginations,	  which	  can	  be	  termed	  “Cold	  War	  fantasy.”	  Such	  imagination	  of	  “real”	  situations	  was	  maintained	  through	  daily,	  repeated	  practices	  being	  taken	  up	  not	  only	  by	  politicians	  and	  governmental	  and	  military	  officials,	  but	  also	  by	  many	  ordinary	  people,	  old	  and	  young.	  Perhaps,	  a	  high-­‐school	  girl	  in	  Connecticut	  never	  imagined	  that	  she	  was	  making	  the	  Cold	  War	  world;	  yet,	  she	  did	  so	  as	  one	  participant	  in	  the	  imagined	  reality	  when	  she	  adopted	  a	  particular	  worldview,	  convinced	  herself	  in	  that	  manner,	  and	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  White	  House	  on	  August	  14.	  She	  pleaded:	  	  	  I	  am	  only	  a	  high	  school	  student	  and	  you	  most	  likely	  won’t	  even	  read	  my	  letter	  but	  if	  you	  would	  try	  to	  understand	  how	  a	  15	  year	  girl	  wants	  the	  chance	  to	  live	  [sic].	  If	  we,	  the	  United	  States	  could	  only	  make	  a	  sneak	  attack	  on	  Russia	  before	  they	  get	  the	  chance	  to	  make	  one	  on	  us.	  On	  night	  when	  I	  was	  laying	  in	  my	  bed	  and	  could	  [not?]	  sleep,	  I	  heard	  a	  plane	  over	  head	  and	  a	  streak	  of	  fear	  went	  through	  me,	  afraid	  any	  minute	  we	  all	  would	  be	  killed.	  […].	  Why	  don’t	  we	  take	  a	  chance	  and	  sneak	  up	  on	  them	  even	  if	  we	  lose	  the	  war	  (which	  I	  doubt	  it	  if	  we	  do	  something	  about	  it)	  at	  least	  we	  can	  say	  we	  tried.	  We	  are	  a	  wonderful	  nation,	  let’s	  keep	  it	  that	  way.138	  	  	  This	  letter,	  of	  course,	  was	  not	  particularly	  original.	  She	  may	  have	  simply	  echoed	  what	  many	  others	  told	  her.	  What	  matters,	  however,	  was	  not	  whether	  it	  was	  “original”	  or	  not,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  she	  joined	  in	  and	  repeated,	  contributing	  to	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  imagined	  reality,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  created	  and	  solidified	  the	  Cold	  War	  world	  itself.	  	  	   With	  the	  escalation	  of	  Cold	  War	  fantasy	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  a	  politician	  who	  had	  been	  criticized	  and	  was	  fading	  away	  suddenly	  came	  back	  to	  center	  stage:	  Joseph	  McCarthy.	  It	  was,	  indeed,	  the	  Korean	  War	  that	  made	  McCarthy	  a	  national	  
                                                138	  Letter,	  Lorraine	  Henderson	  to	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  August	  14,	  1950,	  Box	  1310,	  PHST,	  Official	  File	  471	  B,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	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star.139	  	  “Today	  American	  boys	  lie	  dead	  in	  the	  mud	  of	  Korean	  valleys,”	  McCarthy	  announced,	  stepping	  up	  his	  offensive	  on	  July	  12,	  “Some	  have	  their	  hands	  tied	  behind	  their	  back,	  their	  faces	  shot	  away	  by	  Communist	  machine	  guns.”	  After	  critiquing	  the	  Truman	  administration’s	  management	  of	  the	  Korean	  situation,	  McCarthy	  went	  on	  to	  question	  alleged	  communists	  in	  the	  State	  Department.	  He	  said:	  	  Today	  Korea	  is	  the	  crisis	  area.	  Where	  will	  it	  be	  tomorrow	  if	  the	  same	  men	  act	  as	  your	  advisors	  and	  mold	  your	  thinking,	  Mr.	  President?	  […].	  There	  are	  those	  who	  say	  we	  should	  not	  spend	  time	  searching	  for	  those	  responsible	  for	  the	  disasters	  of	  the	  past	  few	  years.	  Common	  horse-­‐sense	  dictates,	  however,	  that	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  America	  in	  the	  critical	  weeks,	  months	  and	  years	  ahead	  we	  must	  determine	  who	  in	  positions	  of	  trust	  seek	  to	  betray	  us,	  and	  then	  act	  to	  get	  them	  out	  of	  government.	  If	  allowed	  to	  remain,	  they	  will	  undoubtedly	  tip	  the	  scales	  for	  disaster	  and	  against	  victory	  for	  this	  nation.140	  	  	  	  	  	  Riding	  a	  tide	  of	  war	  scare	  and	  anti-­‐communist	  feelings	  immediately	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  McCarthy	  launched	  a	  counterattack.	  Against	  Millard	  Tydings,	  Democratic	  Senator	  from	  Maryland,	  who	  had	  been	  criticizing	  McCarthy’s	  charge	  as	  groundless,	  McCarthy	  struck	  back,	  saying,	  “[Tydings]	  sought	  to	  assure	  communists	  in	  the	  government	  that	  they	  are	  safe	  in	  their	  positions.”141	  Now,	  it	  was	  Tydings	  who	  was	  driven	  into	  a	  difficult	  situation.	  According	  to	  a	  Gallup	  Poll	  taken	  right	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  41	  percent	  of	  those	  polled	  believed	  in	  McCarthy’s	  charges,	  while	  only	  20	  percent	  did	  not.142	  A	  full-­‐page	  editorial	  in	  the	  
                                                139	  Philip	  Jenkins,	  Cold	  War	  At	  Home:	  The	  Red	  Scare	  in	  Pennsylvania,	  1945-­‐1960	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1999),	  9.	  The	  amount	  of	  literature	  on	  the	  red	  scare	  in	  the	  postwar	  America	  is	  enormous.	  For	  brief	  description	  of	  historiography,	  see	  the	  first	  chapter.	  	  	  	  140	  Letter,	  Joseph	  McCarthy	  to	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  July	  12,	  1950,	  Box	  872,	  Official	  File	  252K,	  PHST,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  	  	  	  141	  July	  21,	  1950,	  in	  Carton	  1,	  John	  S.	  Service	  Papers,	  Bancroft	  Library,	  University	  of	  California,	  Berkeley,	  Berkeley,	  CA.	  (B25)	  142	  “Communists	  in	  Government,”	  The	  Gallup	  Poll:	  Vol.	  2	  (7	  July	  1950),	  924.	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Washington	  Time-­‐Herald	  spit	  out	  in	  early	  July:	  “Unfortunately,	  nobody	  believes	  them.	  [The	  Tydings	  report]	  is	  a	  large	  bucket	  of	  whitewash.”143	  	  	   In	  view	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  and	  seen	  from	  the	  dominant	  perspective	  in	  American	  society	  at	  that	  time,	  McCarthy’s	  charges	  seemed	  more	  plausible.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  it	  was	  not	  the	  Korean	  War	  that	  created	  the	  red	  scare	  of	  this	  period.	  Nor	  did	  McCarthy	  create	  that	  phenomenon.	  Actually	  it	  was	  so-­‐called	  “anti-­‐communist”	  logic	  with	  domestic	  roots	  in	  the	  United	  States	  that	  conditioned	  many	  Americans	  to	  view	  the	  Korean	  War	  as	  part	  of	  Moscow’s	  communist	  aggression,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  increased	  the	  verisimilitude	  of	  McCarthy’s	  charges	  more	  than	  ever	  before.	  	  
Translation	  at	  Home	  Briefly	  examining	  immediate	  responses	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  many	  places	  of	  the	  world	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  it	  is	  surprising	  to	  see	  how	  thousands	  of	  people	  worldwide	  could	  witness	  the	  same	  event	  simultaneously	  and	  how	  they	  could	  interpret	  it	  so	  differently.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  conflict	  and	  American	  intervention	  added	  verisimilitude	  to	  the	  discourse	  of	  World	  War	  III	  worldwide.	  With	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II	  still	  fresh,	  the	  war	  in	  Korea	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  simply	  a	  local	  battle	  between	  North	  and	  South	  Korea.	  There	  must	  be,	  many	  assumed,	  superpowers	  behind	  them.	  Against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  such	  World	  War	  III	  discourse,	  the	  moment	  was	  now	  conceptualized	  and	  periodized	  as	  a	  moratorium,	  a	  transitional	  period	  before	  the	  advent	  of	  a	  real	  World	  
                                                143	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  (19	  July	  1950),	  GMEP,	  Subject	  File	  “Internal	  Security:	  Sen.	  McCarthy’s	  Charges,”	  Box	  70,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  MO.	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War	  III—the	  era	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  It	  was	  such	  a	  particular	  way	  of	  recognition	  of	  the	  present	  and	  the	  numerous	  repetitions	  of	  such	  practices	  that	  made	  what	  was	  merely	  a	  discourse	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  into	  the	  “actuality”	  of	  the	  period.	  	  If	  a	  nation-­‐state	  was	  an	  “imagined	  community”	  a	  modern	  product	  of	  shared	  imaginations	  and	  practices	  among	  certain	  group	  of	  people	  in	  certain	  geographical	  location	  as	  Benedict	  Anderson	  has	  pointed	  out,	  a	  strikingly	  similar	  nature	  appeared	  with	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  In	  practice,	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  existed	  not	  because	  it	  existed	  but	  because	  people	  thought	  it	  exist.	  It	  was	  a	  product	  of	  shared	  imaginations	  and	  repeated	  practices—an	  imagined	  reality.	  The	  crucial	  difference	  was	  that	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  which	  gained	  plausibility	  against	  the	  backdrop	  of	  World	  War	  III	  discourse,	  was	  imagined	  and	  shared	  not	  only	  among	  particular	  groups	  of	  people	  in	  particular	  geographical	  spheres	  as	  the	  case	  of	  a	  nation-­‐state;	  it	  was	  envisioned	  and	  joined	  nearly	  worldwide	  across	  ethnicities,	  religions,	  languages,	  and	  geography.	  Such	  shared	  recognition	  of	  the	  world	  shaped	  the	  certain	  sense	  of	  periodization	  concerning	  the	  present,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  constrained	  and	  shaped	  the	  actuality	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  effect,	  reality	  was	  imagined,	  then,	  imagination	  became	  reality.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  looking	  at	  each	  case	  more	  closely,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  discourse	  of	  World	  War	  III,	  seemingly	  shared	  worldwide	  similarly	  and	  simultaneously,	  was	  actually	  more	  locally	  adopted	  through	  indigenous	  lenses,	  which	  were	  utilized	  to	  express	  diverse	  social	  needs	  in	  each	  society.	  In	  an	  extremely	  simplified	  view,	  in	  some	  places,	  such	  as	  South	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan,	  the	  discourse	  of	  World	  War	  III	  proved	  its	  utility	  for	  locals’	  nation	  building	  projects.	  In	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other	  places,	  such	  as	  Indonesia,	  Egypt,	  and	  China,	  it	  functioned	  as	  a	  backdrop	  against	  which	  locals	  could	  express	  independence	  and	  subjectivity	  in	  their	  century-­‐long	  anti-­‐colonial	  struggles.	  In	  other	  cases,	  like	  that	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Cold	  War	  logic	  was	  useful	  for	  expressing	  locals’	  patriotism,	  re-­‐confirming	  their	  “national	  identity.”	  	  Such	  differences	  in	  the	  use	  of	  foreign	  events	  resulted	  from	  the	  nature	  of	  “translation,”	  in	  a	  metaphorical	  sense.	  Any	  work	  of	  translation	  between	  two	  languages,	  for	  instance,	  always	  has	  to	  creatively	  interprets	  the	  meanings	  of	  foreign	  words	  in	  terms	  of	  one’s	  native	  language	  and	  express	  them	  through	  the	  native	  language,	  leading	  to	  inevitable	  creation,	  or	  imaginative	  understanding.	  Likewise,	  observing	  foreign	  events	  is	  always	  accompanied	  by	  the	  risk	  that	  they	  will	  be	  viewed	  in	  terms	  of	  spectators’	  local	  experiences,	  contexts,	  and	  political	  languages,	  even	  though	  events	  and	  phenomena	  observed	  might	  have	  different	  contexts	  and	  historical	  backgrounds.	  This	  happens	  because	  any	  context	  is	  always	  a	  matter	  of	  the	  “here”	  based	  on	  local	  experiences	  and	  memories;	  it	  is	  something	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  in	  a	  certain	  area	  takes	  for	  granted,	  that	  no	  one	  really	  has	  doubts	  about.	  However,	  physical	  distance	  makes	  sharing	  such	  contexts	  difficult,	  if	  not	  impossible,	  and	  gives	  locals	  enormous	  power	  to	  translate	  and	  localize	  foreign	  events	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  own	  domestic	  experiences	  and	  memories,	  resulting	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  multiple	  different	  versions	  of	  “reality”	  of	  the	  world.	  Such	  locally	  interpreted	  “reality”	  of	  the	  world	  could	  not	  be	  ignored	  because	  it	  was	  such	  modified	  versions	  of	  “reality”	  that	  shaped	  and	  conditioned	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  peoples	  and	  policymakers	  saw	  their	  societies	  and	  chose	  particular	  policies	  in	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Chapter	  2:	  Pictures	  
	  
	  
Picture	  1:	  	  People	  preparing	  for	  leaving	  Seoul	  Seoul,	  South	  Korea	  June	  1950	  MacArthur	  Memorial	  Archives,	  Norfolk,	  VA.	  
	  
	  	  






Picture	  2-­‐1:	  	  “Push-­‐Button	  Warfare”	  
US	  News	  &	  World	  Report	  July	  21,	  1950	  	  




Picture	  2-­‐2:	  	  	  “Where	  Next?”	  
Ithaca	  Journal	  July	  8,	  1950	  	  
	  	  	   	  
  
 140 
Picture	  3-­‐1:	  “Get	  Out!”	  	  
Renmin	  Ribao	  July	  19,	  1950	  	  (The	  characters	  on	  the	  strong	  man	  read	  “the	  Korean	  People”)	  	  
	  	  	  
Picture	  3-­‐2:	  	  “A	  Pincer	  Attack”	  




Picture	  3-­‐3:	  	  “American	  Bandits’	  ‘Miscalculation’”	  
Renmin	  Ribao,	  July	  19,	  1950	  	  
	  	  	  
Picture	  3-­‐4:	  	  
Renmin	  Ribao,	  	  July	  23,	  1950	  	  




Picture	  4:	  	  	  “Struck	  Dead	  by	  Lightening”	  	  
Jiefang	  Ribao	  	  August	  30,	  1950	  	  The	  letters	  on	  the	  lightening	  read	  “protest.”	  	  




Picture	  5:	  	  	  “Crush	  American	  Imperialist’s	  Scheme	  of	  Invading	  Asia”	  
Changjiang	  Ribao	  August	  4,	  1950	  	  (The	  dog	  representing	  “American	  Imperialist”	  is	  stabbed	  with	  knifes	  of	  “Korean	  people”	  from	  the	  left	  and	  “Chinese	  people,”	  “Vietnamese	  people,	  ”	  and	  “Philippine	  people”	  from	  right	  side).	  	  




Picture	  6:	  	  	  “Chopping	  Off	  Evil	  Nails”	  
Dongbei	  Ribao	  	  July	  31	  1950	  	  The	  hands	  of	  a	  man	  representing	  America	  were	  stubbed	  by	  bayonets	  of	  “Korean	  People’s	  Army”	  and	  “People’s	  Liberation	  Army.”	  The	  man’s	  hands	  are	  on	  Korea	  and	  Taiwan,	  respectively.	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Picture	  7-­‐1:	  	  	  “Hiroshima	  U.S.A.”	  
Collier’s	  August	  5,	  1950	  Cover	  page	  	  




Picture	  7-­‐2:	  	  “How	  Prepared	  Are	  We	  If	  Russia	  Should	  Attack?”	  
Look	  June	  20,	  1950	  Cover	  page	  	  
	  





Picture	  8:	  	  “This	  Little	  Pig	  Went	  to	  Market”	  
Newsweek	  August	  7,	  1950	  P.	  64	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Picture	  9:	  	  	  “Shakedown	  for	  Decency”	  Saturday	  Evening	  Post	  	  August	  19,	  1950	  	  p.	  10	  	  























Chapter	  3:	  	  Cold	  War	  Fantasy	  	  	  [To]	  gain	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  what	  was	  involved	  in	  all	  the	  phrases	  that	  run	  glibly	  and	  easily	  through	  the	  diplomatic	  documentation	  of	  that	  day,	  [a	  reader	  would]	  have	  to	  read	  other	  things	  as	  well—things	  more	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  peoples	  themselves,	  things	  dealing	  not	  just	  with	  the	  relations	  between	  sovereign	  authorities	  but	  also	  with	  the	  myriad	  points	  of	  contact	  between	  those	  authorities	  and	  the	  peoples	  subject	  to	  their	  rule.1	  	   George	  F.	  Kennan,	  1961	  	   The	  sweeping	  victory	  at	  the	  Inchon	  Landing	  on	  September	  15,	  1950	  demanded	  that	  the	  Truman	  administration	  make	  a	  final	  decision	  about	  what	  to	  do	  next—stopping	  at	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  or	  continuing	  to	  march	  on	  northward?	  	  In	  retrospect,	  since	  the	  conflict	  itself	  began	  with	  North	  Korean	  forces’	  invasion	  of	  South	  Korea,	  it	  could	  have	  ended	  with	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  pre-­‐war	  situation.	  In	  fact,	  the	  official	  stance	  of	  the	  US	  government	  in	  June	  and	  July	  of	  1950	  was	  that	  the	  United	  States	  “had	  no	  intention	  to	  do	  more	  than	  to	  restore	  the	  status	  quo	  ante	  and	  no	  intention	  to	  proceed	  to	  the	  conquest	  of	  northern	  Korea.”2	  The	  Truman	  administration	  could	  have	  stopped	  US	  troops	  at	  the	  38th	  parallel	  and	  declared	  victory	  in	  early	  October,	  possibly	  avoiding	  China’s	  full	  entry	  into	  the	  war,	  and	  averting	  a	  prolonged	  war.	  There	  was	  actually	  heated	  discussion	  inside	  and	  outside	  the	  government,	  and,	  in	  fact,	  the	  administration	  did	  not	  necessarily	  see	  the	  policy	  of	  crossing	  the	  38th	  parallel	  as	  an	  appealing	  one.	  Yet,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  September,	  
                                                1	  George	  F.	  Kennan,	  Book	  Review,	  “An	  Historian	  of	  Potsdam	  and	  His	  Readers,”	  American	  Slavic	  and	  
East	  European	  Review,	  Vol.	  20,	  No.2	  (April	  1961),	  289-­‐94.	  2	  George	  F.	  Kennan,	  Princeton	  Seminars,	  13	  February	  1954,	  Reel	  2,	  Track	  2,	  4.	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library	  (Hereafter	  HSTL);	  Foreign	  Relations	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (FRUS),	  1950:	  Vol.7	  (10	  July	  1950),	  46.	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members	  of	  the	  Truman	  administration	  felt	  that,	  as	  expert	  diplomat	  and	  advisor	  to	  the	  president,	  Averell	  Harriman	  recalled,	  there	  would	  be	  “no	  way	  to	  stop	  it.”3	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  chance	  to	  terminate	  the	  war	  at	  an	  early	  phase	  of	  the	  conflict,	  the	  cease-­‐fire	  for	  the	  Korean	  War	  was	  not	  finalized	  until	  July	  1953,	  at	  the	  same	  38th	  parallel,	  after	  huge	  numbers	  of	  casualties	  for	  American,	  Chinese,	  Korean,	  and	  other	  nations’	  forces,	  as	  well	  as	  millions	  of	  civilian	  casualties	  on	  the	  peninsula.	  Why	  was	  Washington	  not	  satisfied	  with	  the	  recovery	  of	  the	  pre-­‐war	  situation?	  How	  was	  the	  initial	  strategy	  of	  stopping	  at	  the	  38th	  parallel	  challenged	  and	  modified	  in	  the	  summer	  and	  fall	  of	  1950?	  Why	  did	  Washington	  stick	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  crossing	  the	  38th	  parallel,	  a	  line	  that	  the	  Truman	  administration	  saw	  as	  unimportant	  in	  a	  military	  and	  economic	  sense?	  Several	  scholars	  have	  emphasized	  military	  and	  tactical	  grounds,	  as	  well	  as	  high-­‐ranking	  officials’	  leadership	  and	  calculations.4	  Also,	  policymakers’	  personality	  traits,	  such	  as	  hubris,	  have	  been	  discussed.5	  By	  contrast,	  apart	  from	  a	  few	  exceptions,	  the	  role	  of	  domestic	  politics	  and	  the	  1950	  midterm	  elections	  in	  shaping	  American	  foreign	  policy	  has	  not	  been	  focused	  on	  sufficiently.6	  
                                                3	  Averell	  Harriman,	  Princeton	  Seminars,	  14	  February	  1954,	  Reel	  6,	  Track	  1,	  7,	  HSTL.	  	  4	  William	  Stueck,	  The	  Korean	  War:	  An	  International	  History	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995);	  Barton	  Bernstein,	  “The	  Policy	  of	  Risk:	  Crossing	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  and	  Marching	  to	  the	  Yalu,”	  
Foreign	  Service	  Journal	  (March	  1977),	  16-­‐22,	  and	  29;	  Walter	  LaFeber,	  “Crossing	  the	  38th:	  The	  Cold	  War	  in	  Microcosm”	  in	  Reflections	  on	  the	  Cold	  War:	  A	  Quarter	  Century	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Policy,	  ed.	  Lynn	  H.	  Miller	  and	  Ronald	  Pruessen	  (Philadelphia,	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  1974),	  71-­‐90;	  William	  Stueck,	  “The	  March	  to	  the	  Yalu:	  The	  Perspective	  from	  Washington,”	  in	  Child	  of	  Conflict:	  the	  Korean-­‐
American	  Relationship,	  1943-­‐1953,	  ed.	  Bruce	  Cumings	  (Seattle:	  University	  of	  Washington	  Press,	  1983),	  195-­‐237;	  James	  I.	  Matray,	  “Truman’s	  Plan	  for	  Victory:	  National	  Self-­‐Determination	  and	  the	  Thirty-­‐Eighth	  Parallel	  Decision	  in	  Korea,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  American	  History,	  Vol.	  66,	  No.2	  (September	  1979),	  314-­‐33.	  5	  Arnold	  Offner,	  Another	  Such	  Victory:	  President	  Truman	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1945-­‐1953	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2002);	  Ernest	  May,	  “Lesson”	  of	  the	  Past:	  The	  Use	  and	  Misuse	  of	  History	  in	  
American	  Foreign	  Policy	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1975	  [1973]);	  Melvyn	  Leffler,	  A	  
Preponderance	  of	  Power:	  National	  Security,	  the	  Truman	  Administration,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1992).	  	  6	  Rosemary	  Foot,	  The	  Wrong	  War:	  American	  Policy	  and	  the	  Dimensions	  of	  the	  Korean	  Conflict,	  1950-­‐
1953	  (Cornell	  University	  Press:	  Ithaca,	  1985);	  Burton	  Kaufman,	  The	  Korean	  War:	  Challenges	  in	  Crisis,	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Furthermore,	  contemporary	  society	  and	  political	  culture,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  carriers	  of	  these—the	  people—have	  been	  largely	  ignored.	  Although	  traditional	  accounts	  have	  stressed	  the	  roles	  of	  realpolitik	  and	  elite-­‐policymakers	  and	  influential	  opinion-­‐makers,	  the	  course	  of	  US	  foreign	  strategy	  in	  the	  year	  of	  1950	  cannot	  be	  fully	  understood	  without	  examining	  contemporary	  “realities”—socially	  and	  historically	  constructed	  webs	  of	  meanings	  shared	  by	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  people.	  Thus,	  to	  understand	  Washington’s	  actions,	  we	  need	  to	  explore	  domestic	  matrices	  and	  popular	  political	  cultures	  that	  molded	  their	  Cold	  War	  fantasy,	  or	  as	  it	  was	  called,	  “reality.”	  This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  the	  Truman	  administration’s	  hard-­‐line	  policy	  in	  Korea	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  climate	  of	  fear	  and	  crisis	  in	  1950.	  The	  administration’s	  policy	  was	  driven	  by	  policymakers’	  concerns	  about	  domestic	  politics,	  social	  unrest,	  and	  mentalities	  of	  everyday	  people.	  Throughout	  this	  period,	  the	  administration	  had	  to	  avoid	  being	  seen	  as	  “soft	  on	  communism”	  at	  all	  costs.	  In	  short,	  the	  struggle	  over	  the	  38th	  parallel	  was	  not	  necessarily	  about	  a	  particular	  military	  policy.	  It	  was	  more	  about	  symbolic	  political	  struggles	  to	  maintain	  the	  government	  and	  administration’s	  credibility	  in	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  millions	  and	  billions	  of	  people	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  	  	  
Deadlocked	  in	  the	  Government	  “I	  don’t	  want	  any	  implication…that	  we	  are	  going	  to	  war	  with	  Russia,”	  said	  President	  Truman	  on	  June	  26,	  1950,	  “We	  want	  to	  take	  any	  steps	  we	  have	  to	  to	  push	  
                                                                                                                                            
Credibility,	  and	  Command,	  2nd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  McGraw-­‐Hill	  Companies,	  1997	  [1986]);	  While	  not	  focusing	  on	  the	  Korean	  War,	  Jonathan	  Bell’s	  The	  Liberal	  State	  On	  Trial:	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  American	  
Politics	  in	  the	  Truman	  Years	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  2004)	  carefully	  examines	  domestic-­‐political	  side	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  this	  period.	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the	  North	  Koreans	  behind	  the	  line	  but	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  get	  us	  over-­‐committed	  to	  a	  whole	  lot	  of	  other	  things	  that	  could	  mean	  war	  [with	  Russia].	  […].	  We	  must	  be	  damn	  careful.”7	  In	  the	  same	  cabinet	  meeting,	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Army	  Frank	  Pace	  inquired	  whether	  America’s	  action	  would	  be	  held	  only	  south	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  or	  not.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dean	  Acheson	  immediately	  confirmed	  this	  and	  did	  not	  make	  any	  suggestion	  for	  any	  action	  across	  the	  line.8	  As	  these	  conversations	  suggest,	  inside	  closed-­‐door	  communications,	  policymakers	  in	  Washington	  remained	  cautious	  in	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  In	  effect,	  the	  Truman	  administration	  did	  not	  plan	  to	  pursue	  a	  hard-­‐line	  policy	  at	  all.	  	  In	  the	  early	  phase	  of	  the	  war,	  the	  administration	  emphasized	  this	  view	  repeatedly.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  June,	  for	  instance,	  Acheson	  asserted	  that	  the	  United	  States’	  action	  was	  taken	  “solely	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  restoring	  South	  Korea	  to	  its	  status	  prior	  to	  the	  invasion	  from	  the	  north	  and	  of	  reestablishing	  the	  peace	  broken	  by	  that	  aggression.”9	  Further,	  an	  American	  Army	  spokesman	  in	  Korea	  reportedly	  stated	  that	  American	  troops	  were	  only	  involved	  in	  fighting	  “to	  drive	  the	  North	  Koreans	  back	  to	  the	  38th	  parallel	  and	  would	  stop	  there	  and	  use	  force	  if	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  South	  Korean	  troops	  from	  advancing	  beyond	  the	  38th	  parallel.”10	  At	  this	  point,	  in	  short,	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  US	  action	  was	  simply	  “to	  clear	  South	  Korea	  of	  North	  Korean	  military	  forces.”11	  	  
                                                7	  The	  underline	  in	  this	  quote	  was	  written	  in	  the	  handwritten	  note	  of	  George	  Elsey	  who	  attended	  and	  took	  notes.	  See	  “Note	  of	  the	  NSC	  meeting,”	  29	  June	  1950,	  GMEP,	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  71,	  HSTL.	  	  8	  “Memorandum	  of	  Conversation,	  by	  the	  Ambassador	  at	  Large	  (Jessup),”	  26	  June	  1950,	  FRUS,	  1950	  
Vol.	  VII:	  Korea,	  179.	  9	  “Editorial	  Note,”	  FRUS,	  1950	  Vol.	  VII:	  Korea,	  239.	  10	  “Memorandum	  by	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Northeast	  Asian	  Affairs	  (Allison)	  to	  the	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Far	  Eastern	  Affairs	  (Rusk),”	  13	  July	  1950,	  FRUS,	  1950	  Vol.	  VII:	  Korea,	  373.	  11	  “Teleconference	  with	  MacArthur,”	  26	  June	  1950,	  GMEP,	  Subject	  File,	  Box	  71,	  HSTL.	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This	  initial	  strategy,	  however,	  was	  questioned	  and	  challenged	  throughout	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  and	  eventually	  abandoned	  by	  the	  end	  of	  September.	  One	  of	  its	  earliest	  challenges	  to	  this	  policy—to	  limit	  American	  action	  to	  the	  area	  south	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel—came	  from	  key	  officials	  within	  the	  administration,	  including	  Truman’s	  personal	  advisor	  Clark	  Clifford,	  Director	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Northeast	  Asian	  Affairs	  John	  Allison,	  and	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Far	  Eastern	  Affairs	  Dean	  Rusk.12	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  more	  than	  anyone,	  believed	  that	  it	  would	  be	  “folly”	  to	  go	  back	  to	  the	  division	  of	  Korea	  at	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  because,	  he	  and	  his	  close	  friend	  agreed,	  there	  would	  be	  neither	  peace	  nor	  successful	  government	  in	  a	  divided	  Korea.13	  A	  similar	  view	  was	  explicitly	  put	  forth	  in	  the	  Defense	  Department’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  Korean	  situation:	  	  The	  situation	  in	  Korea	  now	  provides	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  free	  world	  with	  the	  first	  opportunity	  to	  displace	  part	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Orbit.	  […]	  The	  establishment	  of	  a	  free	  and	  united	  Korea	  and	  the	  elimination	  of	  the	  North	  Korean	  Communist	  regime…would	  be	  a	  step	  in	  reversing	  the	  dangerous	  strategic	  trend	  in	  the	  Far	  East	  of	  the	  past	  twelve	  months.14	  	  As	  this	  memo	  expressed,	  hard-­‐liners	  viewed	  crossing	  the	  38th	  parallel	  and	  the	  successful	  unification	  of	  Korea	  as	  an	  attractive	  chance	  for	  Washington	  to	  wipe	  out	  the	  disgrace	  of	  “losing	  ground”	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Such	  a	  position	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  one	  of	  
                                                12	  Letter,	  Clark	  Clifford	  to	  HST,	  29	  June	  1950,	  Clark	  M.	  Clifford	  Papers	  [Hereafter	  CMCP],	  “Letters	  to	  and	  from	  HST,”	  Box	  42,	  HSTL;	  “Memorandum	  by	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Northeast	  Asian	  Affairs	  (Allison)	  to	  the	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Far	  Eastern	  Affairs	  (Rusk),”	  1	  July	  1950,	  FRUS,	  1950	  
Vol.	  VII:	  Korea,	  272.	  In	  the	  margin	  on	  this	  script,	  Dean	  Rusk	  signed,	  “Agree,	  DR”;	  Footnote	  to	  “Memorandum	  by	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  Northeast	  Asian	  Affairs	  (Allison)	  to	  the	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Far	  Eastern	  Affairs	  (Rusk),”	  13	  July	  1950,	  FRUS,	  1950	  Vol.	  VII:	  Korea,	  373.	  13	  Letter,	  William	  Mathews	  to	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  July	  22,	  1950,	  Papers	  of	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  (hereafter	  PJFD),	  Box	  49,	  “Letter	  and	  Memos	  to	  Dulles,”	  Princeton	  University,	  Princeton,	  New	  Jersey;	  Letter,	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  to	  William	  Mathews,	  PJFD,	  Box	  48	  “Korea,	  1950,”	  Princeton	  University.	  	  	  14	  “Draft	  Memorandum	  Prepared	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense,”	  FRUS,	  1950	  Vol.	  VII:	  Korea	  (31	  July	  1950),	  506-­‐7.	  
  
 155 
the	  early	  advocacies	  of	  what	  later	  became	  known	  as	  the	  “roll-­‐back”	  policy	  of	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration.	  	  Nonetheless,	  this	  hard-­‐line	  viewpoint	  was	  not	  prevalent.	  Truman	  thought	  Clifford’s	  idea	  “a	  little	  premature.”	  No	  consensus	  for	  broader	  action	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  existed	  even	  in	  the	  State	  Department,	  let	  alone	  other	  sections	  of	  the	  government.	  While	  hawkish	  attitudes	  were	  becoming	  popular	  in	  society,	  government	  officials	  had	  more	  diverse	  opinions.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  vocal	  arguments	  came	  from	  George	  F.	  Kennan	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Policy	  Planning	  Staff	  (PPS).	  They	  consistently	  insisted	  that	  US	  forces	  should	  stop	  at	  the	  38th	  parallel,	  warning	  that,	  if	  U.S.	  forces	  would	  carry	  military	  action	  north	  of	  the	  line,	  “the	  danger	  of	  conflict	  with	  Chinese	  communist	  or	  Soviet	  forces	  would	  be	  greatly	  increased.”15	  The	  Central	  Information	  Agency	  (CIA)	  also	  opposed	  crossing	  the	  parallel.	  The	  CIA	  argued	  that,	  although	  the	  successful	  invasion	  of	  North	  Korea	  would	  have	  some	  merit	  in	  terms	  of	  increasing	  the	  prestige	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  it	  might	  bring	  “grave	  risk	  of	  general	  war”	  with	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.16	  The	  chairman	  of	  the	  Joint	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  (JCS),	  Omar	  Bradley,	  similarly	  disagreed	  with	  crossing	  the	  parallel,	  but	  in	  a	  different	  light:	  military	  ground	  operations	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  “should	  be	  conducted	  by	  South	  Korean	  forces	  since	  it	  [is]	  assumed	  that	  the	  actions	  [will]	  probably	  be	  of	  a	  guerrilla	  character.”17	  	  
                                                15	  “Draft	  Memorandum	  Prepared	  by	  the	  Policy	  Planning	  Staff,”	  22	  July	  1950,	  FRUS,	  1950	  Vol.	  VII:	  
Korea,	  453;	  George	  F.	  Kennan,	  14	  February	  1954,	  Princeton	  Seminars,	  Reel	  6,	  Track	  1:	  8,	  HSTL.	  16	  “Memorandum	  Prepared	  in	  the	  Central	  Information	  Agency,”	  18	  August	  1950,	  FRUS,	  1950	  Vol.	  VII:	  
Korea,	  600-­‐2.	  17	  “Memorandum	  from	  JCS	  to	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,”	  7	  September	  1950,	  HSTP,	  Personal	  File:	  Subject	  File	  “1940-­‐1953:	  NSC-­‐Meeting	  File,”	  Box	  180,	  HSTL.	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Furthermore,	  warnings	  about	  the	  38th	  parallel	  came	  from	  European	  allies.	  French	  officials	  cautioned	  that,	  until	  the	  U.N.	  Security	  Council	  passed	  a	  further	  resolution	  on	  the	  subject,	  U.N.	  forces	  should	  not	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel,	  as	  this	  would	  create	  a	  new	  situation	  and	  might	  bring	  the	  USSR	  and	  China	  into	  the	  war.18	  British	  officials,	  too,	  doubted	  whether	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  could	  be	  justified	  under	  the	  original	  U.N.	  resolution,	  since	  this	  resolution	  was	  aimed	  only	  at	  repelling	  attacks	  from	  the	  North.	  British	  officials	  were	  concerned	  that	  fighting	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  would	  increase	  the	  risk	  of	  Soviet	  intervention.	  They	  did	  not	  believe	  that	  the	  USSR	  wished	  to	  provoke	  a	  major	  war,	  but	  were	  concerned	  that	  the	  Soviets	  might	  dispatch	  a	  volunteer	  force	  or	  large	  military	  supplies,	  which	  would	  create	  a	  situation	  full	  of	  explosive	  possibilities.19	  “The	  United	  States’	  reactions	  to	  the	  Far	  Eastern	  situation	  are	  at	  present	  highly	  emotional,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  reasoned	  arguments	  may	  prove	  to	  have	  little	  appeal,”	  wrote	  a	  British	  official	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  “The	  main	  aim	  [of	  the	  British	  government]	  should	  be	  to	  try	  to	  convince	  the	  United	  States	  that	  their	  policy	  should	  be	  directed	  wholly	  toward	  the	  solution	  of	  the	  Korean	  problem.”20	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  such	  division	  of	  opinion	  within	  and	  beyond	  the	  government,	  President	  Truman	  was	  reluctant	  to	  make	  a	  decision,	  and	  expressed	  “considerable	  worry”	  about	  the	  matter.21	  On	  July	  17,	  he	  asked	  the	  NSC	  to	  prepare	  a	  report	  concerning	  which	  course	  U.S.	  forces	  should	  take	  after	  reaching	  the	  parallel.	  Yet,	  the	  
                                                18	  “Preliminary	  Conversation	  for	  September	  Foreign	  Ministers’	  Meeting,”	  30	  August	  1950,	  HSTP:	  Korean	  War	  Files,	  No.	  17,	  “Tripartite	  meeting	  of	  foreign	  ministers,	  September	  1950,”	  Box	  7,	  HSTL.	  19	  Ibid.	  20	  Memo,	  “The	  implications	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  Korea	  for	  British	  foreign	  policy,”	  Summer	  1950,	  in	  CO537/5392,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  21	  Memoranda	  of	  conversation,	  “Notes	  re.	  NSC	  Meeting”	  (September	  7,	  1950),	  Dean	  Acheson	  Papers	  (Hereafter	  DAP),	  HSTL.	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divide	  was	  so	  deep	  and	  wide	  that,	  throughout	  the	  entire	  summer,	  the	  administration	  lacked	  a	  clear,	  unified	  opinion	  on	  the	  question.	  This	  unusual	  situation	  continued	  until	  early	  September.	  Philip	  Jessup,	  a	  State	  Department	  staff	  member,	  complained	  on	  August	  24	  that	  he	  “could	  hardly	  understand	  how,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  President’s	  specific	  request,	  we	  could	  reply	  to	  the	  President	  merely	  stating	  that	  we	  have	  no	  policy	  recommendations	  at	  this	  time.”22	  	  On	  September	  1,	  1950,	  the	  NSC	  finally	  produced	  the	  government’s	  official	  viewpoint,	  although	  it	  was	  not	  a	  clear-­‐cut,	  unified	  opinion.	  The	  document	  (NSC-­‐81)	  suggested	  that	  US	  forces	  could	  invade	  North	  Korean	  territory	  across	  the	  parallel	  in	  order	  to	  “compel”	  the	  enemy	  to	  stay	  “behind”	  the	  38th	  parallel.	  Yet,	  it	  also	  warned	  that	  crossing	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  “would	  create	  a	  situation	  to	  which	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  be	  almost	  certain	  to	  react	  in	  some	  manner,”	  and	  suggested	  that,	  if	  only	  South	  Korean	  forces	  were	  to	  operate	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel,	  the	  risk	  of	  general	  hostilities	  would	  be	  reduced.23	  Although	  this	  document	  was	  the	  first	  to	  officially	  authorize	  the	  possibility	  of	  American	  forces’	  advancement	  north	  of	  the	  parallel,	  it	  remained	  ambiguous	  with	  suggesting	  two	  policies	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  This	  vagueness	  implies	  that	  there	  was	  still	  strong	  opposition	  to	  such	  a	  course	  of	  action.	  	  In	  short,	  discussions	  among	  State	  Department	  bureaucrats	  were	  deadlocked,	  as	  were	  those	  in	  the	  CIA	  and	  Defense	  Department.	  The	  JCS	  and	  European	  allies	  issued	  serious	  warnings.	  Further,	  the	  NSC’s	  suggestion	  to	  the	  President	  did	  not	  
                                                22	  “Memorandum	  by	  Mr.	  Max	  Bishop	  to	  the	  Ambassador	  at	  Large	  (Jessup),”	  24	  August	  1950,	  FRUS,	  
1950	  Vol.	  VII:	  Korea,	  641.	  	  23	  “United	  States	  Courses	  of	  Action	  with	  Respect	  to	  Korea	  (NSC-­‐81/2),”	  HSTP:	  Personal	  File,	  Subject	  File,	  “1940-­‐1953:	  NSC-­‐Meeting	  File,”	  Box	  180,	  HSTL.	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really	  provide	  a	  clear	  answer.	  Why,	  then,	  did	  the	  Truman	  administration	  decide	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel?	  	  
Public	  Perceptions	  Concerning	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  Beyond	  the	  governmental	  level,	  intriguingly,	  the	  discussion	  over	  whether	  or	  not	  U.S.	  forces	  should	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel	  was	  not	  so	  complicated.	  While	  dissenting	  voices	  surely	  existed,	  serious	  debate	  did	  not	  develop	  among	  the	  public	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950.	  The	  major	  view	  commonly	  held	  was	  that	  Washington	  should	  be	  expected	  to	  take	  a	  tough	  stance	  in	  foreign	  policy.	  	  As	  early	  as	  late	  July,	  attention	  among	  leading	  commentators	  had	  already	  turned	  to	  the	  question	  of	  what	  to	  do	  after	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel.24	  For	  instance,	  Walter	  Lippmann	  of	  the	  Washington	  Post	  argued	  that	  a	  return	  to	  the	  “status	  quo”	  was	  impossible.25	  Even	  the	  “leftist”	  New	  York	  Compass	  supported	  the	  unification	  of	  Korea,	  rather	  than	  halting	  US	  forces	  at	  the	  parallel.26	  The	  Dallas	  News	  asserted,	  “One	  thing	  is	  clear.	  Before	  this	  thing	  is	  over	  with,	  we	  shall	  have	  to	  drive	  the	  North	  Korean	  army	  and	  its	  Russian	  staff	  past	  the	  38th	  parallel	  and	  clean	  out	  of	  North	  Korea.”27	  A	  local	  newspaper,	  the	  Ithaca	  Journal,	  also	  insisted	  that	  the	  United	  Nations	  had	  never	  recognized	  the	  division	  of	  Korea,	  and	  declared,	  “Its	  aim	  from	  the	  beginning	  has	  been	  a	  united	  Korea.	  Why	  not	  declare	  firmly	  now	  that	  a	  united,	  free	  Korea	  will	  result	  from	  military	  operations	  there?”28	  	  
                                                24	  Daily	  Opinion	  Summary	  (25	  July	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  NA.	  	  25	  Special	  Report	  American	  Opinion	  (26	  July	  1950),	  The	  Office	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  Studies	  (OPOS)	  ed.,	  Department	  of	  State,	  SFP,	  Box	  39,	  NA.	  26	  Daily	  Opinion	  Summary	  (25	  July	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  NA.	  27	  Ibid.	  28	  Editorial,	  “United	  Korea,”	  Ithaca	  Journal	  (8	  August	  1950).	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By	  the	  end	  of	  July	  and	  early	  August,	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  observers	  believed	  that	  US	  forces	  should	  press	  their	  offensive	  into	  North	  Korea.	  For	  example,	  the	  
Washington	  Post	  and	  the	  Kansas	  City	  Star	  agreed	  that	  U.N.	  forces	  must	  go	  beyond	  the	  38th	  parallel.	  The	  Kansas	  City	  Star,	  Truman’s	  home	  state	  newspaper,	  asserted,	  “It	  would	  be	  intolerable	  if,	  once	  the	  tide	  of	  battle	  turns	  definitely	  against	  the	  aggressors	  they	  should	  be	  permitted	  to	  break	  off	  hostilities	  and	  simply	  retire	  behind	  the	  38th	  parallel	  to	  await	  a	  better	  opportunity	  to	  strike	  again.”29	  Other	  newspapers	  also	  kept	  in	  lockstep	  with	  this	  view.	  According	  to	  a	  State	  Department	  survey	  in	  August	  1950,	  the	  Providence	  Journal,	  the	  Watertown	  Times,	  the	  Detroit	  News,	  the	  Christian	  Science	  
Monitor,	  and	  the	  Washington	  Post	  supported	  carrying	  the	  offensive	  beyond	  the	  38th	  parallel	  in	  order	  to	  unite	  Korea	  under	  the	  United	  Nations.30	  	  In	  effect,	  while	  government	  officials’	  discussions	  were	  still	  divided	  in	  the	  entire	  summer	  over	  U.S.	  war	  strategy,	  popular	  attitudes	  seemed	  to	  show	  a	  clear	  view.	  The	  Office	  of	  Public	  Opinion	  Studies	  (OPOS)	  in	  the	  State	  Department	  summarized	  this	  plainly	  in	  August:	  	  	  There	  is	  substantial	  agreement	  that	  the	  Korean	  problem	  cannot	  be	  satisfactory	  solved	  short	  of	  reuniting	  the	  nation	  under	  a	  government	  freely	  elected	  by	  the	  people	  of	  the	  north	  and	  south.	  Those	  endorsing	  this	  view	  are	  prepared	  to	  see	  the	  UN	  force	  carry	  the	  offensive	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel,	  if	  necessary,	  to	  achieve	  these	  objectives,	  and	  they	  reject	  any	  thought	  of	  returning	  to	  the	  status	  quo.31	  	  The	  “substantial	  agreement”	  this	  report	  described	  needs	  a	  bit	  more	  explanation	  because	  such	  a	  consensus	  did	  not	  actually	  exist.	  There	  were	  significant	  disagreements	  with	  dissenting	  voices	  demanding	  that	  U.S.	  forces	  halt	  at	  the	  38th	  Parallel.	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  for	  instance,	  the	  liberal	  New	  York	  Post	  insisted	  that	  
                                                29	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  (22	  August	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  NA.	  30	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  (20-­‐25	  August	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  NA.	  31	  “Monthly	  Survey	  of	  American	  Opinion	  on	  International	  Affairs”	  (August	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  12,	  NA.	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the	  U.N.	  forces	  should	  “stay	  this	  side	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel.”32	  The	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  likewise,	  wrote	  that	  U.N.	  forces	  should	  not	  attempt	  to	  cross	  the	  line,	  and	  argued,	  “Such	  a	  job	  will	  have	  to	  be	  undertaken	  by	  the	  South	  Koreans	  alone	  at	  some	  time	  in	  the	  more	  or	  less	  distant	  future.”33	  In	  a	  similar	  manner,	  the	  Chicago	  Tribune	  asserted,	  “We	  shall	  be	  face	  to	  face	  with	  the	  hordes	  of	  Russia	  and	  red	  China	  with	  a	  new	  line	  more	  explosively	  dangerous	  than	  the	  38th	  parallel	  ever	  was.”34	  A	  radio	  commentator,	  Frank	  Edward	  at	  the	  Mutual	  Broadcasting	  System	  (MBS),	  also	  seemed	  to	  represent	  such	  a	  viewpoint:	  	  It	  seems	  probable	  that	  our	  troops	  will	  not	  penetrate	  into	  North	  Korea.	  If	  we	  crush	  the	  Communist	  armies	  in	  South	  Korea	  and	  then	  stop	  at	  the	  38th	  parallel	  it	  would	  amount	  to	  a	  double-­‐barrel	  victory	  for	  us.	  First,	  we	  would	  then	  have	  shown	  the	  world	  we	  are	  not	  to	  be	  pushed	  around,	  and	  we	  would	  give	  the	  lie	  to	  the	  Communist	  charges	  that	  we	  are	  imperialists	  out	  to	  gobble	  up	  the	  world.35	  	  	  As	  these	  examples	  show,	  there	  were	  much	  disagreements,	  although	  it	  is	  true	  that	  intense	  discussions	  never	  developed	  among	  the	  public	  at	  that	  time,	  as	  the	  aforementioned	  study	  of	  the	  State	  Department	  suggested.	  The	  primary	  factor	  for	  this	  was	  that	  those	  who	  disagreed	  restrained	  themselves	  in	  view	  of	  popular	  political	  culture	  at	  that	  time.	  In	  retrospect,	  numberless	  policymakers	  and	  ordinary	  people,	  as	  well	  as	  American	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  in	  the	  year	  of	  1950	  seemed	  to	  have	  a	  different	  set	  of	  worldviews:	  communists	  and	  communists	  sympathizers,	  regardless	  Chinese	  or	  Korean,	  or	  even	  leftists	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  were	  commonly	  viewed	  as	  monolithically	  under	  the	  tight	  control	  of	  Joseph	  Stalin;	  stories	  of	  communist	  spies	  
                                                32	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  (19	  September	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  NA.	  33	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  	  (22	  September	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  NA.	  34	  “Monthly	  Survey	  of	  American	  Opinion	  on	  International	  Affairs”	  (August	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  12,	  NA.	  35	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  (20	  September	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  NA.	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were	  popular	  and	  everywhere	  in	  fiction	  and	  non-­‐fiction;	  fear	  of	  World	  War	  III	  and	  atomic	  attacks	  was	  prevalent;	  many	  housewives	  hoarded	  commodities	  due	  to	  fear	  of	  a	  world	  war;	  a	  lot	  of	  children	  had	  to	  wear	  identification	  tags	  in	  case	  of	  their	  deaths	  from	  atomic	  attack;	  finally,	  the	  Korean	  War	  made	  Senator	  Joseph	  McCarthy	  look	  more	  like	  a	  prophet	  than	  a	  demagogue.	  	  A	  schoolteacher,	  who	  was	  a	  child	  in	  the	  1950s,	  succinctly	  recollected	  the	  feeling	  of	  the	  era:	  “It	  seems	  surreal	  now.	  Every	  summer,	  when	  I	  heard	  heat	  lightning	  over	  the	  city	  and	  the	  sky	  would	  light	  up,	  I	  was	  convinced	  it	  was	  all	  over.	  My	  whole	  childhood	  was	  built	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  Soviets	  were	  the	  real	  threat.”36	  Such	  a	  particular	  worldview—Cold	  War	  fantasy—was	  shared	  by	  millions	  and	  billions	  of	  people,	  not	  just	  among	  elite	  policymakers	  but	  also	  ordinary	  people,	  constituting	  social	  contexts	  that	  made	  some	  choices	  more	  probable	  while	  making	  others	  unlikely.	  Of	  course,	  people	  at	  the	  time	  did	  not	  see	  this	  mentality	  as	  “fantasy.”	  For	  many,	  it	  was	  “real.”	  	  In	  such	  “reality,”	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  Americans	  viewed	  the	  Korean	  War	  not	  as	  a	  local	  conflict	  in	  Korea	  but,	  rather,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  global	  war	  against	  communism.	  Many	  also	  viewed	  communists,	  socialists,	  leftists,	  social	  democrats,	  labor	  activists,	  “fellow	  travelers,”	  “pinks,”	  and	  many	  others	  in	  the	  United	  States	  as	  tools	  of	  Moscow.	  Such	  a	  largely	  imagined	  linkage	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  California	  Governor	  Earl	  Warren’s	  address:	  	  
                                                36	  Joel	  Brinkley,	  “Bush	  and	  Yeltsin	  Declare	  Formal	  End	  to	  Cold	  War;	  Agree	  to	  Exchange	  Visits;	  U.S.	  Looking	  for	  New	  Course	  As	  Superpower	  Conflict	  Ends,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  A1,	  1	  February	  1992.	  The	  quote	  appears	  in	  John	  Kenneth	  White,	  Still	  Seeing	  Red:	  How	  the	  Cold	  War	  Shapes	  the	  New	  American	  
Politics	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview	  Press,	  1997),	  4.	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Our	  country	  is	  at	  war,	  ostensibly	  with	  North	  Korea,	  but	  actually	  with	  Soviet	  Russia.	  […]	  It	  is	  foolhardy	  to	  believe	  that	  Russia	  would	  not	  use	  [atomic	  warfare]	  on	  us	  if	  she	  could.	  Our	  civilian	  defense	  program	  should	  include	  protection	  from	  almost	  certain	  sabotage	  on	  the	  part	  of	  fanatical	  Communists	  among	  us	  who,	  while	  enjoying	  the	  liberties	  of	  this	  country,	  glorify	  in	  their	  distorted	  minds	  the	  slavery	  of	  Soviet	  Russia.37	  	  While	  recent	  studies	  on	  Soviet	  espionage,	  to	  be	  sure,	  clarified	  the	  extensive	  networks	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  mostly	  working	  in	  the	  1930s	  and	  the	  wartime,	  many	  others	  were	  irrelevant.	  Yet,	  diverse	  groups	  of	  people	  were	  all	  suspected	  and	  looked	  upon	  as	  monolithic	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Kremlin,	  and	  thus	  viewed	  as	  “traitors”	  at	  home,	  or	  even	  “enemies”	  within,	  a	  popular	  theme	  which	  often	  appeared	  in	  political	  cartoons	  in	  newspapers	  (Picture	  1).38	  	  	  	   Numerous	  people	  took	  part	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  this	  “reality,”	  in	  many	  cases	  even	  urging	  politicians	  to	  confront	  the	  communist	  threat	  more	  decisively.	  A	  lawyer	  in	  Ohio,	  for	  instance,	  privately	  informed	  on	  the	  propaganda	  publications	  of	  a	  communist	  organization	  to	  his	  senator,	  urging	  him	  to	  undertake	  an	  investigation,	  saying	  “You	  will	  find	  that	  our	  government,	  through	  its	  State	  Department,	  has	  been	  too	  lenient,	  and	  that	  immediate	  action	  should	  be	  started	  to	  stop	  propaganda	  newspapers	  from	  being	  delivered	  to	  American	  citizens.”39	  This	  lawyer	  was	  not	  peculiar;	  A	  Gallup	  Poll	  indicated	  that	  90	  percent	  of	  the	  people	  polled	  agreed	  that	  all	  members	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  in	  heavy	  industries	  should	  be	  removed	  from	  their	  jobs.40	  Further,	  40	  percent	  insisted	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  war	  with	  
                                                37	  “‘Expect	  Sabotage,’	  Warren	  Tells	  State:	  Civilian	  Defense	  Must	  Handle	  Fifth	  Column	  and	  Air	  Raids,	  He	  Says.”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  (5	  August	  1950).	  38	  Cartoon,	  “Look	  Out	  for	  Infiltration	  at	  Home,”	  Ithaca	  Journal	  (14	  August	  1950);	  See,	  also,	  Jenkins,	  
Cold	  War	  At	  Home,	  1.	  39	  Letter,	  Joseph	  J.	  Craciun	  to	  Robert	  A.	  Taft,	  22	  April	  1950,	  RATP,	  Subject	  File:	  1950;	  Communism,	  Box	  915,	  LC.	  	  40	  “American	  Communists,”	  The	  Gallup	  Poll	  Vol.	  2	  (21	  August	  1950),	  933.	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Russia,	  Communist	  Party	  members	  should	  be	  put	  in	  internment	  camps	  or	  prisons.41	  It	  was	  not	  surprising	  that,	  given	  the	  prevalence	  of	  such	  feelings,	  longshoremen	  in	  New	  York	  and	  Boston	  refused	  to	  discharge	  tons	  of	  Russian	  crabmeat	  (Picture	  2).42	  No	  wonder	  that	  many	  children	  at	  that	  time	  had	  to	  practice	  air	  raids	  drills	  in	  elementary	  school,	  with	  the	  comical	  song,	  “Duck	  and	  Cover,”	  and	  that	  many	  of	  those	  in	  New	  York	  state	  were	  required	  to	  wear	  identification	  tags	  in	  case	  of	  their	  unexpected	  deaths	  from	  an	  atomic	  attack.43	  Under	  this	  particular	  “reality,”	  those	  who	  disagreed	  with	  the	  mainstream	  line	  increasingly	  had	  a	  hard	  time.	  A	  high	  school	  student	  at	  that	  time,	  Becky	  Jenkins,	  whose	  father	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  in	  California,	  recalled:	  	  When	  I	  was	  in	  my	  first	  year	  in	  high	  school,	  the	  Korean	  War	  was	  going	  on.	  In	  a	  social	  studies	  class,	  I	  said	  something	  about	  it	  being	  a	  civil	  war	  and	  [that]	  America	  should	  stay	  out	  of	  it.	  The	  teacher	  responded	  with	  “That’s	  the	  position	  of	  the	  Communists!”	  and	  the	  class	  started	  to	  laugh	  and	  scream	  and	  hoot	  at	  me,	  yelling	  “Commie!”	  I	  ran	  home	  from	  school	  sobbing,	  just	  humiliated.44	  	  The	  bullying	  of	  Ms.	  Jenkins	  was	  not	  a	  unique	  event.	  Having	  had	  a	  similar	  experience,	  a	  couple	  in	  Baltimore	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  White	  House	  in	  August:	  “[I]n	  this	  war	  hysteria	  nearly	  everyone	  who	  advocates	  peace	  seems	  to	  be	  automatically	  labeled	  a	  ‘Communist’	  so	  that	  most	  American	  citizens	  are	  frightened	  and	  confused	  into	  
                                                41	  “American	  Communists,”	  The	  Gallup	  Poll	  Vol.	  2	  (21	  August	  1950),	  934.	  The	  Gallup	  Poll	  also	  indicated	  that	  in	  the	  winter	  of	  1949,	  70	  percent	  of	  those	  polled	  believed	  that	  “Russia	  is	  trying	  to	  build	  herself	  up	  to	  be	  the	  ruling	  power	  of	  the	  world,”	  while	  18	  percent	  viewed	  Russia’s	  build-­‐up	  as	  merely	  self-­‐defense.	  In	  the	  mid-­‐November	  1950,	  the	  ratio	  for	  the	  same	  question	  became	  81	  to	  9.	  See	  “Russia,”	  
The	  Gallup	  Poll	  Vol.	  2	  (29	  November	  1950),	  949.	  42	  “No	  Red	  Crabmeat,”	  Newsweek	  (28	  August	  1950),	  66.	  43	  Federal	  Civil	  Defense	  Administration,	  Bert	  the	  Turtle	  Says	  Duck	  and	  Cover	  (Washington:	  U.S.	  G.P.O.,	  1951);	  JoAnne	  Brown,	  “‘A	  is	  for	  Atom,	  B	  is	  Bomb’:	  Civil	  Defense	  in	  American	  Public	  Education,	  1948-­‐1963.”	  The	  Journal	  of	  American	  History,	  Vol.	  75,	  No.1	  (June	  1988).	  44	  Griffin	  Fariello	  ed.,	  “Becky	  Jenkins,”	  Red	  Scare:	  Memories	  of	  the	  American	  Inquisition:	  An	  Oral	  
History	  (New	  York:	  Avon	  Books,	  1995),	  71.	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supporting	  your	  war	  in	  Korea	  and	  your	  preparations	  for	  bigger	  and	  more	  deadly	  wars.”45	  	  Those	  who	  expressed	  their	  views,	  like	  this	  Baltimore	  couple,	  might	  be	  uncommon.	  “The	  war	  fever	  is	  running	  so	  high	  in	  this	  country,”	  wrote	  a	  progressive	  in	  the	  summer,	  “the	  Left	  is	  so	  intimidated	  that	  everything	  to	  talk	  for	  peace	  with	  reason	  and	  calmness	  is	  almost	  as	  useless	  as	  shouting	  in	  the	  teeth	  of	  a	  hurricane.”46	  As	  this	  author,	  amidst	  a	  preponderance	  of	  hawkish	  sentiments	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  diverse	  kinds	  of	  nonconformists	  seemed	  hesitant	  to	  continue	  expressing	  their	  opinions	  in	  public.	  In	  such	  a	  climate,	  the	  number	  of	  dissenting	  voices	  seemed	  smaller	  than	  it	  actually	  was,	  while	  the	  aggressive	  voices	  seemed	  more	  numerous	  than	  they	  really	  were.47	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  seeming	  “consensus”	  was	  established,	  and	  it	  was	  broadly	  and	  commonly	  perceived	  that	  the	  public	  called	  for	  U.S.	  forces’	  advancement	  beyond	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  as	  the	  natural	  course	  of	  things.	  	  When	  the	  public	  appeared	  to	  be	  demanding	  a	  tough	  policy	  unanimously,	  then,	  what	  were	  the	  reactions	  on	  the	  side	  of	  political	  figures?	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  such	  a	  frenzy	  social	  climate	  was	  not	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  direction	  of	  politics	  and	  policymaking	  processes	  concerning	  the	  Korean	  War.	  This	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  the	  year	  of	  1950	  because	  it	  was	  the	  year	  of	  the	  midterm	  elections,	  the	  one	  that	  the	  Republican	  had	  been	  angling	  to	  stage	  a	  comeback.	  	  	  
                                                45	  Fousek,	  To	  Lead	  the	  Free	  World,	  172.	  46	  Letter,	  anonymous	  to	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace,	  August	  9,	  1950,	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace	  Papers	  (hereafter	  HAWP),	  University	  of	  Iowa	  Library	  Archives,	  Iowa	  City,	  Iowa.	  (I82)	  47	  German	  sociologist	  Elisabeth	  Noelle-­‐Neumann	  called	  such	  phenomenon	  as	  “spiral	  of	  silence.”	  See	  
The	  Spiral	  of	  Silence;	  Public	  Opinion—Our	  Skin,	  2nd	  ed.	  (Chicago:	  The	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1993[1984]).	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Domestic	  Politics	  1950—Republicans	  While	  bureaucrats	  in	  Washington	  were	  as	  yet	  unable	  to	  form	  a	  solid,	  unified	  strategy,	  many	  Republican	  congressmen	  paid	  significant	  attention	  to	  political	  currents	  in	  society,	  swiftly	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  situation.	  This	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  because	  1950	  was	  a	  midterm	  election	  year.	  Vividly	  remembering	  their	  bitter	  defeat	  in	  the	  presidential	  election	  of	  1948,	  Republicans	  were	  now	  on	  the	  offensive	  with	  powerful	  themes	  to	  attack	  Democrats:	  “Soft	  on	  Communism,”	  “Who	  Lost	  China?”	  and	  “Liberty	  against	  Socialism.”	  Although	  Congress	  was	  often	  described	  as	  a	  weak	  branch	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  period,	  its	  election	  campaigns	  in	  1950	  had	  a	  significant	  impact	  in	  terms	  of	  pressing	  the	  executive	  branch	  toward	  a	  more	  aggressive	  policy.	  The	  Korean	  War	  was	  the	  major	  issue;	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  in	  fact,	  observed	  in	  August	  that	  the	  1950	  midterm	  elections	  would	  be	  decided	  “almost	  wholly	  by	  public	  reaction	  to	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  its	  multiplying	  problems	  at	  home.”48	  The	  strongest	  critic	  of	  the	  Truman	  administration’s	  Korean	  policy	  was	  the	  powerful	  Republican	  Senator	  from	  Ohio,	  Robert	  A.	  Taft,	  who	  was	  angling	  for	  the	  Republican	  nomination	  in	  the	  1952	  presidential	  election.49	  While	  generally	  agreeing	  with	  the	  administration’s	  decision	  to	  send	  troops	  to	  Korea,	  Taft	  sharpened	  his	  criticism	  in	  a	  speech	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  Congress	  on	  June	  28,	  1950,	  pointing	  to	  the	  “bungling	  and	  inconsistent	  foreign	  policy	  of	  the	  administration.”50	  Meanwhile,	  Taft	  heated	  up	  its	  critique	  of	  the	  administration’s	  refusal	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel.	  As	  
                                                48	  “Korea	  To	  Be	  Issue	  In	  November	  Vote,”	  7	  August	  1950,	  New	  York	  Times.	  49	  James	  T.	  Patterson,	  Mr.	  Republican:	  A	  Biography	  of	  Robert	  A.	  Taft	  (Boston:	  Houghton	  Mifflin,	  1972).	  50	  Robert	  A.	  Taft,	  “The	  Korean	  Crisis:	  Caused	  by	  Wavering	  Foreign	  Policy	  of	  Administration,”	  28	  June	  1950,	  RATP,	  Speeches,	  Box	  1446,	  LC.	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early	  as	  July	  6,	  Taft	  urged	  U.S.	  forces	  not	  to	  stop	  at	  the	  38th	  parallel.51	  Asked	  about	  this	  in	  a	  radio	  interview,	  Taft	  spewed	  out:	  “I	  don’t	  understand	  that	  the	  administration	  has	  decided	  this	  question.	  Personally,	  I	  should	  think	  we	  would	  have	  to	  march	  right	  on	  [over	  the	  parallel]	  and	  at	  least	  occupy	  the	  southern	  part	  of	  North	  Korea	  so	  that	  a	  unified	  Korea	  can	  be	  set	  up.”52	  	  Taft’s	  tough	  stance	  on	  foreign	  policy	  issues	  should	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  context	  of	  his	  re-­‐election	  campaign	  that	  year,	  rather	  than	  deriving	  from	  his	  former	  stance,	  that	  is,	  isolationism.	  In	  the	  postwar	  period,	  the	  Ohio	  Senator	  adapted	  himself	  to	  contingent	  political	  culture,	  transforming	  his	  political	  rhetoric	  from	  an	  isolationist	  stance	  to	  an	  internationalist	  one.	  This	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  during	  the	  period	  between	  the	  fall	  of	  1949	  and	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  when	  Taft	  re-­‐shaped	  his	  stance	  on	  foreign	  policy	  and	  anti-­‐communist	  issues,	  at	  least	  publicly.	  The	  background	  for	  this	  change	  was	  that	  he	  was	  already	  seen	  as	  a	  possible	  candidate	  for	  the	  presidential	  election	  in	  1952,	  and	  Taft	  himself	  positioned	  his	  senatorial	  campaign	  in	  1950	  as	  a	  test	  case	  for	  this	  future	  plan.53	  In	  other	  words,	  Taft	  had	  to	  win,	  and	  by	  a	  large	  margin.	  Then,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  provided	  him	  an	  opportunity.	  In	  a	  private	  letter	  to	  the	  chairman	  of	  the	  Minnesota	  Republican	  Party	  in	  mid-­‐August,	  Taft	  forecast	  effects	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  as	  an	  “asset	  for	  the	  Republicans”	  in	  their	  election	  campaigns	  that	  year,	  indicating	  that	  they	  should	  not	  hesitate	  to	  point	  out	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  administration’s	  foreign	  policy	  in	  their	  campaigns.54	  Although	  the	  
                                                51	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  (24	  July	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  NA;	  Rosemary	  Foot,	  The	  Wrong	  War,	  69.	  	  52	  Robert	  A.	  Taft,	  Transcribed	  Edition	  of	  Capitol	  Report	  No.	  63,	  19	  July	  1950,	  RATP:	  Legislative	  File;	  Korea,	  1950,	  Box	  670,	  LC.	  	  53	  Letter,	  Robert	  R.	  McCormick	  to	  Robert	  A.	  Taft,	  23May	  1950	  and	  Taft	  to	  McCormick,	  29	  May	  1950,	  PATP:	  General	  Correspondence,	  “1950,	  B-­‐W,”	  Box	  33,	  LC.	  54	  Letter,	  Robert	  Taft	  to	  Bernard	  W.	  LeVander,	  August	  11,	  1950,	  PRAT,	  Box	  924:	  “Subject	  File:	  War,	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State	  of	  Ohio	  was	  seen	  as	  Taft	  country,	  his	  re-­‐election	  campaign	  was	  not	  so	  easy.	  Taft	  needed	  to	  take	  any	  advantage	  he	  could,	  and	  he	  did.55	  	  Yet,	  Taft’s	  change	  caused	  some	  confusion	  about	  his	  stance	  on	  foreign	  policy	  issues,	  even	  in	  his	  own	  mind.	  When	  he	  received	  a	  letter	  that	  advocated	  being	  aggressive	  and	  firm	  on	  foreign	  relations	  issues,	  Taft	  stressed	  that	  he	  was	  not	  an	  isolationist	  and	  used	  strong	  words.	  Yet,	  when	  he	  received	  a	  letter	  insisting	  that	  the	  U.S.	  should	  not	  be	  so	  involved	  in	  foreign	  matters,	  Taft	  emphasized	  that	  he	  had	  been	  cautious	  and	  critical	  toward	  the	  Truman	  administration’s	  overly	  international	  approach.	  Also,	  Taft	  wavered	  in	  his	  judgment	  regarding	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  depending	  on	  who	  he	  was	  writing	  to.	  In	  some	  private	  letters	  Taft	  remained	  flexible,	  even	  noting	  that	  he	  was	  not	  opposed	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  while,	  in	  other	  public	  situations,	  he	  maintained	  his	  anti-­‐communist	  tone	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  recognition	  of	  China.56	  Taft’s	  adaptation	  to	  a	  “cold	  warrior”	  in	  his	  public	  image	  exemplifies	  the	  point	  that	  political	  figures	  often	  change	  their	  stances	  depending	  more	  on	  shifts	  in	  popular	  political	  cultures	  that	  surrounding	  them	  than	  on	  their	  own	  political	  philosophy	  or	  beliefs.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Korea	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  Taft’s	  choice	  was	  to	  be	  tough	  and	  aggressive,	  urging	  a	  sort	  of	  the	  “roll-­‐back”	  policy.	  
                                                                                                                                            Korean,	  1950,”	  Library	  of	  Congress,	  Washington	  D.C.	  	  	  	  55	  In	  fact,	  Republicans	  lost	  Ohio	  to	  Democrats	  in	  the	  1948	  presidential	  election	  with	  a	  slight	  margin.	  Also,	  in	  his	  second	  senatorial	  election	  in	  1944,	  Taft	  was	  nearly	  defeated	  by	  labor	  union	  supported	  Democrat.	  A	  bid	  was	  50.3%	  to	  49.7%.	  	  56	  See	  correspondences	  to	  and	  from	  Robert	  A.	  Taft	  in	  RATP:	  Subject	  File,	  “War,	  Korea	  1950,”	  Box	  924,	  LC;	  RATP:	  Subject	  File,	  “Communism	  1950,”	  Box	  915,	  LC;	  RATP:	  “General	  Correspondence	  1950,”	  Box	  33,	  LC;	  RATP:	  Political	  File,	  “1950	  Campaign-­‐Ohio	  Counties,”	  Box	  251,	  LC.	  Also,	  for	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  PRC	  issue,	  see	  Letter,	  Robert	  A.	  Taft	  to	  Carl	  Ryan,	  25	  November	  1949,	  RATP:	  Subject	  File	  “Communism	  1949,”	  Box	  901,	  LC	  and	  Letter,	  Robert	  A.	  Taft	  to	  Lewis	  Hoskins,	  17	  January	  1950,	  RATP:	  Subject	  File	  “Foreign	  Policy	  1950,”	  Box	  917,	  LC.	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Such	  a	  transition	  in	  Taft’s	  stance	  clearly	  appears	  in	  modifications	  he	  made	  to	  his	  speeches	  between	  1949	  and	  1950.	  For	  instance,	  a	  draft	  written	  in	  1949	  began:	  “Today’s	  major	  domestic	  issue	  is	  whether	  we	  shall	  remain	  in	  this	  country	  a	  free	  people	  in	  full	  control	  of	  our	  government,	  or	  whether	  we	  shall	  delegate	  to	  an	  all-­‐powerful	  government	  the	  right	  to	  direct	  our	  local	  communities,	  agriculture,	  industry,	  labor,	  and	  the	  daily	  lives	  of	  our	  citizens.”57	  The	  tone	  in	  this	  speech	  was	  vintage	  Taft,	  an	  anti-­‐New	  Deal	  politician	  who	  focused	  mainly	  on	  domestic	  issues,	  with	  a	  strong	  aversion	  to	  statism.	  The	  same	  speech	  draft	  evolved	  during	  his	  1950	  campaign	  with	  the	  deletion	  and	  addition	  of	  words;	  it	  read:	  	  Today’s	  major	  issue	  is	  whether	  we	  shall	  remain	  in	  this	  country	  a	  free	  people	  in	  full	  control	  of	  our	  government,	  or	  whether	  we	  shall	  delegate	  to	  an	  all-­‐powerful	  government	  the	  right	  to	  direct	  our	  local	  communities,	  agriculture,	  industry,	  labor	  and	  the	  daily	  lives	  of	  our	  citizens.	  This	  is	  the	  struggle	  between	  socialism	  and	  liberty.	  It	  is	  a	  conflict	  that	  rages	  not	  only	  in	  this	  country	  but	  throughout	  the	  world.	  On	  the	  world	  stage	  the	  battle	  is	  between	  free	  government	  and	  Communism—the	  most	  extreme	  form	  of	  socialism	  denying	  most	  affectively	  the	  liberty	  and	  responsibility	  of	  the	  human	  soul.	  This	  is	  the	  root	  of	  the	  “cold	  war.”	  In	  this	  country	  the	  struggle	  is	  no	  less	  intense,	  and	  it	  promises	  to	  be	  the	  principal	  issue	  of	  the	  1950	  election.58	  	  	  The	  message	  Taft	  insisted	  was	  the	  same,	  but	  the	  context	  had	  changed	  radically	  from	  being	  dominated	  by	  a	  domestic	  tone	  to	  a	  more	  international	  one.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Taft’s	  opinion	  remained	  the	  same,	  and	  it	  was	  simply	  connected	  with	  and	  projected	  onto	  international	  issues.	  In	  other	  words,	  Taft’s	  international	  view	  was	  not	  based	  on	  his	  study	  of	  international	  relations	  or	  local	  situations	  in	  foreign	  countries;	  his	  domestic	  views	  slid	  over	  into	  the	  global	  arena.	  It	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  electoral	  campaign	  tactics	  than	  strategic	  and	  military	  considerations.	  	  
                                                57	  “Statement	  of	  Principles,	  Policies	  and	  Objectives	  of	  Republican	  Members	  of	  Congress,”	  RATP:	  Political	  File	  “Campaign	  Miscellany,”	  Box	  307,	  LC.	  	  	  58	  “Liberty	  Against	  Socialism:	  The	  Issue	  in	  1950,”	  RATP:	  Political	  File	  “Campaign	  Miscellany,”	  Box	  307,	  LC.	  The	  underline	  in	  the	  quote	  is	  mine	  to	  emphasize	  Taft's	  changes.	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Such	  a	  tendency	  was	  not	  exclusively	  Taft’s.	  Although	  scholars	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  Cold	  War’s	  impact	  on	  domestic	  politics,	  the	  opposite	  tendency—the	  impact	  of	  political	  context	  on	  foreign	  policymaking—should	  be	  further	  examined.	  The	  “politicality”	  of	  foreign	  policy	  issues	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  It	  had	  been	  commonly	  thought,	  as	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  and	  other	  media	  forecast	  in	  the	  July	  and	  August,	  that	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  its	  multiplying	  problems	  at	  home	  would	  become	  the	  central	  issue	  of	  the	  1950	  midterm	  elections	  (Picture	  3).59	  Keenly	  realizing	  this,	  many	  Republicans	  took	  full	  advantage	  of	  the	  situation.	  Richard	  Nixon,	  then	  a	  rookie	  senatorial	  candidate	  in	  California,	  for	  instance,	  took	  full	  advantage	  of	  foreign	  policy	  issues	  in	  his	  election	  campaign.	  He	  knew	  that	  wages	  were	  growing,	  employment	  was	  up,	  and	  farmers	  and	  small	  businesses	  had	  prospered	  since	  the	  last	  elections,	  and	  he	  knew	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  attack	  Democrats	  on	  domestic	  issues.	  Thus,	  as	  his	  friend	  Oscar	  Bigler	  advised	  him,	  foreign	  policy	  issues	  became	  an	  appropriate	  topic	  for	  criticizing	  the	  administration.60	  	  Similar	  tactics	  were	  adopted	  nationwide,	  as	  Republicans	  in	  other	  states	  similarly	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  situation,	  designing	  the	  central	  issue	  of	  the	  election	  as	  “the	  tragic	  [foreign]	  policy	  pursued	  by	  the	  [Truman]	  administration	  for	  five	  years	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	  war	  in	  Korea.”61	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  summer,	  the	  Republican	  National	  Committee	  had	  made	  up	  and	  circulated	  a	  59-­‐page	  pamphlet,	  Background	  to	  
Korea,	  which	  summarized	  the	  historical	  events	  leading	  to	  the	  war	  in	  Korea,	  
                                                59	  “Korea	  To	  Be	  Issue	  In	  November	  Vote,”	  7	  August	  1950,	  New	  York	  Times.	  60	  Letter,	  Oscar	  Bigler	  to	  Richard	  Nixon,	  July	  24,	  1950,	  Papers	  of	  William	  Knowland	  (hereafter	  PWK),	  Carton	  90:	  “1950	  Campaign,”	  Bancroft	  Library,	  University	  of	  California	  Berkeley,	  CA.	  	  61	  “Foreign	  Policy	  Set	  As	  G.O.P.	  Vote	  Issue,”	  8	  August	  1950,	  New	  York	  Times.	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underlining	  the	  administration’s	  “failures”	  in	  foreign	  policy	  toward	  East	  Asia.62	  Likewise,	  Senator	  Taft	  heightened	  the	  tone	  of	  his	  criticism	  of	  the	  administration	  and	  the	  State	  Department,	  saying	  that	  the	  U.S.	  government	  had	  been	  unprepared	  diplomatically	  and	  militarily	  to	  meet	  communist	  aggression,	  and	  that	  communist	  sympathizers	  in	  the	  government	  should	  be	  gotten	  rid	  of.63	  By	  the	  end	  of	  August,	  the	  Ohio	  Senator	  repeatedly	  asserted	  that	  U.S.	  forces	  would	  have	  to	  prepare	  to	  go	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  not	  only	  “to	  bring	  [about]	  the	  unification	  of	  Korea,”	  but	  also	  “to	  punish	  the	  aggressor.”64	  By	  the	  crucial	  month	  of	  September,	  Republicans	  had	  gone	  fully	  on	  the	  offensive,	  demanding	  a	  tough	  foreign	  policy	  in	  Korea.	  	  	  
Domestic	  Politics	  1950—Democrats	  	  Democrats	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Truman	  administration	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  and	  sensitive	  to	  the	  potency	  of	  Republican	  charges.	  As	  early	  as	  June	  27,	  1950,	  Joseph	  O’Mahoney,	  Senator	  from	  Wyoming	  and	  member	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Senatorial	  Campaign	  Committee,	  warned	  President	  Truman	  that	  foreign	  policy	  on	  the	  Korean	  issues	  would	  “undoubtedly	  be	  used	  to	  support	  a	  charge	  that	  our	  policy	  was	  soft	  toward	  the	  Communists	  in	  Korea.”65	  As	  O’Mahoney	  pointed	  out,	  they	  had	  already	  realized	  that	  more	  failures	  in	  foreign	  relations	  would	  give	  people	  a	  dismal	  view	  of	  the	  administration,	  which	  would	  subsequently	  hurt	  Democrats.	  They	  also	  hoped,	  however,	  that	  the	  opposite	  would	  be	  true,	  as	  well.	  One	  observer	  wrote	  in	  the	  late	  
                                                62	  Republican	  National	  Committee	  ed.,	  “Background	  to	  Korea,”	  GMEP:	  Subject	  File	  “Politics,	  1950,”	  Box91,	  HSTL.	  	  	  63	  Secretary	  of	  State	  [Dean	  Acheson]’s	  Press	  and	  Radio	  Conference,	  28	  September	  1950,	  HSTP:	  President’s	  Secretary’s	  File,	  “Secretary	  of	  State	  Press	  Conference,”	  Box	  54,	  HSTL.	  	  	  64	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  (25	  September	  1950),	  SFC,	  Box	  5,	  LC.	  Senator	  Margaret	  Smith	  (R.,	  Me.)	  agreed	  with	  this	  view,	  too.	  65	  Letter,	  Joseph	  C.	  O’Mahoney	  to	  HST,	  27	  June	  1950,	  Student	  File:	  Korean	  War,	  Box	  1.	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summer	  of	  1950:	  “If	  the	  counteroffensive	  in	  Korea	  is	  successful	  […],	  if	  Russia	  does	  not	  throw	  her	  air	  [force	  to	  Korea],	  then	  that	  will	  greatly	  help	  the	  Democrats.	  They	  can	  go	  to	  the	  country	  with	  good	  news.”66	  In	  short,	  a	  more	  favorable	  picture	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  Democrats	  thought,	  would	  help	  them	  in	  the	  November	  elections.67	  	  Knowing	  the	  potency	  of	  foreign	  policy	  issues	  as	  a	  double-­‐edged	  sword,	  the	  Democratic	  Senatorial	  Campaign	  Committee	  spent	  its	  full	  effort	  in	  the	  campaigns	  through	  publishing	  several	  pamphlets,	  as	  well	  as	  educating	  candidates	  about	  how	  to	  respond	  to	  questions	  concerning	  foreign	  policy	  issues.	  Some	  of	  the	  questions	  were	  along	  these	  lines:	  “Is	  it	  true	  that	  the	  Truman	  Administration	  has	  been	  ‘soft	  toward	  communism?’”	  The	  answer	  provided	  was:	  “No.	  Rather	  than	  being	  soft	  toward	  communism,	  the	  Truman	  Administration	  has	  taken	  the	  lead	  in	  opposing	  communism	  and	  strengthening	  freedom	  in	  the	  world.”	  This	  answer	  then	  went	  on	  through	  the	  administration’s	  “achievements,”	  such	  as	  economic	  and	  military	  aid	  to	  Greece	  and	  Turkey,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  and	  NATO.68	  	  Such	  a	  use	  of	  foreign	  policy	  issues	  in	  domestic	  campaigns	  was	  noteworthy	  because	  domestic	  politics,	  in	  turn,	  began	  demanding	  a	  certain	  course	  of	  direction	  in	  U.S.	  “foreign”	  policy.	  Looking	  back,	  the	  Truman	  administration’s	  first	  anti-­‐communist	  policies	  were	  pronounced	  in	  March	  1947—the	  Truman	  Doctrine	  and	  Loyalty	  Security	  Program—in	  their	  struggles	  to	  roll	  back	  Democrats’	  defeats	  in	  the	  midterm	  elections	  in	  November	  of	  1946.	  Then,	  in	  1950,	  Truman’s	  renewed	  anti-­‐
                                                66	  Letter,	  Carter	  Clarke	  to	  Robert	  Fellers,	  September	  12,	  1950,	  PBFF,	  MacArthur	  Memorial	  Archives,	  Norfolk,	  VA.	  	  67	  Such	  view	  was	  often	  discussed;	  see,	  for	  example,	  “Washington	  Wire,”	  New	  Republic	  (25	  September	  1950).	  	  68	  Democratic	  National	  Committee	  ed.,	  “Questions	  and	  Answers	  on	  Foreign	  Policy,”	  3,	  GMEP:	  Subject	  File	  “Politics,	  1950,”	  Box91,	  HSTL.	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communist	  stance	  on	  foreign	  policy	  issues	  appeared	  in	  late	  February	  in	  response	  to	  Joseph	  McCarthy’s	  (in)famous	  Wheeling	  speech.69	  Two	  month	  later,	  the	  President	  adopted	  strong	  language	  in	  denouncing	  the	  Russians,	  particularly	  stressing	  that	  Americans	  “must	  make	  ourselves	  heard	  round	  the	  world	  in	  a	  great	  campaign	  of	  truth.”70	  	  Seen	  in	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  President	  Truman	  increasingly	  toughened	  his	  “Cold	  War”	  rhetoric	  and	  policy	  more	  along	  the	  line	  of	  domestic	  political	  and	  social	  situations	  than	  with	  military	  and	  diplomatic	  considerations.	  Such	  a	  pattern	  was	  further	  manifested	  and	  confirmed	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  The	  actual	  fighting	  in	  Korea	  and	  McCarthyite	  attacks	  at	  home	  made	  international	  and	  domestic	  affairs	  appear	  interrelated.	  Normally	  this	  was	  not	  considered	  negative;	  it	  was	  described	  as	  “consistency.”	  It	  was,	  in	  fact,	  formally	  pronounced	  in	  Democrats’	  election	  campaigns,	  as	  one	  pamphlet	  declared	  that	  American	  foreign	  abroad	  and	  domestic	  policy	  at	  home	  were	  “two	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin.	  Foreign	  policy	  is	  a	  logical	  and	  necessary	  extension	  of	  our	  program	  at	  home.”71	  Professional	  diplomats	  and	  military	  officers	  might	  have	  argued	  that	  diplomatic	  and	  military	  affairs	  were	  special	  and	  should	  be	  considered	  by	  experts.	  Yet,	  in	  practice,	  these	  affairs	  were	  seldom	  isolated	  from	  politics	  at	  home.	  The	  Truman	  administration	  was	  no	  exception.	  Vice	  President	  Alben	  Barkley,	  who	  had	  been	  responsible	  for	  the	  1950	  midterm	  campaigns,	  suggested	  in	  the	  NSC	  meeting	  in	  
                                                69	  “President	  Address	  at	  Alexandria,	  VA,	  on	  Foreign	  Policy,”	  22	  February	  1950,	  GMEP:	  Subject	  File	  “Truman	  administration:	  Speech	  File,”	  Box	  39,	  HSTL;	  “Daily	  Summary	  of	  Opinion	  Developments,”	  GMEP:	  Subject	  File	  “Truman	  administration:	  Speech	  File,”	  Box	  39,	  HSTL.	  	  70	  “President	  Address	  to	  the	  American	  Society	  of	  Newspaper	  Editors,”	  19	  April	  1950,	  GMEP:	  Subject	  File	  “Truman	  administration:	  Speech	  File,”	  Box	  39,	  HSTL.	  71	  “Questions	  about	  the	  Battle	  in	  Korea,”	  2,	  GMEP:	  Subject	  File	  “Politics,	  1950,”	  Box91,	  HSTL.	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August	  that	  the	  forthcoming	  document	  on	  the	  Korean	  situation	  (NSC-­‐81)	  should	  take	  into	  consideration	  possible	  Congressional	  reactions.72	  Barkley’s	  suggestion	  was	  telling,	  because	  it	  revealed	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  question:	  it	  was	  not	  just	  a	  distant	  military	  concern	  but	  also	  a	  domestic	  political	  issue.	  	  Throughout	  the	  campaign,	  in	  fact,	  younger	  Democratic	  members	  of	  Congress	  were	  itching	  to	  defend	  the	  conduct	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  and	  to	  refute	  some	  of	  the	  wild	  charges	  against	  the	  administration	  and	  State	  Department.	  The	  trouble	  was,	  as	  one	  freshman	  Congressman	  complained,	  that	  “the	  State	  Department	  does	  not	  give	  us	  enough	  equipment	  and	  ammunition	  with	  which	  to	  answer	  these	  charges.”73	  The	  Democratic	  Campaign	  Committee	  sent	  a	  memorandum	  to	  White	  House	  staff	  on	  September	  2,	  1950,	  requesting	  that	  they	  needed	  “a	  clear,	  affirmative	  statement	  of	  the	  achievement	  of	  American	  foreign	  policy,	  including	  our	  entire	  policy	  in	  the	  Far	  East.”74	  In	  the	  critical	  weeks	  between	  late	  August	  and	  September,	  as	  midterm	  elections	  drew	  near,	  domestic	  politics	  demanded	  that	  the	  administration	  have	  a	  clearer	  and	  tougher	  foreign	  policy	  and	  achievement	  abroad.	  
	  
Aftermath	  of	  the	  Inchon	  Landing	  The	  sweeping	  victory	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  in	  the	  Inchon	  Landing	  Operation,	  on	  September	  15,	  1950,	  further	  complicated	  the	  entanglement	  of	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  
                                                72	  “Record	  of	  Actions	  by	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  at	  its	  Sixty-­‐Fourth	  Meeting,	  August	  10,	  1950,”	  10	  August	  1950,	  HSTP:	  Personal	  File,	  Subject	  File,	  1945-­‐1953,	  National	  Security	  Council:	  Actions,	  Record	  of	  1947-­‐1953,	  Box	  167,	  HSTL.	  This	  NSC	  meeting	  had	  been	  preparing	  a	  document,	  “Future	  United	  Policy	  with	  Respect	  to	  North	  Korea,”	  which	  later	  became	  the	  NSC-­‐81.	  73	  “Conversation	  with	  Congressman	  Clinton	  D.	  McKinnon,”	  GMEP:	  Subject	  File,	  “Politics,	  1950:	  Elections,”	  Box	  92,	  HSTL.	  	  74	  Memorandum,	  Ken	  Hechler	  to	  Charles	  Murphy,	  “Campaign	  Materials	  on	  Foreign	  Policy-­‐Defense,”	  2	  September	  1950,	  GMEP:	  Subject	  File	  “Politics,	  1950:	  Elections,”	  Box	  92.	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affairs,	  as	  well	  as	  political	  and	  military	  issues.	  Viewed	  from	  a	  military	  perspective,	  the	  Inchon	  landing	  itself	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  bolt	  out	  of	  the	  blue.	  Nor	  was	  it	  solely	  the	  product	  of	  military	  genius	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur.	  As	  political	  scientist	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim	  points	  out,	  a	  blueprint	  for	  the	  Inchon	  campaign	  had	  been	  already	  prepared	  by	  the	  American	  and	  South	  Korean	  military	  as	  a	  contingency	  plan	  prior	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.75	  In	  addition,	  Chinese	  military	  officers	  and	  Mao	  Zedong	  also	  foresaw	  an	  American	  counterattack	  at	  Inchon.76	  Furthermore,	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung,	  especially	  after	  late	  August,	  began	  preparing	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  Inchon.77	  From	  a	  military	  stand	  point,	  the	  landing	  itself	  was	  “quite	  an	  average	  strategy	  for	  counterattack.”78	  It	  was	  not	  nearly	  the	  miracle	  as	  it	  was	  seen	  to	  be.	  	  Nonetheless,	  political	  effects	  were	  undoubtedly	  dramatic.	  Many	  Americans	  took	  an	  even	  more	  optimistic	  view	  regarding	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  re-­‐unify	  Korea,	  accelerating	  demands	  for	  more	  aggressive	  American	  action.	  After	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Inchon	  Operation,	  the	  approval	  rate	  for	  the	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  Korea	  jumped;	  according	  to	  a	  study	  taken	  by	  the	  National	  Opinion	  Research	  Center,	  81	  percent	  of	  those	  surveyed	  believed	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  right	  in	  entering	  the	  war,	  while	  13	  percent	  thought	  it	  wrong,	  while	  the	  ratio	  for	  same	  question	  had	  been	  75	  to	  21	  percent	  in	  July.79	  As	  this	  shift	  in	  the	  supporting	  ratio	  showed,	  those	  who	  previously	  disagreed	  with	  Truman’s	  policy	  had	  changed	  their	  attitudes,	  and	  begun	  showing	  their	  support	  following	  the	  successful	  operation	  in	  Korea.	  A	  Baltimore	  man,	  for	  
                                                75	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim,	  Sensō	  to	  Heiwa:	  Chōsen	  Hantō	  1950,	  311-­‐313.	  	  	  76	  Ibid,	  314.	  	  77	  Ibid,	  319-­‐330.	  	  78	  Wada	  Haruki,	  Chosen	  senso	  zenshi	  [A	  Complete	  History	  of	  the	  Korean	  War]	  (Tokyo,	  2002),	  191.	  	  79	  “Special	  Report	  American	  Opinion”	  (30	  October	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  39,	  NA.	  The	  poll	  also	  indicated	  that	  Americans	  who	  had	  attended	  college	  were	  appreciably	  more	  in	  favor	  of	  America’s	  intervention	  (90	  percent)	  than	  were	  those	  with	  only	  a	  grammar	  school	  education	  (74	  percent).	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instance,	  wrote	  to	  the	  White	  House	  in	  early	  October	  expressing	  profound	  gratitude	  as	  far	  as	  the	  military	  action	  in	  Korea	  was	  concerned,	  even	  though	  he	  had	  never	  voted	  for	  Democrats	  before,	  and	  still	  thought	  many	  of	  the	  administration’s	  actions	  and	  policies	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  mistaken.80	  	  With	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  optimistic	  mood	  following	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Inchon	  landing,	  demands	  for	  crossing	  the	  38th	  parallel	  significantly	  increased	  among	  newspapers	  and	  commentators.	  (Picture	  4)	  The	  Denver	  Post,	  for	  instance,	  maintained	  that	  U.N.	  forces	  should	  “march	  above	  the	  38th	  parallel	  and	  occupy	  the	  whole	  of	  Korea	  until	  new	  elections	  under	  U.N.	  supervision	  [could]	  be	  held.”81	  A	  
National	  Broadcasting	  Company	  (NBC)	  commentator	  asserted	  that	  stopping	  at	  the	  parallel	  would	  offer	  “no	  satisfactory	  solution.”82	  The	  Boston	  Post	  even	  argued	  that	  it	  would	  be	  “folly”	  to	  keep	  U.N.	  forces	  below	  the	  parallel.	  The	  New	  York	  Herald-­‐Tribune	  likewise	  insisted:	  	  To	  imagine	  that	  it	  is	  now	  possible	  to	  go	  back	  to	  the	  fictitious	  38th	  parallel,	  to	  sit	  down	  and	  negotiate	  the	  freedom	  and	  unification	  of	  Korea	  across	  that	  passion-­‐charged	  line,	  is	  to	  imagine	  an	  absurdity….	  [Korean	  unity]	  is	  the	  test	  of	  the	  [UN]	  assembly’s	  ability	  to	  live	  up	  to	  its	  principles.83	  	  	  Such	  a	  hard-­‐line	  was	  shared	  by	  other	  papers,	  including	  the	  Washington	  Star,	  the	  
Pittsburgh	  Post-­‐Gazette,	  the	  Baltimore	  Sun,	  the	  Rochester	  Democrat	  and	  Chronicle,	  and	  the	  Detroit	  Free	  Press.84	  Major	  news	  magazines	  articles	  also	  urged	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  and	  destroy	  the	  North	  Korean	  Army.	  Among	  them,	  even	  a	  pro-­‐
                                                80	  Letter,	  George	  W.	  Constable	  to	  HST,	  12	  October	  1950,	  HSTP:	  Official	  File,	  471-­‐B,	  Korean	  Emergency,	  HSTL.	  	  81	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  (19	  September	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  NA.	  82	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  (26	  September	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  NA.	  83	  Ibid.	  	  84	  Ibid.	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Democratic	  magazine	  Newsweek	  insisted,	  “‘Keep	  going’	  was	  the	  motto	  for	  all	  the	  U.N.	  forces”	  on	  the	  front.85	  	  Needless	  to	  say,	  many	  congressmen	  lined	  up,	  as	  well,	  after	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Inchon	  Operation,	  advocating	  a	  more	  aggressive	  policy.86	  A	  notable	  example	  was	  California	  Republican	  William	  Knowland,	  who	  charged	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel	  would	  be	  “appeasement”	  of	  Russia.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  Pennsylvania	  Representative	  Hardie	  Scott	  accused	  the	  State	  Department	  of	  seeking	  to	  “subvert	  our	  military	  victory”	  by	  calling	  for	  a	  halt	  at	  the	  38th	  parallel.87	  It	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  the	  American	  Broadcasting	  Companies	  (ABC)	  and	  MBS	  felt	  able	  to	  declare	  in	  late	  September	  that	  sentiments	  in	  Congress	  were	  “overwhelmingly	  in	  favor	  of	  going	  through	  with	  this	  job	  [to	  cross	  the	  parallel	  and	  unify	  Korea].”88	  	  There	  were,	  to	  be	  sure,	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  dissenting	  voices	  regarding	  the	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel,	  even	  following	  the	  sweeping	  victory	  of	  the	  Inchon	  landing.	  According	  to	  a	  Gallup	  Poll	  taken	  immediately	  after	  the	  Inchon	  landing,	  64	  percent	  of	  those	  surveyed	  urged	  American	  forces	  to	  continue	  fighting	  in	  the	  northern	  part	  of	  Korea	  until	  the	  North	  Koreans	  surrendered,	  while	  27	  percent	  
                                                85	  “Keep	  Going,”	  Newsweek	  (2	  October	  1950);	  “Victory	  Looms—So	  Does	  38th	  Parallel,”	  Newsweek	  (2	  October	  1950).	  Newsweek’s	  columnist	  Ernest	  Lindley	  had	  been	  insisting	  that	  UN	  forces’	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  would	  be	  justified	  both	  legally	  and	  historically.	  U.S.	  News	  and	  World	  Report	  (25	  August;	  1	  September	  1950)	  and	  New	  Republic	  (25	  September;	  9	  October	  1950)	  made	  similar	  arguments.	  A	  liberal	  magazine,	  The	  Nation,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  few	  magazines	  that	  remained	  critical	  of	  the	  crossing	  of	  the	  parallel.	  See	  “Deadly	  Parallel,”	  (14	  October	  1950);	  “Unanswered	  Question”	  (28	  October	  1950);	  and	  “Threat	  Out	  of	  China”	  (11	  November	  1950).	  	  86	  Rosemary	  Foot,	  The	  Wrong	  War,	  69.	  In	  addition	  to	  Taft,	  General	  Dwight	  Eisenhower,	  who	  was	  already	  seen	  as	  another	  possible	  Republican	  candidate	  for	  the	  presidential	  election	  of	  1952,	  similarly	  questioned	  the	  stopping	  of	  US	  forces	  at	  the	  parallel.	  Eisenhower,	  then	  President	  of	  Columbia	  University,	  said	  that	  US	  forces	  “[might]	  have	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel	  to	  wage	  a	  successful	  war.”	  See	  “Eisenhower	  Backs	  Invasion	  If	  Needed,”	  New	  York	  Times	  (21	  July	  1950).	  	  87	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  (22	  September	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  LC.	  88	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary”	  (22	  September	  1950),	  SFP,	  Box	  5,	  LC.	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answered	  that	  U.S.	  forces	  should	  stop	  fighting	  at	  the	  parallel.89	  While	  showing	  unmistakable	  majority	  support	  for	  an	  aggressive	  policy,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  nearly	  one	  third	  polled	  continued	  to	  oppose	  carrying	  the	  war	  into	  North	  Korean	  territory.	  Some	  major	  newspapers,	  likewise,	  expressed	  skepticism,	  such	  as	  the	  
Atlanta	  Constitution	  stating	  that	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Inchon	  Operation	  “eliminate[d]	  the	  necessity	  for	  driving	  the	  invaders	  back	  beyond	  the	  38th	  parallel.”	  Yet,	  such	  oppositional	  voices	  were	  becoming	  less	  and	  less	  audible.	  As	  historian	  Allan	  Millet	  points	  out,	  the	  success	  at	  Inchon	  created	  a	  “virulent	  case	  of	  victory	  disease,”	  which,	  indeed,	  silenced	  critiques	  and	  opposition.	  	  	  Furthermore,	  this	  was	  just	  before	  the	  1950	  midterm	  elections	  (Picture	  5).	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  issues	  were	  lumped	  together	  in	  election	  campaigns,	  becoming	  points	  of	  political	  contention,	  as	  if	  it	  were	  an	  issue	  of	  black	  and	  white,	  or	  even	  good	  and	  evil.	  In	  fact,	  a	  Republican	  candidate’s	  one-­‐minute	  advertisement	  on	  radio	  appealed	  voters	  in	  that	  way:	  	  In	  1950	  when	  the	  free	  world	  has	  been	  challenged	  in	  Korea	  by	  the	  totalitarian	  forces	  of	  international	  communism,	  it	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  every	  registered	  American	  voter	  to	  go	  to	  the	  polls.	  The	  eyes	  of	  freemen	  and	  those	  who	  hope	  to	  be	  free	  all	  around	  the	  world	  will	  be	  upon	  us	  on	  November	  Seventh.	  Regardless	  of	  partisan	  affiliation,	  American	  citizens	  have	  an	  opportunity	  on	  November	  Seventh	  of	  serving	  notice	  on	  the	  forces	  of	  international	  communism	  that	  they	  are	  wrong	  when	  they	  speak	  of	  decadent	  democracy.90	  	  	  In	  a	  climate	  so	  highly	  charged	  with	  domestic	  politics	  in	  the	  early	  fall	  of	  1950,	  international	  and	  military	  issues	  became	  points	  of	  domestic	  contention;	  or,	  more	  
                                                89	  “Korea,”	  The	  Gallup	  Poll,	  Vol.	  2	  (13	  October	  1950),	  929.	  The	  poll	  was	  held	  September	  17-­‐22.	  The	  
Gallup	  poll’s	  question	  was	  “What	  do	  you,	  yourself,	  think—should	  the	  fighting	  stop	  when	  we	  have	  succeeded	  in	  pushing	  the	  North	  Koreans	  back	  over	  the	  line	  from	  where	  they	  started—or	  do	  you	  think	  we	  should	  continue	  the	  fight	  in	  their	  own	  territory	  until	  they	  have	  surrendered.”	  27%	  answered	  “Stop	  fighting,”	  64%	  answered	  “Continue	  fighting,”	  and	  9%	  answered	  “No	  opinion.”	  90	  Memo,	  “Script	  for	  the	  One	  Minute	  Spot	  on	  Radio,”	  October	  28,	  1950,	  PWK,	  Carton	  2,	  “1950	  Campaign,”	  Bancroft	  Library,	  Berkeley,	  CA.	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precisely	  speaking,	  domestic	  struggles	  slid	  over	  into	  foreign	  and	  strategic	  issues.	  Several	  professional	  diplomats	  felt	  uncomfortable	  with	  such	  a	  development.	  Characteristically	  more	  concerned	  with	  international	  strategy	  and	  realpolitik	  than	  domestic	  politics	  and	  election	  campaigns,	  George	  F.	  Kennan	  believed	  that	  it	  would	  be	  far	  beyond	  U.S.	  capabilities	  to	  keep	  Korea	  permanently	  out	  of	  the	  sphere	  of	  Soviet	  influence.	  He	  frankly	  admitted	  that	  it	  would	  not	  be	  essential	  for	  the	  United	  States	  to	  have	  an	  anti-­‐Soviet	  Korean	  regime	  in	  all	  of	  Korea	  for	  all	  time.	  Kennan	  even	  added:	  “[W]e	  could	  even	  eventually	  tolerate	  for	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time	  a	  Korea	  nominally	  independent	  but	  actually	  amenable	  to	  Soviet	  influence.”91	  	  The	  more	  politically	  astute	  Dean	  Acheson,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  rejected	  Kennan’s	  view:	  “Such	  was	  national	  interest	  in	  the	  abstract.	  In	  view	  of	  public	  opinion	  and	  political	  pressures	  in	  the	  concrete,	  ideas	  such	  as	  these	  could	  only	  be	  kept	  in	  mind	  as	  warnings	  not	  to	  be	  drawn	  into	  quicksands.”92	  According	  to	  Kennan’s	  recollection,	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  refused	  Kennan’s	  advice	  on	  the	  same	  grounds.	  From	  a	  politician’s	  viewpoint,	  Dulles	  argued,	  it	  would	  confuse	  American	  public	  opinion	  and	  weaken	  support	  for	  the	  President’s	  programs	  for	  the	  strengthening	  of	  American	  defenses.93	  	  Kennan’s	  strategic	  thinking	  might	  have	  been	  well	  justified.	  After	  all,	  crossing	  the	  38th	  Parallel,	  occupying	  North	  Korea,	  and	  having	  a	  one	  thousand	  mile	  border	  with	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  and	  the	  U.S.S.R.	  on	  land	  would	  create	  far	  more	  
                                                91	  Memorandum,	  George	  F.	  Kennan	  to	  Dean	  Acheson,	  21	  August	  1950,	  Student	  File	  “Korean	  War,”	  Box	  1.	  	  92	  Dean	  Acheson,	  Present	  at	  the	  Creation:	  My	  Years	  in	  the	  State	  Department	  (New	  York:	  W.	  W.	  Norton,	  1969),	  446.	  	  93	  George	  F.	  Kennan,	  Memoir	  1925-­‐1950	  (New	  York:	  Pantheon	  Books,	  1967),	  495.	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difficult	  military	  tasks,	  than	  having	  the	  defense	  line	  on	  the	  sea,	  where	  American	  forces	  had	  far	  more	  advantage.	  Even	  if	  not	  defending	  on	  the	  sea,	  as	  Kennan	  argued,	  the	  defense	  line	  at	  the	  “waist”	  of	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  would	  be	  far	  shorter	  and	  easier	  to	  hold,	  than	  having	  it	  at	  the	  long	  border	  with	  China	  and	  the	  Soviet	  Union.94	  	  But	  Kennan’s	  view	  was	  far	  removed	  from	  the	  social	  and	  political	  climate	  of	  the	  summer	  of	  1950.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  foreign	  policy	  was	  rapidly	  becoming	  the	  major	  domestic	  election	  issue,	  with	  Korea	  the	  main	  focus.95	  Observing	  such	  a	  domestic-­‐political	  influence	  on	  foreign	  policy	  considerations,	  British	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Ernest	  Bevin	  lamented	  in	  early	  September	  1950:	  	  [T]he	  atmosphere	  is	  very	  highly	  charged	  in	  the	  U.S.	  at	  this	  moment	  	  and	  with	  the	  elections	  coming	  on	  in	  November	  the	  administration	  is	  going	  to	  find	  it	  very	  difficult	  to	  take	  any	  step	  which	  does	  not	  have	  popular	  support.	  It	  is	  most	  unfortunate	  that	  the	  Far	  East	  should	  have	  become	  a	  party	  political	  issue	  in	  the	  U.S.	  but	  I	  am	  afraid	  we	  have	  to	  accept	  that	  this	  is	  so.96	  	  	  Based	  on	  this	  acceptance	  of	  the	  American	  domestic-­‐political	  situations,	  the	  British	  government	  modified	  its	  stance	  on	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  issue	  following	  the	  U.S.	  victory	  in	  the	  Inchon	  landing,	  from	  cautious	  and	  skeptical	  to	  more	  optimistic.	  Now,	  London	  kept	  step	  with	  Washington	  and	  stopped	  critiquing	  it	  as	  reckless,	  newly	  arguing	  that	  the	  unification	  of	  Korea	  had	  been	  the	  primary	  object	  since	  1948,	  and	  that	  the	  “imaginary	  line”	  had	  never	  had	  international	  recognition	  as	  a	  boundary.97	  	  
                                                94	  George	  F.	  Kennan,	  Princeton	  Seminar,	  Reel	  6,	  Track	  1,	  Page	  8,	  February	  14,	  1954,	  HSTL.	  	  	  95	  Telegram,	  Washington	  DC	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK,	  August	  26,	  1950	  in	  PREM8/1156:	  “Suggested	  visit	  of	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  Washington	  for	  meeting	  with	  President	  Truman	  for	  discussions	  with	  USA	  on	  international	  situation,	  Korea	  and	  defense,”	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  96	  Telegram,	  Foreign	  Secretary	  (Ernest	  Bevin)	  to	  High	  Commissioner	  for	  the	  UK,	  Delhi,	  India,	  for	  Pandit	  Nehru,	  September	  4,	  1950,	  in	  DO133/22:	  “China:	  Political	  Situation,”	  BNA,	  Kew	  UK.	  	  97	  Memorandum	  from	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  (Bevin)	  to	  the	  Cabinet	  “New	  York	  Meetings:	  Developments	  in	  Far	  Eastern	  Policy,”	  October	  6,	  1950,	  in	  CAB21/2102:	  “The	  War	  in	  Korea:	  the	  implication	  of,	  on	  our	  foreign	  policy	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world:	  Co-­‐operation	  with	  USA,”	  BNA;	  Telegram,	  “yingguo	  waijiao	  dachen	  Beiwen	  zhi	  Zhou	  Enlai	  zongli	  de	  dian	  [A	  telegram	  from	  British	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Bevin	  to	  Primer	  Zhou	  Enlain],”	  Ernest	  Bevin	  to	  Zhou	  Enlai,	  October	  10,	  1950,	  in	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   Britain’s	  drastic	  change	  of	  stance	  might	  have	  aroused	  further	  distrust	  in	  Beijing	  toward	  the	  West	  in	  general.	  Beijing	  had	  been	  carefully	  observing	  the	  situation	  in	  Korea,	  and	  quickly	  issued	  a	  series	  of	  warning	  immediately	  following	  the	  Inchon	  landing.	  On	  September	  25,	  for	  instance,	  acting	  chief	  of	  staff	  of	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  Nieh	  Jungchen	  told	  Indian	  ambassador	  to	  China,	  K.	  M.	  Panikkar,	  that	  China	  would	  not	  “sit	  back	  with	  folded	  hands	  and	  let	  the	  Americans	  came	  up	  to	  the	  border.”98	  Having	  received	  reports	  and	  realized	  the	  strong	  tone	  of	  the	  Beijing	  leadership,	  Indian	  Prime	  Minister	  Nehru	  repeatedly	  warned	  London	  that	  U.N./U.S.	  forces	  should	  not	  cross	  the	  38th	  Parallel.	  Writing	  to	  British	  Foreign	  Secretary	  Bevin,	  Nehru	  argued:	  That	  any	  decision	  or	  even	  suggestion	  that	  UN	  forces	  will	  move	  beyond	  38th	  parallel	  is	  likely	  to	  precipitate	  what	  might	  well	  be	  world	  catastrophe	  is,	  I	  fear,	  more	  than	  probable.	  If…Peking	  is	  envisaging	  military	  action,	  announcement	  that	  UN	  forces	  are	  going	  to	  advance	  beyond	  38th	  parallel	  will	  add	  fuel	  to	  fire.	  […].	  Manchurian	  border	  incidents	  and	  support	  of	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek’s	  army	  in	  Formosa	  have	  also	  led	  many	  in	  China	  to	  believe	  that	  invasion	  of	  China	  is	  contemplated.	  Any	  attempt	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel	  will	  convince	  them	  that	  such	  invasion	  is	  imminent	  and	  they	  will	  react	  accordingly.	  I	  would,	  therefore,	  urge	  with	  all	  the	  emphasis	  at	  my	  command,	  that	  NO	  action	  be	  taken	  by	  the	  UN	  that	  would	  involve	  crossing	  the	  38th	  parallel.99	  	  	  Repeating	  his	  objection	  four	  times	  in	  his	  long	  message,	  Nehru	  strongly	  argued	  against	  the	  idea	  of	  crossing	  the	  parallel	  northward	  in	  late	  September.	  Very	  few,	  however,	  took	  the	  Chinese	  messages	  seriously.100	  The	  British	  Foreign	  Office,	  for	  example,	  quickly	  concluded	  in	  September	  29	  that	  it	  would	  be	  “unlikely”	  that	  China	  would	  intervene	  in	  Korea,	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  Beijing	  still	  
                                                                                                                                            110-­‐00024-­‐22,	  FMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  	  	  	  98	  Quoted	  in	  Rosemary	  Foot,	  The	  Wrong	  War,	  79;	  (Whiting,	  China	  Cross	  the	  Yalu,	  93).	  	  99	  Telegram,	  High	  Commissioner	  fro	  the	  UK,	  Delhi,	  to	  Foreign	  Secretary	  in	  New	  York,	  September	  27,	  1950,	  in	  DO133/23:	  “China:	  Political	  Situation,	  Sept.	  4-­‐30,	  1950,”	  BNA,	  Kew	  UK.	  	  	  100	  Several	  policymakers	  did	  continue	  to	  disagree	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  crossing	  the	  38th	  parallel,	  including	  George	  F.	  Kennan,	  O.	  Edmund	  Clubb,	  and	  James	  Webb.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Foot,	  80.	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faced	  a	  mountain	  of	  difficult	  problems	  at	  home,	  and	  that	  China	  lacked	  the	  basic	  military	  capability	  to	  fight	  the	  United	  States.101	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  too	  late	  for	  China	  to	  enter	  the	  war.102	  Observing	  the	  situation	  in	  a	  similar	  manner,	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  officials	  in	  Washington	  also	  refused	  to	  take	  Beijing’s	  warnings	  seriously,	  viewing	  them,	  as	  Dean	  Acheson	  put	  it,	  as	  merely	  a	  “bluff.”103	  	  	   	  
The	  Decision	  to	  Cross	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  Throughout	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  opinions	  as	  to	  crossing	  the	  38th	  parallel	  in	  various	  sectors	  of	  the	  government	  were	  divided,	  as	  were	  those	  of	  Truman’s	  top	  advisors.	  However,	  newspaper	  reporters	  asked	  the	  same	  questions	  again	  and	  again	  in	  this	  period:	  “Will	  the	  US	  forces	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel?”104	  This	  question	  became	  more	  urgent	  after	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Inchon	  Landing	  on	  September	  15,	  1950.	  U.S./U.N.	  forces	  were	  approaching	  closer	  to	  the	  38th	  parallel	  day	  by	  day.	  Recalling	  those	  days,	  one	  State	  Department	  official	  described	  the	  mood	  at	  that	  time:	  “It	  was	  felt	  in	  Washington,	  particularly	  in	  the	  State	  Department,	  that	  we	  were	  completely	  justified	  in	  throwing	  the	  North	  Koreans	  back	  into	  their	  own	  country,	  but	  to	  occupy	  it	  raised	  many	  questions.”105	  	  
                                                101	  Telegram,	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK,	  to	  Washington,	  September	  29,	  1950,	  in	  FO371/84529:	  “Various	  reactions	  to	  events	  in	  Korea.”	  	  	  	  102	  Telegram,	  Peking	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK,	  October	  26,	  1950,	  in	  DO133/24:	  “China:	  Political	  Situation,	  Sept	  29-­‐Oct	  24,	  1950,”	  BNA.	  	  103	  FRUS	  1950	  VII:	  868-­‐869;	  Scholars	  have	  provided	  various	  explanations	  for	  this	  attitude.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Chen	  Jian,	  China’s	  Road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War,	  169-­‐170;	  William	  Stuek,	  The	  Korean	  War,	  230-­‐231;	  Steven	  Casey,	  Selling	  the	  Korean	  War,	  99-­‐100.	  104	  President’s	  Press	  and	  Radio	  Conference,	  31	  August	  1950,	  21	  September	  1950,	  and	  28	  September	  1950,	  HSTP:	  President’s	  Secretary’s	  Files,	  “Press	  Conference	  File,”	  Box	  53;	  Secretary	  of	  State’s	  Press	  and	  Radio	  Conference,	  30	  August	  1950,	  HSTP:	  President’s	  Secretary’s	  Files,	  “Press	  Conference	  File,”	  Box	  54;	  Eben	  Ayers	  Diary,	  1	  and	  28	  September	  1950,	  Eben	  Ayers	  Papers	  (Hereafter	  EAP),	  Box	  21,	  HSTL.	  105	  Letter,	  James	  E.	  Webb	  to	  John	  W.	  Snyder,	  James	  E.	  Webb	  Papers	  (Hereafter	  JEWP),	  Box	  450,	  HSTL.	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During	  this	  period,	  government	  officials	  exchanged	  quite	  a	  lot	  of	  correspondence	  within	  departments	  and	  with	  ambassadors	  in	  foreign	  countries	  regarding	  the	  issue.106	  Nevertheless,	  none	  of	  these	  documents	  suggests	  a	  critical	  decision.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  core	  of	  the	  problem	  was	  not	  about	  a	  particular	  foreign	  policy	  or	  military	  tactics;	  it	  was	  more	  about	  politics.	  In	  fact,	  many	  documents	  in	  this	  period	  stated	  a	  similar	  line:	  the	  decision	  would	  be	  made	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  the	  government.107	  Even	  as	  late	  as	  September	  26,	  1950,	  a	  State	  Department	  staff	  member	  James	  Webb	  composed	  a	  directive	  to	  American	  officials	  in	  Korea	  to	  “make	  every	  effort	  discourage	  Rhee	  or	  other	  ROK	  spokesmen	  making	  pronouncements	  regarding	  ROK’s	  unilateral	  extension	  of	  authority	  north	  of	  38th	  parallel”	  because	  the	  matter	  was	  “being	  considered	  at	  a	  higher	  government	  level.”108	  And	  yet,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  officials	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  the	  administration	  did	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  policy,	  either.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  they	  did	  not	  necessarily	  see	  the	  policy	  of	  crossing	  the	  38th	  parallel	  as	  an	  appealing	  one,	  and	  were	  extremely	  concerned	  about	  possible	  consequences.	  Rejecting	  Kennan’s	  advice	  as	  “national	  interest	  in	  the	  abstract,”	  Dean	  Acheson	  did	  see	  the	  high	  level	  of	  risk	  involved	  in	  crossing	  the	  parallel.	  In	  Princeton	  Seminars	  that	  were	  held	  in	  1954,	  former	  policymakers,	  including	  Dean	  Acheson,	  George	  F.	  Kennan,	  and	  Averell	  Harriman,	  gathered	  and	  discussed	  their	  foreign	  policy	  decisions	  in	  the	  Truman	  administration.	  In	  one	  session,	  Harriman	  recalled	  the	  situation	  that	  they	  faced	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  38th	  parallel	  issue,	  and	  asked	  Acheson:	  	  
                                                106	  See	  for	  example	  documents	  in	  HSTP:	  Korean	  War	  File,	  Department	  of	  State,	  Box	  6,	  HSTL.	  	  	  107	  See	  for	  example	  documents	  in	  July	  and	  September	  1950	  in	  HSTP:	  Korean	  War	  File,	  Department	  of	  State,	  Box	  6,	  HSTL.	  108	  PHST,	  Korean	  War	  File,	  Box	  6,	  “Dept	  of	  State,”	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I	  think	  I	  remember—if	  I’m	  wrong,	  correct	  me—you	  are	  talking	  in	  my	  presence,	  and	  I	  think	  perhaps	  to	  me	  personally,	  about	  the	  concern	  that	  you	  had	  when	  we	  went	  over	  the	  38th	  Parallel;	  you	  recognized	  that	  of	  course	  because	  of…the	  success	  of	  the	  Inchon	  Landings	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  way	  to	  stop	  it.	  But	  as	  I	  recall	  it,	  you	  were	  concerned	  over	  the	  possible	  effects	  of	  our	  going	  beyond	  the	  38th	  Parallel,	  and	  I	  got	  the	  impression	  that	  you	  would	  have	  been	  happier	  at	  that	  time	  if	  we	  hadn’t	  gone	  across.	  Although	  you	  fully	  recognized	  that	  the	  military	  situation	  as	  it	  was,	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	  destroying	  the	  North	  Korean	  army,	  that	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  to	  stop.109	  	  	  In	  Harriman’s	  observation,	  Acheson	  would	  have	  been	  “happier	  at	  that	  time”	  if	  the	  U.S.	  army	  would	  not	  have	  to	  cross	  the	  parallel.	  Answering	  to	  the	  question,	  Acheson	  said	  succinctly:	  “That	  is	  true,	  Averell.”	  	  As	  Harriman’s	  recollection	  shows,	  even	  top	  officials	  were	  not	  necessarily	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  aggressive	  policy.	  Yet,	  with	  initial	  defeats	  in	  Korea,	  the	  American	  public	  more	  or	  less	  became	  irritated,	  if	  not	  about	  to	  lose	  confidence,	  with	  the	  administration’s	  lack	  of	  preparedness.	  The	  Truman	  administration	  had	  already	  been	  criticized	  as	  being	  too	  “soft	  on	  communism.”	  The	  president	  could	  not	  accept	  any	  more	  criticism,	  and	  desperately	  sought	  chances	  to	  show	  his	  “toughness.”	  What	  the	  Truman	  administration	  really	  needed	  in	  late	  summer	  of	  1950	  was	  not	  to	  “scare”	  or	  “deceive”	  the	  American	  people	  to	  “sell”	  its	  hard-­‐line	  defense	  program.	  American	  domestic	  feeling	  was	  already	  ahead	  of	  them	  in	  that	  sense.	  What	  the	  Truman	  administration	  desired	  was,	  as	  John	  Foster	  Dulles	  described,	  “some	  affirmative	  action	  in	  the	  field	  of	  foreign	  affairs	  which	  would	  restore	  the	  confidence	  of	  the	  American	  people	  that	  the	  government	  had	  a	  capacity	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  Communist	  menace.”110	  The	  administration	  needed	  “achievement,”	  as	  its	  election	  campaign	  committee	  had	  been	  demanding	  persistently.	  	  
                                                109	  Averell	  Harriman,	  Princeton	  Seminars,	  February	  14,	  1954;	  Reel	  6,	  Track	  1:	  7,	  HSTL.	  	  	  110	  Thomas	  Christensen,	  Useful	  Adversaries:	  Grand	  Strategy,	  Domestic	  Mobilization,	  and	  Sino-­‐American	  
Conflict,	  1947-­‐1958	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  123.	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Such	  an	  entanglement	  between	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  affairs	  and	  between	  political	  and	  military	  issues	  clearly	  appeared	  on	  Friday,	  September	  29,	  1950,	  a	  day	  that	  marked	  one	  of	  the	  most	  critical	  watersheds	  in	  “Cold	  War	  history,”	  not	  only	  because	  the	  administration	  finally	  approved	  the	  decision	  to	  go	  north	  of	  the	  parallel	  at	  the	  highest	  meetings,	  but	  also	  it	  shifted	  the	  basic	  stance	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy.	  	  	  That	  morning,	  the	  Truman	  administration	  held	  a	  cabinet	  meeting	  at	  the	  White	  House.	  At	  the	  outset,	  members	  briefly	  discussed	  European	  defense,	  and	  then,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  discussed	  domestic	  issues,	  such	  as	  increases	  in	  consumer	  prices,	  the	  decline	  in	  the	  employment	  rate,	  housewives’	  hoarding,	  and	  ongoing	  political	  campaign	  tours	  in	  fifteen	  states.	  Then,	  Vice	  President	  Alben	  Barkley	  raised	  a	  question	  as	  to	  whether	  personal	  attacks	  should	  be	  made	  on	  Republican	  candidates.	  To	  this	  question,	  President	  Truman	  replied	  that	  they	  should	  not	  make	  personal	  attacks	  but	  should	  recite	  the	  record	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Party.	  Another	  member	  insisted	  that	  they	  should	  stress	  the	  successful	  achievements	  of	  the	  Truman	  administration	  in	  fighting	  communism	  in	  Greece,	  Iran,	  Turkey,	  and	  Europe.111	  Then,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dean	  Acheson	  cut	  in	  and	  added.	  “Korea	  will	  be	  used	  as	  a	  stage	  to	  prove	  to	  the	  world	  what	  Western	  Democracy	  can	  do	  to	  help	  the	  underprivileged	  countries	  of	  the	  world.”	  Acheson	  explained,	  “Plans	  are	  being	  developed	  to	  set	  up	  a	  commission	  to	  go	  into	  Korea	  and	  start	  rehabilitation.”	  The	  Secretary	  added,	  “The	  38th	  parallel	  [will]	  be	  ignored.”112	  This	  was	  the	  first	  and	  last	  time	  that	  the	  Truman	  Cabinet	  acknowledged	  their	  decision	  concerning	  the	  
                                                111	  “Notes	  on	  Cabinet	  Meetings	  II,	  1946-­‐1953,”	  29	  September	  1950,	  Matthew	  J.	  Connelly	  Papers	  (Hereafter	  MJCP),	  HSTL.	  	  112	  Ibid;	  Rosemary	  Foot,	  The	  Wrong	  War,	  70;	  Arnold	  Offner,	  Another	  Such	  Victory,	  389.	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advancement	  of	  US	  forces	  into	  North	  Korea.	  It	  is	  symbolic	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  crossing	  the	  38th	  parallel	  was	  brought	  up	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  domestic	  political	  campaigns.	  It	  is	  also	  suggestive	  that	  Acheson	  linked	  the	  38th	  parallel	  issue	  with	  America’s	  credibility	  in	  the	  world—rhetoric	  used	  repeatedly	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed.	  	  At	  around	  noon,	  Truman,	  Acheson,	  and	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  George	  Marshall	  had	  lunch	  together	  and	  held	  another	  meeting	  at	  the	  Blair	  House,	  where	  they	  finally	  agreed,	  at	  this	  highest	  level,	  to	  give	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  the	  green	  light	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel	  northward.	  Although	  Truman	  had	  approved	  this	  policy	  two	  days	  earlier	  with	  some	  conditions,	  by	  this	  decision,	  American	  forces’	  invasion	  of	  North	  Korea	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  unifying	  the	  divided	  countries	  was	  formally	  authorized.113	  Secretary	  Marshall	  then	  sent	  a	  telegram	  to	  MacArthur,	  stating,	  “We	  want	  you	  to	  feel	  unhampered	  tactically	  and	  strategically	  to	  proceed	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel.”114	  Furthermore,	  at	  three	  o’clock	  in	  the	  afternoon,	  these	  three	  went	  back	  to	  the	  White	  House,	  attended	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  (NSC)	  meeting,	  and	  officially	  approved	  NSC-­‐68/1.	  Since	  the	  discovery	  of	  that	  confidential	  document	  in	  1975,	  diplomatic	  historians	  have	  emphasized	  its	  significant	  role.	  Historian	  Ernest	  May,	  for	  instance,	  writes,	  “NSC-­‐68	  laid	  out	  the	  rationale	  for	  US	  strategy	  during	  much	  of	  the	  cold	  war,”	  and	  Walter	  LaFeber	  succinctly	  describes	  it	  as	  the	  “American	  blueprint	  for	  
                                                113	  Dean	  Acheson,	  Princeton	  Seminars,	  13	  February	  1954,	  Reel	  3,	  Track	  2:	  1,	  HSTL;	  Dean	  Acheson,	  
Present	  at	  the	  Creation,	  452-­‐63.	  Truman	  had	  already	  approved	  US	  forces’	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  on	  September	  27,	  but	  requested	  MacArthur	  to	  submit	  a	  military	  plan	  north	  of	  the	  parallel	  in	  advance.	  See	  FRUS,	  1950:	  Vol.	  7	  (27	  September	  1950.	  114	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State,	  FRUS,	  1950:	  Vol.	  7	  (29	  June	  1950),	  826.	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waging	  the	  Cold	  War.”115	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  the	  document	  was	  not	  considered	  as	  such	  when	  it	  was	  written.	  Paul	  Nitze,	  a	  chief	  writer	  of	  the	  document,	  described	  it	  at	  that	  time	  as	  “a	  statement	  of	  [US	  foreign]	  policy	  to	  be	  followed	  over	  the	  next	  four	  or	  five	  years.”116	  The	  document	  was	  issued	  in	  April	  1950,	  but	  was	  rejected	  at	  first,	  and	  had	  been	  pending	  throughout	  the	  entire	  summer.	  It	  would	  have	  gone	  nowhere	  had	  it	  not	  been	  for	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  multiplying	  problems	  related	  to	  the	  war	  at	  home.	  The	  war	  increased	  the	  “importance”	  of	  the	  document,	  and	  it	  was	  finally	  approved	  on	  that	  Friday	  afternoon,	  the	  same	  day	  the	  administration	  formally	  decided	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel.	  	  The	  two	  decisions	  made	  on	  September	  29,	  1950,	  not	  only	  represented	  the	  militaristic	  escalation	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  but	  also	  signified	  the	  solidification	  of	  the	  “Cold	  War”	  framework,	  destroying	  any	  possibilities	  for	  meaningful	  diplomacy	  between	  the	  West	  and	  East.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  these	  policies	  emerged	  not	  so	  much	  results	  of	  geopolitical	  considerations	  or	  policymakers’	  personalities	  as	  their	  judgments	  concerning	  domestic	  politics	  and	  popular	  sentiments	  at	  that	  time.	  This	  was	  the	  moment	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  “containment,”	  which	  had	  been	  advocated	  by	  George	  F.	  Kennan	  since	  1946,	  was	  replaced	  with	  a	  more	  aggressive,	  militarized,	  and	  more	  socially	  constructed	  strategy	  of	  “roll	  back,”	  which	  would	  be	  popularized	  from	  then	  on,	  leading	  to	  the	  heyday	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Having	  made	  such	  crucial	  
                                                115	  Walter	  LaFeber,	  America,	  Russia,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1945-­‐2006,	  tenth	  edition	  (New	  York:	  McGraw-­‐Hill,	  2008),	  103-­‐105;	  Walter	  LaFeber,	  “Crossing	  the	  38th:	  The	  Cold	  War	  in	  Microcosm”	  (1974),	  81;	  and	  Ernest	  May	  ed.,	  American	  Cold	  War	  Strategy:	  Interpreting	  NSC	  68	  (Boston:	  Bedford,	  1993),	  vii.	  116	  “Minutes	  of	  the	  68th	  Meeting	  of	  the	  National	  Security	  Council	  held	  on	  Friday,	  September	  29,	  1950	  in	  the	  Conference	  Room	  of	  the	  White	  House,”	  29	  September	  1950,	  HSTP:	  Personal	  File,	  Subject	  File,	  1940-­‐1953,	  National	  Security	  Council-­‐Meeting	  File,	  Box	  180,	  HSTL.	  The	  NSC-­‐68/1,	  titled	  “United	  States	  Objectives	  and	  Programs	  For	  National	  Security,”	  was	  subsequently	  approved	  by	  Truman	  the	  next	  day,	  and	  circulated	  as	  NSC	  68/2.	  	  	  
  
 187 
political	  decisions	  on	  that	  Friday,	  President	  Truman	  left	  the	  White	  House	  for	  a	  planned	  week’s	  vacation.	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Chapter	  3	  Pictures:	  	  	  
Picture	  1:	  	  	  “Look	  Out	  for	  Infiltration	  at	  Home!”	  	  
Ithaca	  Journal	  	  August	  14,	  1950	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Picture	  2:	  	  	  “No	  Red	  Crabmeat	  for	  this	  stevedore”	  
Newsweek	  	  August	  28,	  1950	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Picture	  3:	  	  	  “In	  the	  Driver’s	  Seat”	  	  
Ithaca	  Journal	  	  July	  25,	  1950	  	  	  
	  	  
  191 
Picture	  4:	  	  	  “Now	  It’s	  Our	  Shot”	  
Kansas	  City	  Star	  October	  18,	  1950	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Picture	  5:	  	  	  “The	  Third	  Man”	  	  
Saturday	  Evening	  Post	  	  September	  23,	  1950	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Chapter	  4:	  War,	  Society,	  Legitimacy	  	   Even	  the	  man	  who	  tries	  to	  rule	  with	  the	  help	  of	  mercenaries	  is	  dependent	  on	  their	  opinion	  and	  on	  the	  opinion	  of	  them	  held	  by	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  population.	  The	  truth	  is	  that	  no	  one	  rules	  with	  mercenaries.	  As	  Talleyrand	  said	  to	  Napoleon:	  “You	  can	  do	  everything	  with	  bayonets,	  Sire,	  except	  sit	  on	  them.”	  And	  ruling	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  seizing	  power,	  but	  the	  tranquil	  exercise	  of	  it.	  In	  sum,	  to	  rule	  is	  to	  sit	  down,	  be	  it	  on	  a	  throne,	  curule	  chair,	  front	  bench,	  ministerial	  seat,	  or	  bishop’s	  cathedra.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  naive	  melodramatic	  view,	  ruling	  is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  question	  of	  a	  heavy	  hand	  as	  of	  a	  firm	  seat.	  The	  State	  is,	  in	  effect,	  the	  state	  of	  opinion.	  It	  is	  a	  position	  of	  equilibrium,	  a	  balance	  of	  pressures.1	  	  	  Jose	  Ortega	  Y	  Gasset,	  The	  Revolt	  of	  the	  Masses	  	  	  	   With	  the	  Truman	  administration’s	  final	  decision	  at	  the	  end	  of	  September	  1950,	  American	  forces	  crossed	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  northward	  on	  October	  7,	  which	  quickly	  brought	  about	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung	  regime	  in	  North	  Korea.	  Suddenly,	  a	  broad	  array	  of	  Korean	  anti-­‐communist	  organizations	  returned	  to	  life	  in	  the	  northern	  part	  of	  Korea,	  and	  began	  retaliating	  against	  Kim’s	  supporters	  and	  sympathizers,	  revealing	  hidden	  conflicts	  that	  had	  been	  silenced	  under	  the	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung	  regime.2	  Observing	  such	  a	  swift	  turn	  in	  the	  Korean	  situation,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  was	  exuberant	  in	  Taiwan,	  writing	  in	  his	  diary:	  “the	  U.S.	  forces’	  crossing	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  was	  the	  major	  turning	  point	  in	  East	  Asia.”3	  That	  was	  so	  because	  the	  new	  situation	  in	  Korea	  suggested	  to	  him	  that	  a	  similar	  situation	  could	  occur	  in	  mainland	  China—once	  Taiwan’s	  counterattack	  began	  with	  the	  support	  of	  American	  forces,	  the	  Chinese	  people	  would	  rise	  up	  and	  the	  communist	  regime	  
                                                1	  Jose	  Ortega	  Y	  Gasset,	  The	  Revolt	  of	  the	  Masses,	  trans.	  Anthony	  Kerrigan	  (Notre	  Dame:	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Press,	  1985[1932]),	  115.	  2	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim,	  Sensō	  to	  Heiwa:	  Chōsen	  Hantō	  1950	  [War	  and	  Peace:	  The	  Korean	  Penninsula	  1950]	  Yoshinobu	  Mori	  trans	  (Tōkyō:	  Shakai	  Hyōronsha,	  2009),	  241.	  	  3	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  October	  14,	  1950,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  Diaries	  (hereafter	  CKSD),	  Box	  48,	  Hoover	  Institution	  Archives	  (hereafter	  HIA),	  Stanford	  University,	  Stanford,	  CA.	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would	  fall.	  While	  almost	  resigned	  to	  Taiwan’s	  fate	  a	  few	  months	  earlier,	  he	  had	  been	  rescued	  by	  this	  evolution	  in	  the	  Korean	  situation.	  Taiwan’s	  economy	  stabilized,	  the	  people	  calmed	  down,	  and,	  finally,	  the	  Americans	  landed	  at	  Inchon	  and	  crossed	  the	  38th	  Parallel,	  providing	  hope	  for	  a	  redrawing	  of	  the	  political	  map	  in	  East	  Asia.	  It	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  wrote	  in	  his	  diary,	  “I	  feel	  to	  thank	  God.”4	  	  Another	  figure	  elated	  by	  the	  events	  of	  October	  1950	  was	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur.	  On	  October	  15,	  the	  general	  declared	  that	  the	  conflict	  was	  won,	  that	  the	  “Chinese	  Commies”	  would	  not	  attack,	  and	  that	  U.S.	  troops	  could	  be	  withdrawn	  from	  Korea	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year.5	  On	  the	  same	  day,	  even	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  devoted	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  space	  to	  two	  sensationalist	  articles:	  “Toward	  V-­‐K	  Day”	  and	  “U.N.’s	  War	  in	  Korea	  Enters	  Its	  Last	  Phase,	  MacArthur’s	  Forces	  Now	  in	  Position	  To	  Wipe	  Out	  Last	  Communist	  Units.”6	  Not	  only	  MacArthur,	  but	  many	  other	  believed	  that	  the	  war	  would	  be	  won.	  Confirming	  this	  belief,	  on	  October	  19,	  American	  troops	  entered	  Pyongyang,	  and,	  on	  the	  next	  day,	  General	  MacArthur	  was	  on	  a	  tour	  from	  Tokyo,	  inspecting	  airborne	  landings	  at	  the	  front	  lines	  and	  visiting	  the	  newly	  gained	  northern	  capital,	  Pyongyang.	  According	  to	  United	  Press	  correspondent	  Earnest	  Hoberecht,	  who	  accompanied	  him	  on	  the	  tour,	  MacArthur	  jokingly	  asked	  General	  Walton	  H.	  Walker,	  who	  greeted	  him	  at	  the	  Pyongyang	  Airport,	  “Any	  celebrities	  here	  to	  greet	  me?”	  He	  scornfully	  added,	  “Where	  is	  Kim	  Buck	  Too?”7	  
                                                4	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  September	  30,	  1950,	  Box	  48,	  CKSD,	  Hoover	  Institute,	  Stanford	  University,	  CA.	  	  5	  Arnold	  Offner,	  Another	  Such	  Victory:	  President	  Truman	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1945-­‐1953	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  391.	  	  6	  “Toward	  V-­‐K	  Day,”	  and	  “U.N.’s	  War	  in	  Korea	  Enter	  Its	  Last	  Phase,	  MacArthur’s	  Forces	  Now	  in	  Position	  To	  Wipe	  Out	  Last	  Communist	  Units,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  October	  15,	  1950.	  	  7	  “Makkasa	  zensen	  wo	  shisatsu;	  ‘Kim-­‐kun	  no	  demukae	  ha?’	  yumoa	  tappuri	  [MacArthur	  Inspects	  the	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   While	  MacArthur	  was	  optimistically	  dismissing	  the	  possibility	  of	  China’s	  entry	  and	  ridiculing	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung	  on	  October	  20,	  however,	  the	  situation	  was	  already	  changing	  rapidly.	  In	  the	  early	  hours	  before	  dawn	  on	  that	  very	  day,	  roughly	  120,000	  Chinese	  officers	  and	  soldiers	  began	  crossing	  the	  Yalu	  River	  at	  the	  Chinese-­‐North	  Korean	  border,	  and,	  within	  three	  days,	  a	  total	  of	  260,000	  had	  entered	  North	  Korean	  territory,	  marching	  to	  the	  south	  to	  redraw	  the	  picture	  of	  the	  war.8	  	  In	  retrospect,	  MacArthur	  might	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  overly	  optimistic,	  but,	  at	  the	  time,	  his	  assessment	  seemed	  both	  rational	  and	  convincing.	  In	  fact,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party’s	  (CCP)	  leadership	  was	  opposed	  to	  China’s	  entry,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  military	  and	  economic	  capabilities,	  as	  well	  as	  mounting	  social	  and	  political	  problems	  at	  home.	  The	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  (PLA)	  had	  neither	  an	  air	  force	  nor	  a	  navy	  able	  to	  confront	  U.S.	  forces,	  and	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  had	  not	  yet	  recovered	  from	  the	  devastation	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  the	  Civil	  War.	  In	  addition,	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  (PRC)	  was	  just	  about	  a	  year	  old,	  and	  had	  yet	  to	  build	  a	  strong	  foundation.	  Looking	  at	  these	  situations,	  MacArthur’s	  “common	  sense”	  was	  not	  necessarily	  invalid.	  Yet,	  China	  entered	  the	  war	  in	  October	  1950,	  and	  continued	  to	  pursue	  an	  aggressive	  strategy.	  By	  December	  6,	  CPV	  armies	  had	  captured	  Pyongyang.	  Furthermore,	  while	  Beijing,	  in	  retrospect,	  could	  have	  terminated	  the	  war	  at	  the	  
                                                                                                                                         Frontline;	  ‘Where	  is	  Mr.	  Kim?’	  With	  Humor],”	  Mainichi	  Shinbun,	  October	  21,	  1950;	  Richard	  H.	  Rovere	  and	  Arthur	  Schlesinger,	  Jr.,	  Genera	  MacArthur	  and	  President	  Truman:	  The	  Struggle	  for	  
Control	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Policy	  (New	  Brunswick,	  NJ:	  Transaction	  Publishers,	  1992	  [1951]),	  136;	  William	  Manchester,	  American	  Caesar:	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  1880-­‐1964	  (Boston,	  MA:	  Little,	  Brown	  and	  Company,	  1978),	  599;	  William	  B.	  Breuer,	  Shadow	  Warriors:	  The	  Covert	  War	  in	  Korea	  (New	  York:	  John	  Wiley	  and	  Sons,	  Inc,	  1996),	  106;	  and	  David	  Halberstam,	  The	  Coldest	  Winter:	  America	  and	  
the	  Korean	  War	  (New	  York:	  Hyperion,	  2007),	  11.	  8	  Chen	  Jian,	  205-­‐209,	  288;	  Allan	  R.	  Millet,	  Vol.	  2,	  297,	  542.	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end	  of	  1950	  by	  halting	  its	  troops	  at	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  and	  declaring	  victory,	  it	  chose	  to	  continue	  the	  war.	  On	  the	  night	  of	  December	  31,	  CPV	  forces	  crossed	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  southward,	  seizing	  Seoul	  on	  January	  4,	  1951.9	  The	  questions	  are:	  Why	  did	  China	  defy	  “common	  sense”	  and	  enter	  the	  Korean	  War	  with	  so	  many	  difficult	  problems	  at	  home?	  Why	  did	  Beijing	  continue	  to	  pursue	  an	  aggressive	  strategy,	  ignoring	  opportunities	  to	  terminate	  the	  war	  at	  an	  earlier	  stage?	  These	  were	  questions	  frequently	  discussed.	  Scholars	  have	  presented,	  roughly	  divided,	  four	  answers,	  which	  are	  not	  necessarily	  mutually	  exclusive:	  ideology,	  security	  concerns,	  Soviet	  pressure,	  and	  Chinese	  leaders’	  personalities	  and	  calculations.10	  Thanks	  to	  the	  work	  of	  these	  scholars,	  we	  can	  now	  analyze	  
                                                9	  Wu	  Ruilin,	  Kang	  Mei	  yuan	  Chao	  zhong	  de	  di	  42	  jun	  [The	  Forty-­‐Second	  Army	  in	  the	  war	  of	  Resist	  
America	  and	  Assist	  Korea]	  (Beijing:	  Jincheng	  chubanshe,	  1995).	  80-­‐81.	  10	  China's	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War	  has	  been	  a	  topic	  for	  discussion	  for	  more	  that	  half	  a	  century.	  In	  the	  1950s	  the	  Western	  media	  tended	  to	  describe	  an	  ideological	  tie	  between	  the	  USSR	  and	  China	  as	  a	  primary	  factor	  for	  China's	  entry	  into	  the	  war.	  In	  1960,	  Allen	  Whiting	  argued	  that	  Beijing’s	  concerns	  about	  physical	  security	  of	  the	  northeastern	  industrial	  border	  areas	  was	  the	  main	  factor,	  highlighting	  that	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  balance	  of	  power	  affected	  China’s	  foreign	  policy.	  Whiting	  stressed	  the	  rationality	  of	  Beijing’s	  decision,	  arguing	  that	  China	  entered	  the	  war	  because	  U.S.	  forces	  crossed	  the	  38th	  parallel,	  despite	  Beijing’s	  warning	  in	  early	  October	  1950.	  See	  Allen	  Whiting,	  China	  Crosses	  
the	  Yalu:	  The	  Decision	  to	  Enter	  the	  Korean	  War	  (New	  York:	  Macmillan,	  1960),	  108-­‐15.	  This	  thesis	  has	  been	  widely	  shared,	  once	  nearly	  forming	  a	  consensus	  view.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  William	  Stueck,	  
The	  Korean	  War:	  An	  International	  History	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1995)	  and	  Simei	  Qing,	  From	  Allies	  To	  Enemies:	  Visions	  of	  Modernity,	  Identity,	  and	  U.S.-­‐China	  Diplomacy,	  1945-­‐1960	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  151-­‐68.	  Quite	  a	  few	  Chinese	  authors	  and	  former	  military	  officials,	  likewise,	  have	  accepted	  this	  “China	  under	  threat”	  thesis	  since	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Pang	  Xianzhi	  and	  Li	  Jie,	  “Mao	  Zedong	  he	  kangmei	  yuanchao	  [Mao	  Zedong	  and	  the	  war	  of	  ‘Resist	  America	  and	  Assist	  Korea’],”	  Dang	  de	  we	  xian	  2000	  (4),	  38;	  Zhang	  Xi,	  “Peng	  Dehuai	  Shouming	  Shuaishi	  Kangmei	  Yuanchao	  de	  Qianqian	  Houhou	  [Before	  and	  After	  Peng	  Dehuai’s	  appointment	  to	  command	  the	  war	  of	  ‘Resist	  America	  and	  Assist	  Korea’],”	  Zhonggong	  
dangshi	  ziliao	  31	  (October	  1989):	  111-­‐59;	  Du	  Ping,	  Zai	  zhiyuanjun	  zongbu	  [At	  the	  Headquarters	  in	  
the	  Chinese	  People’s	  Volunteers]	  (Beijing:	  Jiefangjun	  chubanshe,	  1989);	  and	  Jiang	  Yonghui,	  San	  shi	  
ba	  jun	  zai	  Chaoxian	  [The	  Thirty-­‐Eighth	  Army	  in	  Korea]	  (Shenyang:	  Liaoning	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  2009	  [1996]).	  While	  this	  thesis	  has	  certain	  merit	  in	  understanding	  a	  part	  of	  Beijing’s	  strategic	  thinking,	  a	  question	  still	  remains;	  if	  Americans’	  action	  was	  the	  sole	  triggering	  factor,	  China’s	  decision	  should	  have	  been	  made	  after	  U.S.	  forces	  crossed	  the	  38th	  parallel,	  and	  Beijing	  should	  not	  have	  wavered	  on	  its	  stance	  after	  that.	  But,	  in	  fact,	  Beijing’s	  decision	  was	  contemplated	  before	  the	  event,	  though	  it	  was	  reconsidered	  and	  overturned	  again	  and	  again	  until	  the	  CPV’s	  actual	  crossing	  of	  the	  Yalu	  River.	  	  To	  understand	  this	  puzzle,	  another	  group	  of	  historians	  have	  investigated	  Beijing’s	  motivations	  since	  the	  1990s.	  Drawing	  upon	  newly	  available	  Chinese	  documents,	  these	  scholars	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China’s	  policy	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  from	  multiple	  angles.	  Nonetheless,	  most	  scholarly	  work	  has	  focused	  largely	  on	  power	  politics	  and	  the	  roles	  of	  top-­‐ranking	  policymakers,	  while	  paying	  remarkably	  little	  attention	  to	  other	  significant	  
                                                                                                                                         have	  found	  that	  China	  was	  not	  at	  all	  a	  passive,	  reactive	  actor,	  but	  rather	  the	  one	  that	  demonstrated	  proactive	  agency	  in	  entering	  the	  Korean	  War.	  Notably,	  Chen	  Jian,	  Shu	  Guang	  Zhang,	  and	  Shu	  Ken’ei	  [Zhu	  Jianrong]	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  Chinese	  leadership’s	  characteristics,	  calculations,	  and	  ideology,	  based	  on	  Chinese	  society	  and	  culture.	  Chen	  Jian,	  for	  example,	  has	  challenged	  with	  the	  widely	  shared	  view	  that	  Beijing	  reacted	  to	  the	  U.S.	  forces’	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  CCP	  had	  been	  considering	  and	  preparing	  its	  intervention	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  much	  earlier,	  highlighting	  Mao’s	  own	  determination	  to	  maintain	  “the	  inner	  dynamics	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Revolution.”	  See,	  for	  example,	  Chen	  Jian,	  China’s	  Road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War:	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  
Confrontation	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1994);	  Chen	  Jian,	  Mao’s	  China	  and	  the	  Cold	  
War	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  NC:	  The	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  2001),	  49-­‐84,	  and	  Chen	  Jian,	  “China’s	  Changing	  Aims	  during	  the	  Korean	  War,	  1950-­‐1951,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  American-­‐East	  Asian	  Relations	  1	  (Spring	  1992).	  	  This	  line	  of	  argument,	  emphasizing	  Chinese	  leadership’s	  domestic	  considerations,	  should	  be	  continued	  further.	  On	  this	  approach,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Shu	  Guang	  Zhang,	  Mao’s	  Romanticism:	  
China	  and	  the	  Korean	  War,	  1950-­‐1953	  (Lawrence:	  the	  University	  Press	  of	  Kansas,	  1995);	  and	  Shu	  Ken’ei	  [Zhu	  Jianrong],	  Mo	  Takuto	  no	  Chosen	  Senso:	  Chugoku	  ga	  Oryokuko	  wo	  wataru	  made	  [Mao	  
Zedong’s	  Korean	  War:	  China’s	  Crossing	  of	  the	  Yalu	  River]	  (Tokyo:	  Iwanami,	  2004	  [1991]).	  Thomas	  Christensen	  similarly	  accepts	  this	  “proactive	  China”	  interpretation,	  boldly	  stressing	  that	  Beijing	  utilized	  the	  international	  conflict	  to	  mobilize	  and	  control	  domestic	  politics.	  See	  Christensen,	  Useful	  
Adversaries:	  Grand	  Strategy,	  Domestic	  Mobilization,	  and	  Sino-­‐American	  Conflict,	  1947-­‐1958	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  3-­‐8,	  157-­‐66.	  Also,	  while	  not	  necessarily	  focusing	  on	  the	  Korean	  War	  issue,	  Maurice	  Meisner’s	  Mao's	  China	  and	  After:	  A	  History	  of	  the	  People's	  
Republic,	  3rd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1999	  [1986])	  pays	  significant	  attention	  to	  a	  domestic	  politics	  and	  social	  dimension	  in	  connection	  with	  Beijing’s	  policymaking.	  	  The	  discussion	  of	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War	  has	  been	  further	  complicated	  by	  another	  group	  of	  historians	  who	  use	  newly	  available	  Russian	  documents.	  Since	  the	  1990s,	  they	  have	  underscored	  the	  importance	  of	  Joseph	  Stalin’s	  pressure	  on	  Beijing.	  Vladislav	  Zubok	  and	  Constantine	  Pleshakov,	  for	  instance,	  have	  argued	  that	  “Mao	  seemed	  to	  have	  surrendered	  to	  Stalin’s	  logic:	  he	  agreed	  to	  send	  nine	  divisions	  to	  fight	  in	  Korea.”	  See	  Vladislav	  Zubok	  and	  Constantine	  Pleshakov,	  Inside	  the	  Kremlin's	  Cold	  War:	  From	  Stalin	  to	  Khrushchev	  (Cambridge,	  Mass.:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  66-­‐67.	  This	  Stalin-­‐centric	  view	  matches	  well	  with	  the	  traditional	  American	  consensus,	  and	  it	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  prominent	  American	  historians,	  like	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis,	  have	  chosen	  to	  adopt	  this	  viewpoint.	  Gaddis,	  for	  example,	  emphasized	  “intense	  pressures	  from	  Stalin”	  as	  a	  decisive	  element	  in	  China’s	  entry	  to	  the	  Korean	  War.	  See	  John	  Lewis	  Gaddis,	  We	  Now	  Know:	  
Rethinking	  Cold	  War	  History	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1997),	  77-­‐81,	  and	  The	  Cold	  War:	  
A	  New	  History	  (New	  York:	  Penguin	  Press,	  2005),	  42-­‐46.	  	  For	  the	  studies	  that	  have	  utilized	  Russian	  documents,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Sergei	  Goncharov,	  John	  Lewis,	  and	  Xue	  Litai,	  Uncertain	  Partners:	  Stalin,	  Mao,	  and	  the	  Korean	  War	  (Stanford:	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  Alexandre	  Y.	  Mansourov,	  “Stalin,	  Mao,	  Kim,	  and	  China’s	  Decision	  to	  Enter	  the	  Korean	  War,	  September	  16-­‐October	  15,	  1950,”	  CWIHP	  Bulletin	  6/7	  (1995);	  Kathryn	  Weathersby,	  “‘Should	  We	  Fear	  This?’	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Danger	  of	  the	  War	  with	  America,”	  CWIHP	  
Working	  Paper	  No.39	  and	  “Soviet	  Aims	  in	  Korea	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  1945-­‐50:	  New	  Evidence	  From	  the	  Russian	  Archives,”	  CWIHP	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  8.;	  and	  A.V.	  Torukunofu,	  Chosen	  
Senso	  no	  nazo	  to	  shinjitsu	  [The	  Myth	  and	  Truth	  of	  the	  Korean	  War],	  translation	  of	  Anatoliĭ	  Vasilevich	  Torkunov's	  Zagadochnaia	  voĭna	  by	  Shimotomai	  Nobuo	  and	  Kimu	  Sonho	  (Tokyo:	  Soshisha,	  2001).	  Also,	  informative	  and	  thoughtful	  is	  Vojtech	  Mastny,	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  Soviet	  
Insecurity:	  The	  Stalin	  Years	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  
  198 
influences:	  in	  particular,	  domestic	  politics	  and	  popular	  attitudes,	  which	  constituted	  a	  social	  context	  that	  limited	  the	  range	  of	  choices	  available	  to	  Beijing.	  Such	  a	  domestic	  matrix	  provided	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  political	  contexts	  that	  made	  some	  decisions	  likely,	  and	  others	  less	  probable.	  Built	  on	  the	  existing	  literature’s	  findings,	  this	  chapter	  expands	  the	  framework	  in	  answering	  the	  questions	  posed	  above	  with	  particular	  attention	  to	  everyday	  people’s	  voices	  and	  behaviors,	  and	  connects	  the	  making	  of	  Beijing’s	  policies	  to	  domestic	  politics,	  historical	  contexts,	  and	  daily	  lives	  of	  ordinary	  people.	  	  	  	  
After	  Inchon:	  Rumors	  and	  Fears	  As	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  Beijing	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  major	  actor	  in	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  Korean	  War;	  generally	  supporting	  the	  North	  Koreans	  but	  avoiding	  direct	  involvement.	  One	  major	  factor	  in	  Beijing’s	  change	  of	  attitude	  was	  the	  American	  victory	  at	  the	  Inchon	  Landing	  on	  September	  15,	  1950.11	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  hearing	  of	  the	  U.S.	  victory,	  Mao	  Zedong	  seemed	  to	  begin	  changing	  his	  mind	  on	  the	  China’s	  stance	  in	  the	  war,	  writing	  to	  Gao	  Gang	  on	  that	  day,	  “It	  seems	  that	  not	  sending	  troops	  would	  be	  inappropriate,	  and	  that	  we	  need	  to	  prepare	  in	  earnest.”12	  Yet,	  no	  consensus	  existed	  among	  the	  CCP	  leadership,	  and	  any	  decision	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  was	  yet	  to	  come.	  What	  became	  a	  critical	  factor	  for	  Beijing	  leaders’	  final	  decision	  was,	  rather,	  serious	  ramifications	  of	  the	  Inchon	  
                                                11	  Chen	  Jian,	  China’s	  Road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War,	  158-­‐164.	  	  12	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  Mao	  Zedong	  yu	  Mosike	  di	  en	  en	  yuan	  yuan	  (Mao	  Zedong’s	  Indebtedness	  and	  Bitterness	  toward	  Moscow)(Nanchang,	  PRC:	  Jiangxi	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  1999),	  288.	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Landing	  in	  Chinese	  society,	  as	  well	  as	  Beijing’s	  observation	  of	  them,	  issues	  which	  have	  not	  been	  well	  understood	  in	  the	  existing	  literature.	  	  	   To	  be	  sure,	  newspapers	  at	  that	  time	  rarely	  delivered	  reports	  that	  could	  be	  viewed	  as	  portraying	  the	  Communist	  Party	  in	  a	  negative	  light.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  American	  victory	  at	  Inchon	  was	  reported	  several	  days	  later,	  and	  only	  in	  a	  small	  article,	  which	  described	  not	  “America’s	  victory,”	  but	  North	  Korean	  forces’	  “fierce	  defensive	  battle,”	  in	  which	  the	  People’s	  Army	  caused	  “serious	  damage”	  to	  American	  forces.13	  Similarly,	  the	  North	  Korean	  forces’	  retreat	  from	  Seoul	  was	  described	  as	  a	  “planned	  withdrawal”	  and	  “victory.”14	  The	  amount	  of	  news	  on	  the	  war	  then	  sharply	  decreased	  in	  late	  September	  and	  October.15	  It	  might	  appear	  strange,	  thus,	  to	  think	  about	  “ramifications”	  of	  the	  Inchon	  Landing	  in	  Chinese	  society.	  One	  might	  ask:	  “How	  could	  the	  operation	  have	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  public	  without	  much	  information?”	  	  Yet,	  the	  fact	  that	  newspapers	  stopped	  reporting	  on	  the	  war	  situation	  provided	  enough	  of	  a	  sign	  to	  let	  readers	  sense	  the	  change	  of	  tide	  in	  the	  war.	  “Editors	  of	  newspapers	  must	  have	  racked	  their	  brains	  to	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  say	  People’s	  Army’s	  ‘victory’	  to	  describe	  their	  retreat	  from	  Seoul!”	  sarcastically	  said	  one	  traffic	  policeman	  in	  Beijing.16	  Another	  policeman,	  Li	  Guozhong,	  was	  even	  more	  
                                                13	  Renmin	  Ribao,	  September	  23,	  1950.	  	  14	  “zhongnan	  qu	  qingnian	  qunzhong	  de	  sixiang	  qingkuang	  [The	  thought	  situations	  among	  a	  mass	  of	  youth	  in	  Zhongnan	  area],”	  Neibu	  cankao,	  October	  31,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  15	  “Diwu	  quwei,	  Qu	  fulian	  chouweihui	  deng	  danwei	  guanyu	  Kang-­‐Mei	  Yuan-­‐Chao	  gongzuo	  de	  baogao,	  zhoubao,	  jianbao	  	  [Reports	  and	  summaries	  of	  the	  fifth	  district	  committee	  and	  women’s	  league	  of	  the	  district	  etc.	  concerning	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  campaigns],”	  October	  20,	  1950,	  No.	  040-­‐002-­‐00123,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  16	  “Beijing-­‐shi	  diliu	  quwei	  ge	  zhibu	  youguan	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  qunzhong	  fanying	  ji	  xuanchuan	  zhihuizhan	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Reports	  from	  various	  branch	  offices	  of	  the	  sixth	  district	  in	  Beijing	  concerning	  the	  common	  people’s	  reactions	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	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critical:	  “Newspapers	  report	  how	  many	  Americans	  died,	  and	  how	  many	  Yi	  Sung-­‐man	  soldiers	  died.	  But	  did	  no	  one	  die	  on	  the	  Korean	  [People’s	  Army]	  side?	  The	  news	  is	  nothing	  but	  propaganda.”17	  Another	  internal	  report	  similarly	  informed	  Beijing	  that	  many	  people	  no	  longer	  trusted	  Renmin	  Ribao,	  viewing	  it	  as	  reporting	  only	  good	  news	  for	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  as	  Nationalist	  Party’s	  paper	  did	  for	  it.18	  The	  internal	  report,	  thus,	  concluded,	  “After	  Inchon,	  a	  sense	  of	  disappointment	  is	  spreading.”19	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  marked	  decline	  in	  the	  quantity	  of	  war	  news,	  what	  increased	  rapidly	  following	  the	  Inchon	  Landing	  were	  rumors,	  from	  the	  verisimilar	  and	  credible	  to	  the	  wild	  and	  fantastical.	  “America	  is	  not	  a	  ‘paper	  tiger;’	  it	  is	  an	  ‘iron	  tiger’!”	  “North	  Koreans	  can	  do	  nothing	  about	  it,”	  maintained	  whispers	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  other	  neighboring	  cities.20	  Another	  typical	  story	  involved	  the	  fate	  of	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung;	  one	  rumor	  in	  Beijing	  had	  it	  that	  Kim	  was	  already	  captured	  and	  taken	  prisoner,	  and	  another	  that	  Kim	  had	  evacuated	  to	  Beijing,	  or	  possibly	  Moscow.21	  The	  change	  of	  tide	  in	  Korea	  increased	  concerns	  about	  its	  neighboring	  region,	  the	  
                                                                                                                                         movements	  and	  working	  plans	  for	  propaganda],”	  November,	  1950,	  No.	  038-­‐001-­‐00023,	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Archives	  (hereafter	  BMA),	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  17	  Ibid.	  	  18	  “Zhongnan	  qu	  qingnian	  qunzhong	  de	  sixiang	  qingkuang	  [The	  thought	  situations	  among	  a	  mass	  of	  youth	  in	  Zhongnan	  area],”	  Neibu	  cankao,	  October	  31,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  19	  Ibid.	  	  20	  “1951	  nian	  bannian	  lai	  jinxing	  kang-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  aiguo	  zhuyi	  jiaoyu	  de	  qingkuang	  baogao	  [Situation	  report	  concerning	  the	  ongoing	  patriotism	  education	  of	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1951],”	  September	  21,	  1951,	  C21-­‐1-­‐108,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC;	  “Wuxi,	  Suzhou	  dengdi	  liuchuan	  de	  yaoyan	  ji	  bufen	  ganbu	  qunzhong	  dui	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  [The	  spread	  of	  rumors	  in	  Wuxi	  and	  Suzhou	  etc.	  and	  reactions	  among	  some	  cadres	  and	  the	  common	  people	  toward	  the	  current	  political	  situation],”	  November	  11,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  21	  Ibid;	  “Beijing-­‐shi	  diliu	  quwei	  ge	  zhibu	  youguan	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  qunzhong	  fanying	  ji	  xuanchuan	  zhihuizhan	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Reports	  from	  various	  branch	  offices	  of	  the	  sixth	  district	  in	  Beijing	  concerning	  the	  common	  people’s	  reactions	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  and	  working	  plans	  for	  propaganda],”	  October	  19,	  1950,	  No.	  038-­‐001-­‐00023,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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northeast	  of	  China;	  one	  student	  at	  Youzhen	  Junior	  School	  in	  Beijing,	  Ma	  Lilan,	  heard	  that	  all	  schools	  in	  Shenyang	  had	  moved	  to	  Harbin.	  Another	  student,	  who	  had	  been	  accepted	  to	  a	  university	  in	  the	  northeast,	  gave	  up	  going	  to	  the	  school	  because	  his	  family	  feared	  the	  outbreak	  of	  a	  war	  in	  the	  north.22	  	  Such	  imaginings	  about	  the	  prospect	  of	  war	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  northeast	  region.	  “American	  airplanes	  are	  attacking	  the	  northeast.	  What	  should	  we	  do	  if	  they	  come	  to	  Beijing?”	  “The	  United	  States	  must	  use	  an	  atomic	  bomb	  in	  Shanghai,”	  maintained	  rumors	  in	  Beijing	  and	  Shanghai,	  respectively.23	  With	  these	  rumors	  and	  fears,	  again,	  commodity	  prices	  increased	  in	  many	  cities,	  and,	  similarly,	  the	  price	  of	  gold	  jumped.	  In	  the	  city	  of	  Wuxi	  in	  the	  Jiangsu	  Province,	  for	  instance,	  gold	  prices	  increased	  by	  125	  percent	  in	  only	  four	  days	  following	  September	  18.24	  Rumors	  and	  fears	  of	  these	  kinds	  often	  ignited	  another	  concern—the	  recurrence	  of	  Civil	  War,	  that	  is,	  the	  Nationalist	  Party’s	  counteroffensive.	  	  Whispers	  maintained,	  for	  example,	  “The	  Nationalist	  Party	  already	  began	  landing	  at	  Guangdong	  and	  Dalian;”	  “GMD	  armies	  of	  two	  million	  strength	  have	  been	  
                                                22	  “Diwu	  quwei,	  Qu	  fulian	  chouweihui	  deng	  danwei	  guanyu	  Kang-­‐Mei	  Yuan-­‐Chao	  gongzuo	  de	  baogao,	  zhoubao,	  jianbao	  	  [Reports	  and	  summaries	  of	  the	  fifth	  district	  committee	  and	  women’s	  league	  of	  the	  district	  etc.	  concerning	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  campaigns],”	  October	  20,	  1950,	  No.	  040-­‐002-­‐00123,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC;	  	  “Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  yundong	  zhong	  zhongxuesheng	  de	  sixiang	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  situation	  of	  thought	  among	  high	  school	  students	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements],”	  September	  21,	  1950,	  No.	  100-­‐001-­‐00034,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  23	  “Beijing-­‐shi	  diliu	  quwei	  ge	  zhibu	  youguan	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  qunzhong	  fanying	  ji	  xuanchuan	  zhihuizhan	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Reports	  from	  various	  branch	  offices	  of	  the	  sixth	  district	  in	  Beijing	  concerning	  the	  common	  people’s	  reactions	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  and	  working	  plans	  for	  propaganda],”	  November,	  1950,	  No.	  038-­‐001-­‐00023,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC;	  “1951	  nian	  bannian	  lai	  jinxing	  kang-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  aiguo	  zhuyi	  jiaoyu	  de	  qingkuang	  baogao	  [Situation	  report	  concerning	  the	  ongoing	  patriotism	  education	  of	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1951],”	  September	  21,	  1951,	  C21-­‐1-­‐108,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  24	  “Mei-­‐jun	  zai	  Renchuan	  denglu	  hou,	  Wuxi	  gongshang	  jie	  sixiang	  hunluan	  huangjin	  pengzhang	  [	  The	  inflation	  in	  glod	  price	  and	  the	  confusion	  among	  the	  business	  circles	  in	  Wuxi	  following	  the	  landing	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  at	  Inchon]”	  Neibu	  cankao,	  October	  13,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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heading	  for	  Changsha.”	  Another	  story	  even	  claimed,	  “Lin	  Biao	  was	  already	  dead	  in	  an	  air	  raid	  on	  August	  8th,	  and	  his	  coffin	  had	  already	  arrived	  at	  Changsha.”25	  In	  such	  whispers,	  even	  the	  weather	  provided	  a	  reasoning	  for	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party;	  one	  rumor	  maintained	  that	  World	  War	  III	  had	  just	  begun,	  and	  that	  the	  people	  now	  working	  for	  the	  CCP	  would	  be	  killed	  soon,	  adding	  that	  “When	  Japanese	  armies	  came	  here	  we	  had	  a	  long	  spell	  of	  dry	  weather,	  and	  the	  Japanese	  were	  routed	  within	  a	  year.	  Now	  the	  communist	  armies	  have	  come	  and	  we	  have	  a	  long	  drought,	  too.	  They	  will	  not	  be	  here	  so	  long,	  either.”26	  With	  the	  American	  forces’	  landing	  at	  Inchon	  and	  North	  Korean	  army’s	  setbacks,	  and	  with	  rumors	  of	  the	  GMD’s	  counteroffensive	  on	  the	  mainland,	  came	  a	  sea	  change	  in	  popular	  attitudes.	  According	  to	  internal	  reports,	  some	  local,	  village-­‐level	  cadres	  became	  half-­‐hearted,	  some	  who	  had	  claimed	  interest	  in	  registering	  with	  the	  Communist	  Party	  suddenly	  evaded	  commitment,	  some	  members	  of	  the	  Youth	  League	  began	  planning	  to	  withdraw	  or	  already	  withdrawn	  their	  names	  from	  membership,	  and	  some	  peasants	  became	  reluctant	  to	  provide	  provisions.27	  Such	  half-­‐heartedness	  was	  quite	  common	  at	  that	  moment.	  A	  staff	  member	  of	  the	  Police	  Department	  in	  Beijing,	  Liu	  Baomin,	  too,	  even	  though	  publicly	  advocating	  his	  
                                                25	  “Hunan,	  Zhejiang,	  Sunan,	  Shandong	  dengdi	  yaoyan	  huiji	  [The	  collection	  of	  rumors	  in	  Hunan,	  Zhejiang,	  Sunan,	  and	  Shandong	  etc.],”	  Neibu	  cankao,	  October	  25,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  26	  Ibid.	  	  27	  “Zhonggong	  Shanghai	  shi	  jiaoqu	  gongzuo	  weiyuanhui	  xuanchuan	  bu	  guanyu	  jiaoqu	  Kang-­‐Mei	  Yuan-­‐Chao	  xuanchuan	  jiaoyu	  gongzuo	  qingkuang	  de	  baogao	  [The	  report	  concerning	  operations	  of	  propaganda	  and	  education	  on	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  in	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Shanghai],”	  A71-­‐2-­‐889-­‐10,	  January	  5,	  1951,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC;	  “Kang-­‐Mei	  Yuan-­‐Chao	  yundong	  zhong	  zhongxuesheng	  de	  sixiang	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  situation	  of	  thought	  among	  high	  school	  students	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements],”	  November,	  1950,	  No.	  100-­‐001-­‐00034,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC;	  and	  “Beijing-­‐shi	  diliu	  quwei	  ge	  zhibu	  youguan	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  qunzhong	  fanying	  ji	  xuanchuan	  zhihuizhan	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Reports	  from	  various	  branch	  offices	  of	  the	  sixth	  district	  in	  Beijing	  concerning	  the	  common	  people’s	  reactions	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  and	  working	  plans	  for	  propaganda],”	  November	  2,	  1950,	  No.	  038-­‐001-­‐00023,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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“determined	  support”	  for	  the	  stance	  of	  the	  Beijing	  Government,	  reportedly	  purchased	  a	  tricycle	  after	  the	  Inchon	  Landing	  in	  secret,	  preparing	  to	  flee	  Beijing	  in	  case	  of	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  III.28	  	  	   Such	  an	  attitude	  was	  a	  sort	  of	  self-­‐protection	  on	  the	  side	  of	  ordinary	  people	  in	  a	  time	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  unrest,	  and	  not	  at	  all	  unreasonable	  in	  view	  of	  increasingly	  deteriorating	  social	  order.	  In	  fact,	  anti-­‐communist	  and	  insurrectionary	  activities	  became	  more	  and	  more	  common	  after	  the	  United	  States	  entered	  in	  the	  Korean	  War,	  particularly	  in	  the	  weeks	  following	  the	  American	  victory	  at	  Inchon.	  Various	  kinds	  of	  “counterrevolutionaries,”	  for	  instance,	  attacked	  factories	  and	  railways,	  set	  fire	  to	  warehouses	  and	  private	  houses,	  and	  even	  organized	  riots	  and	  battles	  against	  local	  communist	  governments.29	  Reactionary	  slogans	  were	  ubiquitous;	  graffiti	  in	  a	  public	  convenience	  at	  the	  Beihai	  Park	  in	  Beijing	  read,	  for	  example,	  “Defeat	  Mao	  Zedong!”	  “Mao	  Zedong	  is	  the	  head	  of	  rebels,”	  and	  so	  on.	  Similar	  slogans	  appeared	  even	  in	  front	  of	  army	  camps.30	  Such	  rumors	  and	  doubts	  about	  the	  CCP’s	  legitimacy	  were	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  some	  remote	  areas,	  local	  communist	  governments	  had	  difficulties	  in	  managing—or	  even	  lost	  control	  over—local	  “rebels.”	  A	  local	  official	  in	  the	  Zhejiang	  Province,	  south	  of	  Shanghai,	  for	  example,	  informed	  Beijing	  at	  the	  end	  of	  September	  1950:	  	  
                                                28	  Ibid.	  	  29	  See	  news	  articles	  appeared	  in,	  for	  instance,	  Chiangjiang	  Ribao	  (25	  July	  1950,	  8	  October,	  5	  November,	  and	  24	  November);	  Jilin	  Ribao	  (26	  October,	  28	  October,	  1	  November,	  and	  5	  November);	  
Henan	  Ribao	  (14	  November	  and	  23	  November);	  Shanxi	  Ribao	  (6	  August,	  8	  September,	  21	  October,	  and	  4	  December);	  Guangxi	  Ribao	  (10	  December	  and	  17	  December);	  and	  Renmin	  Ribao	  (17	  October).	  These	  newspapers	  are	  available	  at	  Jilin	  University	  Library	  Archives	  (hereafter	  JULA),	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  	  	  	  30	  Jiang	  Yonghui,	  14.	  Jiang	  Yonghui	  was	  an	  adjutant	  commander	  in	  the	  CPV	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	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In	  August,	  military	  achievements	  against	  rebels	  were	  not	  so	  large,	  and	  our	  attack	  on	  them	  was	  not	  strong	  enough,	  giving	  them	  opportunities	  to	  take	  advantage	  of.	  The	  activities	  of	  rebels	  have	  now	  tended	  to	  become	  rampant	  […].	  They	  spread	  rumors,	  deceive	  people,	  frighten	  people,	  and	  kidnap	  people.	  They	  send	  foodstuffs	  and	  money	  to	  people	  as	  they	  wish,	  and,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  conduct	  looting,	  thus	  destroying	  and	  damaging	  to	  our	  organization	  in	  villages.	  They	  assassinate	  our	  active	  supporters	  in	  villages,	  block	  traffic,	  and	  destroy	  electric	  cables,	  thus	  disturbing	  order	  in	  villages.31	  	  	  	  Such	  a	  situation	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  this	  area	  in	  the	  eastern	  part	  of	  China.	  Another	  report,	  from	  the	  Hubei	  Province	  in	  the	  central	  area,	  similarly	  described	  activities	  of	  local	  “rebels,”	  which	  became	  rampant	  particularly	  in	  the	  late	  summer	  of	  1950.	  These	  activities	  included,	  for	  example,	  dozens	  of	  robberies	  every	  month,	  destruction	  of	  crops,	  demolition	  of	  traffic	  routes	  and	  electric	  cables,	  and	  so	  on.32	  Likewise,	  a	  report	  from	  the	  Hunan	  Province	  detailed	  the	  activities	  of	  counterrevolutionary	  groups,	  such	  as	  the	  “Chinese	  Self-­‐Rescuing	  Army”	  in	  the	  area.33	  It	  was	  said	  that,	  in	  the	  western	  part	  of	  the	  province,	  where	  around	  300,000	  people	  lived,	  there	  were	  more	  than	  “70,000	  rebels.”	  A	  far	  more	  remote	  corner,	  the	  Guizhou	  Province,	  might	  have	  been	  the	  most	  troubling	  from	  Beijing’s	  perspective,	  since	  eighty	  percent	  of	  the	  province	  had	  been	  captured	  by	  local	  “rebels.”34	  CCP	  leaders	  were	  acutely	  aware	  of	  widespread	  unrest.	  They	  noted	  the	  chain	  of	  association	  between	  counterrevolutionary	  activities	  and	  America’s	  intervention	  in	  the	  Korean	  War.	  After	  America’s	  direct	  intervention	  in	  Korea	  and	  
                                                31	  “Zhejiang	  liu	  fenqu	  feite	  huadong	  jianqu	  changjue	  [The	  activities	  of	  bandits	  and	  spies	  became	  rampant	  in	  the	  sixth	  district	  of	  Zhejiang],”	  Neibu	  cankao,	  October	  13,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  32	  “Hubei	  tufei	  tewu	  eba	  huadong	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  situations	  of	  activities	  of	  local	  bandits,	  spies,	  and	  local	  despots	  in	  Hubei],”	  Neibu	  cankao,	  October	  14,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  33	  “Xiangxi	  Wugang,	  Chengbu	  deng	  xian	  feite	  huadong	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  situations	  of	  activities	  of	  bandits	  and	  spies	  in	  Xiangxi	  Wugang,	  Chengbu	  etc.],”	  Neibu	  cankao,	  October	  19,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  34	  Shu	  Ken’ei	  [Zhu	  Jianrong],	  Mo	  Takuto	  no	  Chosen	  Senso:	  Chugoku	  ga	  Oryokuko	  wo	  wataru	  made	  
[Mao	  Zedong’s	  Korean	  War:	  China’s	  Crossing	  of	  the	  Yalu	  River](Tokyo:	  Iwanami	  Gendai	  Bunko,	  2004),	  382-­‐3.	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its	  dispatch	  of	  the	  Seventh	  Fleet	  to	  the	  Taiwan	  Straight,	  Beijing	  was	  haunted	  by	  fear	  for	  the	  survival	  of	  its	  new	  government.	  This	  fear	  was	  caused	  by	  the	  prospect	  of	  counterrevolutionary	  pressures	  from	  within	  and	  without,	  and	  not	  groundless	  at	  all,	  particularly	  in	  view	  of	  the	  continuing	  Civil	  War.35	  	  
Legitimacy	  Still	  Unsettled:	  Continuing	  Civil	  War	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China,	  one	  third	  of	  Chinese	  territory	  was	  not	  yet	  under	  CCP	  control.	  In	  addition	  to	  Hainan	  Island,	  Tibet,	  and	  Taiwan,	  all	  or	  most	  parts	  of	  Guangdong,	  Guangxi,	  Sichuan,	  Guizhou,	  and	  Yunnan,	  as	  well	  as	  portions	  of	  Shanxi,	  Hunan,	  and	  Hubei	  were	  not	  yet	  “liberated.”	  By	  the	  time	  of	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  most	  of	  these	  regions	  had	  come	  under	  control,	  yet	  Tibet	  and	  Taiwan	  remained	  thorns	  in	  the	  CCP’s	  side.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  even	  in	  “liberated”	  areas,	  resistance	  remained	  powerful.	  In	  Guangxi	  province,	  for	  example,	  the	  local	  communist	  party	  announced	  that	  more	  than	  “7,000	  people”	  were	  killed	  by	  reactionaries	  in	  1950.36	  At	  a	  glance,	  this	  number	  may	  seem	  high,	  but,	  in	  response,	  the	  local	  liberation	  army	  suppressed	  “143,000	  rebels”	  	  the	  same	  year.37	  More	  specifically,	  in	  only	  five	  days	  in	  early	  December	  1950,	  about	  “4,560	  reactionaries”	  were	  reportedly	  killed.38	  	  The	  large-­‐scale	  purge	  in	  Guangxi	  province	  in	  1950	  was	  not	  an	  independent	  event.	  According	  to	  a	  speech	  by	  Zhou	  Enlai,	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  (PLA)	  
                                                35	  Meisner,	  71.	  	  36	  Hu	  Sheng	  et	  al.,	  Zhongguo	  gongchandang	  de	  qishinian	  [A	  Seventy-­‐years	  History	  of	  the	  Chinese	  
Communist	  Party]	  (Beijing:	  Zhonggong	  dangshi	  chubanshe,	  1991),	  328.	  37	  Guangxi	  Ribao,	  10	  December	  1950,	  JULA,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	  38	  Guangxi	  Ribao,	  17	  December	  1950,	  JULA,	  Changchun,	  PRC.	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had	  eliminated	  about	  “8,070,000	  enemies”	  since	  1946,	  and	  in	  one	  year	  between	  1949	  and	  1950,	  “2,180,000	  reactionaries”	  were	  killed.39	  These	  massive	  numbers	  that	  the	  CCP	  announced	  may	  have	  been	  exaggerated	  in	  order	  to	  impress	  their	  audience,	  but,	  even	  so,	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  problem—the	  existence	  of	  social	  unrest—was	  certain.	  These	  numbers	  indicate	  not	  only	  the	  strength	  of	  CCP	  rule,	  but	  also	  suggest	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  deep-­‐rooted	  disavowal	  of	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  communist	  regime.	  	  	   After	  Inchon,	  in	  particular,	  a	  prospect	  of	  counterrevolution	  wore	  the	  aura	  of	  “reality”	  as	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  heightened	  its	  propaganda	  campaigns	  in	  central	  and	  southern	  China	  in	  the	  weeks	  following	  the	  American	  victory	  at	  the	  Inchon	  Landing.	  On	  September	  26,	  for	  instance,	  the	  GMD’s	  ten	  airplanes	  flew	  over	  coastal	  and	  central	  areas,	  such	  as	  the	  Hubei,	  Hunan,	  Anhui,	  Jiangxi,	  Zhejiang,	  Fujian,	  and	  Guangdong	  provinces,	  dropping	  bags	  containing	  white	  rice,	  books,	  and	  leaflets.	  A	  letter	  to	  “fellow	  countrymen	  who	  suffer	  from	  famine”	  told	  readers	  that	  North	  Korean	  forces	  had	  been	  defeated	  already,	  and	  that	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  has	  been	  preparing	  for	  a	  counterattack,	  adding,	  “Our	  fellow	  countrymen	  in	  the	  mainland!	  Stood	  up,	  and	  support	  GMD’s	  counteroffensive!”40	  	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  the	  CCP	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950	  was	  still	  far	  from	  establishing	  authority	  and	  credibility	  in	  the	  hearts	  of	  the	  people.	  Recurring	  counterrevolutionary	  activities	  and	  the	  continuing	  Civil	  War,	  thus,	  were	  not	  just	  a	  
                                                39	  Zhou	  Enlai,	  Zhou	  Enlai	  junshi	  wenxuan	  [Zhou	  Enlai’s	  Collected	  Works	  on	  Military	  Affairs],	  30	  September	  1950	  (Beijing:	  Renmin	  chubanshe,	  1997),	  60-­‐61.	  	  40	  “Kongjun	  yuanfei	  dalu	  kongtou	  baimi	  [Air	  force	  flew	  far	  to	  the	  mainland	  to	  drop	  white	  rice],”	  
Minsheng	  Ribao,	  September	  27,	  1950,	  National	  Taiwan	  University,	  Taipei,	  Taiwan;	  Neibu	  cankao,	  November	  9,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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military	  issue,	  but,	  at	  core,	  a	  political	  issue,	  which	  could	  have	  fundamental	  and	  negative	  ramifications	  for	  other	  domestic	  programs—at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  CCP’s	  legitimacy—such	  as	  land	  reform.	  	  In	  fact,	  for	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  land	  reform	  was	  not	  really	  “agrarian”	  reform,	  but,	  rather,	  a	  political	  campaign,	  because	  its	  aim	  was	  the	  destruction	  of	  the	  political	  power	  of	  the	  gentry-­‐landlord	  class	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  legitimacy	  in	  thousands	  of	  villages	  throughout	  China.	  In	  the	  countryside,	  where	  probably	  more	  than	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  of	  500	  million	  was	  comprised	  of	  poor	  peasants,	  the	  real	  heart	  of	  agrarian	  reform	  was	  to	  build	  a	  sense	  of	  trust	  toward	  the	  CCP.	  	   Yet,	  problems	  in	  the	  land	  reform	  program	  had	  been	  escalating	  since	  the	  spring	  of	  1950,	  reaching	  critical	  mass	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950.	  An	  internal	  report	  written	  in	  November	  of	  1950	  summarized	  the	  situation	  well:	  	  After	  the	  American	  intervention	  in	  Korea,	  landlords	  and	  rich-­‐peasants	  appeared	  to	  be	  planning	  mischief,	  and,	  particularly	  after	  this	  fall,	  there	  have	  been	  more	  than	  a	  hundred	  cases	  of	  various	  kinds	  of	  reactionary	  activities.	  In	  particular,	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  Shangdu	  and	  Kangbao,	  there	  were	  more	  than	  fifty	  such	  cases.	  For	  example,	  some	  landlords	  threatened	  peasants	  and	  recaptured	  their	  land,	  and	  others	  seized	  their	  crops.	  In	  other	  cases,	  they	  ejected	  peasants	  through	  threatening	  or	  starting	  rumors,	  saying,	  for	  instance,	  “World	  War	  III	  has	  started.	  The	  land	  [allocated	  to	  peasants]	  will	  be	  back	  to	  original	  owners.”	  Peasants	  are	  afraid	  of	  a	  change	  of	  the	  government.	  There	  is	  a	  case	  in	  which	  landlords	  merged	  with	  local	  gangs,	  killing	  communist	  cadres	  and	  active	  peasants.	  	  Such	  landlords’	  counterattack	  has	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  local	  communist	  government,	  which	  has	  decided	  to	  suppress	  these	  actions.	  Many	  cases	  of	  intense	  conflicts	  between	  peasants	  and	  landlords	  are	  emerging	  everywhere.41	  	  Looking	  closely,	  however,	  one	  notes	  that	  conflicts	  of	  this	  kind	  were	  much	  more	  persistent	  and	  deep-­‐rooted	  than	  this	  report	  described.	  In	  fact,	  these	  were	  
                                                41	  “Meidi	  qinChao	  hou,	  Chasheng	  gedi	  dizhu	  jinxing	  fangong	  [After	  the	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  Korea,	  landlords	  in	  various	  places	  in	  the	  Cha	  province	  carry	  on	  counterattack],”	  November	  30,	  1950,	  
Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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problems,	  which	  had	  existed	  and	  were	  being	  exacerbated,	  and	  which	  only	  came	  to	  surface,	  particularly	  after	  America’s	  entry	  into	  the	  war	  and	  its	  landing	  at	  Inchon.	  	  The	  crux	  of	  the	  problem,	  actually,	  was	  the	  CCP’s	  initial	  moderate	  stance	  in	  terms	  of	  land	  reform,	  which	  was	  adopted	  in	  the	  early	  months	  of	  the	  PRC	  but	  discarded	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  in	  initiating	  the	  spread	  of	  land	  reform	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1950,	  the	  Communist	  Party	  took	  a	  much	  more	  cautious	  and	  moderate	  policy.	  It	  promised	  that	  land	  reform	  would	  be	  conducted	  in	  “an	  orderly	  manner	  through	  a	  step-­‐by-­‐step	  process.”42	  Radicalism	  was	  avoided,	  and	  less	  revolutionary	  policies—such	  as	  preservation	  of	  rich	  peasants—were	  chosen.	  Such	  a	  milder	  and	  gradualist	  course	  was	  taken	  to	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  sustain	  production	  levels	  and	  to	  avoid	  social	  and	  economic	  disorder.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  such	  policies	  could	  lend	  the	  continuation	  of	  “reactionary”	  forces,	  keeping	  the	  life	  of	  peasants	  as	  it	  was.43	  In	  short,	  moderate	  policy	  could	  have	  economic	  benefits,	  but	  have	  negative	  effects,	  politically.	  	  In	  fact,	  Xin	  Hunan	  Bao,	  a	  local	  newspaper	  in	  the	  Hunan	  province,	  received	  questions	  and	  doubts	  from	  readers	  regarding	  such	  land	  reform	  in	  the	  early	  months	  of	  the	  PRC:	  “Is	  this	  policy	  not	  contradictory	  to	  a	  previous	  one	  that	  aimed	  at	  eradicating	  the	  land-­‐owning	  class?”	  “How	  could	  peasants	  live	  without	  confiscating	  lands	  of	  rich-­‐peasants?”	  “How	  was	  the	  previous	  land	  reform	  policy	  changed	  as	  such?”	  “What	  kind	  of	  attitude	  should	  we	  take	  toward	  former	  landlords?”44	  Lower-­‐
                                                42	  Amako	  Satoshi,	  Chuka	  jinmin	  kyowakoku	  shi	  [A	  History	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China]	  (Tokyo,	  1999),	  21.	  	  43	  “Jiangsu	  Zhenjiang	  shi	  gejie	  dui	  tudi	  fa…de	  fanying	  [The	  reactions	  toward	  the	  Land	  Reform	  Law	  in	  the	  various	  circles	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Zhenjiang	  in	  Jiangsu],”	  Neibu	  Cankao,	  July	  18,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  44	  “Dui	  ‘budong	  funong	  tudi	  caichan’	  kouhao	  de	  yiwen	  [The	  questions	  toward	  slongans	  of	  ‘Not	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ranking	  officials	  in	  villages	  expressed	  puzzlement,	  as	  well.	  “The	  policy	  of	  protecting	  prosperous	  farmers	  cannot	  satisfy	  peasants’	  demands,	  and	  land	  reform	  would	  be	  rendered	  meaningless.”	  Fearful	  of	  the	  decline	  in	  peasants’	  spirits,	  some	  cadres	  intentionally	  did	  not	  convey	  this	  policy	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1950,	  and	  others	  even	  deliberately	  misrepresented	  the	  content	  of	  recent	  land	  reform	  policies	  in	  their	  attempts	  at	  winning	  peasants’	  hearts.45	  It	  was	  no	  wonder	  that	  the	  Communist	  Party	  had	  so	  little	  success	  in	  collecting	  taxes	  and	  foodstuffs;	  in	  the	  southwestern	  region,	  the	  party	  collected	  only	  eleven	  percent	  of	  expected	  taxes	  and	  forty	  percent	  of	  expected	  foodstuffs.	  The	  main	  causes	  for	  this	  difficulty	  reportedly	  came	  from	  the	  resistance	  of	  the	  land-­‐owning	  classes.46	  Much	  worse	  than	  the	  tax	  problem	  was	  that	  land	  reform	  was	  an	  issue	  at	  the	  very	  basis	  of	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  regime.	  In	  fact,	  landowners	  made	  desperate	  efforts	  to	  survive	  the	  revolution.	  Some	  provided	  feasts	  for	  peasants,	  some	  re-­‐purchased	  land	  and	  farming	  equipment	  from	  peasants,	  and	  others	  threatened	  peasants	  by	  saying,	  for	  instance,	  that	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  had	  already	  returned	  to	  the	  mainland,	  and	  that	  the	  communist	  rule	  would	  not	  last	  very	  long.47	  In	  the	  south,	  where	  clan	  organizations	  were	  strong	  and	  local	  communist	  parties	  relatively	  weak,	  
                                                                                                                                         taking	  lands	  and	  propaties	  from	  rich-­‐peasants’],”	  Neibu	  Cankao,	  June	  8,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  45	  “Hebei,	  Pingyuan	  ge	  jieceng	  dui	  budong	  funong	  zhengce	  de	  fanying	  [The	  reactions	  among	  various	  levels	  in	  society	  in	  Hebei	  Pingyuan	  toward	  the	  policy	  of	  preserving	  rich	  peasants],”	  Neibu	  Cankao,	  July	  10,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  	  46	  “The	  central	  tasks	  among	  immediate	  operations:	  the	  summary	  of	  Deng	  Xiaoping’s	  report	  in	  the	  Southwest	  newspaper	  conference,”	  Neibu	  Cankao,	  May	  23,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  47	  “Xuanchang…dizhu	  qianfang	  baiji	  dikang	  pohuai	  [Landlords	  in	  Xuanchang	  making	  every	  possible	  effort	  to	  resist	  and	  destroy],”	  Neibu	  Cankao,	  May	  16,	  1950;	  Neibu	  Cankao,	  July	  19,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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the	  gentry	  used	  kinship	  ties	  to	  protect	  themselves.48	  In	  many	  of	  these	  southern	  regions,	  Communist	  Party	  officials	  were	  considered	  “outsiders,”	  who	  had	  come	  abruptly	  from	  the	  	  “north,”	  and	  had	  little	  knowledge	  of	  local	  situations,	  often	  not	  even	  speaking	  the	  native	  dialect,	  and	  thus	  often	  provoking	  resentment	  from	  natives.49	  	  In	  these	  areas,	  the	  CCP	  had	  not	  yet	  achieved	  social	  control	  on	  the	  local	  level,	  and	  thus	  local	  residents	  often	  chose	  to	  follow	  “local	  rules”	  of	  indigenous	  gangs	  and	  “bandits”	  who	  had	  been	  dominant	  on	  the	  local	  scene	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  because	  they	  feared	  these	  local	  forces	  more	  than	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  As	  Frederick	  C.	  Teiwes	  points	  out,	  ordinary	  peasants	  still	  had	  little	  confidence	  about	  whether	  CCP	  rule	  would	  be	  irreversible	  or	  not.50	  	  In	  rural	  areas	  of	  Hunan,	  for	  instance,	  local	  residents	  avoided	  talking	  to	  communist	  officials	  publicly	  for	  fear	  of	  revenge	  by	  local	  “bandits.”	  Local	  residents	  reportedly	  said,	  “The	  government	  would	  release	  bandits	  just	  two	  or	  three	  months	  after	  they	  arrested	  them.	  What	  can	  we	  say?”51	  “I	  do	  not	  fear	  the	  Heaven	  or	  Earth,	  but	  I	  am	  only	  afraid	  of	  the	  People’s	  government	  being	  too	  tolerant.”52	  	   Such	  doubts	  and	  fears	  gained	  the	  ring	  of	  truth	  as	  American	  forces	  landed	  at	  Inchon	  and	  advanced	  to	  the	  north.	  According	  to	  an	  internal	  report,	  “unlawful”	  
                                                48	  Meisner,	  92-­‐96.	  49	  Frederick	  C.	  Teiwes,	  “Establishing	  and	  Consolidating	  of	  the	  New	  Regime,”	  84;	  Also,	  see,	  Ezra	  Vogel,	  Canton	  Under	  Communism:	  Programs	  and	  Politics	  in	  a	  Provincial	  Capital,	  1949-­‐1968	  (New	  York,	  1971	  [1969]),	  91-­‐106.	  	  50	  Frederick	  C.	  Teiwes,	  “Establishing	  and	  Consolidating	  of	  the	  New	  Regime,”	  85.	  51	  “Linli	  dui	  guanfei	  chuli	  bu	  qiadang	  jishi	  tufei	  chengji	  zaoyao	  qunzhong	  kongju	  [The	  dealings	  of	  bandits	  not	  appropriate	  in	  Linli,	  local	  bandits	  seizing	  the	  opportunity	  without	  delay	  and	  spreading	  rumors,	  and	  the	  masses	  terrified],”	  Neibu	  Cankao,	  May	  15,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  52	  Xiangxi	  Wugang,	  Chengbu	  deng	  xian	  feite	  huadong	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  situations	  of	  activities	  of	  bandits	  and	  spies	  in	  Xiangxi	  Wugang,	  Chengbu	  etc.],”	  Neibu	  cankao,	  October	  19,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  
  211 
landowners	  resumed	  making	  their	  presence	  felt	  in	  rural	  communities,	  often	  bringing	  together	  variety	  of	  anti-­‐communist	  forces	  to	  form	  armed	  resistance	  organizations.53	  Peasant	  leaders	  became	  less	  enthusiastic,	  village	  cadres	  became	  reluctant	  to	  conduct	  programs,	  and	  peasants	  did	  not	  dare	  to	  attend	  meetings.	  In	  fact,	  one	  locals’	  meeting	  in	  Shanghai	  that	  was	  supposed	  to	  have	  more	  than	  twenty	  participants	  only	  had	  ten.54	  Fearing	  the	  return	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  Party,	  by	  that	  time,	  some	  peasants	  refused	  to	  receive	  lands	  and	  houses	  allocated	  to	  them.	  “Landlords	  will	  make	  a	  counterattack.	  Our	  boss	  cannot	  be	  reliable,”	  one	  peasant	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Wuxi	  said.	  At	  this	  point,	  an	  elementary	  school	  teacher’s	  comment	  appeared	  “realistic”:	  “Peasants	  cannot	  do	  anything	  well	  for	  ever	  and	  ever.	  If	  they	  want	  to	  do	  something,	  they	  must	  rely	  on	  landlords.”55	  	  Popular	  images	  of	  America	  and	  landowning	  classes	  were	  mixed	  because	  America	  was	  viewed	  as	  backing	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  [Jiang	  Jieshi]	  and,	  by	  extension,	  the	  landowning	  class	  in	  China.	  Even	  though	  landowners	  in	  rural	  China	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  Korea,	  images	  of	  American	  capitalism,	  combined	  with	  hostility,	  connected	  them	  in	  a	  symbolic	  sense.	  If	  Beijing	  did	  not	  take	  an	  aggressive	  attitude	  towards	  the	  United	  States	  in	  Korea,	  how	  could	  local	  party	  members	  logically	  convince	  peasants	  to	  confront	  landowners	  at	  home?	  How	  could	  peasants	  believe	  in	  the	  CCP’s	  land	  reform	  program	  if	  Beijing	  was	  soft	  on	  landlords	  
                                                53	  “Hunan	  Yongshun	  dengdi	  tufei	  huadong	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  situation	  of	  activities	  of	  local	  bandits	  in	  Hunan	  Yongshun	  etc],”	  Neibu	  Cankao,	  June	  22,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  Jiang	  Yonghui,	  San	  
shi	  ba	  jun	  zai	  Chaoxian	  [The	  Thirty-­‐Eighth	  Army	  in	  Korea]	  (Shenyang:	  Liaoning	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  1996),	  14.	  Jiang	  Yonghui	  was	  an	  adjutant	  commander	  in	  the	  CPV	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  54	  “Zhonggong	  Shanghaishi	  jiaoqu	  gongzuo	  weiyuanhui	  guanyu	  Shanghaishi	  Hualongqu	  heping	  qianming	  yundong	  de	  gongzuo	  jianbao	  [CCP	  rural	  workings	  committee	  on	  peace	  signature	  campaigns	  at	  Hualong	  district	  in	  Shanghai],”	  November	  4,	  1950,	  A71-­‐2-­‐56,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  	  55	  Ibid.	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and	  “Meidi	  [American	  imperialism],”	  which	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  backing	  landlords	  in	  China?	  In	  this	  way,	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  issues	  were	  seen	  to	  be	  connected,	  and	  American	  involvement	  became	  to	  be	  an	  undesirable	  factor	  for	  CCP	  supporters,	  which	  could	  cause	  the	  de-­‐stabilization	  of	  domestic	  order	  and	  erosion	  of	  confidence	  among	  the	  people.56	  	  Viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  it	  is	  no	  wonder,	  thus,	  that	  some	  of	  those	  who	  had	  been	  enthusiastic	  and	  supportive	  toward	  the	  Communist	  Party	  grew	  impatient	  with	  the	  CCP’s	  cautious	  stance	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  In	  early	  September,	  for	  instance,	  a	  local	  committee	  in	  Zhenjiang,	  eastern	  China,	  was	  informed	  that	  some	  people	  said,	  “Why	  don’t	  we	  go	  and	  fight?	  What	  is	  the	  point	  of	  just	  issuing	  protests	  in	  writing?”57	  A	  local	  committee	  in	  Beijing	  received	  similar	  letters:	  “The	  American	  army	  invades	  Korea	  in	  full	  strength.	  That’s	  too	  much	  for	  the	  Korean	  people.	  Why	  doesn’t	  our	  Democratic	  side	  send	  troops?”	  “Meidi	  [American	  imperialism]	  has	  already	  come	  over	  our	  head.”	  “American	  imperialists	  openly	  invade	  [Korea],	  why	  don’t	  we	  support	  Korea	  in	  open	  ways?”58	  	  
                                                56	  Wang	  Bo,	  Mao	  Zedong	  de	  jiannan	  juece:	  Zhongguo	  renmin	  zhiyuanjun	  chubing	  Chaoxian	  de	  juece	  
guocheng	  [Mao	  Zedong’s	  Difficult	  Decision:	  A	  Process	  of	  Decision	  making	  over	  the	  Dispatch	  of	  the	  
Chinese	  People’s	  Volunteers	  to	  Korea],	  2nd	  ed	  (Zhongguo	  shehui	  kexue	  chubanshe,	  2006),	  129.	  57	  “Mei-­‐ji	  qinfan	  wo	  dongbei	  lingkong	  hou	  Zhenjiang	  qunzhong	  fanying	  [The	  masses’	  reactions	  in	  Zhenjiang	  following	  the	  American	  combat	  planes’	  violation	  of	  our	  northeastern	  territorial	  sky],”	  
Neibu	  cankao,	  September	  12,	  1950.	  	  58	  “Opinions	  regarding	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  war,”	  a	  memo	  from	  Beijing	  municipal	  committee	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  8	  October	  1950,	  in	  Beijing	  shi	  dangan	  guan	  yanjiushi	  ed.,	  “Beijing	  shi	  yu	  Kan-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  [City	  of	  Beijing	  and	  ‘Resist	  America	  and	  Assist	  Korea’	  movements],”	  Lengzhan	  
guojishi	  yanjiu	  [Cold	  War	  International	  History	  Studies],	  vol.	  2	  (Beijing:	  Shijie	  zhishi	  chubanshe,	  2006),	  396;	  “Beijing-­‐shi	  diliu	  quwei	  ge	  zhibu	  youguan	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  qunzhong	  fanying	  ji	  xuanchuan	  zhihuizhan	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Reports	  from	  various	  branch	  offices	  of	  the	  sixth	  district	  in	  Beijing	  concerning	  the	  common	  people’s	  reactions	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  and	  working	  plans	  for	  propaganda],”	  November	  2,	  1950,	  No.	  038-­‐001-­‐00023,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC;	  “Zhongnan	  qu	  qingnian	  qunzhong	  de	  sixiang	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  thought	  situations	  of	  the	  youth	  in	  the	  Zhongnan	  region],”	  Neibu	  cankao,	  October	  31	  and	  November	  3,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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   It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  such	  an	  aggressive	  stance	  remained	  only	  one	  of	  several	  viewpoints,	  and	  did	  not	  represent	  a	  majority.59	  According	  to	  local	  cadres’	  observations	  in	  Beijing,	  many	  expressed	  reluctance	  toward	  the	  idea	  of	  entering	  the	  war.	  Some	  said,	  “To	  be	  sure,	  it	  is	  a	  good	  thing	  to	  send	  troops	  to	  Korea,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  do	  so	  because	  many	  people	  now	  dislike	  any	  war,	  many	  don't	  have	  hatred	  toward	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  thus	  morale	  is	  very	  low.”	  Likewise,	  one	  low-­‐ranking	  party	  member	  said,	  “China	  has	  just	  come	  out	  from	  the	  horrors	  of	  war.	  We	  need	  enough	  rest	  and	  preparation.”60	  	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  some	  intellectuals,	  businessmen,	  and	  college	  students	  simply	  remained	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  “I	  simply	  don’t	  feel	  hatred	  toward	  the	  United	  States,”	  one	  female	  student	  at	  Yanjing	  University	  in	  Beijing	  said.61	  Another	  high	  school	  student	  in	  the	  northeastern	  city	  of	  Jilin	  asked,	  “What’s	  wrong	  with	  the	  U.S.?	  I	  love	  to	  have	  American	  bread	  and	  milk.”62	  A	  similar	  opinion	  came	  up	  in	  a	  discussion	  class	  at	  a	  junior	  school	  in	  Beijing;	  one	  student	  voiced	  his	  opinion,	  “Americans	  are	  good.	  They	  came	  to	  help	  us	  before.	  Giving	  us	  foodstuffs	  can	  be	  called	  an	  ‘economic	  invasion,’	  but	  not	  a	  ‘political	  invasion,’”	  and	  further	  
                                                59	  A	  similar	  observation	  can	  be	  seen	  in,	  for	  instance,	  Hou	  Songtao,	  “Kan-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  yundong	  zhong	  de	  shehui	  dongyuan”	  [The	  Social	  Mobilization	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  Movements],	  PhD.	  Dissertation,	  Zhonggong	  zhongyao	  dangxiao,	  2006,	  29.	  	  60	  “Beijing-­‐shi	  diliu	  quwei	  ge	  zhibu	  youguan	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  qunzhong	  fanying	  ji	  xuanchuan	  zhihuizhan	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Reports	  from	  various	  branch	  offices	  of	  the	  sixth	  district	  in	  Beijing	  concerning	  the	  common	  people’s	  reactions	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  and	  working	  plans	  for	  propaganda],”	  November,	  1950,	  No.	  038-­‐001-­‐00023,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  	  61	  Beijing	  shi	  dangan	  guan	  yanjiushi	  ed.,	  “Report	  on	  ‘Resist	  America	  and	  Assist	  Korea’	  campaign,”	  a	  memo	  from	  Beijing	  municipal	  committee	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  5	  November	  1950,	  in	  Lengzhan	  
guojishi	  yanjiu	  [Cold	  War	  International	  History	  Studies],	  397-­‐8.	  62	  “How	  one	  student	  realized	  ‘American	  Imperialist,’”	  Jilin	  Ribao,	  10	  November	  1950.	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inquired,	  “If	  this	  is	  an	  invasion,	  why	  do	  not	  we	  think	  the	  support	  from	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  an	  invasion?”63	   	  Still,	  there	  was	  another	  kind	  of	  attitude	  that	  was	  common	  and	  widespread	  at	  that	  time:	  apathy.	  “It’s	  not	  my	  business	  whether	  we	  go	  to	  war	  or	  not.	  I	  just	  do	  my	  job.	  That’s	  it,”	  said	  one	  policeman	  in	  Beijing	  in	  late	  August	  of	  1950.64	  A	  similar	  view	  was	  observed	  everywhere;	  a	  local	  committee	  in	  Nanjing	  observed	  that	  some	  people	  were	  saying:	  “‘Opposing	  America’	  is	  just	  something	  Mao	  Zedong	  is	  doing.	  If	  we	  can	  just	  continue	  to	  eat,	  for	  us,	  whatever	  would	  be	  fine.	  If	  Americans	  would	  come,	  it’s	  just	  all	  right,	  too.”65	  In	  Shanghai,	  as	  well,	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  students	  were	  saying,	  “Who	  cares?”66	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  many	  ordinary	  people	  it	  mattered	  little.	  Such	  an	  attitude	  appeared	  in	  a	  voice	  of	  a	  Shanghai	  factory	  worker:	  	  Today,	  Taiwan	  is	  conducting	  their	  land	  reform,	  and	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  has	  also	  begun	  criticizing	  himself.	  They	  now	  understand	  that	  they	  need	  to	  serve	  the	  general	  public	  and	  people.	  Why	  should	  we	  attack	  them	  now?	  Isn’t	  it	  impossible	  for	  Mao	  Zedong	  and	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  to	  issue	  a	  joint	  statement	  that	  neither	  is	  going	  to	  participate	  in	  World	  War	  III?	  We	  common	  people	  just	  need	  to	  eat	  and	  survive.	  We	  don’t	  need	  to	  say,	  ‘You	  are	  a	  supporter	  of	  Mao!’	  or	  ‘You	  are	  a	  supporter	  of	  Chiang!’	  Who	  cares?67	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  “Beijing-­‐shi	  diliu	  quwei	  ge	  zhibu	  youguan	  Kang	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  “Nanjing	  ge	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  1950,	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  cankao,	  CUHK,	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  Kong,	  PRC.	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From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  however,	  such	  a	  lack	  of	  interest	  was,	  in	  a	  sense,	  most	  threatening	  because	  it	  could	  undermine	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  communist	  revolution	  and	  government.	  In	  other	  words,	  this	  issue	  was	  the	  reason	  for	  their	  existence.	  Such	  elements	  of	  indifference	  could	  be	  dangerous	  because	  people	  could	  easily	  switch	  positions	  depending	  on	  the	  course	  of	  current	  events.	  	  	   This	  is	  why	  the	  communist	  leadership	  paid	  significant	  attention	  to	  currents	  of	  popular	  attitudes.	  The	  municipal	  committee	  in	  Beijing,	  for	  example,	  studied	  public	  reactions	  concerning	  China’s	  stance	  on	  the	  Korean	  War,	  classifying	  people	  in	  four	  categories:	  those	  who	  urged	  Beijing	  to	  enter	  the	  war,	  those	  who	  opposed	  entering	  the	  war	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  China’s	  incapability,	  those	  who	  opposed	  entering	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  just	  cause,	  and	  those	  who	  did	  not	  find	  any	  fault	  on	  the	  American	  side.68	  	  A	  similar	  investigation	  was	  conducted	  with	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  in	  August	  of	  1950.	  This	  study	  focused	  on	  soldiers’	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  United	  States,	  placing	  them	  into	  three	  categories:	  fifty	  percent	  had	  strong	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  and	  firm	  confidence	  in	  communist	  programs;	  another	  forty	  percent	  understood	  the	  CCP’s	  programs	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  war	  but	  remained	  less	  confident;	  and	  the	  remaining	  ten	  percent	  experiencing	  tendencies	  toward	  “fearing	  America,”	  “admiring	  America”	  or	  “sympathizing	  with	  America.”	  This	  last	  ten	  percent,	  reportedly	  mostly	  youth	  from	  newly	  “liberated”	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areas,	  lacked	  confidence	  in	  the	  CCP	  programs.69	  While	  we	  cannot	  gauge	  the	  reliability,	  it	  suggests	  that	  nearly	  half	  still	  remained	  more	  or	  less	  dubious,	  though	  the	  majority	  had	  confidence	  in	  the	  CCP’s	  programs.	  What	  is	  interesting	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  accuracy	  of	  this	  ratio	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  communist	  authorities	  paid	  attention	  to	  popular	  attitudes.	  In	  fact,	  policymakers	  in	  Beijing	  were	  attentive	  to	  the	  balance	  among	  these	  categories:	  the	  majority	  that	  made	  up	  of	  supportive	  elements;	  another	  large	  portion	  sitting	  on	  the	  fence;	  and	  a	  small	  portion	  remaining	  dubious	  toward	  the	  communist	  cause.	  Because	  of	  the	  supportive	  majority,	  the	  CCP	  would	  be	  able	  to	  conduct	  its	  programs	  at	  home.	  Yet,	  the	  discontented	  faction	  remained,	  and	  the	  large	  portion	  of	  politically	  moderate	  elements	  could	  easily	  falter	  depending	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  circumstances,	  particularly	  in	  wartime.	  	  Although	  Beijing	  remained	  relatively	  cautious	  toward	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  America’s	  involvement	  throughout	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  the	  complexity	  of	  popular	  attitudes	  created	  a	  difficult	  situation:	  if	  Beijing	  chose	  not	  to	  confront	  the	  United	  States	  abroad,	  the	  majority	  of	  supportive	  elements	  could	  become	  reluctant	  or	  lose	  confidence	  in	  CCP	  programs,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  undesirable	  elements	  in	  society	  could	  rise	  up,	  possibly	  disturbing	  CCP	  legitimacy	  at	  home.	  During	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  thus,	  the	  communist	  leadership	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  issues	  in	  conjunction.	  This	  was	  because	  achieving	  one	  goal	  could	  possibly	  promote	  other	  goals,	  while	  failing	  to	  attain	  one	  could	  have	  a	  harmful	  influence	  on	  other	  tasks,	  whether	  abroad	  or	  at	  home.	  Such	  a	  consideration	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  Du	  Ping,	  Zai	  zhiyuanjun	  zongbu	  [At	  the	  Headquarters	  in	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weighed	  heavily	  when	  Beijing	  faced	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  China	  would	  enter	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  early	  October	  of	  1950.	  	  	  
China’s	  Entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War	  	  On	  October	  1,	  1950,	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  celebrated	  its	  first	  anniversary.	  Newspapers	  printed	  pictures	  of	  Mao	  Zedong	  and	  Sun	  Wen	  side-­‐by-­‐side,	  and	  carried	  articles	  and	  letters	  extoling	  the	  achievements	  of	  the	  “people’s	  victory.”	  In	  Beijing,	  Tiananmen	  Square	  was	  filled	  with	  thousands	  of	  people	  all	  day	  long;	  the	  review	  of	  the	  troops	  began	  in	  the	  morning,	  followed	  by	  waves	  of	  demonstrations	  and	  parades	  in	  the	  afternoon,	  which	  Mao	  Zedong	  and	  other	  CCP	  leaders	  observed	  from	  the	  top	  of	  the	  Tiananmen	  Gate.	  Similar	  events	  were	  held	  all	  over	  the	  country,	  and	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  participated	  in	  various	  events	  celebrating	  the	  first	  anniversary	  of	  the	  new	  government	  (Picture	  1).	  	  	  	  	   Mao	  Zedong,	  however,	  might	  not	  have	  been	  in	  a	  mood	  to	  celebrate,	  as	  he	  had	  just	  received	  two	  urgent	  messages	  on	  that	  day,	  one	  from	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung,	  and	  the	  other	  from	  Joseph	  Stalin,	  both	  soliciting	  Beijing	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  in	  Korea	  in	  support	  of	  North	  Korea.	  The	  situation	  in	  Korea	  was	  grave.	  North	  Korean	  armies	  were	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  annihilation,	  and	  the	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung	  regime	  was	  facing	  imminent	  collapse.	  Worse	  still,	  Beijing	  had	  received	  an	  intelligence	  report,	  indicating	  the	  U.S.	  forces’	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel,	  though,	  in	  retrospect,	  it	  was	  a	  misreport.70	  Having	  received	  these	  letters	  and	  information,	  Mao	  held	  an	  urgent	  meeting	  on	  that	  
                                                70	  Shu	  Guang	  Zhang,	  Mao’s	  Romanticism,	  77;	  UK4B-­‐31-­‐11,	  Telegram,	  CRO	  to	  High	  Commissioner	  in	  Dehli,	  October	  3,	  1950,	  in	  DO133/24	  “China:	  Political	  Situation,”	  BNA,	  Kew,	  U.K.	  This	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  was	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  as	  a	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  The	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  that	  crossed	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  on	  October	  1	  was	  South	  Korean	  armies.	  U.S.	  forces	  crossed	  the	  parallel	  on	  October	  8	  local	  time.	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evening	  with	  Zhu	  De,	  Liu	  Shaoqi,	  and	  Zhou	  Enlai,	  in	  which	  he	  insisted	  that	  China	  needed	  to	  enter	  the	  war.	  Perhaps	  due	  to	  the	  lingering	  feverish	  atmosphere	  of	  that	  anniversary	  day,	  Mao’s	  view	  prevailed.71	  	   With	  that	  spirit,	  Mao	  stayed	  up	  late	  and	  wrote	  two	  telegrams,	  one	  to	  Gao	  Gang	  and	  Deng	  Hua,	  and	  the	  other	  meant	  to	  be	  sent	  to	  Stalin.	  It	  was	  already	  around	  2	  am	  on	  October	  2.	  Mao	  instructed	  to	  Gao	  Gang	  to	  come	  to	  Beijing,	  and	  Deng	  Hua	  to	  complete	  preparation	  of	  the	  Northeast	  Border	  Defense	  Army	  and	  put	  it	  on	  standby.72	  To	  Stalin,	  he	  wrote:	  	  We	  have	  decided	  to	  send	  a	  portion	  of	  our	  troops	  to	  Korea	  under	  the	  name	  of	  Volunteers	  in	  order	  to	  assist	  Korean	  comrades	  in	  fighting	  the	  troops	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  its	  running	  dog	  Syngman	  Rhee.	  If	  Korea	  were	  completely	  occupied	  by	  the	  Americans,	  the	  Koreans’	  revolutionary	  potency	  would	  be	  fundamentally	  destroyed,	  and	  the	  American	  invaders	  would	  be	  more	  rampant,	  and	  [such	  a	  situation	  would	  be]	  very	  unfavorable	  to	  the	  whole	  East.73	  	  	  In	  a	  part	  of	  this	  long	  telegram,	  Mao	  further	  explained	  a	  possible	  worst-­‐case	  scenario,	  involving	  domestic	  concerns	  and	  possible	  repercussions	  of	  the	  war	  among	  the	  most	  unfavorable	  elements	  at	  home.	  He	  wrote:	  	  	  We	  consider	  that	  the	  most	  unfavorable	  situation	  would	  be	  that	  the	  Chinese	  forces	  fail	  to	  destroy	  American	  troops	  in	  large	  numbers	  in	  Korea,	  thus	  resulting	  in	  a	  stalemate,	  while	  the	  U.S.	  openly	  enters	  the	  war	  against	  China.	  [That	  situation]	  would	  be	  destructive	  to	  China’s	  economic	  construction	  already	  under	  way,	  and	  would	  cause	  discontents	  toward	  us	  among	  the	  national	  bourgeoisie	  and	  other	  sectors	  of	  the	  people	  (they	  are	  afraid	  of	  war).74	  	  	  This	  telegram,	  however,	  was	  not	  sent	  to	  Moscow.	  On	  that	  day,	  October	  2,	  the	  meeting	  of	  the	  Politburo	  Standing	  Committee	  was	  held	  at	  Zhongnanhai,	  and,	  to	  Mao’s	  surprise,	  virtually	  everyone	  except	  for	  himself	  expressed	  skepticism,	  
                                                71	  Shen	  Zhihua,	  184,	  Chen	  Jian,	  173.	  	  72	  Mao	  Zedong,	  Jienguo	  yilai	  Mao	  Zedong	  wengao	  [Mao	  Zedong’s	  Collected	  Works	  After	  the	  
Establishment	  of	  the	  Country],	  vol.	  1	  	  (Beijing:	  Zhongyang	  wenxian	  Chubanshe,	  1987),	  538.	  73	  Ibid,	  539-­‐41;	  Chen	  Jian,	  China’s	  Road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War,	  175.	  74	  Mao	  Zedong,	  Jienguo	  yilai	  Mao	  Zedong	  wengao,	  540;	  Chen	  Jian,	  China’s	  Road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War,	  176.	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pessimism,	  or	  even	  opposition	  toward	  his	  idea	  of	  entering	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  support	  of	  North	  Korea.	  Lin	  Biao	  expressed	  reservations,	  as	  well,	  and	  refused	  Mao’s	  request	  to	  be	  a	  commander	  of	  Chinese	  forces.	  Faced	  with	  unexpected	  opposition	  among	  the	  CCP	  leadership,	  instead	  of	  sending	  his	  draft	  to	  Moscow,	  Mao	  met	  with	  N.	  V.	  Roschin,	  Soviet	  Ambassador	  to	  China	  late	  at	  night	  on	  October	  2,	  orally	  informed	  him	  that	  China	  was	  not	  ready	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  at	  this	  point.	  Mao	  explained	  that	  China’s	  entry	  would	  entail	  “extremely	  serious	  consequences;”	  first	  of	  all,	  U.S.	  forces	  would	  overpower	  China,	  since	  China’s	  military	  capability	  was	  nowhere	  near	  to	  that	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Second,	  China’s	  entry	  could	  bring	  about	  open	  warfare	  between	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  could	  lead	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  pulling	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  into	  the	  war.	  Much	  worse,	  such	  a	  situation	  would	  cause	  the	  entire	  program	  of	  building	  the	  country	  to	  deteriorate,	  possibly	  provoking	  many	  people’s	  discontent	  toward	  the	  communist	  regime.	  Thus,	  Mao	  recommended	  that	  North	  Korea	  take	  on	  a	  guerrilla	  warfare	  strategy,	  and,	  in	  the	  end,	  while	  adding	  that	  the	  final	  decision	  had	  not	  been	  made,	  Mao	  concluded	  that	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  show	  patience,	  refrain	  from	  advancing	  troops,	  and	  prepare	  troops	  until	  a	  time	  more	  advantageous	  to	  China.75	  	  	   Roschin	  was	  surprised	  by	  Mao’s	  reply,	  informing	  Stalin	  on	  the	  following	  day,	  October	  3,	  that	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  had	  changed	  its	  opinion.	  Stalin,	  who	  
                                                75	  “Ciphered	  telegram	  from	  Roshchin	  in	  Beijing	  to	  Filippov	  [Stalin],	  October	  3,	  1950,	  conveying	  October	  2,	  1950	  message	  from	  Mao	  to	  Stalin,”	  in	  CWIHP	  Digital	  Archives:	  The	  Korean	  War,	  available	  at	  <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/digital-­‐archive>;	  also,	  Shen	  Zhihua,	  Chaoxian	  
zhanzheng,	  Vol.	  2,	  576-­‐77;	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  293-­‐294;	  Xu	  Yan,	  Mao	  Zedong	  yu	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  
zhanzheng:	  zhengque	  er	  huihuang	  de	  yunchou	  weiwo	  [Mao	  Zedong	  and	  a	  War	  of	  “Resisting	  America	  
and	  Assisting	  Korea”:	  Correct	  and	  Glorious	  Operation	  Planning	  ]	  (Beijing:	  Jiefang	  jun,	  2003),	  86-­‐87.	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had	  been	  carefully	  avoiding	  a	  direct	  confrontation	  with	  the	  United	  States,	  may	  not	  have	  been	  particularly	  shocked.	  In	  fact,	  in	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  his	  reply	  to	  Mao	  Zedong,	  Stalin	  acknowledged	  Mao’s	  reservations	  in	  view	  of	  domestic	  considerations.	  While	  continuing	  to	  strongly	  urge	  China	  to	  send	  troops	  to	  Korea	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  not	  yet	  fully	  prepared	  for	  a	  large-­‐scale	  war,	  and	  that	  Japanese	  militarism	  had	  not	  yet	  recovered	  and	  would	  not	  provide	  any	  military	  support	  for	  the	  United	  States,76	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  draft,	  Stalin	  referred	  to	  domestic	  situations	  in	  China	  and	  accepted	  Mao’s	  position.	  He	  wrote:	  	  Your	  reply	  contains	  a	  consideration	  that	  is	  new	  to	  me,	  the	  one	  on	  the	  domestic	  situation	  of	  China,	  which,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  is	  of	  decisive	  significance.	  You	  assert	  that,	  in	  case	  of	  a	  new	  war	  with	  regard	  to	  Korean	  events	  there	  will	  be	  very	  many	  malcontents	  in	  the	  country,	  that	  there	  is	  strong	  longing	  for	  peace	  in	  the	  country.	  This	  means	  that	  China,	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  internal	  situation,	  is	  not	  ready	  for	  a	  new	  war.	  In	  such	  a	  big	  country	  as	  China,	  the	  future	  of	  the	  people	  is	  decided	  not	  by	  foreign	  policy	  factors,	  but	  by	  the	  factors	  of	  domestic	  situation.	  Of	  course,	  you	  should	  know	  the	  domestic	  situation	  in	  China	  better	  than	  anybody	  else.	  If	  the	  internal	  situation	  in	  China	  does	  not	  allow	  you	  to	  risk	  such	  steps	  that	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  new	  war,	  then	  one	  should	  think	  in	  general	  if	  one	  should	  undertake	  such	  a	  risk.	  Therefore	  I	  fully	  understand	  you	  and	  your	  position.77	  	  Stalin,	  however,	  did	  not	  send	  this	  draft	  on	  the	  spot.	  Instead,	  he	  revised	  and	  sent	  it	  on	  the	  night	  of	  the	  following	  day	  on	  October	  5.	  In	  the	  final	  draft,	  Stalin’s	  tone	  of	  urging	  China	  to	  send	  troops	  heightened	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  his	  own	  interpretation	  of	  China’s	  domestic	  situations	  and	  possible	  consequences.	  Instead	  of	  simply	  accepting	  Mao’s	  explanation	  that	  the	  new	  war	  against	  the	  United	  States	  would	  cause	  a	  rise	  in	  discontents,	  Stalin	  pointed	  out	  that,	  in	  this	  emerging	  war	  
                                                76	  Niu	  Jun,	  “The	  Birth	  of	  the	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China	  and	  the	  Road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War”	  in	  Melvyn	  Leffler	  and	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  The	  Cambridge	  History	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  vol.	  1	  (New	  York,	  2010),	  240-­‐242.	  77	  “New	  Evidence	  on	  Cold	  War	  Crises:	  Russian	  Documents	  on	  the	  Korean	  War,	  1950-­‐1953,”	  Cold	  War	  International	  History	  Project	  Bulletin,	  Issue	  14/15	  (Winter	  2003-­‐Spring	  2004),	  376;	  Also,	  see,	  Shen	  Zhihua,	  Chaoxian	  zhanzheng,	  Vol.	  2,	  583-­‐584.	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situation,	  the	  bourgeois	  parties	  that	  were	  part	  of	  the	  Chinese	  coalition	  would	  exploit	  discontent	  in	  the	  country	  against	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  and	  its	  leadership.78	  	  	   Mao	  Zedong	  and	  Chinese	  leadership	  probably	  did	  not	  need	  to	  listen	  to	  Stalin’s	  analysis.	  It	  was	  already	  clear.	  They	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  and	  paid	  attention	  to	  such	  possible	  ramifications	  for	  domestic	  politics.	  In	  fact,	  Beijing	  did	  not	  wait	  for	  Stalin’s	  reply.	  Before	  the	  message	  was	  orally	  conveyed	  to	  Mao	  Zedong	  on	  the	  night	  of	  October	  6,	  Beijing’s	  leadership	  had	  already	  confirmed	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War.	  The	  decision	  was	  made	  in	  a	  series	  of	  CCP	  Central	  Committee	  Politburo	  meetings,	  held	  on	  October	  4	  and	  5	  in	  Zhongnanhai.	  	   At	  the	  first	  meeting	  on	  October	  4,	  the	  mood	  was	  not	  conductive	  for	  a	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  war.	  As	  in	  the	  meeting	  on	  October	  2,	  virtually	  everyone	  except	  Mao	  expressed	  reservations.79	  From	  their	  viewpoint,	  there	  were	  five	  primary	  reasons	  for	  objection.	  First,	  wounds	  from	  previous	  wars	  had	  not	  healed	  and	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  remained	  weak.	  Second,	  land	  reform	  had	  not	  advanced	  and	  the	  newly	  established	  regime	  was	  not	  yet	  consolidated.	  Third,	  Taiwan	  and	  many	  other	  areas	  had	  yet	  to	  be	  captured,	  and	  there	  were	  still	  about	  a	  million	  “rebels”	  and	  “counterrevolutionaries.”	  Fourth,	  China’s	  military	  arsenal	  was	  far	  behind	  that	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  and,	  in	  particular,	  China	  had	  command	  of	  neither	  the	  air	  nor	  sea.	  Last,	  people	  and	  soldiers	  had	  a	  feeling	  of	  war-­‐weariness.80	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  Ibid;	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  Rongzhen	  Memoir]	  (Beijing:	  Jiefangjun	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  Guang	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  80	  Chen	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  Road	  to	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  Korean	  War,	  182;	  Shu	  Guan	  Zhang,	  80;	  Shi	  Zhe,	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  (Beijing:	  Zhong	  ang	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  chubanshe,	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  494;	  Dangdai	  Zhongguo	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  bianji	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  Zhongguo	  chubanshe,	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Scholars	  have	  not	  yet	  agreed	  on	  the	  point	  whether	  or	  not	  Lin	  Biao,	  then	  the	  commander	  of	  the	  Fourth	  Field	  Army	  in	  the	  northeast,	  who	  was	  actually	  Mao’s	  first	  choice	  to	  be	  commander	  of	  the	  CPV,	  attended	  the	  Politburo	  meetings	  on	  October	  4	  and	  5,	  but	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  he	  attended	  those	  meetings	  and	  raised	  the	  strong	  objection.	  According	  to	  their	  accounts,	  Lin	  Biao	  insisted:	  	  We	  just	  founded	  our	  country.	  It	  was	  not	  a	  long	  time	  ago.	  […]	  National	  strength	  is	  still	  weak,	  and	  we	  do	  not	  have	  enough	  power	  to	  fight	  again.	  Especially	  we	  don’t	  have	  the	  same	  level	  as	  the	  U.S.	  forces.	  Thus,	  I	  still	  have	  this	  view:	  we	  need	  to	  be	  cautious.	  We	  have	  already	  been	  at	  war	  for	  more	  than	  twenty	  years,	  and	  our	  energy	  has	  not	  recovered	  yet.	  […].	  America	  is	  the	  largest	  and	  strongest	  industrial	  nation	  with	  highly	  modernized	  military	  equipment.	  The	  U.S.	  has	  an	  extremely	  powerful	  air	  force	  and	  navy.	  […]	  I	  believe	  strengthening	  the	  northeastern	  border	  is	  better	  way,	  avoiding	  “catching	  fire	  burning	  ourselves	  to	  death.”81	  	  Lin	  Biao’s	  point	  was	  clear,	  and	  even	  similar	  to	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur’s	  analysis	  at	  that	  time.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  oppositional	  voice	  against	  sending	  troops	  to	  Korea,	  expressed	  by	  Lin	  Biao,	  Liu	  Shaoqi,	  Gao	  Gang	  and	  others,	  was	  grounded	  in	  domestic	  and	  military	  concerns.	  	  	   The	  tide	  of	  discussion	  changed	  in	  the	  meeting	  held	  on	  October	  5.	  Peng	  Dehuai,	  who	  had	  just	  been	  asked	  by	  Mao	  to	  be	  a	  commander	  of	  Chinese	  forces	  that	  morning,	  delivered	  an	  impassioned	  speech,	  asserting	  that	  China	  would	  need	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  for	  three	  reasons.	  First,	  if	  American	  forces	  were	  to	  stay	  in	  Taiwan	  and	  Korea,	  they	  could	  find	  an	  excuse	  to	  invade	  China	  at	  any	  time.	  Second,	  if	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  2000),	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Americans	  occupied	  the	  Korean	  peninsula,	  future	  problems	  could	  be	  more	  complicated.	  Third,	  in	  doing	  this,	  China	  could	  give	  a	  serious	  blow	  to	  “domestic	  and	  international	  reactionary	  spirits”	  and	  the	  “Qin-­‐Mei	  [sympathizing	  with	  America]	  elements.”82	  	  Peng	  Dehuai	  developed	  the	  last	  portion	  of	  this	  argument	  several	  days	  later	  in	  speeches	  before	  high-­‐ranking	  military	  officials	  in	  the	  northeast,	  saying	  that,	  if	  China	  would	  not	  actively	  dispatch	  troops	  to	  support	  the	  Korean	  revolutionary	  government	  and	  its	  people,	  domestic	  and	  international	  counterrevolutionaries’	  spirits	  could	  begin	  to	  rise,	  and	  Qin-­‐Mei	  [sympathizing	  with	  America]	  elements	  in	  society	  would	  be	  able	  to	  become	  active.”83	  For	  these	  reasons,	  Peng	  insisted,	  attacking	  earlier	  would	  be	  better	  than	  having	  to	  do	  so	  later.	  Peng’s	  powerful	  assertion	  had	  a	  strong	  impression	  on	  other	  participants	  in	  the	  meeting,	  eventually	  bringing	  the	  Politburo	  to	  back	  Mao’s	  stance	  of	  sending	  troops	  to	  Korea.84	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  while	  Lin	  Biao	  and	  other	  members	  used	  domestic	  and	  military	  arguments	  to	  oppose	  it,	  Peng	  Dehuai	  listed	  different	  sets	  of	  domestic	  and	  military	  rationales	  to	  advocate	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  war.	  	  	   The	  Politburo’s	  decision,	  however,	  remained	  in	  flux	  for	  another	  two	  weeks	  due	  to	  Stalin’s	  ambiguous	  attitude.	  In	  a	  prolonged	  10-­‐hour-­‐long	  meeting	  among	  Stalin,	  Zhou	  Enlai,	  and	  Lin	  Biao	  on	  October	  10-­‐11,	  Stalin	  clarified	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  air	  support	  for	  Korea	  in	  short	  order.85	  The	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Chinese	  side	  felt	  betrayed	  by	  this	  statement,	  as	  they	  made	  a	  decision	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  provide	  air	  support	  for	  Chinese	  land	  forces.	  This	  belief	  was	  derived	  from	  series	  of	  Moscow-­‐Beijing	  correspondence	  in	  July	  of	  1950,	  in	  which	  Moscow	  recommended	  that	  Beijing	  move	  Chinese	  divisions	  to	  the	  Chinese-­‐Korean	  border	  in	  case	  the	  U.S.	  crossed	  the	  38th	  Parallel,	  and	  vaguely	  promised	  that	  the	  USSR	  would	  “try	  to	  provide	  air	  cover	  for	  these	  units.”	  Thus,	  it	  might	  be	  possible	  that,	  from	  Moscow’s	  perspective,	  Stalin’s	  promise	  of	  air	  cover	  was,	  from	  the	  beginning,	  limited	  to	  Chinese	  forces	  on	  the	  Chinese-­‐Korean	  border,	  and	  did	  not	  include	  air	  support	  over	  the	  Korean	  peninsula	  in	  the	  war.	  	  	   Because	  of	  this	  discrepancy	  over	  the	  issue	  of	  air	  support,	  Zhou	  Enlai	  and	  Lin	  Biao	  viewed	  sending	  troops	  to	  Korea	  as	  simply	  impossible.	  While	  Stalin	  continued	  to	  counsel	  them	  to	  accept	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  war,	  he	  could	  not	  convince	  them.	  Eventually,	  Stalin	  and	  Zhou	  agreed	  that	  China	  would	  not	  send	  troops	  to	  Korea,	  and	  that	  they	  would	  give	  up	  North	  Korea,	  letting	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung	  and	  his	  troops	  evacuate	  to	  the	  northeastern	  region	  of	  China.86	  A	  telegram	  under	  the	  joint	  signature	  of	  Stalin	  and	  Zhou	  was	  sent	  to	  Beijing	  on	  October	  11,	  to	  which	  Mao	  replied	  on	  the	  next	  day,	  confirming	  that	  he	  agreed	  to	  this	  arrangement,	  and	  that	  he	  had	  already	  given	  instructions	  to	  halt	  the	  plan	  to	  enter	  Korea.	  Mao	  also	  immediately	  canceled	  the	  movements	  of	  divisions	  stationing	  in	  Shandong	  to	  the	  northeast.87	  Receiving	  Mao’s	  reply,	  Stalin	  telegraphed	  Kim	  Il-­‐sung	  on	  October	  13,	  informing	  him	  that	  China	  would	  not	  enter	  the	  war,	  and	  recommending	  guerrilla	  warfare	  in	  the	  northeastern	  region	  of	  China.	  Stalin	  also	  ordered	  Molotov,	  on	  that	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day,	  to	  assist	  with	  Kim’s	  evacuation.	  The	  Korean	  War,	  thus,	  might	  have	  ended	  at	  this	  point	  with	  the	  defeat	  of	  North	  Korea.	  	  	   To	  the	  surprise	  of	  Stalin,	  however,	  Beijing	  overturned	  Moscow’s	  advice	  and	  decided	  to	  send	  troops	  to	  Korea	  even	  without	  Soviet	  air	  support.	  After	  receiving	  Stalin’s	  telegram	  on	  the	  afternoon	  of	  October	  12,	  Mao,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  notified	  Moscow	  that	  he	  had	  halted	  the	  plan	  to	  send	  troops,	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  summoned	  Peng	  Dehuai	  and	  Gao	  Gang	  to	  Beijing	  to	  have	  an	  emergency	  meeting	  on	  October	  13.	  Through	  discussing	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  and	  various	  consequences	  of	  not	  sending	  troops,	  the	  Beijing	  leadership	  eventually	  reached	  the	  conclusion	  that	  they	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  enter	  the	  war.88	  Mao	  wrote	  to	  Zhou	  Enlai	  in	  Moscow	  after	  the	  meeting:	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  discussions	  with	  Gao	  Gang,	  Peng	  Dehuai,	  and	  other	  comrades	  of	  the	  Politburo,	  we	  all	  recognize	  that	  it	  is	  still	  advantageous	  to	  send	  our	  troops	  to	  Korea.	  […].	  The	  active	  policy	  we	  adopted	  would	  be	  extremely	  beneficial	  to	  China,	  Korea,	  the	  East,	  and	  the	  world.	  If	  we	  will	  not	  send	  troops	  and	  let	  the	  enemy	  reach	  the	  banks	  of	  the	  Yalu	  River,	  domestic	  and	  international	  reactionary	  spirits	  will	  rise	  up,	  which	  would	  be	  detrimental	  to	  all	  of	  these	  aspects.	  It	  would	  be	  particularly	  more	  unfavorable	  to	  the	  northeast	  [of	  China];	  the	  entire	  Northeast	  Border	  Defense	  Army	  would	  have	  to	  be	  tied-­‐up	  down	  there,	  and	  the	  electric	  power	  plants	  in	  south	  Manchuria	  would	  be	  under	  the	  enemy’s	  control.89	  	  	  As	  shown	  in	  this	  telegram,	  Beijing’s	  consideration	  was	  multifold.	  It	  was	  surely	  concerned	  with	  border	  security,	  but	  also	  apprehensive	  about	  more	  vague	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  effects	  of	  U.S.	  forces’	  victory	  in	  Korea,	  that	  is,	  a	  possible	  increase	  in	  “reactionary	  sprits”	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	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   The	  examination	  of	  Beijing’s	  reasoning	  in	  this	  series	  of	  discussions	  sheds	  light	  on	  several	  important	  historiographical	  issues.	  First	  of	  all,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Beijing	  entered	  the	  Korean	  War	  not	  because	  of	  “intense	  pressures”	  from	  Moscow.90	  To	  be	  sure,	  Stalin	  had	  been	  encouraging	  Beijing	  to	  assist	  North	  Korea;	  in	  particular,	  Stalin’s	  message,	  dispatched	  at	  11	  pm	  on	  October	  5,	  has	  been	  well	  known	  among	  researchers	  because	  of	  Stalin’s	  famous	  declaration	  that	  the	  communist	  camp	  should	  not	  fear	  war	  against	  the	  United	  States,	  adding,	  “If	  a	  war	  is	  inevitable,	  then	  let	  it	  be	  waged	  now.”91	  However,	  the	  arrival	  of	  this	  message	  did	  not	  affect	  Beijing’s	  policymaking;	  it	  was	  delivered	  at	  10:30	  pm	  on	  October	  6,	  that	  is,	  one	  day	  after	  the	  CCP	  Politburo	  reached	  its	  conclusion,	  and	  this	  was	  the	  same	  meeting	  in	  which	  Mao	  Zedong	  conveyed	  the	  Politburo’s	  decision	  to	  send	  troops	  to	  Korea.92	  	  Furthermore,	  as	  historian	  Kathryn	  Weathersby	  points	  out,	  Stalin	  remained	  cautious,	  taking	  every	  effort	  to	  avoid	  a	  military	  confrontation	  with	  the	  United	  States.93	  In	  fact,	  when	  the	  controversy	  over	  air	  support	  loomed	  and	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  refused	  to	  send	  ground	  troops	  in	  the	  meeting	  on	  October	  10-­‐11,	  Stalin	  gave	  up	  North	  Korea,	  instructing	  Kim	  Il-­‐song	  to	  evacuate	  to	  China.	  It	  was	  the	  Beijing	  leadership	  that	  overturned	  Stalin’s	  suggestion	  and	  informed	  Moscow	  that	  China	  would	  send	  troops	  regardless	  of	  the	  Soviets’	  stance.	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   By	  the	  same	  token,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  say	  that	  the	  U.S.	  military	  action	  of	  crossing	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  was	  only	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  factors	  that	  brought	  Beijing	  to	  choose	  war.	  If	  American	  action	  had	  been	  the	  primary	  factor,	  China’s	  decision	  would	  have	  been	  made	  afterwards,	  and	  Beijing	  should	  not	  have	  wavered	  on	  its	  stance	  after	  that.	  But,	  in	  fact,	  Beijing’s	  decision	  was	  contemplated	  before	  the	  event,	  while	  its	  decision	  was	  overturned	  and	  reconsidered	  again	  and	  again	  until	  the	  moment	  of	  Chinese	  forces	  actual	  crossing	  of	  the	  Yalu	  River.	  To	  be	  sure,	  the	  prospect	  of	  U.S.	  forces’	  presence	  across	  the	  Yalu	  River	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  security	  of	  the	  border	  region.	  Yet,	  what	  concerned	  Beijing	  was	  more	  the	  meaning	  of	  that	  presence	  than	  the	  presence	  itself.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  “security”	  included	  not	  only	  the	  physical	  threat	  to	  the	  northeastern	  region,	  but	  far-­‐reaching	  repercussions	  of	  impressions	  in	  people’s	  minds.	  	  In	  1950,	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  (PRC)	  was	  less	  than	  a	  year	  old,	  and	  had	  yet	  to	  build	  a	  strong	  foundation,	  and	  faced	  several	  critical	  issues.	  The	  Chinese	  economy	  had	  to	  be	  reconstructed	  along	  communist	  lines.	  Land	  reform,	  which	  had	  only	  began	  nationwide	  that	  summer,	  had	  already	  produced	  serious	  problems.	  The	  anti-­‐rightist	  movement	  was	  about	  to	  be	  launched.	  Civil	  War	  in	  southern	  and	  western	  parts	  of	  China	  had	  finally	  come	  to	  an	  end	  only	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1950,	  yet	  forces	  of	  resistance	  and	  counterrevolution	  were	  still	  active	  all	  over	  the	  country.	  In	  addition,	  Tibet	  and	  Taiwan	  were	  not	  under	  CCP	  control.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  although	  revolutionary	  enthusiasm	  was	  strong	  in	  some	  portions	  of	  the	  population,	  another	  unignorable	  portion	  of	  the	  population	  remained	  doubtful,	  if	  not	  overtly	  hostile,	  toward	  the	  CCP’s	  legitimacy.	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Although	  such	  domestic	  problems	  were	  the	  primary	  reason	  for	  the	  CCP	  leadership’s	  reluctance	  to	  enter	  into	  large-­‐scale	  warfare,	  the	  same	  domestic	  problems	  weighed	  heavily	  on	  their	  decision	  to	  enter	  the	  Korean	  War.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  image	  of	  “America”	  had	  been	  symbolically	  connected	  with	  the	  “enemy”	  in	  all	  communist	  programs	  at	  home	  since	  the	  late	  1940s,	  including	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  economy,	  land	  reform,	  the	  anti-­‐rightist	  movement,	  suppression	  of	  various	  kinds	  of	  counter-­‐revolutionaries,	  and,	  most	  of	  all,	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  Civil	  War.	  Therefore,	  America’s	  intervention	  in	  Korea	  in	  July	  1950	  created	  a	  dilemma:	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  war	  might	  be	  a	  great	  burden	  for	  China,	  slowing	  CCP’s	  reconstruction	  programs.	  However,	  all	  of	  those	  programs	  might	  be	  damaged,	  if	  not	  destroyed,	  if	  Beijing	  did	  not	  take	  on	  an	  aggressive	  policy	  in	  the	  war.	  	  The	  Korean	  War	  was,	  in	  a	  sense,	  a	  test	  case	  for	  the	  CCP’s	  legitimacy	  and	  identity	  in	  the	  turbulent,	  uncertain	  period	  following	  the	  Chinese	  Civil	  War.	  What	  Beijing	  had	  to	  seek	  was	  not	  merely	  border	  security	  but	  also	  maintaining	  favorable	  popular	  impressions	  and	  domestic	  social	  equilibrium	  at	  home,	  through	  maintaining	  border	  security.	  Viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  Beijing’s	  aggressive	  posture	  does	  not	  seems	  like	  a	  mere	  reflection	  of	  Mao’s	  personality	  or	  his	  revolutionary	  enthusiasm.	  If	  Beijing’s	  decision	  had	  been	  based	  on	  Mao’s	  personal	  characteristics	  or	  enthusiasm,	  the	  decision	  could	  have	  been	  made	  much	  earlier,	  with	  little	  hesitation,	  and	  should	  not	  have	  fluctuated	  once	  the	  decision	  was	  made.	  Yet,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  Beijing’s	  decision	  swayed	  back	  and	  forth,	  tilted	  by	  various	  circumstantial	  changes.	  Therefore,	  it	  would	  be	  more	  reasonable	  to	  say	  that	  Beijing’s	  decision	  was	  built	  more	  on	  the	  leadership’s	  periodic	  observations	  of	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social	  attitudes,	  its	  fear	  of	  withering	  revolutionary	  support	  at	  home,	  and	  its	  quite	  practical	  needs	  concerning	  the	  consolidation	  of	  CCP	  legitimacy,	  given	  unpredictable	  and	  precarious	  domestic	  situations.	  	   After	  a	  series	  of	  further	  discordance	  with	  Moscow	  and	  subsequent	  stop-­‐	  and	  go-­‐signs	  each	  time,	  on	  October	  18,	  Beijing	  was	  at	  last	  able	  to	  reconfirm	  its	  final	  order	  to	  send	  troops	  to	  Korea.	  While	  all	  communications	  and	  operations	  regarding	  military	  moves	  were	  conducted	  under	  cover,	  even	  ordinary	  people	  must	  have	  discerned	  that	  something	  serious	  was	  going	  on.	  In	  Shenyang,	  for	  instance,	  suddenly,	  extensive	  air	  raid	  precautions	  were	  begun,	  pillboxes	  erected,	  trenches	  dug	  in	  the	  streets,	  many	  factories	  dismantled	  and	  machinery	  moved	  to	  north,	  and	  many	  residents	  began	  evacuating.	  British	  diplomats	  in	  Beijing	  collected	  scattered	  pieces	  of	  information,	  from	  sources	  such	  as	  travelers	  from	  Shanghai	  who	  testified	  that	  they	  saw	  Shanghai’s	  CCP	  armies	  moving	  up	  to	  Shenyang,	  or	  a	  foreign	  businessman	  who	  affirmed	  that	  Shenyang	  was	  in	  a	  mood	  of	  “considerable	  panic.”	  Analyzing	  these	  bits	  of	  information,	  a	  British	  report	  on	  October	  24,	  concluded,	  “It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  measures	  may	  portend	  some	  new	  move	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Government	  in	  connection	  with	  Korea	  for	  which	  they	  fear	  severe	  retaliation.”	  The	  British	  observation	  was	  accurate.	  Chinese	  forces,	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  the	  Chinese	  People’s	  Volunteers,	  crossed	  the	  Yalu	  River	  beginning	  on	  the	  night	  of	  October	  19,	  1950,	  and	  a	  total	  of	  260,000	  troops	  entered	  North	  Korean	  territory.	  	  
	  
“Reality”	  Still	  Unsettled	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China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950	  had	  far-­‐reaching,	  though	  mostly	  unintentional,	  effects	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  As	  was	  the	  case	  for	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  China’s	  action	  was	  “understood”	  in	  many	  places	  in	  many	  different	  ways	  according	  to	  local	  contexts.	  Often	  it	  was	  arbitrarily	  associated	  with	  local	  struggles,	  eventually	  contributing	  to	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  political	  shifts	  in	  distant	  places.	  Still,	  perhaps,	  nowhere	  on	  earth	  were	  more	  profound	  convulsions	  felt	  than	  within	  China	  itself.	  The	  most	  noticeable	  change	  occurred	  in	  newspapers.	  In	  early	  November	  of	  1950,	  a	  communist	  organ,	  Renmin	  
Ribao	  at	  last	  changed	  its	  cautious	  and	  relatively	  low-­‐key	  tone	  that	  had	  prevailed	  since	  July	  to	  one	  that	  was	  more	  aggressive	  and	  harshly	  anti-­‐American.	  “Who	  has	  been	  feeding	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  [Jiang	  Jieshi]?	  Who	  has	  spent	  $6	  billion	  in	  support	  of	  reactionaries	  in	  China?	  […]	  Who	  has	  destroyed	  world	  peace?	  Who	  has	  raped	  our	  sisters?	  Who	  has	  been	  our	  worst	  and	  deadliest	  enemy?”	  asked	  a	  poem	  entitled	  “American	  Killer”	  on	  November	  26,	  answering	  its	  own	  question:	  “That	  is	  American	  imperial	  invaders!	  American	  demons!”94	  	  Following	  a	  series	  of	  Chinese	  victories	  in	  November	  and	  early	  December,	  
Renmin	  Ribao	  completely	  changed	  its	  attitude.	  On	  December	  7,	  a	  cartoon	  in	  the	  newspaper	  depicted	  the	  “Chinese	  people,”	  who	  had	  been	  described	  previously	  as	  supportive	  observers,	  now	  as	  important	  participants	  in	  the	  conflict,	  with	  a	  strong	  determination	  to	  drive	  U.S.	  forces	  from	  Korea	  (Picture	  2).95	  	  On	  the	  next	  day,	  
Renmin	  Ribao	  published	  an	  eight-­‐line	  poem,	  accompanying	  a	  photo	  of	  gift	  bags	  for	  soldiers.	  It	  read:	  
                                                94	  Renmin	  Ribao,	  25	  November	  1950.	  	  95	  Renmin	  Ribao,	  7	  December	  1950.	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Thousands	  of	  comfort	  bags	  	   	   Thousands	  of	  comfort	  letters	  	   	   Thousands	  of	  Chinese	  people’s	  respect	  and	  love	  	  	   	   Devote	  [them]	  to	  the	  heroic	  soldiers	  on	  the	  Korean	  front	  	   	   Bravely	  advance	  to	  the	  south	  	   	   Continuously	  advance	  to	  the	  south	  	   	   To	  Seoul,	  to	  the	  seashore	  	   	   Our	  hearts	  are	  with	  you	  forever.96	  	  	  The	  publication	  of	  this	  poem	  was	  a	  significant	  jump	  for	  Renmin	  Ribao,	  which	  had	  been	  making	  a	  cautious	  effort	  to	  differentiate	  the	  Korean	  War	  from	  Chinese	  people’s	  business,	  and	  continued	  to	  obscure	  China’s	  aims	  in	  the	  war.	  The	  poem	  clearly	  anticipated	  Chinese	  forces’	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel	  and	  the	  “recovery”	  of	  Seoul,	  and	  even	  implied	  the	  unification	  of	  the	  Korean	  Peninsula	  through	  its	  evocation	  of	  the	  “seashore.”	  The	  unstated	  but	  radical	  change	  in	  Renmin	  Ribao	  occurred	  immediately	  following	  the	  Chinese	  and	  North	  Korean	  forces’	  capture	  of	  Pyongyang	  on	  December	  6,	  1950,	  which	  came	  almost	  out	  of	  blue	  for	  many	  Chinese	  people,	  who	  doubted	  that	  Chinese	  armies	  had	  any	  chance	  of	  defeating	  American	  forces.97	  This	  is	  why	  the	  event	  had	  an	  enormous	  impact	  on	  the	  current	  of	  popular	  attitudes	  in	  society.	  A	  local	  communist	  cadre	  in	  Fuzhou,	  for	  example,	  observed	  that	  peasants,	  in	  particular,	  were	  delighted	  by	  news	  of	  the	  CPV’s	  victory,	  while,	  reportedly,	  many	  landlords	  in	  the	  area	  found	  it	  discouraging.98	  Likewise,	  in	  rural	  areas	  of	  the	  Hunan	  Province,	  passions	  for	  participating	  in	  the	  CPV	  quickly	  increased;	  the	  local	  committee	  suddenly	  received	  more	  than	  2,000	  applicants	  by	  the	  end	  of	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  Renmin	  Ribao,	  8	  December	  1950.	  97	  “Zhonggong	  Shanghaishi	  Dachang	  quwei	  xuanchuanbu	  guanyu	  qingzhu	  pingrang	  jiefang	  de	  qingkuang	  baogao	  [The	  propaganda	  division	  of	  the	  Dachang	  district	  committee	  of	  CCP	  Shanghai	  committee	  concerning	  a	  report	  on	  the	  celebration	  of	  Pyongyang’s	  liberation],”	  December	  15,	  1950,	  A71-­‐2-­‐883-­‐25,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  98	  Ibid.	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December.99	  Similar	  scenes	  could	  be	  witnessed	  in	  northeastern	  provinces,	  such	  as	  Rehe,	  Jilin,	  and	  Heilongjiang,	  as	  well.	  	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  news	  of	  the	  CPV’s	  victory	  aroused	  the	  enthusiasm	  among	  many	  people	  (Picture	  3).	  Many	  students	  began	  volunteering	  to	  attend	  the	  Military	  Academy,	  groups	  of	  medical	  students	  joined	  in	  the	  army	  to	  go	  to	  Korea,	  peasants	  began	  submitting	  foodstuffs	  more	  enthusiastically	  and	  punctually,	  and	  many	  people	  began	  believing	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  indeed	  a	  paper	  tiger.	  A	  similar	  shift	  in	  popular	  sentiments	  from	  doubt	  to	  belief	  was	  brought	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  Beijing	  from	  Qingdao,	  Shanghai,	  Fuzhou,	  and	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  country.100	  One	  such	  internal	  report	  from	  northern	  China	  noted	  that	  some	  people	  had	  even	  begun	  taking	  a	  more	  hawkish	  tone,	  asserting,	  “We	  should	  not	  give	  Americans	  time	  to	  rest.	  Rather,	  we	  should	  go	  to	  the	  United	  States	  and	  defeat	  them	  completely.”101	  With	  the	  seizure	  of	  Pyongyang,	  Chinese	  people’s	  views	  on	  their	  own	  country	  began	  changing,	  as	  well.	  One	  high	  school	  student	  reportedly	  said	  that	  he	  had	  previously	  looked	  down	  on	  his	  country	  because	  it	  had	  only	  numerous	  people	  without	  any	  airplanes	  or	  artillery,	  but	  now,	  after	  hearing	  the	  news	  of	  China’s	  
                                                99	  “Hunan	  Ruanjiang,	  Xiangxiang	  deng	  di	  nongmin	  relie	  yaoqiu	  canjun	  [Peasants	  of	  Ruanjiang	  and	  Xiangxiang	  in	  Hunan	  Province	  enthusiastically	  demand	  to	  join	  the	  army],”	  December	  29,	  1950,	  
Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  100	  “Pingrang	  jiefang	  hou	  Fuzhou,	  Qingdao	  gejie	  yiban	  sixiang	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  general	  thought	  situation	  in	  various	  circles	  in	  Fuzhou	  and	  Qingdao	  after	  the	  liberation	  of	  Pyongyang],”	  December	  23,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  101	  “Pingrang	  jiefang	  hou	  dongbei	  Rehe	  deng	  di	  renmin	  kaishi	  zizhang	  susheng	  he	  mabi	  sixiang	  [People	  in	  Rehe	  in	  the	  northeast	  region	  began	  developing	  expectations	  of	  quick	  victory	  and	  lowering	  their	  guard	  after	  the	  liberation	  of	  Pyongyang],”	  January	  13,	  1951,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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victory,	  he	  had	  come	  to	  love	  his	  fatherland.102	  A	  well-­‐known	  Shanghai	  businessman,	  Liu	  Hongsheng,	  had	  similar	  feelings;	  initially	  dubious	  about	  China’s	  campaigns	  against	  the	  United	  States,	  Liu	  changed	  his	  view	  after	  China’s	  victorious	  advances	  in	  the	  battlefield,	  recalling	  later,	  “For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  my	  life,	  I	  am	  proud	  to	  be	  Chinese.”103	  This	  was	  a	  moment	  when	  patriotism	  and	  pride	  developed	  quickly	  in	  China,	  as	  well	  as	  when	  a	  large	  number	  of	  Westerners	  finally	  decided	  to	  leave	  China.104	  	   The	  Chinese	  communist	  leadership	  would	  have	  been	  satisfied	  if	  this	  sort	  of	  attitude	  was	  unanimous	  in	  society.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  it	  was	  not.	  Even	  after	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  war,	  and	  the	  CPV’s	  victories	  over	  American	  forces,	  many	  remained	  doubtful,	  indifferent,	  or	  hostile	  to	  Beijing’s	  policies.	  The	  Beijing	  municipal	  committee	  observed	  in	  November	  of	  1950,	  for	  instance,	  that	  “not	  a	  small	  number	  of	  people”	  maintained	  a	  negative	  attitude	  regarding	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  war,	  and	  that,	  in	  particular,	  intellectuals	  and	  businessmen	  expressed	  “‘yes’	  in	  mouths	  ‘no’	  in	  hearts”	  to	  the	  CCP’s	  efforts	  at	  home	  and	  in	  Korea.105	  
                                                102	  “Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  yundong	  zhong	  zhongxuesheng	  de	  sixiang	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  thought	  situation	  of	  high	  school	  students	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements],”	  December	  26,	  1950,	  No.	  100-­‐001-­‐00034,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  	  	  103	  Sherman	  Cochran,	  “Capitalists	  Choosing	  Communist	  China:	  The	  Liu	  Family	  of	  Shanghai,	  1948-­‐56,”	  in	  Brown	  and	  Pickowicz	  ed.,	  Dilemmas	  of	  Victory:	  The	  Early	  Years	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  
China,	  pp.	  378-­‐79.	  104	  “Pingrang	  jiefang	  hou	  Jinshi	  Ying,	  Mei,	  Fa	  deng	  guo	  qiaomin	  hen	  konghuang	  zhunbei	  jizhong	  chetui	  [British,	  American,	  and	  French	  residents	  in	  Tianjin	  feel	  terrified	  and	  are	  preparing	  for	  mass	  withdrawal	  after	  the	  liberation	  of	  Pyongyang],”	  December	  23,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  105	  Beijing	  shi	  dangan	  guan	  yanjiushi	  ed.,	  “Beijing	  shi	  yu	  kang-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao,-­‐Report	  on	  ‘Resist	  America	  and	  Assist	  Korea’	  campaign,”	  a	  memo	  from	  Beijing	  municipal	  committee	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  5	  November	  1950,	  in	  Lengzhan	  guojishi	  yanjiu	  [Cold	  War	  International	  History	  Studies],	  398;	  Ibid,	  “The	  Second	  Report	  on	  ‘Resist	  America	  and	  Assist	  Korea’	  campaign,”	  a	  memo	  from	  Beijing	  municipal	  committee	  to	  Chairman	  Mao	  and	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  12	  November	  1950,	  
Lengzhan	  guojishi	  yanjiu	  [Cold	  War	  International	  History	  Studies],	  403.	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The	  existence	  of	  such	  possible	  turncoats,	  that	  is,	  possible	  enemies	  within,	  was	  particularly	  menacing	  in	  view	  of	  the	  continuing	  chaotic	  domestic	  situation	  in	  China	  even	  following	  the	  Chinese	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  the	  late	  fall	  of	  1950.	  In	  Shanghai,	  for	  instance,	  a	  statue	  of	  Mao	  Zedong	  at	  the	  Meixi	  Elementary	  School	  was	  destroyed	  in	  early	  November,	  with	  a	  flyer	  left	  on	  it,	  reading	  “Defeat	  Mao	  Zedong!”106	  Throughout	  November,	  graffiti	  and	  numerous	  bills	  suddenly	  appeared	  in	  many	  places.	  Anti-­‐communist	  slogans,	  such	  as	  “If	  Mao	  Zedong	  and	  Zhu	  De	  stay,	  the	  war	  will	  never	  end,”	  appeared	  in	  the	  bathrooms	  and	  on	  walls	  of,	  at	  least,	  the	  Dongji	  High	  School,	  Minli	  Female	  School,	  Qingxin	  Female	  School,	  and	  Jiangnan	  Shipbuilding	  School.107	  Furthermore,	  the	  Jingye	  High	  School	  had	  two	  alleged	  incidents	  of	  arson,	  leading	  officials	  to	  conduct	  an	  investigation.108	  In	  Dalian,	  similar	  slogans,	  like	  “Defeat	  Moscow,	  Defeat	  Traitors—Communists,”	  appeared	  in	  the	  bathrooms	  of	  the	  Boai	  Market	  and	  on	  the	  wall	  of	  the	  Dalian	  Transportation	  Company,	  among	  a	  total	  of	  thirty-­‐nine	  incidents.109	  Such	  sentiments	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  urban	  areas.	  Many	  rural	  areas	  similarly	  witnessed	  an	  increase	  in	  anti-­‐communist	  activities,	  including	  food	  poisoning,	  arson,	  and	  murder.	  In	  a	  rural	  area	  in	  the	  western	  part	  of	  Sichuan	  Province,	  for	  instance,	  a	  series	  of	  incidents	  of	  untraceable	  food	  poisoning	  occurred	  
                                                106	  “Zhonggong	  Shanghai	  shi	  Penglai	  quwei	  xuanchuanbu	  guanyu	  yiban	  sixiang	  qingkuang	  ji	  shishi	  xuanjiao	  gongzuo	  baogao	  [Report	  written	  by	  the	  propaganda	  division	  of	  the	  Penglai	  district	  committee	  in	  Shanghai	  concerning	  the	  general	  thought	  situation	  as	  well	  as	  propaganda	  working	  on	  current	  issues],”	  November	  13,	  1950,	  No.	  A22-­‐2-­‐20-­‐25,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  107	  Ibid.	  108	  Ibid;	  Also,	  “Shanghai	  dazhong	  xuexiao	  xuesheng	  choumei	  guannian	  shangwei	  wanquan	  shuli	  [Anti-­‐American	  perceptions	  are	  not	  yet	  well	  established	  among	  college	  and	  high	  school	  students	  in	  Shanghai],”	  November	  28,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  109	  “Shenyang,	  Lvda	  zuijin	  qunzhong	  sixiang	  dongtai	  ji	  dite	  huodong	  zhuangkuang	  [Recent	  thoughts	  trends	  among	  people	  in	  Shengyang	  and	  Lvda	  etc.	  and	  the	  situation	  of	  enemy	  agent	  activities],”	  November	  30,	  Neibu	  Cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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frequently	  in	  early	  November.	  The	  actual	  causes	  of	  these	  incidents	  is	  unknown,	  but	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  a	  former	  landlord	  poisoned	  a	  water	  well.110	  In	  the	  same	  period,	  “reactionary”	  slogans	  often	  appeared,	  as	  well;	  some	  read:	  “Welcome	  the	  Nationalist	  Army	  back	  to	  the	  Mainland”	  and	  “The	  Communist	  Party	  is	  reducing	  the	  rich	  to	  poor	  and	  then	  slaughtering	  the	  poor.”111	  	  In	  newly	  “liberated”	  areas	  in	  southern	  and	  central	  regions	  of	  China,	  kinship	  played	  roles	  in	  undermining	  communist	  programs	  and	  unity.	  For	  instance,	  in	  Guizhou	  Province—one	  of	  the	  poorest	  regions	  and	  most	  remote	  from	  communist	  control—kinship	  relationships	  proved	  to	  be	  effectual	  in	  cutting	  off	  communist	  ties.	  According	  to	  an	  internal	  report	  sent	  from	  Guiyang,	  a	  typical	  case	  that	  utilized	  kinship,	  in	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  a	  Nationalist	  sympathizer	  was	  trying	  to	  induce	  a	  CCP	  sympathizer,	  worked	  as	  follows:	  “Why	  don’t	  we	  re-­‐unite	  our	  family	  group	  again?	  You	  and	  I	  had	  a	  good	  relationship	  before,	  didn’t	  we?	  You	  are	  now	  deceived	  by	  the	  communists	  and	  are	  following	  a	  different	  path,	  but,	  if	  you	  think	  it	  over	  again	  and	  regret	  it	  now,	  we	  can	  cancel	  out	  your	  past,	  and	  assure	  you	  a	  future	  position	  and	  work.”112	  	  In	  addition	  to	  such	  “gentle”	  persuasion,	  more	  straightforward	  measures—threats	  and	  assassinations—were	  taken,	  as	  well.	  In	  Guiyang,	  untraceable	  letters	  were	  sent	  to	  local	  chiefs	  of	  communist	  agricultural	  associations,	  threatening	  and	  urging	  them	  to	  surrender	  with	  promises	  of	  amnesty.	  Furthermore,	  rumors	  spread	  
                                                110	  “Chuangxi	  dizhu	  pohuai	  huodong	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  situation	  of	  landlords’	  destructive	  activities	  in	  Chuangxi],”	  December	  7,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  111	  Ibid.	  112	  “Guomindang	  tewu	  zai	  Guiyang	  sanbo	  yaoyan	  [Guomingdang’s	  agents	  spread	  rumors	  in	  Guiyang],”	  November	  28,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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that	  one	  could	  receive	  a	  ton	  of	  white	  rice	  for	  the	  murder	  of	  an	  association	  chief.	  In	  fact,	  a	  local	  chief’s	  entire	  family	  was	  reportedly	  killed	  near	  Chengdu,	  their	  bodies	  thrown	  into	  a	  river,	  though	  we	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  the	  killer	  actually	  received	  tons	  of	  white	  rice.113	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  former	  landlords	  felt	  a	  bit	  heartened,	  while	  newly	  “liberated”	  peasants	  felt	  scared.	  According	  to	  an	  internal	  report	  sent	  in	  November	  1950,	  a	  peasant	  named	  Liu	  Chongyi	  refused	  to	  receive	  land	  distributed	  through	  communist	  land	  reform,	  and	  another	  moved	  out	  of	  a	  house	  which	  was	  similarly	  allocated	  through	  a	  communist	  program,	  saying,	  “My	  former	  landlord	  will	  come	  back	  and	  I	  will	  be	  killed	  if	  I	  stay	  here.”114	  Local	  cadres	  in	  villages	  had	  difficulties	  in	  arguing	  with	  such	  views	  because	  the	  amount	  of	  news	  and	  reports	  had	  been	  radically	  reduced,	  so	  that	  they	  did	  not	  know	  how	  to	  refute	  rumors.115	  	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  government	  officials	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  an	  increasingly	  chaotic	  climate	  in	  society.	  “Chaotic”	  is	  perhaps	  a	  more	  appropriate	  term	  to	  describe	  the	  situation	  at	  that	  time	  than	  “state	  controlled”	  or	  “monolithic.”	  As	  a	  British	  diplomat	  pointed	  out,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  view	  the	  communist	  regime	  as	  strong,	  consolidated,	  or	  lacking	  conflict.116	  Observing	  the	  situation,	  a	  local	  communist	  official	  in	  Shenyang	  wrote	  a	  lengthy	  internal	  report	  concerning	  the	  social	  situation	  and	  public	  order	  based	  on	  materials	  from	  the	  Police	  
                                                113	  Ibid;	  Also,	  “Chuanxi	  dizhu	  pohuai	  huodong	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  situation	  of	  landlords’	  destructive	  activities	  in	  Chuangxi],”	  December	  7,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  114	  “Shenyang,	  Lvda	  zuijin	  qunzhong	  sixiang	  dongtai	  ji	  dite	  huodong	  zhuangkuang	  [Recent	  thoughts	  trends	  among	  people	  in	  Shengyang	  and	  Lüda	  etc.	  and	  the	  situation	  of	  enemy	  agent	  activities],”	  November	  30,	  Neibu	  Cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  115	  “Wuxi	  nongcun	  ganbu	  wufa	  jipo	  yapyan	  hen	  kumen	  [Cadres	  in	  villages	  of	  Wuxi	  unable	  to	  refute	  rumors,	  feeling	  much	  depressed],”	  December	  5,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  116	  Memorandum	  (From	  A.A.E.	  Franklin	  to	  J.S.H.	  Shattock),	  January	  11,	  1951,	  FO371/92192,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	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Department	  in	  the	  City	  of	  Shenyang.	  The	  report	  was	  reprinted	  on	  November	  30	  in	  
Neibu	  cankao,	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  internal	  bulletin,	  issued	  daily	  and	  circulated	  among	  only	  an	  extremely	  limited	  number	  of	  high-­‐ranking	  governmental	  officials.117	  The	  report	  read:	  A	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  (workers,	  peasants,	  students	  and	  so	  on)	  in	  Shenyang	  recognizes	  the	  justice	  of	  our	  volunteer	  army	  in	  the	  war	  for	  the	  liberation	  of	  the	  Korean	  people,	  and	  believes	  in	  our	  victory,	  thus	  strictly	  observing	  law	  and	  order	  and	  positively	  participating	  in	  their	  work.	  […].	  	  However,	  a	  small	  portion	  of	  the	  people	  is	  afraid	  of	  American	  weapons	  and	  ravages	  of	  war,	  leading	  to	  unrest	  and	  fear.	  In	  the	  Five-­‐One	  Plant,	  for	  example,	  more	  than	  1,200	  workers	  were	  absent	  from	  work	  for	  several	  days	  after	  October	  19th.	  In	  another	  plant,	  about	  450	  workers—roughly	  28	  percent	  of	  the	  total—deserted	  their	  jobs	  in	  the	  two	  weeks	  following	  October	  10th.	  At	  the	  Medical	  University,	  eighteen	  students	  ran	  away,	  and	  these	  kinds	  of	  sentiments	  are	  already	  affecting	  our	  party	  and	  organization	  members,	  especially	  those	  from	  Southern	  China.	  […].	  	  Our	  enemies’	  destructive	  activities	  are	  growing.	  Reactionary	  groups—remnants	  of	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek’s	  troops	  and	  land	  lords—recognize	  that	  now	  is	  the	  time	  to	  change	  the	  government,	  and	  they	  are	  feeling	  extremely	  excited,	  becoming	  active,	  and	  spreading	  rumors	  and	  making	  trouble.	  […].	  Given	  the	  increase	  in	  enemy	  activity,	  we	  now	  see	  reactionary	  slogans	  everywhere;	  in	  October	  alone,	  we	  have	  found	  about	  thirty	  reactionary	  slogans	  and	  graffiti	  in	  twenty-­‐nine	  locations,	  including	  elementary	  and	  middle/high	  schools,	  the	  Sanitation	  Department,	  Army	  Hospital,	  an	  iron	  mill,	  rubber	  plant,	  machine	  manufacturing	  plant,	  chemical	  factory,	  and	  electric	  paper	  manufacturing	  plant,	  all	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Shenyang.	  Among	  these,	  thirteen	  were	  scribbled	  on	  bathroom	  walls,	  and	  others	  appeared	  on	  blackboards	  in	  schools,	  on	  street	  walls,	  and	  telephone	  poles,	  and	  even	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  a	  water	  pot	  and	  the	  insides	  of	  dishes.	  Their	  contents	  usually	  involve	  cursing	  the	  Communist	  Party,	  intimidating	  party	  and	  organization	  members,	  or	  sowing	  discord	  within	  the	  Sino-­‐Soviet	  relationship.	  For	  instance,	  “Defeat	  the	  Soviet	  Union,”	  “Party	  and	  Youth	  League	  members,	  be	  careful	  of	  your	  skull,”	  and	  so	  on.	  On	  October	  17th,	  sixteen	  bills	  and	  posters	  labeled	  “Anti-­‐Communist	  Save-­‐the-­‐Nation	  Youth	  Association”	  appeared	  in	  three	  alleyways	  in	  Haichang,	  Nenjiang,	  and	  Andong,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  Nansi	  Street	  in	  the	  Heping	  District,	  which	  is	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Kaiming	  Police	  Branch;	  On	  October	  20th,	  another	  four	  reactionary	  posters	  were	  found	  in	  the	  bathroom	  of	  the	  paint	  processing	  plant;	  On	  October	  23rd,	  twelve	  reactionary	  leaflets	  were	  found	  in	  a	  mailbox	  on	  Taiyuan	  Street,	  all	  urging	  the	  youth	  to	  conduct	  counterrevolutionary	  activities	  and	  propagate	  military	  victories	  against	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  
                                                117	  Shen	  Zhihua,	  comments,	  the	  international	  conference,	  “China,	  the	  Third	  World,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,”	  Hangzhou,	  China,	  November	  5-­‐7,	  2010.	  	  According	  to	  Shen	  Zhihua,	  circulation	  was	  limited	  to	  only	  high-­‐ranking	  officials	  at	  the	  top	  of	  each	  communist	  organization.	  In	  the	  1950s,	  only	  2,400	  copies	  were	  circulated	  nationwide.	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Facing	  the	  aforementioned	  situation,	  in	  order	  to	  consolidate	  social	  order,	  maintain	  economic	  development,	  and	  prevent	  destruction	  by	  enemies,	  each	  factory	  and	  organization	  should	  conduct	  and	  deepen	  security	  education,	  heighten	  vigilance,	  tighten	  various	  rules,	  clarify	  and	  distinguish	  each	  responsibility	  to	  avoid	  suffering	  any	  loss.	  […].118	  	  This	  report	  includes	  several	  interesting	  points.	  First,	  it	  clearly	  demonstrates	  the	  existence	  of	  quite	  extensive	  doubts	  about	  the	  ruling	  communist	  party.	  Second,	  its	  meticulous	  manner	  indicates	  the	  capability	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  organization	  even	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  Third,	  the	  document	  reveals	  the	  depth	  of	  local	  communist	  officials’	  concerns	  about	  social	  order,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  degree	  of	  their	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  education	  and	  propaganda	  in	  maintaining	  the	  desired	  social	  order.	  Finally,	  the	  report	  implies	  that,	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  PRC,	  the	  line	  between	  enemies	  and	  friends	  was	  not	  particularly	  clear,	  and	  that,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  dubious	  elements	  existed	  within	  the	  “governing”	  system,	  including	  lower-­‐ranking	  local	  government	  officials,	  policemen,	  public	  school	  teachers	  and	  professors,	  as	  well	  as	  various	  kinds	  of	  technocrats	  and	  engineers.	  These	  were	  the	  elite	  and	  professional	  class	  in	  society,	  who	  had	  worked	  for	  the	  Nationalist	  Government	  and	  remained	  in	  their	  positions	  under	  the	  Communist	  Government.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  possible	  and	  most	  menacing	  threat	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Beijing	  government	  actually	  resided	  within	  its	  own	  headquarters.	  	  	  One	  might	  doubt	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  report	  itself,	  raising	  questions	  about	  whether	  the	  CCP	  deliberately	  stressed	  or	  even	  fabricated	  these	  “facts”	  in	  order	  to	  tighten	  control	  over	  the	  government	  and	  society,	  a	  manner	  of	  inquiry	  which	  might	  
                                                118	  “Shenyang,	  Lüda	  zuijin	  qunzhong	  sixiang	  huodong	  ji	  dite	  huodong	  zhuangkuang	  [Recent	  throught	  trends	  among	  people	  in	  Shengyang	  and	  Lüda	  etc.	  and	  the	  situation	  of	  enemy	  agent	  activities],”	  November	  30,	  Neibu	  Cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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be	  more	  appropriate	  for	  describing	  the	  situation	  in	  later	  years,	  such	  as	  1952	  and	  1953.	  Such,	  however,	  was	  the	  effect	  of	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  PRC,	  but	  not	  necessarily	  the	  administration’s	  initial	  intention	  or	  motivation.	  First	  and	  foremost	  the	  report	  was	  written	  for	  and	  read	  within	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  closed	  circles,	  without	  any	  propaganda	  role	  for	  the	  mass	  population.	  Moreover,	  contents	  of	  these	  reports	  were	  not	  necessarily	  altogether	  groundless	  fabrications,	  in	  view	  of	  contemporary	  anti-­‐communist	  activity	  originating	  from	  Taiwan.	  	  The	  Nationalist	  Party	  in	  Taiwan,	  in	  fact,	  had	  escalated	  its	  anti-­‐communist	  campaign	  over	  the	  coastal	  areas	  of	  the	  mainland,	  particularly	  during	  the	  period	  from	  late	  September	  to	  December	  of	  1950.	  In	  early	  November,	  for	  example,	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  continually	  appealed	  to	  the	  mass	  public	  on	  the	  mainland	  through	  radio	  broadcasts,	  saying:	  	  Our	  soldiers	  and	  compatriots	  on	  the	  mainland!	  […].	  Refuse	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Army!	  Refuse	  to	  contribute	  foodstuffs!	  Refuse	  to	  go	  northward!	  Refuse	  to	  fight	  abroad!	  Oppose	  the	  invasion	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  Korea!	  If	  you	  find	  yourself	  on	  the	  front	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  refuse	  to	  attend	  operations	  and	  gather	  under	  the	  flag	  of	  the	  United	  Nations!119	  	  The	  claims	  of	  such	  anti-­‐communist	  campaigns	  across	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait	  did	  not	  necessarily	  appear	  implausible,	  especially	  in	  view	  of	  American	  presence	  in	  the	  Korean	  peninsula	  and	  Taiwan	  Strait.	  In	  fact,	  even	  after	  China’s	  victories	  on	  the	  battlefield,	  some	  simply	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  news	  of	  those	  victories,	  anticipating	  that	  
                                                119	  “Zijiu	  jiuguo	  zuihao	  shiji	  [The	  best	  opportunity	  to	  self-­‐help	  and	  save	  the	  country],”	  November	  13,	  1950,	  in	  Fan	  Gong	  Kang	  E	  zhong	  de	  Jiang	  Jieshi	  zongtong	  [Generalissimo	  Jiang	  Jieshi	  in	  the	  Anti-­‐Communist	  and	  Resist	  Russia	  movements]	  (Taipei,	  1950),	  66,	  101-­‐4,	  Dangshiguan	  [Nationalist	  Party	  Archives],	  Taipei,	  Taiwan.	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the	  United	  States	  would	  plan	  a	  direct	  landing,	  like	  the	  Inchon	  Landing,	  on	  the	  coast	  of	  Qindao	  or	  Shanghai.	  120	  In	  short,	  even	  following	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War,	  and	  its	  victories	  on	  the	  battlefield,	  feelings	  of	  uneasiness	  in	  society	  had	  not	  disappeared	  and,	  rather,	  lingered	  as	  an	  issue	  with	  which	  officials	  had	  to	  deal.	  Unbelievable	  as	  it	  might	  sound,	  at	  this	  point	  even	  an	  eclipse	  became	  a	  source	  of	  anxiety	  for	  communist	  authorities.	  In	  early	  December,	  the	  communist	  local	  newspaper	  in	  Shanxi	  Province,	  for	  instance,	  explained	  the	  scientific	  mechanism	  of	  the	  eclipse,	  appealing	  to	  readers	  not	  to	  believe	  any	  rumors	  that	  would	  take	  advantage	  of	  worries	  among	  the	  masses	  at	  the	  time	  of	  eclipse.121	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  communist	  authority	  paid	  attention	  to	  any	  small	  incident	  that	  had	  the	  ability	  to	  damage	  the	  CCP’s	  legitimacy.	  	  This	  was	  because	  the	  situation	  surrounding	  the	  issue	  of	  legitimacy	  was	  still	  erratic	  and	  uncertain,	  and	  such	  an	  environment	  could	  change	  easily,	  depending	  on	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  The	  war	  situation	  in	  Korea	  was	  becoming	  a	  key	  factor	  for	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  newly	  established	  government—If	  Chinese	  forces	  were	  to	  win,	  pride	  and	  trust	  in	  the	  Beijing	  government	  would	  increase,	  while,	  if	  they	  were	  defeated	  on	  the	  battlefield,	  doubts	  and	  distrust	  toward	  communist	  authorities	  would	  develop	  at	  home.	  In	  a	  sense,	  battles	  in	  Korea	  were	  not	  just	  military	  and	  security	  issues	  but	  also	  political	  issues	  concerning	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  government	  at	  home.	  Beijing’s	  policymaking	  concerning	  the	  Korean	  War	  was	  
                                                120	  “Pingrang	  jiefang	  hou	  Fuzhou,	  Qingdao	  gejie	  yiban	  sixiang	  zhuangkuang	  [The	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  in	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  in	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  and	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  after	  the	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  of	  Pyongyang],”	  December	  23,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  121	  Shanxi	  Ribao,	  December	  8,	  1950.	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conducted	  within	  such	  political	  and	  social	  circumstances,	  and	  its	  decision	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  southward	  was	  no	  exception.	  From	  the	  framing	  of	  the	  issue	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  plan,	  it	  was	  not	  just	  a	  military	  strategy	  but	  a	  matter	  of	  politics	  and	  impressions.	  	  	  
Advancing	  to	  the	  South	  In	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  piercing	  cold	  night	  of	  December	  31,	  1950,	  the	  Chinese	  People’s	  Volunteers	  (CPV)	  began	  their	  third-­‐phase	  offensive	  and	  crossed	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  southward.122	  This	  offensive	  marked	  a	  symbolic	  watershed	  in	  the	  Korean	  War,	  signifying	  China’s	  counterattack	  and	  America’s	  retreat.	  In	  retrospect,	  Beijing	  could	  have	  terminated	  the	  war	  at	  this	  point	  by	  halting	  CPV	  forces	  at	  the	  parallel	  and	  declaring	  victory	  over	  the	  United	  States.	  Strategically,	  the	  CPV	  had	  already	  recovered	  most	  of	  North	  Korea’s	  lost	  territory,	  and	  China’s	  strong	  resolution	  and	  capability	  had	  been	  clearly	  demonstrated	  to	  the	  world.	  However,	  Chinese	  troops	  were	  approaching	  their	  combat	  and	  logistical	  limits.123	  In	  fact,	  the	  CPV’s	  field	  commander,	  Peng	  Dehuai,	  had	  been	  reluctant	  to	  conduct	  this	  offensive.	  Peng	  understood	  the	  difficulty	  of	  the	  war	  situation	  and	  viewed	  Chinese	  forces	  as	  already	  fatigued	  and	  in	  need	  of	  rest.	  Furthermore,	  he	  had	  seen	  the	  lack	  of	  food	  and	  clothing	  supplies	  at	  the	  front.	  In	  his	  telegram	  to	  Beijing	  on	  December	  8,	  1950,	  Peng	  actually	  suggested	  that	  Chinese	  armies	  halt	  to	  the	  north	  of	  the	  parallel	  and	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  Wu	  Ruilin,	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  (Spring	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  Cold	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  (Chapel	  Hill,	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  University	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  Press,	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  pp.	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  and	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  War,	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  (Lawrence,	  Kan.:	  University	  of	  Kansas	  Press,	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  p.	  123;	  Hong	  Xuezhi,	  Kang	  Mei	  yuan	  Chao	  zhanzheng	  huiyi	  [Memoirs	  of	  a	  War	  of	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  America	  and	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  Korea”]	  (Beijing:	  Jie	  fang	  jun	  wen	  yi,	  1990),	  pp.	  98-­‐99.	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conduct	  another	  offensive	  the	  following	  spring.	  This	  was	  expected	  by	  many	  in	  China,	  particularly	  those	  who	  had	  considered	  the	  dispatch	  of	  the	  CPV	  useless	  or	  dangerous,	  and	  who	  were	  surprised	  at	  the	  news	  of	  CPV’s	  capture	  of	  Pyongyang	  in	  mid-­‐December.	  Some	  businessmen	  in	  Fuzhou,	  for	  instance,	  reportedly	  expressed	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  war	  would	  end	  immediately	  if	  Chinese	  armies	  were	  to	  stop	  at	  the	  38th	  Parallel.124	  Foreign	  observers	  expressed	  similar	  hopes;	  a	  newspaper	  in	  Japan,	  
Asahi	  Shinbun,	  for	  instance,	  stated	  that	  the	  PRC	  would	  not	  need	  to	  worry	  about	  border	  security	  because	  no	  country	  in	  the	  Western	  camp	  had	  ambitions	  to	  invade	  China.125	  Beijing,	  in	  fact,	  was	  not	  concerned	  about	  it,	  either;	  Chinese	  policymakers	  did	  not	  think	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  attack	  the	  mainland.126	  Why,	  then,	  did	  China	  take	  an	  aggressive	  course,	  ignoring	  opportunities	  to	  end	  the	  war	  at	  this	  moment?	  	   With	  regard	  to	  Beijing’s	  decision	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  Parallel,	  scholars	  have	  presented	  several	  factors.	  First,	  Beijing	  was	  concerned	  that	  stopping	  at	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  would	  give	  U.S.	  forces	  time	  to	  recover.	  Second,	  Kim	  Il	  Sung	  visited	  Beijing	  on	  December	  3,	  pleading	  with	  Chinese	  authorities	  to	  advance	  Chinese	  armies	  southward	  across	  the	  parallel.127	  Third,	  Beijing	  had	  obtained	  an	  American	  
                                                124	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  [CCP	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  Studies]	  (Vol.	  1,	  2002),	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  Zhang,	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  p.	  121;	  William	  Stueck,	  The	  Korean	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intelligence	  report,	  suggesting	  that	  America	  would	  withdraw	  fully.128	  Fourth,	  Moscow	  pressured	  Beijing,	  stating,	  on	  December	  7,	  “The	  cessation	  of	  military	  activity	  in	  Korea	  we	  consider	  incorrect	  in	  the	  present	  situation,	  when	  American	  troops	  are	  suffering	  defeat.”129	  	  Nevertheless,	  it	  might	  be	  hasty	  to	  attribute	  the	  decision	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  solely	  to	  military	  and	  diplomatic	  considerations	  or	  to	  Moscow’s	  pressure.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  there	  were	  numerous	  precedents	  for	  Beijing	  not	  following	  Moscow’s	  line,	  and,	  while	  Beijing	  and	  Moscow	  came	  to	  the	  same	  conclusion	  at	  this	  time,	  they,	  arguably,	  had	  different	  reasons.	  Another	  possible	  explanation	  for	  Beijing’s	  decision	  is	  domestic	  concerns	  about	  political	  consequences	  of	  stopping	  CPV	  armies	  at	  the	  38th	  Parallel.	  Beijing	  was	  already	  aware	  of	  signs	  of	  the	  withering	  of	  revolutionary	  passion	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  population,	  and	  it	  had	  been	  concerned	  about	  the	  fading	  of	  the	  line	  between	  friends	  and	  foes.	  Mao	  Zedong,	  in	  fact,	  turned	  his	  attention	  toward	  popular	  impressions	  in	  dealing	  with	  this	  international	  issue.	  Such	  a	  tendency	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  series	  of	  correspondence	  between	  Beijing	  and	  the	  battlefront.	  In	  a	  telegram	  to	  Peng	  Dehuai	  on	  December	  13,	  for	  instance,	  Mao	  wrote:	  	  	  The	  United	  States,	  Britain,	  and	  other	  countries	  are	  requiring	  our	  armies	  to	  halt	  to	  the	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel,	  in	  order	  to	  reorganize	  their	  forces	  for	  another	  offensive.	  Therefore,	  our	  forces	  must	  cross	  the	  38th	  parallel.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  arrive	  and	  stop	  to	  the	  north	  of	  the	  parallel,	  it	  would	  cause	  us	  serious	  political	  disadvantages.130	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  Receiving	  Mao’s	  telegram,	  Peng	  Dehuai	  once	  again	  replied	  with	  a	  long	  telegram	  four	  days	  later,	  warning	  of	  difficulties	  on	  the	  battlefield.	  In	  particular,	  he	  was	  worried	  about	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  “an	  unrealistic	  optimism	  for	  a	  quick	  victory”	  following	  the	  CPV’s	  two	  major	  victories.	  In	  his	  view,	  US	  forces	  would	  not	  retreat	  soon,	  and	  the	  war	  would	  be	  “protracted	  and	  arduous.”	  Peng	  wrote,	  “If	  our	  attack	  does	  not	  go	  smoothly,	  we	  will	  stop	  fighting	  right	  away.	  Whether	  we	  can	  and	  will	  control	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  will	  depend	  on	  concrete	  conditions.”131	  Receiving	  Peng’s	  message,	  Mao	  immediately	  responded,	  trying	  to	  explain	  the	  symbolic	  meaning	  of	  the	  third-­‐phase	  offensive	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  Parallel.	  He	  wrote:	  	  Your	  assessment	  of	  the	  enemy’s	  situation	  is	  correct.	  [We]	  must	  be	  prepared	  for	  a	  protracted	  war.	  Now	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Britain	  are	  taking	  advantage	  of	  the	  old	  impression	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  in	  the	  people’s	  minds	  for	  their	  political	  propaganda	  in	  order	  to	  force	  us	  to	  accept	  a	  cease-­‐fire.	  Therefore,	  our	  forces	  must	  cross	  the	  parallel	  now	  and	  rest	  afterward.132	  	  Mao	  tried	  to	  explain	  the	  political	  impact	  of	  crossing	  the	  parallel	  in	  terms	  of	  impressions	  in	  the	  people’s	  minds.	  In	  fact,	  in	  another	  telegram,	  Mao	  wrote	  that,	  after	  crossing	  the	  38th	  Parallel,	  the	  CPV	  could	  return	  and	  rest	  north	  of	  the	  parallel.133	  Peng	  accepted	  Mao’s	  instruction	  but	  remained	  ambivalent.	  Peng	  complained	  slightly:	  	  In	  the	  mobilization	  for	  this	  offensive	  we	  have	  stressed	  the	  political	  significance	  of	  the	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  (it	  is	  actually	  not	  that	  important	  politically).	  It	  will	  be	  more	  difficult	  for	  us	  to	  explain	  to	  our	  troops	  why	  we	  seized	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  and	  gave	  it	  up	  afterwards.	  Once	  occupied,	  we	  may	  as	  well	  retain	  it	  if	  there	  are	  no	  other	  particular	  concerns	  involved.134	  
                                                131	  Shu	  Guang	  Zhang,	  Mao’s	  Romanticism	  ,	  126.	  132	  Mao	  Zedong,	  December	  21,	  1950,	  in	  Jienguo	  yilai	  Mao	  Zedong	  wengao,	  [Mao	  Zedong’s	  Collected	  Works	  After	  the	  Establishment	  of	  the	  Country],	  731-­‐32.	  133	  Du	  Ping,	  Zai	  zhiyuanjun	  zongbu	  [At	  the	  Headquarters	  of	  the	  Chinese	  People’s	  Volunteers]	  (Beijing:	  Jie	  fang	  jun,	  1989),	  153.	  134	  Yan	  Wang,	  Peng	  Dehuai	  nianpu	  [A	  Chronological	  Record	  of	  Peng	  Dehuai]	  (Beijing:	  Renmin,	  1998)	  December	  28,	  1950,	  p.	  460.	  Shuguang	  Zhang,	  Mao’s	  Romanticism,	  128.	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  On	  the	  next	  day,	  December	  29,	  Mao	  again	  sent	  a	  telegram	  to	  Peng.	  He	  tried	  to	  clarify	  the	  political	  purpose	  and	  symbolic	  meaning	  of	  the	  third-­‐phase	  offensive	  to	  reassure	  a	  seemingly	  dissatisfied	  field	  commander.	  Mao	  wrote:	  	  The	  so-­‐called	  38th	  Parallel	  is	  an	  old	  impression	  in	  the	  people’s	  mind,	  and	  will	  no	  longer	  exist	  after	  this	  campaign.	  It	  therefore	  does	  not	  matter	  whether	  our	  troops	  will	  rest	  and	  reorganize	  south	  or	  north	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel.	  [However,]	  if	  we	  do	  not	  launch	  this	  offensive,	  and	  if	  our	  forces	  spend	  the	  entire	  winter	  resting	  and	  reorganizing,	  it	  will	  arouse	  the	  capitalist	  countries	  to	  speculate	  a	  great	  deal	  [on	  our	  intentions]	  and	  cause	  the	  democratic	  nations	  to	  disdain	  us;	  should	  we	  gain	  another	  victory	  in	  early	  January	  […],	  we	  will	  greatly	  impress	  the	  democratic	  front	  and	  the	  people	  of	  the	  capitalist	  countries,	  thereby	  striking	  a	  new	  blow	  at	  the	  imperialists	  and	  enhancing	  pessimism	  among	  them.135	  	  	  In	  a	  purely	  military	  sense,	  Mao’s	  directions	  to	  Peng	  might	  have	  been	  nonsense,	  since	  he	  was	  suggesting	  that,	  although	  he	  had	  ordered	  the	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  parallel,	  it	  would	  not	  matter	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  CPV	  retained	  it	  after	  the	  campaign.	  From	  a	  military	  commander’s	  perspective,	  an	  offensive	  would	  not	  be	  necessary	  if	  the	  parallel	  were	  strategically	  unimportant.	  Nevertheless,	  Mao’s	  concern	  was	  not	  simply	  about	  military	  tactics.	  Rather,	  his	  focus	  was	  on	  political	  impressions.	  More	  specifically,	  he	  was	  contemplating	  the	  campaign’s	  symbolic	  impact—a	  victory	  for	  communist	  China	  and	  a	  retreat	  for	  “American	  imperialism”—in	  the	  minds	  of	  people	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.136	  Mao	  viewed	  the	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  as	  not	  only	  a	  military	  strategy,	  but	  a	  symbolic	  political—in	  a	  sense,	  public	  relations—victory.	  For	  Beijing,	  halting	  the	  Chinese	  armies	  at	  the	  38th	  parallel	  would	  have	  meant	  a	  concession	  to	  the	  enemy,	  
                                                135	  Shu	  Guang	  Zhang,	  Mao’s	  Romanticism,	  p.	  129;	  Yan	  Wang,	  Peng	  Dehuai	  nianpu	  [A	  Chronological	  
Record	  of	  Peng	  Dehuai],	  December	  28,	  1950,	  460;	  and	  Xu	  Yan,	  Mao	  Zedong	  yu	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  
zhanzheng,	  171-­‐172.	  	  136	  Chen	  Jian,	  “China’s	  Changing	  Aims	  during	  the	  Korean	  War,	  1950-­‐1951,”	  pp.	  26-­‐29,	  40-­‐41;	  Chen	  Jian,	  Mao’s	  China	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  pp.	  61,	  92-­‐96.	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the	  image	  of	  which	  would	  create,	  in	  Mao’s	  words,	  a	  “serious	  political	  disadvantage,”	  possibly	  hindering	  the	  progress	  of	  China’s	  land	  reform,	  economic	  reconstruction,	  and	  anti-­‐counterrevolutionary	  programs,	  as	  well	  as	  possibly	  causing	  actual	  withering	  of	  popular	  support	  for	  the	  newly	  established	  government.	  	  In	  sum,	  Beijing’s	  decisions	  to	  enter	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  to	  cross	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  were	  not	  just	  military	  issues.	  They	  were	  political	  issues.	  These	  decisions	  can	  be	  seen,	  in	  a	  sense,	  as	  parts	  of	  massive	  propaganda	  campaigns	  meant	  to	  solidify	  the	  very	  identity	  of	  the	  newly	  established	  government	  in	  millions	  of	  people’s	  minds	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  This	  was	  the	  kind	  of	  politics	  which	  characterized	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  world	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period,	  and	  which	  can	  be	  observed	  not	  only	  in	  China	  but	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world:	  that	  is,	  the	  politics	  of	  truth-­‐making.	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Chapter	  4:	  Pictures	  
	  Picture	  1:	  	  	  "Shanghai	  shi	  di	  shiliu	  mianfangsha	  chang	  1950	  nian	  qingzhu	  	  guoqing	  youxing	  duiwu	  [A	  mass	  demonstration	  to	  celebrate	  the	  	  National	  Day	  at	  Shanghai	  No.	  Sixteenth	  cotton	  spinning	  factory]	  October	  1,	  1950	  Shanghai,	  PRC	  	  H1-­‐31-­‐2-­‐59	  	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Shanghai,	  PRC	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Picture	  2:	  	  “Failure	  of	  MacArthur’s	  ‘All-­‐Out	  Attack’”	  
Renmin	  Ribao	  	  December	  4,	  1950	  	  (Beginning	  from	  the	  right	  side,	  MacArthur	  is	  cutting	  off	  Korea,	  but	  then,	  on	  the	  left,	  huge	  two	  hands	  of	  “Chinese	  People’s	  Army”	  and	  “Korean	  People’s	  Army”	  are	  chopping	  off	  MacArthur’s	  hands).	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Picture	  3-­‐1:	  	  	  "Shanghai	  di	  shiliu	  mianfangshachang	  fan	  Meidi	  [A	  demonstration	  against	  anti-­‐American	  imperialism	  at	  the	  sixteenth	  cotton	  spinning	  factory	  in	  Shanghai]"	  1951	  	  H1-­‐31-­‐6-­‐20	  	  	  	  	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Shanghai,	  PRC	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Picture	  3-­‐2:	  	  
	  "Kang-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  baojia	  weiguo:	  gei	  cangan	  huodong	  de	  dongzhi	  xianhua	  [Resisting	  America	  and	  assisting	  Korea,	  protecting	  home	  and	  defending	  country	  movement:	  Giving	  flower	  to	  cadres	  attending	  youth	  workers'	  activities]	  January	  1951	  	  H1-­‐23-­‐6-­‐6	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Shanghai,	  PRC	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Picture	  3-­‐3:	  
	  	  "Qunzhong	  zai	  chezhan	  huansong	  Shanghai	  shi	  zhiyuan	  fuChao	  yiliao	  shoushu	  di	  xi,	  wu	  dadui	  [The	  mass	  of	  people	  seeing	  off	  the	  fourth	  and	  fifth	  voluntary	  medical	  groups	  going	  to	  Korea]"	  July	  27,	  1951	  	  H1-­‐11-­‐3-­‐19	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Shanghai,	  PRC	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Chapter	  5:	  Truth-­‐Making	  in	  Society	  	   Few	  wars,	  if	  any,	  are	  the	  result	  of	  conspiracies	  by	  wicked	  men,	  whether	  the	  “wicked”	  be	  identified	  as	  diplomats,	  strategists,	  arms	  makers,	  industrialists,	  bankers,	  aristocrats,	  or	  demagogues.	  War	  occurs	  because	  all	  men	  value	  certain	  other	  things	  more	  than	  they	  value	  peace.	  Whatever	  these	  things	  may	  be,	  they	  are	  equated,	  quite	  honestly	  even	  if	  naïvely,	  with	  the	  cause	  of	  God	  against	  Satan.1	  	   	  Frederick	  L.	  Schuman,	  International	  Politics	  (1948)	  	  	   All	  newspapers	  in	  Shanghai	  appeared	  five	  hours	  late	  on	  the	  morning	  of	  Sunday,	  November	  12,	  1950.	  It	  turned	  out	  that	  communist	  officials	  had	  arrived	  at	  each	  newspaper	  office	  around	  4	  a.m.	  on	  that	  day	  and	  closely	  scrutinized	  every	  news	  item.2	  Just	  a	  day	  earlier,	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  presentiment	  for	  this	  tightening-­‐up	  of	  news	  censorship.	  The	  Chinese	  business	  manager	  of	  the	  North	  China	  Daily	  News,	  a	  British-­‐owned	  English	  newspaper	  in	  Shanghai,	  was	  summoned	  by	  telephone	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Bureau.	  In	  the	  interview	  that	  followed,	  two	  senior	  communist	  officials	  conveyed	  to	  him	  an	  order	  of	  the	  Military	  Control	  Commission	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  there	  must	  be	  no	  more	  reports	  “against”	  either	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  or	  countries	  friendly	  to	  the	  PRC,	  and	  that	  publication	  of	  reports	  from	  news	  agencies	  or	  radio	  stations	  operated	  by	  “unfriendly	  imperialist	  countries”—which	  they	  meant	  Reuters,	  AP,	  and	  UP—must	  cease	  immediately.3	  Following	  this	  notification	  on	  Saturday	  and	  surprise	  inspections	  on	  Sunday,	  the	  communist	  authority	  on	  Monday,	  
                                                1	  Frederick	  L.	  Schuman,	  International	  Politics,	  4th	  ed.	  (New	  York,	  1948),	  395.	  2	  Telegram,	  Commonwealth	  Relations	  Office	  (hereafter	  CRO),	  UK,	  to	  High	  Commissioners,	  “Tightening-­‐Up	  of	  Chinese	  Censorship,”	  November	  24,	  1950,	  in	  “China:	  Political	  Situation,	  November	  1-­‐	  February	  23,	  1951,”	  DO133/25,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  3	  Telegram,	  CRO	  to	  High	  Commissioners,	  November	  15,	  1950,	  in	  “China:	  Political	  Situation,	  November	  1-­‐	  February	  23,	  1951,”	  DO133/25,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	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November	  13,	  sealed	  Reuter’s	  receiving	  apparatus	  used	  by	  the	  North	  China	  Daily	  
News,	  ruling	  out	  any	  hope	  for	  a	  relaxation	  of	  censorship.	  This,	  in	  a	  practical	  sense,	  was	  the	  moment	  that	  the	  historic	  newspaper,	  established	  in	  Shanghai	  by	  a	  British	  millionaire	  in	  1850,	  ended	  its	  century-­‐long	  history.4	  	  	   By	  the	  same	  token,	  on	  the	  next	  day,	  Tuesday,	  November	  14,	  all	  theaters	  in	  Beijing	  and	  Shanghai	  stopped	  screening	  American	  films	  altogether.	  In	  Beijing,	  the	  interior	  and	  exterior	  of	  all	  sixteen	  theaters	  were	  decorated	  with	  slogans	  written	  in	  eye-­‐catching	  yellow	  letters	  on	  red	  cloth.	  All	  of	  these	  theaters	  held	  exhibitions	  of	  cartoons	  and	  pictures,	  and	  most	  set	  up	  megaphones	  in	  front	  for	  chanting	  slogans	  out	  loud.5	  In	  the	  following	  weeks,	  these	  theaters	  screened	  thirty-­‐one	  films—seventeen	  Chinese,	  thirteen	  Russian,	  and	  one	  North	  Korean,	  with	  titles	  like	  “Defend	  the	  Country,	  Preserve	  Family,”	  “Warriors	  in	  White	  Robes,”	  “A	  Chinese	  Girl,”	  and	  so	  on.6	  Each	  show	  was	  interrupted	  frequently	  with	  cheers	  and	  shouts	  of	  greeting	  from	  the	  audience	  for	  “Chinese	  People’s	  Volunteers!,”	  “Chairman	  Mao!,”	  and	  “Generalissimo	  Stalin!”	  In	  no	  time,	  newspapers	  in	  Beijing	  began	  publishing	  advertisements	  and	  film	  reviews	  every	  single	  day,	  and	  more	  than	  50,000	  large	  posters	  for	  those	  films	  were	  appearing	  everywhere	  in	  the	  city.	  According	  to	  an	  overall	  summary	  of	  the	  campaign,	  
                                                4	  Telegram,	  CRO	  to	  High	  Commissioners,	  “Tightening-­‐Up	  of	  Chinese	  Censorship,”	  November	  24,	  1950,	  in	  “China:	  Political	  Situation,	  November	  1-­‐	  February	  23,	  1951,”	  DO133/25,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  The	  publication	  of	  the	  North	  China	  Daily	  News	  was	  formally	  suspended	  in	  March	  1951.	  The	  newspaper	  was	  named	  from	  a	  British	  perspective;	  Shanghai	  is	  in	  the	  “north”	  as	  opposed	  to	  Guangdong	  and	  Hong	  Kong	  in	  the	  “South”	  where	  the	  British	  had	  their	  territory.	  In	  Guangdong,	  too,	  all	  radio	  stations	  and	  radio	  transmitting	  equipment	  were	  required	  to	  be	  registered	  with	  the	  police	  in	  early	  December	  1950.	  See	  letter,	  Trade	  Commissioner	  (Montgomery)	  	  to	  Board	  of	  Trade,	  UK,	  December	  16,	  1950,	  in	  “Extension	  of	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists	  over	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  China,”	  FO371/92192,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  	  	  5	  Ibid.	  	  6	  “Dianyingye	  tongye	  gonghui	  zai	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  yundong	  zhong	  de	  huodong	  qingkuang	  [Beijing	  Cinema	  Guild	  concerning	  the	  situation	  of	  activities	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements],”	  No.	  022-­‐012-­‐00841,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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submitted	  by	  the	  Beijing	  Cinema	  Guild,	  during	  this	  period,	  a	  total	  of	  more	  than	  400,000	  people	  watched	  films	  in	  the	  sixteen	  theaters	  in	  Beijing.	  Similarly,	  in	  Shanghai,	  the	  Cinema	  Guild	  declared	  that	  the	  city	  had	  been	  suffering	  America’s	  cultural	  invasion	  since	  its	  first	  screening	  of	  American	  films	  in	  1926.	  “American	  films,	  which	  have	  inundated	  China	  like	  a	  flood,	  have	  raised	  a	  portion	  of	  our	  young	  people	  to	  be	  pro-­‐American,	  and	  disarmed	  them	  psychologically,”	  asserted	  the	  Shanghai	  Cinema	  Guild;	  “These	  films	  brought	  young	  people	  up	  to	  be	  idlers	  who	  don’t	  make	  honest	  livings,	  reared	  them	  as	  weaklings,	  trained	  them	  to	  despise	  women,	  and	  made	  them	  decadent	  and	  degenerate,	  rotten	  and	  spoiled.”7	  The	  tightening-­‐up	  of	  censorship	  in	  the	  news	  media	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  propaganda	  campaigns	  in	  film	  industries	  in	  mid-­‐November	  1950	  came	  alongside	  the	  beginning	  and	  development	  of	  the	  “kang-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  [Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea]”	  movements,	  which	  swept	  over	  China	  and	  extended	  literally	  to	  every	  corner	  of	  people’s	  daily	  lives	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period	  (Picture	  1).8	  Even	  within	  a	  couple	  of	  weeks	  in	  late	  November,	  various	  events	  and	  programs	  unfolded	  rapidly,	  including	  conferences,	  speech	  contests,	  study	  groups,	  meetings	  at	  tea	  houses,	  exhibitions	  of	  political	  cartoons,	  and	  various	  gatherings	  to	  discuss	  
                                                7	  “Shanghai	  shi	  wenhuaju	  guanyu	  Shanghai	  yingyuan	  zidong	  tingying	  Meidiguo	  yingpian	  de	  shenqing	  [The	  Shanghi	  Literacy	  Bureau	  concerning	  Shanghai	  theaters’	  application	  for	  voluntarily	  stopping	  screening	  of	  American	  films],”	  November	  4,	  1950,	  B172-­‐1-­‐33-­‐1,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC;	  “Shanghai	  shi	  Wenhuaju	  dui	  Meidiguo	  dianying	  de	  pipan	  baogao	  [The	  Shanghi	  Literacy	  Bureau’s	  report	  on	  American	  imperialist’s	  films],”	  November	  1950,	  B172-­‐1-­‐33-­‐30,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  Also	  see	  a	  British	  observation	  in	  telegram,	  CRO	  to	  High	  Commissioners,	  “Tightening-­‐Up	  of	  Chinese	  Censorship,”	  November	  24,	  1950,	  in	  “China:	  Political	  Situation,	  November	  1-­‐	  February	  23,	  1951,”	  DO133/25,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  8	  For	  discussion	  of	  earlier	  preliminary	  practices	  of	  Beijing’s	  political	  mobilization	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Chen	  Jian,	  China’s	  Road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War:	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  
Confrontation	  (New	  York:	  Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  139-­‐140.	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imperialists’	  past	  crimes.9	  With	  this	  rise	  in	  patriotism,	  tens	  of	  thousands,	  if	  not	  millions,	  of	  people	  became	  involved	  in	  these	  movements,	  forming	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  consensus	  and	  social	  order	  in	  the	  newly	  established	  communist-­‐revolutionary	  country,	  which	  eventually	  and	  effectively	  marginalized	  various	  kinds	  of	  dissidents	  and	  minorities.	  All	  of	  these	  campaigns,	  to	  be	  sure,	  were	  results	  of	  officially	  designed	  top-­‐down	  programs,	  which	  were	  quite	  often	  coercive	  and	  brutal.10	  And	  yet,	  to	  understand	  the	  spread	  and	  implementation	  of	  such	  movements,	  more	  explanation	  is	  needed.	  How	  did	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  propaganda	  campaigns	  function?	  How	  did	  a	  particular	  version	  of	  “truth”	  become	  dominant?	  Why	  did	  so	  many	  people	  participate	  in	  the	  movements?	  	  
Fear	  and	  Opposition	  First	  and	  foremost,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  popular	  attitudes	  were	  not	  merely	  products	  of	  Communist	  Party	  propaganda.	  Nor	  were	  they	  monolithic.	  Since	  we	  know	  about	  the	  severe	  suppression	  under	  the	  communist	  rule	  in	  later	  years,	  it	  might	  be	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  open	  and	  bold	  criticism	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party.	  Yet,	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  such	  suppression	  was	  yet	  to	  come,	  and	  voices	  of	  straightforward,	  head-­‐on	  opposition	  to	  Beijing’s	  policy	  were	  audible.	  With	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  Beijing’s	  cautious	  and	  lenient	  attitude	  was	  about	  to	  change,	  but	  such	  a	  shift	  was	  not	  perceived	  in	  public,	  and,	  thus,	  many	  people	  seemed	  
                                                9	  “Zhonggong	  Shanghai	  shiwei	  xuanchuanbu	  jiaoqu	  gongzuo	  weiyuanhui	  shiyi	  yuefen	  xuanjiao	  gongzuo	  jiekuang	  [Summary	  of	  propaganda	  and	  educational	  working	  in	  November	  written	  by	  the	  suburban	  working	  committee	  of	  the	  propaganda	  division	  of	  the	  CCP	  Shanghai	  committee],”	  December	  18,	  1950,	  No.	  A22-­‐2-­‐6-­‐210,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  	  10	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Chang	  and	  Halliday,	  Mao:	  The	  Unknown	  Story	  (New	  York:	  Knopf,	  2005).	  For	  scholarly	  response	  to	  this	  book,	  see,	  Gregor	  Benton	  and	  Chun	  Lin,	  Was	  Mao	  Really	  a	  Monster?	  :	  The	  
Academic	  Response	  to	  Chang	  and	  Halliday's	  Mao,	  the	  Unknown	  Story	  (New	  York:	  Routledge,	  2010).	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to	  have	  no	  reluctance	  in	  expressing	  objections,	  skepticism,	  or	  distrust	  toward	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  Communist	  Party.11	  Among	  such	  objections,	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  just	  cause	  stood	  out.	  One	  elementary	  school	  teacher	  in	  Beijing,	  for	  instance,	  raised	  a	  question	  in	  November	  1950:	  “We	  have	  been	  proclaiming	  that	  we	  support	  peace.	  Is	  it	  not	  contradictory	  if	  we	  send	  troops	  now?”12	  Such	  an	  opinion	  was	  not	  unusual,	  particularly	  among	  teachers.	  Another,	  similarly,	  said,	  “Dispatching	  troops	  to	  Korea	  is	  interference	  in	  Korea’s	  internal	  affairs,	  which	  clearly	  goes	  against	  the	  United	  Nation	  Charter.”13	  Others	  even	  grew	  concerned	  that	  China	  would	  become	  an	  imperialist	  power	  if	  its	  troops	  were	  to	  remain	  in	  Korea.14	  Business	  circles	  shared	  such	  concerns;	  a	  senior	  member	  of	  an	  electric	  company	  in	  Tianjin,	  for	  instance,	  said	  in	  late	  November,	  “China	  and	  Korea	  are	  after	  all	  two	  separate	  countries.	  Korea	  is	  not	  like	  Henan	  or	  Hebei	  Province	  where	  we	  can	  send	  troops	  and	  help	  them	  out.	  When	  we	  were	  fighting	  a	  civil	  war,	  did	  any	  countries	  come	  to	  China	  to	  help	  us?	  We	  should	  liberate	  Taiwan	  before	  going	  to	  Korea.”15	  	  
                                                11	  For	  a	  general	  overview	  of	  the	  shift	  of	  Beijing’s	  stance,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Xu	  Changbin	  ed.,	  Zhongguo	  gongchandang	  sixiang	  zhengzhi	  gongzuo	  shi	  [A	  History	  of	  the	  Political	  Ideology	  Work	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party]	  (Haerbin,	  Heilongjiang	  jiaoyu	  chuban	  she,	  1990),	  144-­‐55.	  More	  detailed	  discussion,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  “Zhongguo	  gongchandang	  dui	  zhongguo	  zichan	  jieji	  de	  renzhi	  jiqi	  celve	  [CCP’s	  perception	  and	  tactics	  toward	  the	  Chinese	  bourgeoisie],”	  Jindaishi	  yanjiu	  [Mondern	  History	  Studies],	  Issue	  3,	  1993.	  12	  “Beijingshi	  diliu	  quwei	  ge	  zhibu	  youguan	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  qunzhong	  fanying	  ji	  xuanchuan	  zhihuizhan	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Reports	  from	  various	  branch	  offices	  of	  the	  sixth	  district	  in	  Beijing	  concerning	  the	  common	  people’s	  reactions	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  and	  working	  plans	  for	  propaganda],”	  November	  2,	  1950,	  No.	  038-­‐001-­‐00023,	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Archives	  (hereafter	  BMA),	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  	  	  13	  “Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  baojia	  weiguo	  shengzhong	  Chasheng	  gejie	  sixiang	  dongtai	  [Thought	  trends	  in	  various	  circles	  in	  Cha	  Province	  among	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  and	  Protect	  Home	  Defend	  Country],”	  December	  20,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  Chinese	  University	  in	  Hong	  Kong	  (hereafter	  CUHK),	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  14	  “Tianjin	  gejie	  dui	  muqian	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  [Responses	  in	  various	  circles	  in	  Tianjin	  regarding	  the	  current	  political	  situation],”	  November	  18,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  15	  “Jing-­‐shi	  dianye	  gonghui	  deng	  bufeng	  zhigong	  dui	  muqian	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  [Reflections	  on	  the	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In	  addition	  to	  such	  straightforward	  objections,	  feelings	  of	  distrust	  and	  fear	  were	  prevalent,	  in	  spite,	  or,	  perhaps,	  because	  of	  waves	  of	  CCP	  propaganda	  campaigns.	  “The	  Communist	  Party’s	  propaganda	  deceives	  people,”	  said	  one	  worker	  in	  a	  factory	  in	  Shanghai,	  “It	  has	  been	  said	  that	  the	  United	  States	  is	  a	  paper	  tiger.	  But	  now	  the	  lie	  comes	  to	  light.	  In	  fact,	  American	  forces	  defeated	  North	  Korean	  armies	  and	  they	  are	  almost	  arriving	  at	  the	  Yalu	  River,	  aren’t	  they?”16	  A	  local	  official	  in	  Changsha	  began	  to	  grow	  desperate,	  since	  many	  workers,	  shopkeepers,	  teachers,	  and	  students	  in	  the	  area	  happily	  read	  Hong	  Kong	  editions	  of	  Da	  gong	  bao	  and	  Wen	  hui	  
bao	  and	  did	  not	  trust	  local	  communist	  newspapers,	  because	  they	  believed	  that	  local	  papers	  carried	  only	  “good”	  news	  for	  the	  party.17	  Another	  official	  in	  Hangzhou	  similarly	  informed	  Beijing	  that	  many	  merchants	  in	  the	  city	  listened	  to	  and	  trusted	  the	  Voice	  of	  America	  on	  the	  radio.18	  A	  manager	  of	  the	  Zhongnan	  Bank	  in	  Nanjing	  spat	  out,	  reportedly,	  “Nothing	  good	  would	  happen	  for	  China	  after	  entering	  the	  war.	  China’s	  shoreline	  is	  so	  long,	  and	  the	  Americans	  can	  make	  a	  landing	  offensive	  anytime.	  	  The	  Communist	  Party	  said	  that	  American	  forces	  are	  worn	  out,	  but	  actually	  it	  is	  Chinese	  armies	  that	  are	  dead	  tired.”19	  	  
                                                                                                                                            political	  situation	  among	  workers	  in	  electronic	  industry	  labor	  unions	  in	  Tianjin],”	  November	  24,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  16	  “Shanghai	  ,	  Tianjin	  deng	  di	  yaoyan	  yisu	  [A	  number	  of	  rumors	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  Tianjin	  etc.],”	  November	  7,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  17	  “Changsha	  ge	  jieceng	  dui	  muqian	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  liuchuan	  de	  yixie	  yaoyan	  [Rumors	  concerning	  the	  current	  political	  situation	  among	  various	  sectors	  in	  Changsha],”	  November	  22,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  18	  “Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  gaochao	  zhong	  Zhejiang	  mouxie	  qunzhong	  de	  sixiang	  zhuangkuang	  he	  yaoyan	  [Thought	  situation	  and	  rumors	  among	  the	  common	  people	  of	  Zhejiang	  in	  a	  high	  tide	  of	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements],”	  November	  14,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  19	  “Nanjing	  ge	  jieceng	  dui	  muqian	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  [Responses	  toward	  the	  current	  political	  situation	  among	  various	  sectors	  in	  Nanjing],”	  November	  23,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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Such	  doubts	  provided	  countless	  topics	  for	  conversation,	  producing	  numerous	  rumors.	  In	  Xi’an,	  for	  instance,	  a	  rumor	  had	  it	  in	  November	  that	  the	  United	  States	  had	  already	  dropped	  an	  atomic	  bomb	  in	  northeastern	  China	  two	  weeks	  earlier,	  and	  that	  the	  communist	  government	  was	  going	  to	  move	  to	  an	  interior	  city,	  Lanzhou,	  more	  than	  1,000	  miles	  west	  of	  Beijing.20	  Other	  rumors	  in	  the	  Jiangxi	  Province	  maintained	  that	  the	  North	  Korean	  government	  had	  already	  escaped	  into	  Chinese	  territory,	  that	  U.S.	  forces	  had	  occupied	  Hainan	  Island,	  and	  that	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  would	  began	  a	  counteroffensive	  immediately.21	  Similar	  rumors	  related	  to	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  were	  particularly	  abundant,	  and	  tended	  to	  contain	  details,	  however	  wild	  they	  might	  have	  been,	  that	  made	  them	  appear	  “truer.”	  One,	  in	  Changsha	  in	  November,	  asserted	  that	  the	  Nationalist	  Party,	  led	  by	  prominent	  GMD	  generals,	  Chen	  Cheng	  and	  He	  Yingqin,	  would	  attack	  the	  southern	  and	  middle	  part	  of	  China,	  and	  Okamura	  Yasuji,	  ex-­‐commander	  of	  the	  Japanese	  military,	  would	  attack	  northern	  China,	  and	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  would	  be	  in	  the	  command	  of	  the	  entire	  force.22	  	  Intriguingly,	  such	  rumors	  reflected	  certain	  myths	  widely	  held	  in	  Chinese	  society;	  in	  this	  case,	  Nationalist,	  Japanese,	  and	  American	  forces	  were	  bundled	  together	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  attack	  China.	  This	  kind	  of	  rumor	  usually	  proceeded	  as	  follows:	  World	  War	  III	  had	  already	  begun	  and	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  Japanese	  and	  American	  forces,	  would	  come	  back	  to	  the	  mainland	  by	  the	  following	  
                                                20	  “Xi’an	  ge	  jieceng	  dui	  muqian	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  he	  gaidi	  de	  yixie	  yaoyan	  [Reactions	  and	  rumors	  related	  to	  the	  current	  political	  situation	  among	  various	  sectors	  in	  Xi’an],”	  November	  16,	  1950,	  Neibu	  
cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  21	  “Jiangxi	  liuchuan	  de	  yaoyan	  he	  ge	  jieceng	  sixiang	  zhuangkuang,”	  November	  9,	  1950,	  Naibu	  cankao	  [The	  thought	  situation	  among	  various	  sectors	  and	  rumors	  spreading	  in	  Jiangxi]	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  22	  “Changsha	  ge	  jieceng	  dui	  muqian	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  liuchuan	  de	  yixie	  yaoyan	  [Rumors	  on	  current	  political	  situation	  among	  various	  sectors	  in	  Changsha],”	  November	  22,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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year;	  and	  then	  it	  would	  be	  the	  Communist	  Party	  that	  would	  have	  to	  run	  away	  to	  Taiwan.23	  In	  a	  mood	  of	  deep	  pessimism,	  resignation,	  and	  desperation,	  a	  strange	  phenomenon	  occurred	  in	  many	  places	  in	  November	  1950:	  people	  throwing	  parties,	  eating	  and	  drinking	  heavily.	  One	  internal	  bulletin	  reported	  on	  such	  parties	  in	  the	  northeastern	  area,	  describing	  one	  of	  them	  as	  including	  a	  lot	  of	  freshly	  butchered	  pork	  and	  chicken.24	  	  Behind	  such	  rumors	  and	  fears,	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  find	  certain	  historical	  preconceptions	  concerning	  both	  foreign	  countries	  and	  the	  Chinese	  people	  themselves.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  later	  in	  this	  chapter,	  many	  Americans	  at	  that	  time	  had	  particular	  images	  of	  China,	  such	  as	  one	  that	  described	  China	  as	  an	  incapable	  child—prejudice	  which	  helped	  to	  form	  a	  certain	  pattern	  of	  “reality”	  from	  an	  American	  perspective.25	  Interestingly,	  many	  Chinese	  had	  similar	  biases	  regarding	  themselves.	  One	  local	  communist	  official	  in	  Beijing,	  for	  example,	  said,	  “China	  is	  something	  like	  a	  child,	  while	  the	  United	  States	  is	  like	  a	  wall.	  How	  can	  a	  child	  move	  a	  wall?	  We	  should	  wait	  for	  a	  while	  until	  the	  child	  becomes	  an	  adult.”26	  Another	  senior	  official	  in	  
                                                23	  “Wuxi,	  Suzhou	  dengdi	  liuchuan	  de	  yaoyan	  ji	  bufen	  ganbu	  qunzhong	  dui	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  [The	  spread	  of	  rumors	  in	  Wuxi	  and	  Suzhou	  etc.	  and	  reactions	  among	  some	  cadres	  and	  the	  common	  people	  toward	  the	  current	  political	  situation],”	  November	  11,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  24	  "Liaodong,	  Liaoxi,	  Rehe,	  Heilongjiang	  deng	  sheng	  ge	  jieceng	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  [Reactions	  toward	  the	  current	  political	  situation	  among	  various	  sectors	  in	  Liaodong,	  Liaoxi,	  Rehe,	  and	  Heilongjiang	  Province],"	  December	  18,	  1950;	  	  "Songjian	  sheng	  muqian	  ganbu,	  qunzhong	  sixiang	  dongtai	  [Thought	  trends	  at	  present	  among	  cadres	  and	  the	  common	  people	  in	  Songjian	  Province]"	  November	  30,	  1950;	  and	  "Rehe,	  Jinzhou	  deng	  di	  ganbu	  qunzhong	  dui	  Chaoxian	  zhanshi	  de	  fanying	  [Reactions	  toward	  the	  Korean	  War	  among	  cadres	  and	  the	  common	  people	  in	  Rehe	  and	  Jinzhou	  etc.],"	  July	  22,	  1950,	  Neibu	  
cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  25	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Thomas	  Borstelmann,	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  Color	  Line	  (Cambridge,	  Mass:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  48-­‐53;	  Michael	  H.	  Hunt,	  Ideology	  and	  U.S.	  Foreign	  Policy	  (New	  Haven,	  Conn:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  1987),	  162-­‐63;	  Bruce	  Cumings,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Korean	  War:	  
The	  Roaring	  of	  the	  Cataract	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  Universtiy	  Press,	  1990),	  97;	  Harold	  Isaacs,	  
Scratches	  on	  Our	  Minds	  (New	  York:	  J.	  Day	  Co.,	  1958);	  and	  T.	  Christopher	  Jespersen,	  American	  Images	  
of	  China,	  1931-­‐1949	  (Stanford,	  Cal.,	  Stanford	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  	  26	  “Beijingshi	  diliu	  quwei	  ge	  zhibu	  youguan	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  qunzhong	  fanying	  ji	  xuanchuan	  zhihuizhan	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Reports	  from	  various	  branch	  offices	  of	  the	  sixth	  district	  of	  Beijing	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Shenyang	  made	  a	  similar	  comparison:	  “If	  the	  United	  States	  is	  a	  paper	  tiger,	  you	  know,	  China	  is	  less	  than	  a	  cat!”27	  One	  low-­‐ranking	  policeman	  in	  the	  city,	  Zhao	  Wei,	  also	  lamented,	  “Who	  can	  match	  the	  United	  States?	  Who	  can	  stop	  Japan	  if	  they	  come	  back	  again?	  The	  Soviet	  Union	  is	  not	  so	  strong.	  Once	  they	  were	  severely	  defeated	  by	  the	  Japanese.	  I	  am	  a	  northeasterner	  myself	  and	  I	  know	  it	  very	  well.”28	  Rumors	  and	  fears	  of	  this	  kind	  typically	  maintained:	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  Japan,	  and	  the	  United	  States	  would	  attack	  China	  in	  no	  time;	  Americans	  would	  land	  near	  Shanghai,	  the	  Japanese	  would	  attack	  from	  Korea,	  and	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  would	  make	  a	  counteroffensive	  from	  the	  South;	  then,	  the	  Communist	  Party	  would	  have	  to	  retreat	  to	  Taiwan.29	  These	  kinds	  of	  rumors	  often	  contained	  sequels,	  as	  well;	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  would	  then	  cede	  the	  Beijing-­‐Shanghai	  railways	  to	  Japan,	  Shanghai	  would	  go	  to	  Britain,	  and	  Tianjin	  and	  Qingdao	  to	  the	  United	  States;	  and	  these	  countries	  would	  dispatch	  their	  troops	  and	  quickly	  seize	  these	  territories.30	  Another	  version	  added	  France	  to	  this	  list	  of	  foreign	  powers,	  adding	  that	  the	  French	  would	  obtain	  the	  Guangxi	  Province,	  which	  is	  located	  next	  to	  Vietnam.31	  	  
                                                                                                                                            concerning	  the	  common	  people’s	  reactions	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  and	  working	  plans	  for	  propaganda],”	  November	  2,	  1950,	  No.	  038-­‐001-­‐00023,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  	  27	  “Shenyang,	  Lvda	  zuijin	  qunzhong	  sixiang	  dongtai	  ji	  dite	  huodong	  zhuangkuang	  [Recent	  thoughts	  trends	  among	  the	  common	  people	  in	  Shengyang	  and	  Lvda	  etc.	  and	  the	  situation	  of	  enemy	  agent	  activities],”	  November	  30,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  28	  “Beijing	  shi	  diliu	  quwei	  ge	  zhibu	  yougan	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  qunzhong	  fanying	  ji	  xuanchuang	  zhihui	  zhan	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Reports	  from	  various	  branch	  offices	  of	  the	  sixth	  district	  of	  Beijing	  concerning	  the	  common	  people’s	  reactions	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  and	  working	  plans	  for	  propaganda],”	  November	  1950,	  No.	  038-­‐001-­‐00023,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  29	  “Chuanxi	  dizhu	  pohuai	  huodong	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  situation	  of	  landlords’	  destructive	  activities	  in	  Chuangxi],”	  December	  7,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  30	  “Wuxi,	  Suzhou	  deng	  di	  liuchuan	  de	  yaoyan	  ji	  bufen	  ganbu	  qunzhong	  dui	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  [The	  spread	  of	  rumors	  in	  Wuxi	  and	  Suzhou	  etc.	  and	  reactions	  among	  some	  cadres	  and	  people	  toward	  the	  current	  political	  situation],”	  November	  11,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  31	  “Changsha	  ge	  jieceng	  dui	  muqian	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  liuchuan	  de	  yixie	  yaoyan	  [Rumors	  on	  the	  current	  political	  situation	  among	  various	  sectors	  in	  Changsha],”	  November	  22,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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Although	  names	  of	  foreign	  countries	  and	  their	  imagined	  acquisitions	  varied,	  many	  of	  these	  rumors	  and	  their	  preconceptions	  about	  foreign	  countries	  and	  themselves	  were	  rooted	  in	  historical	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  Western	  and	  Japanese	  colonialism.	  And	  it	  was	  such	  an	  association	  of	  historical	  memories	  with	  contemporary	  events	  in	  Korea	  that	  brought	  about	  another	  pattern	  of	  popular	  reactions	  that	  eventually	  contributed	  to	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  “Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea”	  movements:	  a	  surge	  in	  nativism	  and	  sense	  of	  pride,	  as	  well	  as	  fierce	  anti-­‐colonial	  sentiments,	  particularly	  among	  the	  youth.	  	  	  
Consent	  and	  Participation	  	  After	  hearing	  news	  of	  battlefield	  victories	  in	  early	  December	  1950,	  excited	  students	  gathered	  in	  front	  of	  foreign	  embassies	  and	  consulates	  in	  Beijing,	  loudly	  shouting,	  “Defeat	  imperialism,”	  scribbling	  “Defeat	  American	  imperialists”	  on	  walls,	  and,	  eventually,	  even	  getting	  into	  fights	  with	  foreigners.	  The	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Committee	  later	  excused	  such	  incidents,	  asserting	  that	  they	  were	  the	  results	  of	  simple	  enthusiastic	  sentiments	  springing	  from	  the	  mob,	  and	  that	  they	  had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  party	  organization.32	  The	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Committee	  promised	  the	  Central	  Committee	  that	  it	  would	  prevent	  the	  recurrence	  of	  events	  like	  this.	  Concerned	  about	  such	  matters,	  one	  of	  the	  CCP’s	  top	  leaders,	  Liu	  Shaoqi,	  forwarded	  the	  memorandum	  to	  all	  provincial	  and	  municipal	  committees	  nationwide,	  requiring	  them	  to	  give	  attention	  to	  preventing	  such	  excessively	  antagonistic	  incidents	  against	  
                                                32	  Footnote	  in	  Liu	  Shaoqi,	  Jian	  guo	  yi	  lai	  Liu	  Shaoqi	  wengao	  [Collected	  Works	  of	  Liu	  Shaoqi	  After	  the	  
Establishment	  of	  the	  Country](Beijing:	  Zhongyang	  wenxian	  chubanshe,	  2005),	  p.	  593.	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foreigners.33	  As	  is	  clear	  from	  these	  incidents	  and	  the	  CCP	  response	  to	  them,	  anti-­‐colonial	  and	  anti-­‐American	  sentiments	  grew	  explosively	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  to	  an	  extent	  that	  often	  exceeded	  the	  party	  line.	  	  By	  this	  point,	  numerous	  broadsides	  and	  posters	  had	  appeared	  at	  schools	  and	  universities	  in	  many	  cities.	  At	  Peking	  University,	  for	  example,	  new	  broadsides	  on	  the	  current	  issue	  were	  renewed	  every	  day,	  one	  after	  another,	  with	  estimated	  word	  counts	  at	  more	  than	  60,000	  a	  day	  (Picture	  2).	  	  Some	  students	  and	  workers	  even	  wrote	  in	  blood,	  to	  which	  the	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Committee	  responded	  by	  ordering	  a	  stop	  to	  such	  practices.	  In	  addition,	  a	  signature	  collecting	  campaign	  in	  Beijing	  received,	  reportedly,	  7,460	  signatures	  in	  only	  three	  days.34	  Surprised	  by	  such	  a	  result,	  an	  official	  of	  the	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Committee	  wrote,	  “Student	  attendance	  is	  ardent.	  The	  number	  of	  signatures	  exceeds	  our	  original	  estimation.	  Moreover,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  event	  that	  is	  organized	  by	  force.”35	  Such	  a	  rise	  in	  patriotism	  was	  unmistakable.	  A	  Senior	  Director	  of	  the	  Jardine	  Engineering	  Corporation	  in	  Hong	  Kong,	  Mr.	  H.	  Y.	  Hsu,	  visited	  Guangdong	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950	  and	  observed:	  “The	  tide	  of	  neo-­‐patriotism	  has	  swept	  high,	  especially	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  young	  people.	  Everywhere	  in	  China	  one	  hears	  young	  people	  singing	  anti-­‐American	  songs,	  and	  notices	  them	  
                                                33	  “Telegram	  from	  Liu	  Shaoqi	  to	  regional,	  local,	  and	  municipal	  committees,”	  Jian	  guo	  yi	  lai	  Liu	  Shaoqi	  
wengao	  [A	  Collected	  Works	  of	  Liu	  Shaoqi	  After	  the	  Establishment	  of	  the	  Country]	  (Beijing:	  Zhongyang	  wenxian,	  1998),	  December	  7,	  1950,	  593.	  34	  Beijing	  shi	  dangan	  guan	  yanjiushi	  ed.,	  “Report	  on	  ‘Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea’	  campaign,”	  a	  memo	  from	  the	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Committee	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  November	  5,	  1950,	  in	  “Beijing	  yu	  Kan-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao,”	  Lengzhan	  guojishi	  yanjiu	  [Cold	  War	  International	  History	  
Studies],	  Vol.	  2	  (Spring/Summer	  2005),	  397-­‐8;	  “The	  Second	  Report	  on	  the	  ‘Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea’	  campaign,”	  a	  memo	  from	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Committee	  to	  Chairman	  Mao,	  November	  12,	  1950,	  402-­‐3;	  and	  “Report	  on	  the	  situation	  regarding	  young	  students,	  workers,	  and	  military	  staff	  in	  schools,”	  a	  memo	  from	  the	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Committee	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  December	  19,	  1950,	  404-­‐5.	  	  	  	  35	  Beijing	  shi	  dangan	  guan	  yanjiushi	  ed.,	  “Report	  on	  the	  situation	  regarding	  young	  students,	  workers,	  and	  military	  staff	  schools,”	  a	  memo	  from	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Committee	  to	  the	  Central	  Committee,	  December	  19,	  1950,	  in	  Lengzhan	  guojishi	  yanjiu	  [Cold	  War	  International	  History	  Studies],	  405.	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rushing	  for	  military	  training,	  as	  they	  feel	  that	  they	  are	  fighting	  for	  a	  righteous	  cause	  and	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  their	  nation.”36	  As	  Mr.	  Hsu	  observed,	  the	  extension	  of	  such	  feelings	  was	  particularly	  evident	  in	  the	  daily	  lives	  of	  young	  people.	  	  Let	  us	  take	  a	  look	  at	  one	  earnest	  student’s	  day	  in	  Shanghai,	  based	  on	  the	  observations	  of	  an	  anonymous	  British	  man	  in	  the	  city:	  at	  10	  a.m.,	  the	  student	  participated	  in	  reading	  and	  discussion	  of	  current	  events	  as	  reported	  in	  the	  newspapers;	  from	  2	  to	  4,	  the	  student	  attended	  a	  class	  discussion	  meeting;	  from	  4	  to	  6,	  he	  attended	  another	  meeting	  of	  students	  who	  were	  planning	  to	  go	  to	  the	  Military	  Academy;	  finally	  after	  supper,	  he	  went	  with	  classmates	  to	  see	  a	  Russian	  World	  War	  II	  film,	  entitled	  “Berlin:	  An	  Impregnable	  Fortress.”37	  In	  addition	  to	  all	  of	  the	  above	  extracurricular	  activities,	  course	  work	  in	  the	  classroom	  was	  also	  associated	  with	  the	  “Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea”	  movements.	  A	  high	  school	  history	  course,	  for	  instance,	  introduced	  the	  history	  of	  American	  invasions	  of	  China	  since	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century;	  a	  science	  course	  discussed	  how	  empty	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  was;	  an	  art	  class	  contributed	  to	  the	  production	  of	  anti-­‐imperialist	  and	  anti-­‐American	  drawings	  and	  cartoons;	  and	  a	  literature	  session	  provided	  students	  opportunities	  to	  read	  newspaper	  and	  magazine	  articles	  on	  current	  events.38	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  these	  activities	  and	  programs	  in	  schools	  were	  spread	  as	  part	  of	  CCP’s	  “Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea”	  movements.	  Yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  
                                                36	  H.	  Y.	  Hsu,	  “Notes	  by	  H.	  Y.	  Hsu,”	  January	  4,	  1951,	  in	  “Extension	  of	  the	  power	  of	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists	  over	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  China,”	  FO371/92193,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  37	  Letter,	  “Student	  Life	  in	  China	  Today,”	  anonymous	  to	  the	  UK	  Foreign	  Office,	  December	  15,	  1950,	  in	  “Extension	  of	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists,”	  FO371/92192,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  38	  “Shanghai	  dazhong	  xuexiao	  xuesheng	  choumei	  guannian	  shangwei	  wanquan	  queli	  [Anti-­‐American	  perceptions	  are	  not	  yet	  well	  established	  among	  college	  and	  high	  school	  students	  in	  Shanghai],”	  November	  28,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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their	  daily	  practice	  and	  implementation	  was	  dependent	  on	  and	  conducted	  by	  numerous	  local	  actors,	  such	  as	  the	  devoted	  student	  mentioned	  above,	  in	  addition	  to	  classmates,	  teachers,	  and	  parents.	  These	  locals’	  enthusiastic	  participation	  was	  unignorable	  in	  understanding	  the	  scale	  and	  extension	  of	  the	  movements.	  One	  teacher	  in	  Shanghai,	  for	  example,	  expressed	  his	  sense	  of	  mission	  as	  an	  educator:	  “We	  have	  to	  convey	  to	  our	  youth	  and	  children	  the	  crimes	  of	  American	  Imperialism.	  We	  need	  to	  work	  on	  letting	  all	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people	  love	  our	  motherland,	  and	  to	  let	  them	  participate	  in	  this	  patriotic	  movement.”39	  Such	  a	  call	  for	  patriotism	  did	  not	  appear	  out	  of	  place	  at	  that	  time.	  Many	  students	  and	  parents	  acted	  in	  concert.	  The	  aforementioned	  British	  man	  observed:	  	  	  Many	  very	  fine	  students	  are	  actually	  volunteering	  to	  leave	  their	  middle	  schools	  and	  colleges	  to	  respond	  to	  “the	  call	  of	  the	  fatherland.”	  It	  is	  a	  tragedy	  and	  a	  fact	  of	  great	  importance	  that	  such	  a	  large	  number	  of	  these	  young	  patriots	  are	  volunteering	  with	  their	  major	  motive	  that	  of	  resisting	  the	  U.S.A.	  Frequently	  one	  reads	  that	  it	  is	  a	  “sacred	  task	  to	  resist	  the	  U.S.A.”	  When	  I	  asked	  one	  student	  what	  he	  was	  joining,	  he	  replied	  immediately,	  “The	  Air	  Force	  to	  bomb	  Americans.”40	  	  This	  British	  man	  in	  Shanghai,	  then,	  lamented	  that	  many	  students	  who	  were	  academically	  speaking	  the	  best	  in	  class	  willingly	  stood	  up	  to	  volunteer,	  concluding	  that	  “the	  movement	  to	  ‘answer	  the	  call	  of	  the	  fatherland’	  is	  definitely	  growing.”41	  	   We	  can	  catch	  a	  glimpse	  of	  the	  determination	  and,	  in	  some	  other	  cases,	  hesitation,	  among	  young	  students	  and	  workers	  at	  that	  time	  in	  hundreds	  of	  letters	  they	  sent	  to	  local	  communist	  offices.	  Many	  of	  these	  letters	  were	  preserved	  in	  the	  
                                                39	  “Zhongguo	  jiaoyu	  gonghui	  Shanghai	  shi	  weiyuanhui	  guanyu	  Fangming	  tongzhi	  zuo	  de	  ‘Wei	  baowei	  zuguo	  he	  qingnian	  ertong	  xingfu	  de	  jianglai	  er	  fendou’	  de	  baogao,	  [The	  Shanghai	  Committee	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Educational	  Guild	  concerning	  a	  report	  on	  Fang	  Ming’s	  ‘Struggles	  for	  the	  happy	  future	  of	  the	  youth	  and	  children	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  our	  mother	  country’]”	  December	  9,	  1950,	  No.	  C1-­‐2-­‐121-­‐29,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  40	  Letter,	  “Student	  Life	  in	  China	  Today,”	  anonymous	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK,	  December	  15,	  1950,	  in	  FO371/92192:	  “Extension	  of	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists,”	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  41	  Ibid.	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Beijing	  Municipal	  Archives,	  through	  which	  we	  can	  explore	  various	  reasons	  and	  emotions	  that	  drove	  many	  to	  participate	  into	  the	  war.	  One	  such	  letter,	  written	  by	  a	  student	  at	  Peking	  University,	  Yang	  Tiwei,	  read:	  	  Today	  I	  have	  read	  articles	  in	  Renmin	  Ribao,	  reporting	  that	  many	  workers	  and	  students	  have	  expressed	  their	  willingness	  to	  enlist	  in	  the	  army	  to	  fight	  in	  Korea,	  and	  I	  was	  very	  much	  impressed.	  I	  realized	  that	  I	  should	  not	  stay	  out	  anymore,	  and	  that	  I	  just	  need	  to	  make	  myself	  into	  a	  volunteer	  soldier.	  Thus,	  I	  request	  the	  Party	  to	  dispatch	  me	  to	  Korea	  in	  order	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  battle	  against	  American	  Imperialism,	  and	  to	  make	  their	  forces	  disappear.	  […].	  I	  have	  been	  thinking	  about	  this	  issue	  since	  yesterday,	  and	  I	  think	  my	  thoughts	  are	  ripe	  enough	  now.	  I	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  stay	  here	  and	  not	  go	  to	  Korea.	  I	  have	  thought	  about	  my	  mother,	  […]	  and	  I	  believe	  she	  should	  think	  that	  my	  enlistment	  is	  an	  honor.	  My	  volunteering	  is	  not	  something	  I	  can	  decide	  on	  by	  myself;	  it	  is	  the	  requirement	  of	  the	  era	  and	  revolution.	  I	  was	  born	  to	  a	  well-­‐to-­‐do	  family,	  and	  need	  to	  toughen	  myself.	  Let	  me	  be	  dispatched	  to	  the	  place	  where	  the	  battle	  is	  most	  fierce.42	  	  Like	  this	  student,	  many	  college	  students	  described	  their	  actions	  as	  responding	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  era,	  while	  many	  others	  were	  simply	  convinced	  from	  their	  personal	  experiences;	  one	  policeman	  in	  Beijing,	  for	  instance,	  expressed,	  “When	  I	  was	  working	  as	  a	  policeman	  at	  a	  train	  station,	  I	  was	  often	  beaten	  and	  humiliated	  by	  the	  Japanese,	  Americans,	  and	  British.	  Now	  they	  are	  coming	  again.	  And	  I	  can	  go	  and	  fight	  them.	  Let	  me	  be	  sent	  to	  the	  front	  lines	  immediately.”43	  Reading	  these	  letters,	  one	  notes	  that	  the	  series	  of	  events,	  such	  as	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  as	  well	  as	  American	  and	  Chinese	  interventions	  in	  the	  conflict,	  were	  often	  observed	  in	  a	  particular	  manner,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  with	  
                                                42	  Yang	  Tiwei,	  Letter	  to	  the	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Committee,	  November	  2,	  1950,	  in	  “Beijing	  daxue	  deng	  xiao	  daxuesheng	  shenqing	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  zhiyuanshu	  [Volunteer	  applications	  for	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  (War)	  written	  by	  college	  students	  at	  Peking	  University	  and	  other	  schools],”	  No.	  001-­‐009-­‐00146,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  	  43	  Letters,	  November	  1950,	  in	  “Shiqingguanju,	  Shi	  jiaolian	  deng	  danwei	  de	  tongzhi	  guanyu	  shenqing	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  zhiyuanshu	  [Volunteer	  applications	  for	  the	  war	  of	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  written	  by	  cadres	  in	  units	  such	  as	  the	  Sanitary	  Bureau	  and	  Transportation	  Association	  in	  Shanghai],”	  No.	  001-­‐009-­‐00146,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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Americans,	  in	  their	  own	  ways.44	  Such	  an	  interpretation	  of	  events,	  in	  effect,	  was	  more	  important	  than	  the	  events	  themselves,	  because	  it	  was	  such	  perceptions,	  not	  the	  events	  themselves,	  that	  shaped	  “reality.”	  In	  other	  words,	  how	  events	  were	  observed	  and	  understood	  was	  more	  influential	  than	  what	  the	  events	  actually	  were.	  And	  no	  events	  were	  observed	  in	  a	  vacuum;	  they	  were	  seen	  through	  observers’	  particular	  historical,	  cultural,	  or	  even	  linguistic	  conditions.	  In	  China	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  memories	  of	  the	  War	  against	  Japan	  played	  certain	  roles	  in	  preparing	  historical	  contexts	  that	  became	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  understanding	  the	  outside	  world	  and	  current	  events.	  Such	  memories	  of	  war,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  provided	  a	  foundation	  onto	  which	  a	  whole	  set	  of	  mechanisms	  of	  state	  mobilization	  and	  people’s	  participation	  were	  built,	  while,	  on	  the	  other,	  being	  constructed	  and	  reproduced	  anew	  through	  these	  state	  and	  grassroots	  activities.	  	  	  
Memories	  of	  War	  and	  the	  Consolidation	  of	  “Truth”	  	   This	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  following	  the	  commencement	  of	  the	  “Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea”	  movements	  in	  November	  1950.	  In	  fact,	  principle	  discussion	  topics	  in	  numerous	  meetings	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  American	  intervention	  in	  Korea	  than	  the	  War	  Against	  Japan.	  For	  instance,	  in	  a	  meeting	  organized	  by	  a	  Beijing	  branch	  office	  of	  the	  Chinese	  People’s	  Bank,	  participants	  primarily	  discussed	  their	  experiences	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  One	  expounded:	  	  Today	  American	  imperialists	  follow	  the	  same	  path	  that	  the	  Japanese	  imperialists	  took	  before,	  seeking	  to	  take	  Asians	  and	  Chinese	  back	  to	  the	  days	  of	  colonialism	  and	  make	  them	  their	  slaves	  one	  more	  time.	  We	  have	  suffered	  the	  invasion	  of	  Japan;	  
                                                44	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Borstelmann,	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  Color	  Line;	  Michael	  H.	  Hunt,	  Ideology	  and	  US	  
Foreign	  Policy;	  Isaacs,	  Scratches	  on	  Our	  Minds	  and	  T.	  Christopher	  Jespersen,	  American	  Images	  of	  China.	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fathers	  and	  mothers	  and	  brothers	  and	  sisters	  were	  killed	  and	  violated.	  How	  much	  did	  our	  hearts	  hurt	  when	  our	  men	  were	  hung	  and	  beaten	  by	  the	  Japanese?	  I	  cannot	  even	  express	  it.	  We	  will	  never	  accept	  the	  same	  thing	  happening	  again.45	  	  	  In	  a	  similar	  manner,	  the	  Taxi	  Trade	  Guild	  resolved	  in	  November	  22:	  “Now,	  war	  is	  approaching	  to	  the	  border	  of	  our	  northeastern	  area.	  American	  Imperialists	  are	  following	  the	  same	  path	  the	  Japanese	  took	  before:	  first	  invading	  Taiwan	  and	  Korea,	  then	  the	  northeastern	  part	  of	  China,	  and	  eventually	  attempting	  to	  invade	  China.	  Let	  us	  remember	  the	  time	  when	  the	  Japanese	  occupied	  the	  Northeast.	  What	  did	  they	  do?	  In	  terms	  of	  our	  business,	  for	  instance,	  long-­‐distance	  buses	  had	  to	  be	  stopped.	  […].	  We	  should	  remember	  such	  a	  history	  of	  national	  ruin.”46	  In	  another	  meeting	  at	  a	  school	  in	  Beijing,	  one	  female	  teacher	  revealed	  a	  gang	  rape	  she	  suffered	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  Japanese	  soldiers	  in	  wartime,	  recalling	  memories	  and	  hatred	  of	  imperialism.47	  	  Memories	  of	  the	  War	  against	  Japan	  were,	  indeed,	  everywhere,	  providing	  many	  people	  a	  lens	  through	  which	  U.S.	  intervention	  in	  Korea	  was	  observed.	  A	  cartoon	  published	  in	  Changjiang	  Ribao,	  for	  instance,	  depicted	  an	  alleged	  America’s	  plan	  to	  invade	  China,	  describing	  it	  as	  a	  “Plot	  in	  the	  Same	  Old	  War”	  in	  comparison	  with	  Japanese	  Empire’s	  expansion	  beginning	  with	  the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  of	  1894-­‐95,	  the	  Russo-­‐Japanese	  War	  of	  1904-­‐05,	  and	  the	  Manchurian	  Incident	  and	  the	  Sino-­‐
                                                45	  “Shiqingguanju,	  Shiwenlian	  deng	  danwei	  de	  tongzhi	  guanyu	  shenqing	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  zhiyuanshu	  	  [Volunteer	  applications	  for	  the	  War	  of	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  written	  by	  cadres	  in	  units	  such	  as	  the	  Sanitary	  Bureau	  and	  Transportation	  Association	  in	  Shanghai],”	  November	  1950,	  No.	  001-­‐009-­‐00145,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  46	  “Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  shijian	  [Issues	  related	  to	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements],”	  November	  22,	  1950,	  No.	  087-­‐042-­‐00064,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  47	  “Tuanshiwei	  deng	  guanyu	  dongyuan	  jqingnian	  canjia	  junxiao	  gongzuo	  de	  baogao	  ji	  xiaoxue	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  huodong	  zonghe	  baogao	  [The	  Youth	  League	  Committee	  concerning	  the	  work	  of	  mobilization	  of	  the	  youth	  to	  attend	  military	  schools,	  as	  well	  as	  its	  comprehensive	  report	  on	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  in	  elementary	  schools],”	  October	  29,	  1950,	  No.	  001-­‐009-­‐00143,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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Japanese	  War	  (Picture	  3).48	  	  As	  such,	  accusations	  of	  Japanese	  war	  crimes	  during	  the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War,	  as	  well	  as	  Japan’s	  rearmament,	  were	  quite	  common	  in	  meetings	  of	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  (Picture	  4),	  even	  to	  the	  degree	  that	  some	  participants	  questioned	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  were	  too	  many	  stories	  about	  Japan.49	  	  It	  turned	  out,	  however,	  that	  this	  approach	  was	  most	  efficient	  and	  influential.	  The	  common	  logic	  maintained	  that	  American	  imperialists	  were	  copying	  Japanese	  imperialists,	  and	  their	  plan	  was	  to	  conquer	  China,	  Asia,	  and	  the	  entire	  world.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  look	  at	  the	  interplay	  between	  the	  reproduction	  of	  memory	  and	  the	  shaping	  of	  “reality,”	  which	  was	  taken	  place	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  diverse	  memories	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐Japanese	  War	  created	  a	  basis	  for	  many	  Chinese	  to	  perceive	  the	  situations	  through	  a	  particular	  lens,	  contributing	  to	  the	  making	  of	  the	  “reality”	  of	  Americans’	  scheme	  to	  invade	  and	  enslave	  China.	  On	  the	  other,	  such	  a	  “reality”	  contributed	  to	  the	  reproduction	  of	  certain	  historical	  narratives	  concerning	  experiences	  and	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  These	  parts	  of	  this	  reciprocal	  cycle	  re-­‐enforced	  one	  another,	  re-­‐producing	  
both	  certain	  images	  of	  “reality”	  and	  certain	  kinds	  of	  memories	  of	  the	  War	  against	  Japan,	  which	  in	  turn	  formed	  particular	  “truth”	  about	  “us”	  and	  “them.”	  Such	  a	  “truth”	  typically	  maintained	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  about	  to	  launch	  an	  all-­‐out	  attack	  on	  China	  from	  multiple	  directions	  such	  as	  Korea,	  Taiwan,	  and	  Vietnam,	  and	  that	  “we”	  
                                                48	  Changjian	  Ribao,	  November	  10,	  1950,	  Jilin	  University	  Library	  Archives,	  Chunchun,	  PRC.	  49	  “Diwuquwei,	  Qu	  fulian	  chou	  weihui	  deng	  danwei	  guanyu	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  gongzuo	  de	  baogao,	  zhoubao,	  jianbao	  [Reports	  and	  summaries	  of	  the	  fifth	  district	  committee	  and	  district	  women’s	  league	  etc.	  concerning	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements],”	  December	  1950,	  No.	  040-­‐002-­‐00123,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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must	  need	  to	  fight	  against	  the	  enemy	  (Picture	  5).50	  The	  spread	  of	  such	  a	  “truth”	  can	  be	  observed	  even	  in	  drawings	  of	  children	  (Picture	  6);51	  in	  the	  process	  of	  constructing	  what	  the	  “world”	  was,	  children’s	  perceptions	  reflected	  socio-­‐political	  environment	  and	  popular	  sentiments	  at	  that	  time.	  	  In	  this	  reciprocal	  cycle	  of	  shaping	  and	  sharing	  certain	  narratives	  of	  history	  and	  reality,	  to	  be	  sure,	  the	  Communist	  Party	  exerted	  enormous	  power	  through	  its	  censorship,	  propaganda,	  and	  various	  other	  campaigns.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  the	  re-­‐production	  of	  memory	  and	  “reality”	  were	  not	  a	  one-­‐man	  show	  by	  the	  Party.	  One	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  spread	  of	  a	  cartoon	  from	  an	  American	  magazine,	  in	  which	  American	  forces	  appeared	  about	  to	  attack	  China	  from	  three	  directions	  of	  Korea,	  Taiwan,	  and	  Vietnam.	  The	  story	  begins	  with	  the	  publication	  of	  the	  cartoon	  in	  a	  hawkish	  American	  weekly	  magazine,	  Collier’s.	  It	  was	  first	  re-­‐printed	  on	  November	  20	  in	  Tianjin’s	  Jinbu	  Ribao	  (Picture	  7),	  formerly-­‐Da	  gong	  bao,	  one	  of	  China’s	  oldest	  non-­‐partisan	  newspapers,	  which	  had	  changed	  its	  name	  in	  late	  1949.52	  It	  was,	  then,	  re-­‐printed	  again	  in	  neighboring	  regional	  newspapers,	  Henan	  Ribao	  and	  Shanxi	  Ribao,	  on	  November	  23.	  Then,	  it	  was	  re-­‐published	  in	  the	  party	  organ,	  Renmin	  Ribao	  on	  November	  24.	  Finally,	  CCP	  top	  leader,	  Premier	  Zhou	  Enlai,	  referred	  to	  the	  cartoon	  in	  his	  talk	  on	  November	  25,	  saying:	  	  We	  don’t	  need	  to	  search	  for	  proof	  of	  America’s	  scheme	  for	  invasion.	  Let	  us	  look	  and	  quote	  Americans’	  own	  voices.	  Pictures	  published	  in	  [American]	  newspapers	  and	  magazines	  can	  prove	  this.	  In	  all	  of	  these	  pictures,	  drawings	  of	  arrows	  are	  all	  directed	  toward	  mainland	  China,	  via	  Taiwan	  and	  Vietnam.	  […].	  In	  fact,	  after	  the	  outbreak	  of	  
                                                50	  Changjiang	  Ribao,	  December	  4,	  1950;	  Xian	  Qunzhong,	  December	  3,	  1950.	  	  51	  Xinhua	  Ribao	  [New	  China	  Daily],	  11	  December	  1950;	  Shanxi	  Ribao	  [Shanxi	  Daily],	  12	  November	  1950.	  	  	  52	  Jinbu	  Ribao,	  formerly	  Da	  gong	  bao	  in	  Tianjin,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  oldest,	  non-­‐partisan	  daily	  newspaper	  in	  China.	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the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  United	  States	  immediately	  began	  its	  invasion	  of	  Taiwan	  and	  Vietnam.53	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  movement	  of	  this	  Collier’s	  picture.	  It	  did	  not	  go	  from	  central	  to	  local;	  rather	  it	  appeared	  first	  in	  Tianjin,	  then	  in	  neighboring	  local	  newspapers,	  and,	  finally,	  in	  the	  central	  party	  organ,	  with	  Zhou	  Enlai’s	  adaptation	  in	  his	  speech.	  	  	  	  This	  story	  also	  indicates	  the	  malleable	  and	  constructed	  nature	  of	  “reality.”	  Beijing’s	  observations,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  local	  newspapers	  were,	  from	  a	  historian’s	  hindsight,	  inaccurate.	  The	  Truman	  administration	  was	  concerned	  about	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  war	  and	  never	  seriously	  considered	  the	  idea	  of	  war	  with	  China,	  let	  alone	  a	  world	  war.	  Furthermore,	  the	  picture	  appeared	  in	  Collier’s	  was	  not	  representative	  of	  Washington	  at	  all.	  It	  was	  simply	  an	  expression	  of	  one	  of	  many	  different	  opinions,	  and,	  actually,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  hawkish,	  in	  American	  society	  at	  that	  time.	  And	  yet,	  because	  Collier’s	  aggressive	  stance	  fit	  neatly	  with	  a	  dominant	  Chinese	  perception	  of	  America’s	  motives,	  its	  cartoon	  was	  picked	  up	  and	  understood	  as	  revealing	  the	  “real”	  motives	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  Only	  these	  hawkish	  voices	  seemed	  to	  be	  “real,”	  while	  dovish	  voices	  in	  America	  were	  considered	  hypocritical	  (Picture	  8).	  Such	  a	  perspective	  was	  considered	  appropriate,	  intelligent,	  and	  realistic	  in	  China	  at	  that	  time,	  even	  though	  it	  was	  not	  based	  on	  factual	  information	  or	  reliable	  communications.	  As	  historian	  Akira	  Iriye	  correctly	  points	  out,	  “All	  realities	  in	  a	  way	  are	  imagined	  realities,	  products	  of	  forces	  and	  movements	  that	  are	  mediated	  though	  
                                                53	  Zhou	  Enlai,	  November	  25,	  1950,	  in	  Zhou	  Enlai	  nianpu	  [A	  Chronological	  Record	  of	  Zhou	  Enlai],	  Vol.	  1	  (Beijing:	  Zhongyang	  wenxian,	  1999),	  111.	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human	  consciousness.”54	  Socially	  constructed	  and	  historically	  contingent,	  such	  an	  imagined	  “reality”	  in	  China	  developed	  into	  a	  particular	  mode,	  which	  was	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  another	  imagined	  “reality”	  which	  could	  be	  observed	  in	  American	  society	  at	  that	  time—the	  world	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  characterized	  by	  a	  bipolar	  framework.	  	  If	  a	  dominant	  American	  narrative	  described	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War	  as	  part	  of	  Moscow’s	  attack	  on	  the	  West,	  a	  growing	  narrative	  in	  China	  viewed	  American	  intervention	  in	  Korea	  as	  a	  prelude	  to	  America	  attacking	  China,	  as	  the	  Japanese	  had	  a	  decade	  earlier.	  	  Thus,	  one	  low-­‐ranking	  communist	  cadre’s	  observation	  did	  not	  seem	  illogical	  in	  November	  1950:	  “The	  war	  in	  Korea	  is	  expanding.	  The	  war	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  civil	  war	  in	  Korea;	  it	  is	  a	  part	  of	  a	  world	  war	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  been	  pushing	  forward.”55	  As	  such,	  dominant	  narratives	  of	  the	  “truth”	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  that	  of	  the	  postwar	  world	  in	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950	  came	  to	  converge	  into	  similar	  bipolar	  conceptions,	  with	  different	  local	  roots.	  A	  similar	  bipolar	  conception	  began	  taking	  root	  across	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait,	  with	  a	  different	  basis.	  As	  in	  mainland	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  politics	  of	  truth-­‐making	  in	  Taiwan	  was	  accompanied	  by	  certain	  elements	  of	  imagination	  based	  on	  local	  and	  historical	  contexts.	  If	  many	  Americans	  viewed	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War	  as	  a	  sign	  of	  Moscow’s	  challenge	  to	  the	  West,	  and	  if	  many	  Chinese	  perceived	  American	  actions	  as	  a	  reoccurrence	  of	  the	  imperial	  invasions	  of	  Asia,	  
                                                54	  Akira	  Iriye,	  “Culture	  and	  International	  History,”	  in	  Michael	  Hogan	  and	  Thomas	  Peterson,	  eds.,	  
Explaining	  the	  History	  of	  American	  Foreign	  Relations,	  2nd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2004),	  245.	  	  55	  “Shiqingguanju,	  Shiwenlian	  deng	  danwei	  de	  tongzhi	  guanyu	  shenqing	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  zhiyuanshu	  	  [Volunteer	  applications	  for	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  War	  written	  by	  cadres	  in	  units	  such	  as	  the	  Sanitary	  Bureau	  and	  Transportation	  Association	  in	  Shanghai],”	  November	  1950,	  No.	  001-­‐009-­‐00145,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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many	  Nationalist	  party	  members	  and	  sympathizers	  in	  Taiwan	  interpreted	  the	  situation	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Civil	  War.	  	  Still	  less	  than	  a	  year	  after	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  had	  evacuated	  the	  mainland	  for	  Taiwan,	  an	  increasingly	  prevailing	  narrative	  claimed	  that	  anti-­‐communist	  battles	  must	  be	  seen	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  war	  between	  Taiwan	  and	  mainland	  China,	  but	  a	  struggle	  between	  the	  Chinese	  people	  and	  Russian	  Imperialism.56	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War	  provided,	  according	  to	  this	  view,	  a	  chance	  for	  a	  world	  war,	  through	  which	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  would	  be	  able	  to	  fight	  back	  against	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  and	  return	  to	  the	  mainland	  with	  the	  support	  of	  the	  United	  States.57	  Such	  a	  narrative,	  of	  course,	  was	  only	  one	  of	  many	  views	  in	  a	  chaotic	  postwar	  Taiwanese	  society;	  however,	  through	  interpreting	  the	  meaning	  of	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  war,	  this	  version	  of	  “reality”	  increasingly	  came	  to	  be	  predominant,	  marginalizing	  and	  silencing	  various	  disagreements	  in	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  following	  years,	  as	  we	  will	  examine	  in	  detail	  in	  a	  later	  chapter.	  As	  in	  other	  societies,	  the	  ascent	  of	  such	  a	  particular	  narrative	  in	  Taiwan	  required	  the	  propagation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  certain	  myths—or	  wishes—about,	  in	  Taiwan’s	  case,	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  mainland.	  For	  instance,	  an	  internal	  report	  in	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  China	  (Taiwan)	  argued	  that,	  in	  mainland	  China,	  passion	  for	  the	  Communist	  Party	  had	  evaporated,	  and	  eagerness	  for	  a	  counteroffensive	  was	  ripening.	  The	  report,	  thus,	  concluded	  that	  the	  strength	  of	  guerrilla	  forces	  was	  increasing	  in	  rural	  areas,	  particularly	  in	  southern	  and	  
                                                56	  “Weihe	  hanjian	  biwang	  qinlue	  bibai,”	  [Why	  traitors	  will	  lose	  and	  the	  invasion	  will	  fail]”	  in	  
Gaizao[Reform]	  No.	  5	  (November	  1,	  1950),	  101-­‐4,	  Nationalist	  Party	  Archives,	  Taipei,	  Taiwan.	  	  57	  “Ru	  dazhan	  baofa	  jike	  chongfan	  dalu	  [If	  world	  war	  explodes,	  we	  can	  return	  to	  the	  mainland],”	  editorial,	  Zhongyang	  Ribao,	  December	  10,	  1950.	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southwestern	  China,	  such	  as	  Yunnan	  and	  Guangxi.	  Such	  a	  view	  was	  widely	  propagated	  through	  newspapers.	  An	  official	  party	  organ,	  Zhongyang	  Ribao,	  for	  example,	  published	  articles	  claiming	  that	  there	  were	  1.6	  million	  anti-­‐communist	  guerrillas	  in	  mainland	  China,	  and	  that	  their	  countrymen	  on	  the	  mainland	  were	  enslaved	  by	  the	  Russian	  imperialists	  and	  waiting	  to	  be	  rescued.58	  In	  regard	  to	  the	  Korean	  War,	  it	  was	  widely	  told	  that	  many	  Chinese	  soldiers	  were	  forced	  to	  participate	  and,	  thus,	  would	  surrender	  if	  U.S./U.N.	  forces	  appealed	  to	  them	  under	  the	  name	  of	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek.59	  	  Views	  of	  this	  kind	  were,	  to	  be	  sure,	  not	  altogether	  lies.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  population	  too	  large	  to	  be	  ignored	  expressed	  doubts	  and	  distrust	  toward	  the	  CCP	  at	  that	  time.	  And	  yet,	  such	  views	  were	  certainly	  based	  on	  exaggeration,	  throwing	  light	  only	  on	  particular	  sets	  of	  facts	  and	  excluding	  others,	  thus	  contributing	  to	  the	  making	  of	  a	  “truth.”	  As	  in	  mainland	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  a	  particular	  “reality”	  attained	  predominance	  only	  through	  gaining	  the	  acceptance	  and	  participation	  of	  the	  population.	  In	  other	  words,	  thus,	  only	  a	  “reality”	  that	  went	  along	  with	  popular	  imagination	  could	  survive	  and	  prevail.	  Official	  propaganda,	  of	  course,	  had	  certain	  effects	  in	  a	  complex	  process	  of	  the	  shaping	  of	  such	  imagination,	  but	  much	  more	  forceful	  was	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  war	  itself	  and	  interpretations	  of	  it	  within	  society,	  as	  well	  as	  people’s	  numerous	  choices	  and	  the	  
                                                58	  “Anti-­‐communist	  Guerrilla—1.6	  million,”	  Zhongyang	  Ribao,	  November	  26,	  1950;	  Also,	  see,	  “Jianli	  dalu	  fanyong	  zhengquan	  fangan	  caoan	  [A	  draft	  for	  the	  proposal	  to	  establish	  a	  political	  regime	  to	  counterattack	  the	  mainland],”	  No.	  014-­‐00001-­‐2999A,	  Xingzheng	  yuan	  [Office	  of	  Administration],	  Academia	  Sinica,	  Taipei,	  Taiwan.	  	  	  59	  Minutes,	  Central	  Reform	  Meeting	  on	  November	  1950,	  No.	  6-­‐41-­‐202,	  Nationalist	  Party	  Papers,	  Hoover	  Institute,	  Stanford	  University,	  Stanford,	  California.	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degrees	  of	  participation.	  The	  real	  function	  of	  state	  propaganda,	  actually,	  was	  not	  necessarily	  to	  create	  consensus,	  but	  to	  clarify	  dividing	  lines	  within	  society.	  	  	  
Divide	  Lines	  Clarified	  With	  the	  series	  of	  Chinese	  victories	  in	  Korea,	  the	  “Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea”	  movements	  continued	  to	  be	  extending	  in	  December	  of	  1950.	  Against	  this	  background,	  countless	  storekeepers	  in	  major	  cities	  competed	  to	  make	  donations,	  many	  shoemakers	  declared	  their	  intentions	  to	  repair	  soldiers’	  shoes	  for	  free,	  rickshaw	  coolies	  signed	  or	  gave	  their	  names	  for	  the	  Patriotic	  Pledge,	  and	  students	  and	  workers	  participated	  in	  various	  kinds	  of	  mobilization	  campaigns,	  some	  even	  volunteering	  for	  the	  army.60	  These	  were	  the	  people	  who	  surprised	  a	  tax	  office	  clerk	  in	  Beijing	  who,	  previously,	  had	  experienced	  the	  perpetual	  problem	  of	  non-­‐payment	  of	  overdue	  taxes	  in	  his	  district,	  because	  now	  taxpayers	  were	  organizing	  themselves	  and	  taking	  initiative	  in	  paying	  taxes.61	  These	  were	  people	  who,	  as	  a	  result,	  cooperated	  with	  the	  CCP’s	  mobilization	  programs.	  Viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  CCP’s	  campaigns	  were	  not	  always	  forcefully	  and	  brutally	  imposed,	  but	  were,	  to	  some	  extent,	  welcomed	  and	  supported	  by	  certain	  portions,	  if	  not	  a	  majority,	  of	  the	  population.	  We	  can	  get	  a	  glimpse	  of	  such	  a	  feeling	  of	  cooperation	  and	  sense	  of	  unity	  in	  a	  report	  compiled	  by	  an	  official	  of	  the	  Beijing	  Cinema	  Guild:	  	  
                                                60	  “Beijing	  shi	  tanfan	  kan-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  gongzuo	  jihua	  zongjie	  [Planning	  and	  summing-­‐up	  of	  Beijing	  street	  vendors’	  activities	  of	  Resisting	  American	  and	  Assisting	  Korea],”	  No.	  022-­‐010-­‐00314,	  pp.	  23-­‐25,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  	  61	  "Diwu	  quwei	  guanyu	  wuqu	  kang-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  yundong	  de	  chubu	  jihua,	  zongjie,	  baokao	  [The	  fifth	  district	  committee's	  planning,	  summary,	  and	  report	  concerning	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  in	  the	  fifth	  district	  of	  Beijing],"	  040-­‐002-­‐00119,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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On	  the	  morning	  of	  December	  13,	  1950,	  about	  seventy	  elementary	  school	  children	  walked	  more	  than	  three	  miles	  to	  the	  Beijing	  Theater	  from	  the	  outskirts	  of	  the	  city,	  but	  found	  not	  a	  single	  free	  seat	  when	  they	  arrived.	  For	  these	  children	  fully	  soaked	  in	  sweat,	  the	  theater	  wanted	  to	  give	  them	  a	  rest,	  thus	  making	  an	  announcement	  to	  the	  audience—“These	  children	  came	  from	  far	  away	  but	  could	  not	  find	  any	  free	  seat;	  can	  we	  take	  care	  of	  them,	  offering	  seats	  and	  letting	  them	  take	  a	  rest?”	  As	  soon	  as	  this	  announcement	  finished,	  everyone	  stood	  up;	  some	  held	  their	  children	  on	  knees;	  some	  offered	  their	  seats;	  and	  others	  shared	  seats.	  And	  then,	  quickly	  all	  of	  these	  seventy	  children	  could	  sit	  down.	  The	  theater	  was	  filled	  with	  a	  warm	  and	  kindly	  air;	  it	  was	  like	  a	  big	  family.62	  	  Aside	  from	  such	  a	  degree	  of	  enthusiasm	  and	  mood	  of	  cooperation	  among	  the	  people,	  the	  most	  interesting	  point	  of	  this	  report	  is	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  author	  illustrated	  this	  scene	  using	  the	  metaphor	  of	  a	  “big	  family.”	  This	  is	  because	  this	  notion	  of	  “family”	  might	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  why	  so	  many	  people	  participated	  in	  the	  communist	  campaigns	  of	  “Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea”	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950.	  In	  fact,	  the	  tightening-­‐up	  of	  censorship	  in	  the	  news	  media,	  escalation	  of	  propaganda	  campaigns,	  and	  spread	  of	  nationalistic	  education	  were	  not	  disdained.	  Rather,	  they	  were	  in	  many	  ways	  embraced	  as	  means	  of	  bringing	  order,	  unity,	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  national	  pride	  to	  the	  country,	  which	  came	  to	  be	  commonly	  and	  proudly	  proclaimed	  as	  Xin	  Zhongguo	  [New	  China].	  Indeed,	  without	  understanding	  this	  aspect	  of	  “attractiveness,”	  we	  cannot	  comprehend	  the	  spread	  and	  function	  of	  the	  movements	  at	  that	  time.	  	  Nevertheless,	  as	  communist	  authorities	  were	  keenly	  aware,	  the	  tide	  of	  popular	  attitudes	  was	  still	  capricious,	  possibly	  tilted	  by	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  war	  in	  Korea.	  The	  situation	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950	  was	  chaotic	  because	  this	  period	  observed,	  simultaneously,	  the	  rapid	  development	  of	  both	  support	  and	  confidence,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  doubt	  and	  dissatisfaction,	  on	  the	  other.	  There	  was	  undoubtedly	  a	  sense	  of	  pride	  in	  the	  achievements	  of	  the	  newly	  established	  government,	  but	  also	  existed	  
                                                62	  Ibid.	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was	  a	  strong	  undercurrent	  of	  dissatisfaction	  and	  apathy.63	  First	  of	  all,	  even	  among	  supporters,	  not	  everyone’s	  sense	  of	  patriotism	  led	  them	  to	  volunteering	  for	  the	  army;	  many	  people,	  especially	  among	  the	  peasants,	  were	  eager	  to	  join	  the	  army	  because	  that	  was	  the	  only	  thing	  they	  were	  accustomed	  to	  and	  good	  at.	  Such	  an	  attitude	  was	  prevalent	  among	  low-­‐ranking	  village	  officials,	  who	  now	  felt	  relieved	  to	  be	  released	  from	  the	  “headachy”	  tasks	  of	  economic	  progress.64	  According	  to	  one	  internal	  bulletin	  from	  the	  Shanxi	  Province,	  some	  peasant	  leaders	  proudly	  claimed	  that	  they	  had	  not	  learned	  any	  new	  things	  like	  economic	  development,	  but	  knew	  old	  things	  like	  guerrilla	  warfare	  very	  well.65	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  campaigns	  had	  created	  new	  problems	  and	  much	  confusion,	  For	  example,	  in	  one	  village	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Beijing,	  “donations”	  were	  literally	  forced;	  when	  one	  family	  refused	  to	  contribute	  money,	  local	  officials	  became	  furious,	  but,	  because	  they	  could	  not	  collect	  enough	  donations,	  anyway,	  in	  the	  end	  they	  decided	  to	  make	  a	  false	  report	  in	  order	  to	  fulfill	  a	  quota.66	  Likewise,	  in	  a	  campaign	  to	  collect	  comfort	  letters	  to	  soldiers,	  members	  of	  one	  local	  committee	  duplicated	  letters	  in	  order	  to	  inflate	  their	  numbers.67	  Furthermore,	  in	  promoting	  
                                                63	  See,	  for	  instance,	  British	  diplomat’s	  observation	  in	  a	  memorandum,	  A.A.E.	  Franklin	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  February	  24,	  1951	  in	  “Extension	  of	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists	  over	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  China,”	  FO371/92194,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  	  64	  “Liaodong	  ,	  Liaoxi,	  Rehe,	  Heilongjiang	  deng	  sheng	  ge	  jieceng	  dui	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  [Reactions	  toward	  the	  current	  political	  situation	  among	  various	  sectors	  in	  Liaodong,	  Liaoxi,	  Rehe,	  and	  Heilongjiang	  Province],”	  December	  18,	  1950,	  in	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  65	  “Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  Bao	  Jia	  Wei	  Guo	  sheng	  zhong	  Chasheng	  gejie	  sixiang	  dongtai	  [Thought	  trends	  in	  various	  circles	  in	  Cha	  Province	  among	  the	  voices	  of	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  and	  Protect	  Home	  Defend	  Country	  Movements],”	  December	  20,	  1950,	  in	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  66	  “Shiwei	  xuanchuanbu	  guanyu	  Beijingshi	  jixu	  puji	  shenru	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  yundong	  deqingkuang	  baogao	  [The	  propaganda	  division	  of	  Beijing	  city	  committee	  concerning	  continuing	  spreading	  and	  deepening	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements],”	  February	  13,	  1951,	  No.	  001-­‐012-­‐00080,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  67	  Ibid.	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anti-­‐American	  signature	  campaigns,	  some	  lower-­‐ranking	  officials	  in	  local	  committees	  in	  Beijing	  added	  false	  signatures	  in	  order	  to	  finish	  the	  work	  assigned	  to	  them.68	  In	  addition	  to	  such	  a	  variety	  of	  mendacious	  reports,	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  movements	  revealed	  that	  quite	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  population	  did	  not	  support	  the	  communist	  authorities.	  Some	  even	  openly	  scorned	  students’	  activities	  in	  the	  “Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea”	  movements;	  one	  middle-­‐age	  worker	  in	  Beijing	  reportedly	  said:	  Who	  would	  believe	  what	  students	  say?	  Ordinary	  folks	  would	  say,	  ‘Ah,	  what	  noisy	  students!’	  They	  are	  not	  really	  smart.	  They	  quickly	  appear	  once	  something	  happens,	  but	  on	  the	  next	  day	  they	  are	  gone.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Marco	  Polo	  Bridge	  Incident	  [in	  1937],	  there	  were	  such	  noisy	  students,	  but	  they	  quickly	  knelt	  down	  when	  the	  Japanese	  came	  over.	  Moreover,	  many	  of	  them	  still	  talk	  like	  foreigners.	  I	  don’t	  understand	  what	  they	  are	  saying.69	  	  Observing	  such	  a	  situation,	  this	  report	  warned	  that	  there	  was	  a	  certain	  distance	  between	  student	  groups	  enthusiastic	  about	  the	  campaigns	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  masses.	  Further,	  as	  discussed	  earlier,	  many	  sectors	  of	  the	  population	  remained	  dubious,	  and	  such	  a	  situation	  continued	  even	  with	  the	  massive	  extension	  of	  the	  “Resist	  America	  and	  Assist	  Korea”	  movements.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  some	  students	  simply	  remained	  pro-­‐American.	  Even	  among	  the	  waves	  of	  anti-­‐American	  campaigns	  in	  December	  1950,	  several	  high-­‐school	  students	  in	  Beijing	  reportedly	  spoke	  of	  America	  with	  an	  air	  of	  envy,	  saying,	  “I	  have	  heard	  that	  in	  the	  United	  States	  even	  a	  dog	  eats	  meat	  and	  even	  a	  beggar	  wears	  suits;”	  “I	  have	  never	  heard	  that	  there	  is	  a	  beggar	  in	  America;”	  “I	  wish	  to	  be	  an	  American.	  
                                                68	  Ibid.	  	  69	  “Beijingshi	  diliu	  quwei	  ge	  zhibu	  youguan	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  de	  qunzhong	  fanying	  ji	  xuanchuan	  zhihuizhan	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Reports	  from	  various	  branch	  offices	  of	  the	  sixth	  district	  of	  Beijing	  concerning	  people’s	  reactions	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  and	  the	  working	  plans	  for	  propaganda],”	  November	  1950,	  No.	  038-­‐001-­‐00023,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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How	  wonderful	  it	  would	  be	  if	  I	  could	  cling	  to	  the	  tail	  of	  an	  aircraft	  and	  go	  to	  the	  United	  States!”70	  Such	  a	  sense	  of	  envy	  toward	  American	  society	  indeed	  could	  not	  be	  ignored;	  some	  even	  observed	  that	  ordinary	  people	  did	  not	  have	  feelings	  of	  hatred	  toward	  the	  United	  States	  at	  all,	  and	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  make	  them	  develop	  such	  feelings	  quickly.71	  	  In	  addition	  to	  such	  pro-­‐American	  sentiments,	  some	  simply	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  China’s	  victory	  over	  American	  forces,	  suspecting	  that	  the	  United	  States	  must	  be	  planning	  a	  direct	  landing,	  like	  the	  Inchon	  Landing,	  on	  the	  coast	  of	  Qingdao	  or	  Shanghai.72	  Further,	  even	  amidst	  the	  massive	  waves	  of	  campaigns,	  some	  youth	  simply	  remained	  indifferent;	  one	  student	  at	  Yanjing	  University	  in	  Beijing	  reportedly	  told	  to	  his	  classmates,	  who	  had	  begun	  discussing	  the	  Korean	  War	  issue	  in	  class:	  “Well,	  let’s	  talk	  about	  it	  after	  the	  exam.”	  Others	  similarly	  remained	  uncooperative,	  saying,	  “It	  would	  simply	  be	  a	  waste	  to	  use	  college	  students	  as	  soldiers.”73	  Although	  we	  have	  seen	  the	  increase	  of	  enthusiasm	  among	  teachers	  and	  students,	  some	  remained	  reluctant	  and	  even	  bewildered.	  One	  teacher	  in	  a	  Shanghai,	  for	  instance,	  said	  with	  a	  perplexed	  air,	  “When	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  ruled	  this	  country	  we	  taught	  that	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  is	  good.	  Since	  the	  Communist	  Party	  has	  come,	  we	  have	  
                                                70	  “Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  yundong	  zhong	  zhongxuesheng	  de	  sixiang	  zhuangkuang	  [Thought	  situation	  among	  high	  school	  students	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements],”	  December	  26,	  1950,	  No.	  100-­‐001-­‐00035,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  71	  “Tianjin	  gejie	  dui	  muqian	  shiju	  de	  fanying	  	  [Responses	  in	  various	  circles	  in	  Tianjin	  regarding	  the	  current	  political	  situation],”	  November	  18,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  	  72	  “Pingrang	  jiefang	  hou	  Fuzhou,	  Qingdao	  gejie	  yiban	  sixiang	  zhuangkuang	  [The	  general	  thought	  situation	  in	  various	  circles	  in	  Fuzhou	  and	  Qingdao	  after	  the	  liberation	  of	  Pyongyang],”	  December	  23,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	  73	  “Zai	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  yundong	  zhong	  tuanyuan	  de	  sixiang	  qingkuang	  [The	  thought	  situation	  among	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Communist	  Youth	  League	  in	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements],”	  November	  1950,	  	  No.	  100-­‐001-­‐00034,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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been	  teaching	  that	  the	  Communist	  Party	  is	  good.	  What	  would	  we	  have	  to	  say,	  then,	  if	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  were	  to	  come	  back	  again?”74	  Even	  following	  the	  series	  of	  Chinese	  victories	  in	  Korea,	  even	  amidst	  massive	  propaganda	  campaigns,	  such	  reluctance	  was	  not	  wiped	  out.	  Much	  worse,	  from	  Beijing’s	  perspective,	  there	  remained	  some	  portions	  of	  the	  population	  who	  retained	  a	  firm	  distrust	  toward	  the	  Communist	  regime.	  One	  internal	  report,	  which	  described	  popular	  attitudes	  and	  current	  situations	  in	  the	  Shanxi	  Province,	  in	  fact,	  took	  a	  dim	  view	  of	  the	  movements’	  prospects:	  “On	  the	  surface,	  many	  people	  agree	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea’	  campaigns,	  but	  many	  bear	  doubts	  about	  the	  future	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  the	  majority	  is	  afraid	  of	  the	  American	  forces	  in	  their	  hearts.	  Many	  do	  not	  trust	  our	  newspapers,	  always	  listen	  to	  the	  Nationalist	  Party’s	  radio	  programs,	  and	  hastily	  believe	  in	  wild	  rumors,	  thus	  remaining	  unstable.	  Even	  in	  public,	  there	  have	  been	  a	  lot	  of	  behaviors	  of	  boldly	  abusing	  the	  People’s	  Government.”75	  The	  negative	  tone	  of	  this	  report	  was	  not	  exaggerated.	  	  We	  can	  catch	  a	  glimpse	  of	  such	  dissatisfaction	  among	  a	  certain	  portion	  of	  the	  population	  in	  one	  memorandum,	  scrawled	  on	  a	  piece	  of	  paper,	  now	  kept	  at	  the	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Archives.	  The	  memo	  recounts	  a	  brief	  conversation	  between	  a	  rickshaw	  man	  and	  his	  customer,	  a	  female	  doctor.	  According	  to	  this	  note,	  their	  chat	  went	  as	  follows.	  When	  the	  rickshaw	  came	  near	  Beihai	  Park,	  the	  two	  saw	  propaganda	  
                                                74	  “Zhongguo	  jiaoyu	  gonghui	  Shanghai	  shi	  weiyuanhui	  guanyu	  Fangming	  tongzhi	  zuo	  de	  ‘Wei	  baowei	  zuguo	  he	  qingnian	  ertong	  xingfu	  de	  jianglai	  er	  fendou’de	  baogao	  [The	  Shanghai	  Committee	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Educational	  Guild	  concerning	  a	  report	  on	  Fang	  Ming’s	  ‘Struggles	  for	  the	  happy	  future	  of	  the	  youth	  and	  children	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  our	  mother	  country’],”	  December	  9,	  1950,	  No.	  C1-­‐2-­‐121-­‐29,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  75	  “Shanxi	  kan-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  yundong	  zhankai	  yilai	  ge	  jieceng	  sixiang	  dongtai	  [The	  general	  trends	  of	  thoughts	  on	  the	  various	  levels	  of	  society	  following	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movement	  in	  Shanxi],”	  Neibu	  cankao,	  December	  8,	  1950,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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cartoons	  of	  the	  “Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea”	  campaigns;	  the	  doctor	  said	  to	  the	  puller:	  	  The	  Communist	  Party	  is	  trying	  to	  deceive	  people	  by	  using	  these	  ‘Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea’	  cartoons.	  Now	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  and	  the	  Americans	  are	  united	  in	  the	  war.	  The	  Russians	  are	  now	  actually	  chasing	  and	  violating	  women	  in	  the	  northeastern	  area.	  Moreover,	  they	  took	  over	  six	  power	  plants	  there.	  Today,	  all	  men	  between	  eighteen	  and	  fifty	  years	  old	  are	  conscripted;	  on	  the	  surface,	  it	  is	  of	  course	  called	  ‘volunteering,’	  but	  in	  fact	  it	  is	  forced.	  Alas,	  China	  will	  get	  nowhere.	  Mao	  Zedong	  must	  know	  that	  Stalin	  is	  hoping	  to	  ruin	  China.76	  	  When	  the	  rickshaw	  man	  asked	  the	  doctor	  if	  the	  story	  was	  really	  true,	  she	  reportedly	  replied,	  “I	  am	  a	  northeasterner.	  I	  saw	  it	  myself.”77	  This	  story	  is	  interesting	  not	  so	  much	  for	  its	  information	  in	  itself,	  but	  because	  it	  shows	  the	  existence	  of	  individual	  observation	  and	  judgment,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  massive	  scale	  of	  propaganda	  campaigns	  all	  over	  China	  during	  this	  period.	  	  Such	  an	  individual’s	  observation	  appeared	  unmistakably	  in	  a	  letter	  sent	  from	  one	  worker	  at	  the	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Administration	  for	  Cleaning	  to	  the	  local	  communist	  office	  in	  November	  of	  1950.	  Interestingly,	  the	  letter	  was	  entitled,	  not	  “Zhiyuanshu	  [letter	  for	  enlisting]”	  but	  “Yijianshu	  [letter	  of	  opinion].”	  Instead	  of	  volunteering	  for	  the	  army,	  in	  fact,	  this	  young	  worker	  expressed	  his	  concerns	  and	  opinions	  to	  the	  authority.	  It	  read:	  	  When	  I	  learned	  about	  the	  Korean	  issue,	  my	  understanding	  was	  still	  inaccurate	  and	  I	  was	  thinking	  that	  the	  Korean	  War	  was	  not	  deeply	  relevant	  to	  us.	  Through	  some	  study,	  however,	  I	  have	  realized	  that	  such	  a	  view	  was	  merely	  a	  narrow	  ethnic	  notion.	  Now	  I	  am	  not	  viewing	  the	  Korean	  problem	  as	  an	  isolated	  issue.	  I	  see	  it	  as	  part	  of	  American	  Imperialism,	  which	  follows	  the	  path	  of	  Japanese	  Imperialism	  of	  the	  past,	  using	  Korea	  as	  a	  stepping-­‐stone	  to	  invade	  China,	  and	  already	  realizing	  it	  today.	  	  	  
                                                76	  “Diwu	  quwei,	  Qu	  fulian	  chouweihui	  deng	  danwei	  guanyu	  Kang	  Mei	  Yuan	  Chao	  gongzuo	  de	  baogao,	  zhoubao,	  jianbao	  	  [Reports	  and	  summaries	  of	  the	  fifth	  district	  committee	  and	  women’s	  league	  of	  the	  district	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Based	  on	  this	  understanding,	  I	  am	  attending	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movement	  for	  the	  defense	  of	  our	  country	  and	  people,	  and	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  my	  own	  security,	  peace,	  and	  daily	  life.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  what	  I	  have	  done	  so	  far	  is	  just	  to	  mobilize	  other	  people,	  and	  I	  have	  not	  thought	  about	  my	  own	  action.	  I	  have	  a	  concept	  of	  action.	  But	  how	  can	  I	  express	  it?	  That’s	  a	  big	  problem!	  Ordinary	  people	  have	  participated	  in	  the	  Volunteer	  Army	  and	  gone	  to	  Korea.	  	  	  How	  about	  myself?	  	  Also	  join	  to	  the	  Voluntary	  Army?	  	  No,	  I	  cannot!	  	  	  My	  mind	  was	  messed	  up.	  I	  don’t	  have	  such	  a	  high	  level	  of	  resolution.	  I	  don’t	  have	  such	  a	  sense	  of	  self-­‐sacrifice.	  However	  continuing	  to	  discuss	  this	  matter,	  I	  cannot	  overcome	  my	  contradiction.	  […].	  Why	  cannot	  I	  equally	  carry	  out	  the	  duty	  that	  other	  people	  of	  the	  proletariat	  have	  been	  doing?	  It’s	  hard	  for	  me.	  It’s	  really	  painful.78	  	  	  In	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  his	  long	  letter,	  this	  worker	  declared	  and	  promised	  that	  he	  would	  voluntarily	  reduce	  his	  salary	  by	  five	  percent,	  and	  extend	  his	  working-­‐hours	  for	  one-­‐hour	  every	  day.	  This	  letter	  is	  interesting	  because	  it	  shows	  not	  only	  how	  news	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  forced	  even	  a	  worker	  to	  connect	  a	  foreign	  war	  with	  his	  life	  and	  think	  about	  his	  behavior,	  but	  also	  how	  an	  individual	  observed	  the	  situation,	  suffered	  anxiety,	  and	  decided	  not	  to	  join	  the	  army,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  massive	  scale	  of	  propaganda	  campaigns.	  From	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  letter,	  we	  can	  presume	  that	  he	  was	  a	  sincere	  learner	  and	  participant,	  from	  the	  CCP’s	  viewpoint.	  In	  the	  second	  half,	  however,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  he	  was	  not	  an	  opinion-­‐less	  robot	  who	  just	  passively	  followed	  the	  party	  line;	  he	  refused	  to	  go	  to	  war,	  while	  choosing	  to	  suggest	  his	  own	  actions,	  in	  the	  end,	  such	  as	  reducing	  his	  salary	  and	  extending	  his	  working	  hours.	  	  These	  examples	  suggest	  that	  what	  propaganda	  campaigns—defined	  broadly,	  from	  censorship	  to	  education	  programs	  to	  military	  strategy—in	  the	  fall	  and	  winter	  
                                                78	  “Yijian	  shu	  [Letter	  of	  Opinion],”	  November	  8,	  1950,	  in	  "Shi	  qingguan	  ju	  ...	  deng	  danwei	  de	  tongzhi	  guanyu	  shenqing	  Kang-­‐Mei	  Yuan-­‐Chao	  de	  zhiyuan	  shu	  [Volunteer	  letters	  for	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  written	  by	  cadres	  of	  the	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Administration	  for	  Cleaning],"	  001-­‐009-­‐00145,	  pp.	  34-­‐37,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	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of	  1950	  really	  did	  was	  not	  necessarily	  to	  change	  people’s	  minds.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  while	  certain	  portions	  of	  the	  population	  embraced	  and	  participated	  in	  the	  CCP’s	  campaigns,	  quite	  a	  few	  remained	  dubious,	  if	  not	  hostile,	  to	  CCP	  rule.	  Seen	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  primary	  effect	  of	  such	  extensive	  campaigns,	  rather,	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  
clarifying	  where	  the	  divide	  existed	  in	  society.	  Active	  communist	  sympathizers	  became	  more	  enthusiastic	  and	  aggressive,	  with	  devoted	  students,	  for	  instance,	  staying	  up	  all	  night	  to	  write	  letters	  to	  Mao	  Zedong,	  some	  even	  writing	  them	  in	  blood	  in	  order	  to	  show	  their	  determination.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  those	  who	  had	  been	  dubious	  about	  the	  communist	  regime	  confirmed	  their	  distrust,	  with	  some	  students	  telling	  enthusiastic	  classmates	  straight	  out:	  “Just	  go	  to	  Korea	  as	  soon	  as	  possible,	  or	  I	  will	  see	  your	  heads	  at	  the	  execution	  ground	  when	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  returns.”79	  As	  such,	  the	  waves	  of	  campaigns	  themselves	  did	  not	  settle	  confusion.	  Nor	  were	  they	  able	  to	  convince	  nonconformists.	  Rather,	  they	  brought	  hidden	  problems	  on	  the	  surface.	  To	  “solve”	  such	  disputes	  in	  society,	  more	  direct,	  more	  brutal,	  and	  more	  societal	  kinds	  of	  processes	  were	  required—that	  is,	  social	  punishment	  and	  suppression	  among	  the	  people	  on	  the	  ground,	  which	  took	  place	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed.	  	  	  The	  pattern	  that	  appeared	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  truth-­‐making	  in	  China	  during	  the	  “Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea”	  movements	  in	  the	  fall	  and	  winter	  of	  1950	  is	  worth	  looking	  at.	  First,	  all	  campaigns,	  to	  be	  sure,	  resulted	  from	  officially	  designed	  programs,	  which	  were	  quite	  often	  top-­‐down	  and	  coercive.	  Throughout	  the	  
                                                79	  “Shanghai	  dazhong	  xuexiao	  xuesheng	  choumei	  guannian	  shangwei	  wanquan	  shuli	  [Anti-­‐American	  perceptions	  are	  not	  yet	  well	  established	  among	  college	  and	  high	  school	  students	  in	  Shanghai],”	  November	  28,	  1950,	  Neibu	  cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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movements,	  the	  CCP’s	  focus	  was	  on	  people’s	  minds	  and	  their	  participation.	  The	  point	  at	  issue	  was	  how	  people	  saw	  themselves,	  their	  history,	  and	  the	  outside	  world,	  and	  how	  they	  behaved	  accordingly.	  It	  was	  reasonable	  for	  the	  communist	  party	  to	  begin	  these	  campaigns	  in	  news	  and	  film	  industries,	  as	  well	  as	  education,	  literature,	  and	  history.	  Yet,	  the	  CCP’s	  propaganda	  campaign	  itself	  was	  only	  half-­‐successful	  because	  it	  appealed	  mostly	  to	  those	  who	  had	  already	  been	  supportive	  and	  sympathetic	  to	  their	  programs.	  	  The	  real	  implementation	  of	  the	  campaigns,	  thus,	  actually	  depended	  on	  more	  diverse	  actors	  and	  factors,	  namely,	  the	  existence	  of	  numerous	  devoted	  followers,	  and	  historical	  memories	  that	  provided	  a	  logic	  for	  those	  people	  and	  CCP	  programs.	  This	  point	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  powerful	  manipulation	  of	  the	  communist	  regime.	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  sweeping	  manner	  of	  the	  extension	  and	  materialization	  of	  the	  campaign	  cannot	  be	  understood	  if	  we	  look	  solely	  at	  coercion	  and	  control	  by	  the	  communist	  authority.	  It	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  consent,	  initiative,	  and	  participation	  by	  local	  actors.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  widespread	  permeation	  of	  the	  campaign	  was	  possible	  only	  at	  a	  crossroads	  of	  coercion	  and	  willingness,	  and	  of	  mobilization	  and	  participation.	  The	  primary	  function	  of	  state	  propaganda,	  thus,	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  forging	  a	  consensus	  than	  clarifying	  dividing	  lines	  between	  “us”	  and	  “them.”	  The	  series	  of	  points	  raised	  here	  is	  intriguing,	  not	  because	  such	  phenomena	  were	  unique	  to	  China,	  but	  because	  they	  were	  quite	  common,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  even	  in	  American	  society	  and	  politics	  at	  that	  time.	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“Why	  do	  we	  fight	  in	  such	  a	  distant	  place?”	  asked	  a	  narrator	  in	  a	  film	  titled	  
Why	  Korea?,	  which	  was	  produced	  by	  the	  Twentieth	  Century-­‐Fox	  Film	  Corporation	  in	  December	  1950.	  Showing	  unfamiliar	  images	  of	  rice	  fields	  and	  mountains,	  the	  narrator	  asked	  again,	  “Why	  do	  we	  fight	  in	  Korea,	  a	  faraway	  place	  we	  barely	  know?	  Why?”	  Instead	  of	  answering	  this	  question	  immediately,	  however,	  the	  film	  provided	  a	  “history”	  of	  the	  recent	  past,	  stringing	  together	  kaleidoscopic	  images	  of	  the	  prewar	  and	  postwar	  periods—Japan’s	  invasion	  and	  the	  Manchurian	  Incident,	  Hitler’s	  and	  Mussolini’s	  marches	  in	  Europe,	  parades	  at	  the	  Kremlin,	  communist	  expansion	  in	  Eastern	  Europe,	  as	  well	  as	  East	  and	  Southeast	  Asia,	  followed	  by	  heroic	  images	  of	  the	  Berlin	  Airlift.	  Describing	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  as	  part	  of	  Moscow’s	  worldwide	  schemes,	  the	  film	  warns	  that	  there	  will	  be	  “no	  more	  geographical	  boundaries.”	  With	  pictures	  of	  Paris,	  London,	  New	  York	  City,	  Washington	  D.C.,	  Chicago,	  San	  Francisco,	  and,	  finally,	  Seoul,	  the	  film	  concluded:	  “Today	  this	  is	  the	  Korea,	  but	  Korea	  is	  an	  example.	  We	  are	  fighting	  not	  for	  geographical	  borders	  but	  for	  a	  way	  of	  life.	  If	  we	  don’t	  fight	  there,	  we	  will	  fight	  here.	  We	  have	  no	  other	  choice.”80	  This	  film,	  Why	  Korea?,	  was	  screened	  in	  hundreds	  of	  theaters	  nationwide,	  from	  New	  York	  City	  and	  San	  Francisco	  to	  Des	  Moines,	  Iowa,	  and	  Dulles,	  Texas,	  and	  eventually	  won	  the	  Academy	  Award	  for	  best	  documentary	  in	  1951.	  	  Many	  viewers	  of	  this	  film	  might	  have	  recalled	  Frank	  Capra’s	  Prelude	  to	  War,	  a	  masterpiece	  of	  wartime	  propaganda,	  released	  during	  World	  War	  II,	  in	  May	  1942,	  and,	  similarly,	  won	  the	  Academy	  Award	  that	  year.	  There	  were,	  however,	  a	  couple	  of	  important	  differences.	  First,	  unlike	  Capra’s	  film,	  Why	  Korea?	  produced	  an	  
                                                80	  “Why	  Korea?”	  Twenty	  Century-­‐Fox	  film,	  Motion	  Picture	  Collection,	  HSTL,	  Independence	  Missouri.	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unignorable	  controversy.	  While	  many	  theaters	  ran	  the	  film,	  and	  some	  enthusiastically	  did	  so,	  quite	  a	  few	  theater	  owners	  refused,	  calling	  it	  a	  “war	  mongering	  film.”81	  The	  Independent	  Theatre	  Owners	  of	  Ohio,	  for	  instance,	  protested	  the	  White	  House,	  which	  had	  authorized	  and	  urged	  theater	  owners	  to	  show	  the	  film,	  insisting	  on	  that	  the	  government	  should	  make	  another	  film	  titled	  “Why	  We	  Should	  Get	  Out	  of	  Korea.”82	  The	  existence	  of	  such	  controversy	  reveals	  the	  contested	  nature	  of	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  malleability	  of	  “reality”	  and	  “truth.”	  In	  fact,	  while	  largely	  accepted	  at	  that	  time,	  the	  “truth”	  that	  Why	  Korea?	  provided	  contained	  certain	  preconceptions	  in	  American	  society,	  rather	  than	  the	  actuality	  of	  Korea	  and	  East	  Asia.	  In	  other	  words,	  such	  a	  “reality”	  does	  not	  exist	  out	  there,	  and,	  thus,	  has	  to	  be	  boldly	  addressed,	  widely	  shared,	  and	  unquestionably	  supported	  to	  maintain	  the	  prestigious	  status	  of	  “reality.”	  Since	  such	  a	  consensus	  regarding	  “truth”	  did	  not	  exist,	  it	  had	  to	  be	  made,	  initiating	  waves	  of	  truth-­‐making	  campaigns	  in	  American	  society.	  This	  was	  the	  background	  that	  necessitated	  American	  versions	  of	  propaganda	  and	  mobilization	  programs	  in	  the	  Korean	  War	  period.	  	  Such	  truth-­‐making	  programs,	  to	  be	  sure,	  were	  nothing	  new	  in	  the	  year	  of	  1950.	  Many	  similar	  programs	  had	  already	  been	  developed	  as	  wartime	  mobilization	  campaigns	  during	  the	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  administration.	  Most,	  however,	  were	  terminated	  in	  the	  early	  postwar	  period	  due	  to	  governmental	  budget	  cutting	  efforts.	  It	  was	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  that	  re-­‐energized	  those	  programs	  anew.	  Immediately	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  “Campaign	  of	  Truth,”	  
                                                81	  Letter,	  Don	  P.	  West	  to	  John	  R.	  Steelman,	  n.d.	  471-­‐B;	  letter,	  Charles	  Niles	  to	  John	  R.	  Steelman,	  January	  13,	  1951,	  471-­‐B.	  HSTL.	  	  82	  Letter,	  P.	  J.	  Wood	  to	  John	  R.	  Steelman,	  January	  22,	  1951,	  471-­‐B.	  	  HSTL.	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which	  aimed	  at	  “rolling	  back”	  Soviet	  versions	  of	  “truth,”	  obtained	  financial	  and	  institutional	  support	  from	  Congress.83	  At	  the	  end	  of	  1950,	  President	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  issued	  an	  executive	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  Federal	  Civil	  Defense	  Administration	  (FCDA)	  within	  the	  Office	  for	  Emergency	  Management,	  which	  was	  quickly	  elevated	  to	  an	  independent	  government	  agency	  in	  the	  executive	  branch.84	  	  As	  several	  historians	  have	  examined	  in	  detail,	  this	  agency	  played	  an	  active	  role	  in	  the	  years	  that	  followed	  in	  initiating	  various	  propaganda	  and	  mobilization	  campaigns	  through	  publishing	  numerous	  pamphlets	  and	  leaflets,	  broadcasting	  various	  programs,	  holding	  diverse	  exhibits,	  and	  even	  helping	  to	  establish	  a	  college,	  National	  Civil	  Defense	  College,	  at	  Olney,	  Maryland,	  that	  aimed	  at	  instructing	  citizens	  various	  rescue	  techniques	  in	  the	  nation’s	  civil	  defense	  effort.85	  Some	  of	  the	  largest	  and	  best-­‐known	  campaigns	  were,	  “Operation	  Skywatch”	  and	  “Alert	  America,”	  in	  which,	  according	  to	  a	  speech	  by	  Truman,	  two	  million	  Americans	  voluntarily	  participated.86	  Throughout	  these	  campaigns,	  the	  FCDA	  continuously	  warned	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  has	  atomic	  bombs	  and	  airplanes	  that	  could	  drop	  those	  bombs	  on	  American	  cities,	  urging	  citizens	  that	  every	  city,	  factory,	  office,	  and	  home	  must	  be	  prepared	  and	  organized	  for	  civil	  defense.87	  	  
                                                83	  Walter	  Hixson,	  Parting	  the	  Curtain:	  Propaganda,	  Culture,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  1945-­‐1961	  (New	  York:	  St.	  Martin's	  Press,	  1997),	  14-­‐15;	  Kenneth	  Osgood,	  Total	  Cold	  War:	  Eisenhower's	  Secret	  Propaganda	  
Battle	  at	  Home	  and	  Abroad	  (Lawrence,	  KS:	  University	  of	  Kansas,	  2006),	  43;	  Marc	  J.	  Selverstone,	  
Constructing	  the	  Monolith:	  The	  United	  States,	  Great	  Britain,	  and	  International	  Communism,	  1945-­‐1950	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2009),	  177.	  	  	  84	  Guy	  Oakes,	  The	  Imaginary	  War:	  Civil	  Defense	  and	  American	  Cold	  War	  Culture	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  34-­‐38.	  85	  "Invitation	  to	  the	  first	  public	  exhibition	  of	  the	  Federal	  Civil	  Defense	  Administration's	  Rescue	  Street,"	  Folder	  "Civil	  Defense	  Campaign,"	  Box	  6,	  Spencer	  R.	  Quick	  Files,	  Staff	  Member	  and	  Office	  Files,	  HSTP,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  86	  “Statement	  by	  the	  President	  on	  the	  First	  Anniversary	  of	  Civil	  Defense,”	  January	  12,	  1952,	  Folder	  “Feb.	  1951-­‐1953,”	  Box	  1671,	  OF1591,	  HSTP,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  87	  “Federal	  Civil	  Defense	  Administration	  Press	  Information,”	  No.	  120,	  June	  21,	  1951,	  in	  memorandum	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Many	  Americans,	  probably,	  did	  not	  to	  need	  to	  hear	  such	  an	  instruction	  from	  the	  government.	  In	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  many	  had	  already	  gone	  ahead	  with	  their	  own	  motivations	  and	  purposes.	  For	  example,	  the	  aforementioned	  film,	  Why	  Korea?,	  was,	  in	  fact,	  designed	  and	  produced	  at	  the	  initiative	  of	  a	  private	  corporation,	  Twenty	  Century-­‐Fox,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Capra’s	  Prelude	  to	  War,	  produced	  with	  the	  commission	  and	  support	  of	  General	  George	  Marshall	  and	  the	  then-­‐War	  Department.	  In	  addition	  to	  such	  corporate	  support,	  many	  individuals	  engaged	  in	  various	  kinds	  of	  social	  mobilization	  and	  civil	  defense	  efforts.	  A	  Houston	  housewife,	  for	  instance,	  took	  pen	  in	  hand	  and	  sent	  a	  letter	  to	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  George	  Marshall	  to	  report	  the	  lack	  of	  mobilization	  efforts	  in	  her	  neighborhood,	  telling	  him	  that	  she	  was	  ready	  to	  find	  the	  housewife’s	  place	  in	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  defense	  plan,	  and	  asking	  what	  she	  could	  do	  to	  this	  purpose.88	  A	  New	  York	  car	  dealer,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  found	  a	  business	  opportunity	  in	  civil	  defense	  programs,	  and	  developed	  an	  ambulance	  trailer-­‐truck,	  designed	  for	  the	  use	  by	  civil	  defense	  agencies,	  which,	  according	  to	  his	  proposal,	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  small	  auditorium-­‐lecture	  room,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  emergency	  and	  operation	  room.89	  	  Still	  others,	  particularly	  those	  with	  military	  experience,	  sought	  opportunities	  to	  be	  recognized	  in	  their	  communities	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  need	  for	  voluntary	  civil	  defense	  programs	  at	  home.	  A	  veteran	  living	  in	  a	  rural	  community,	  one	  hundred	  miles	  north	  of	  New	  York	  City,	  for	  instance,	  wrote	  the	  White	  House:	  	  
                                                                                                                                            from	  John	  T.	  Gibson	  to	  Irving	  Perlmeter,	  June	  23,	  1951,	  Folder	  “Miscellaneous,	  1945-­‐50,”	  Box	  1743,	  OF	  2965,	  HSTP,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  88	  Laura	  McEnaney,	  Civil	  Defense	  Begins	  at	  Home:	  Militarization	  Meets	  Everyday	  Life	  in	  the	  Fifties	  (Princeton,	  2000),	  88.	  	  89	  Letter,	  Frank	  Dale	  to	  HST,	  January	  17,	  1951,	  Folder	  “1945-­‐Jan.	  1951,”	  Box	  1671,	  OF1591,	  HSTP,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	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There	  are	  too	  many	  men	  in	  this	  land	  with	  excellent	  military	  experience	  who	  are	  forced	  to	  stand	  on	  the	  side-­‐lines	  of	  war,	  helpless	  to	  assist	  because	  of	  age,	  infirmities	  and	  lack	  of	  up-­‐to-­‐the-­‐minute	  training.	  […].	  They	  all	  want	  to	  be	  identified	  as	  being	  active	  in	  the	  defense	  of	  their	  country,	  but	  not	  on	  an	  “air	  raid	  warden”	  basis.	  […]	  I	  know	  that	  our	  defense	  potential	  can	  be	  greatly	  increased	  if	  these	  veterans	  are	  asked	  to	  serve	  and	  if	  they	  are	  given	  recognition	  of	  a	  sort	  for	  a	  specialized	  type	  of	  defense	  work.90	  	  Responding	  to	  the	  army	  official’s	  request,	  the	  man	  enthusiastically	  introduced	  his	  own	  plan	  for	  organizing	  and	  defending	  his	  community,	  envisioning	  active	  roles	  for	  “citizen	  soldiers,”	  who	  would	  work	  8	  hours	  per	  day	  at	  their	  regular	  civilian	  jobs	  and	  serve	  12	  hours	  at	  night	  for	  their	  country—including	  4	  hours	  on	  active	  duty	  for	  air	  interceptor	  defense,	  and	  8	  hours	  to	  rest	  on	  reserve	  at	  a	  local	  headquarters—which	  would	  enable	  citizens,	  the	  man	  conceived,	  to	  carry	  on	  both	  civilian	  and	  military	  duties.91	  	  Unfortunately	  for	  this	  man,	  neither	  the	  White	  House	  nor	  the	  Army	  adopted	  his	  plan.	  Nevertheless,	  his	  basic	  idea	  was	  not	  far	  out	  of	  step	  with	  the	  core	  ethos	  of	  civil	  defense	  ideology:	  individuals	  voluntarily	  serving	  the	  state,	  as	  epitomized	  in	  a	  pamphlet	  drawing	  (Picture	  9),	  illustrating	  society	  as	  a	  pyramid	  structure,	  composed	  by	  individuals,	  families,	  neighborhoods,	  communities,	  cities,	  states,	  and	  the	  federal	  government,	  in	  that	  order.	  As	  we	  will	  examine	  in	  a	  later	  chapter,	  such	  a	  strong	  desire	  for	  “orderly”	  society	  was	  the	  underlying	  theme	  of	  civil	  defense	  and	  propaganda	  programs,	  which	  were	  quite	  often	  favorably	  embraced	  not	  only	  by	  policymakers,	  but	  also	  numerous	  everyday	  people	  in	  society.	  	  
                                                90	  Letter,	  Richard	  J.	  Kennedy	  to	  Gen.	  Harry	  H.	  Vaughan,	  August	  8,	  1950,	  Folder	  “1945-­‐Jan.	  1951,”	  Box	  1671,	  OF1591,	  HSTP,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  	  91	  Letter,	  Richard	  J.	  Kennedy	  to	  Gen.	  Harry	  H.	  Vaughan,	  September	  6,	  1950,	  Folder	  “1945-­‐Jan.	  1951,”	  Box	  1671,	  OF1591,	  HSTP,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	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Observing	  such	  popular	  support	  and	  participation	  in	  these	  programs,	  one	  would	  notice	  an	  interesting	  point	  in	  common:	  the	  lack	  of	  mention	  of	  the	  Chinese	  and	  Korean	  people.	  This	  was	  also	  true	  for	  the	  aforementioned	  Twenty	  Century-­‐Fox	  film,	  
Why	  Korea?.	  Frank	  Capra’s	  masterpieces	  of	  propaganda,	  such	  as	  Prelude	  to	  War	  and	  
Know	  Your	  Enemy,	  depict	  the	  Japanese	  and	  the	  Nazis	  as	  primary	  enemies	  from	  beginning	  to	  end,	  however	  clichéd	  and	  stereotypical	  the	  descriptions	  were.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  Why	  Korea?	  barely	  shows	  Koreans	  at	  all,	  regardless	  of	  North	  or	  South.	  Nor	  did	  the	  Chinese	  appear	  in	  the	  film.	  Except	  for	  a	  few	  shots	  of	  refugee,	  the	  Korean	  people	  were	  almost	  completely	  absent	  from	  the	  film.	  Why?	  It	  was	  because	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  the	  Chinese	  intervention	  were	  considered	  merely	  results	  of	  the	  Kremlin’s	  worldwide	  scheme,	  signs	  of	  the	  beginning	  of	  World	  War	  III,	  which,	  for	  many,	  provided	  concrete	  “evidence”	  that	  supposedly	  proved	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  
“World	  War	  III	  is	  Here	  Now”	  Following	  news	  of	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War,	  widespread	  in	  American	  society	  in	  December	  of	  1950	  was	  amplified	  fear	  and	  rumors	  of	  World	  War	  III—particularly	  of	  already	  losing	  it.92	  “I’ve	  had	  conference	  after	  conference	  on	  the	  jittery	  situation	  facing	  the	  country,”	  wrote	  President	  Truman	  in	  his	  journal	  on	  December	  9,	  1950,	  “I’ve	  worked	  for	  peace	  for	  five	  years	  and	  six	  months,	  and	  it	  looks	  like	  World	  War	  III	  is	  here.	  I	  hope	  not—but	  we	  must	  meet	  whatever	  comes	  and	  we	  
                                                92	  For	  instance,	  see,	  “World	  War	  III,	  Phase	  I:	  Soviet	  Ahead,”	  US	  News	  &	  World	  Report,	  November	  24,	  1950.	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will.”93	  Like	  many	  Americans,	  the	  president	  had	  just	  learned	  that	  the	  Pyongyang	  area	  had	  fallen	  into	  enemy’s	  hands,	  and	  that	  U.S.	  forces	  were	  completely	  outnumbered	  in	  Korea.	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur’s	  cable	  had	  informed	  him	  that	  the	  number	  of	  Chinese	  soldiers	  was	  estimated	  at	  300,000,	  while	  that	  of	  U.S.	  troops	  was	  merely	  135,000.94	  	  Sharing	  in	  this	  view,	  one	  American	  military	  official	  wrote	  to	  a	  friend	  in	  mid-­‐December:	  “We	  must	  recognize	  publicly	  that	  World	  War	  III	  is	  here	  now.	  We	  must	  take	  all	  appropriate	  action	  to	  win;	  universal	  war	  service,	  industrial	  mobilization,	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	  not	  only	  American	  forces	  but	  also	  the	  forces	  of	  Nationalist	  China,	  of	  Japan,	  of	  Free	  Korea,	  of	  Germany,	  and	  Franco’s	  Spain.”95	  For	  MacArthur,	  World	  War	  III	  might	  have	  already	  been	  a	  “reality;”	  the	  general	  urged	  Washington	  to	  take	  aggressive	  action	  against	  mainland	  China,	  advocating	  a	  blockade	  of	  the	  coast	  of	  China,	  an	  attack	  on	  China’s	  industrial	  capacity	  to	  wage	  war,	  and	  the	  use	  of	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek’s	  armies	  in	  the	  war	  in	  Korea	  and,	  possibly,	  in	  mainland	  China.96	  	  	  While	  not	  giving	  in	  to	  MacArthur’s	  demands,	  on	  December	  15,	  President	  Truman,	  with	  a	  similar	  sense	  of	  crisis,	  made	  a	  declaration	  of	  national	  emergency	  by	  radio.	  It	  is	  worthwhile	  to	  pay	  attention	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  president	  gave	  meaning	  to	  various	  events.	  He	  said:	  	  	  
                                                93	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  Long	  Hand	  Note	  File,	  December	  9,	  1950,	  Box	  281,	  President’s	  Secretary	  File,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  94	  “Minutes	  of	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  President	  with	  Congressional	  Leaders,	  11	  am,	  Friday,	  in	  the	  White	  House,”	  December	  1,	  1950,	  Folder	  "Attlee	  Meeting	  -­‐	  December	  1950,"	  Box	  149,	  Foreign	  Affairs	  File,	  Subject	  File,	  President's	  Secretary's	  Files,	  HSRP,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  	  	  95	  Letter,	  Carter	  Clarke	  to	  Bonner	  Fellers,	  December	  18,	  1950,	  Folder	  9,	  Box	  1,	  Papers	  of	  Bonner	  F.	  Fellers	  (hereafter	  PBFF),	  MMA,	  Norfolk,	  Virginia.	  96	  Correspondent,	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  to	  the	  Joint	  Chief	  of	  Staffs,	  December	  30,	  1950,	  Folder	  11,	  Box	  1,	  PDM,	  MMA,	  Norfolk,	  Virginia.	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I	  am	  talking	  to	  you	  tonight	  about	  what	  our	  country	  is	  up	  against,	  and	  what	  we	  are	  going	  to	  do	  about	  it.	  Our	  homes,	  our	  Nation,	  all	  the	  things	  we	  believe	  in,	  are	  in	  great	  danger.	  This	  danger	  has	  been	  created	  by	  the	  rulers	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  […]	  In	  June,	  the	  forces	  of	  communist	  imperialism	  broke	  out	  into	  open	  warfare	  in	  Korea.	  […]	  Then,	  in	  November,	  the	  communists	  threw	  their	  Chinese	  armies	  into	  the	  battle	  against	  the	  free	  nation.	  By	  this	  act,	  they	  have	  shown	  that	  they	  are	  now	  willing	  to	  push	  the	  world	  to	  the	  brink	  of	  a	  general	  war	  to	  get	  what	  they	  want.	  This	  is	  the	  real	  meaning	  of	  the	  events	  that	  have	  been	  taking	  place	  in	  Korea.	  This	  is	  why	  we	  are	  in	  such	  grave	  danger.97	  	  By	  connecting	  several	  events	  with	  one	  thread	  of	  “communist	  imperialism,”	  instead	  of	  treating	  them	  case	  by	  case,	  the	  president	  highlighted	  and	  authorized	  some	  particular	  facts	  as	  more	  meaningful	  than	  others.	  Such	  a	  grand	  narrative,	  of	  course,	  was	  not	  Truman’s	  creation;	  it	  was	  simply	  a	  repetition	  of	  an	  already-­‐familiar	  story.	  Yet,	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Cold	  War,	  it	  was	  not	  particular	  “origins”	  that	  generated	  and	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  such	  a	  world.	  Rather,	  it	  was	  repetitions	  that	  consolidated	  the	  logic	  and	  eventually	  the	  world	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  while	  silencing	  and	  marginalizing	  various	  oppositional	  viewpoints.	  In	  this	  version	  of	  “reality,”	  Moscow’s	  intentions	  and	  abilities	  were	  often	  overestimated;	  it	  was	  believed	  to	  be	  controlling	  China,	  North	  Korea,	  as	  well	  as	  all	  communists	  and	  “pinks”	  in	  American	  society.	  Sharing	  this	  widespread	  perspective,	  the	  head	  of	  a	  Christian	  organization	  in	  California	  sent	  a	  long	  letter	  to	  his	  Senator,	  William	  Knowland,	  asserting	  that	  North	  Korea’s	  attack	  was	  made	  through	  the	  manipulation	  of	  Stalin,	  that	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  was	  also	  without	  a	  doubt	  
                                                97	  Press	  release,	  President	  Harry	  S.	  Truman’s	  Speech,	  December	  15,	  1950,	  Folder	  "Korea,"	  Box	  1304,	  OF471,	  HSTP,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri;	  Dean	  Acheson,	  likewise,	  made	  similar	  logic	  several	  times	  in	  the	  NSC	  meeting	  and	  the	  cabinet	  meeting	  on	  November	  28,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  President’s	  meeting	  with	  congressional	  leaders	  on	  December	  13.	  See,	  FRUS:	  Vol.	  7:	  Korea,	  1242-­‐49;	  "Minutes	  of	  Cabinet	  Meeting,	  4:20pm,	  Tuesday,	  at	  the	  White	  House,"	  Folder	  "Attlee	  Meeting	  -­‐	  December	  1950,"	  Box	  149,	  Foreign	  Affairs	  File,	  Subject	  File,	  President's	  Secretary's	  Files,	  HSTP,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri;	  and	  “Minutes	  of	  the	  Meeting	  of	  the	  President	  with	  Congressional	  Leaders,	  10:00	  am,	  Wednesday,	  at	  the	  White	  House,”	  December	  13,	  1950,	  Folder	  "Attlee	  Meeting	  -­‐	  December	  1950,"	  Box	  149,	  Foreign	  Affairs	  File,	  Subject	  File,	  President's	  Secretary's	  Files,	  HSTP,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	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under	  the	  control	  of	  Moscow,	  and	  that	  the	  Kremlin	  was	  hoping	  to	  break	  up	  American	  society	  via	  networks	  of	  communist	  agents	  living	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  He	  concluded:	  “Russia	  plans	  a	  controlled,	  deliberate	  provocation	  of	  America,	  chopping	  at	  us	  with	  small	  but	  steady	  internal	  blows	  when	  possible,	  throwing	  blocks	  at	  us	  with	  her	  satellites,	  all	  the	  time	  readying	  her	  forces	  for	  that	  day	  when	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  to	  strike.”98	  Like	  this	  letter,	  masses	  of	  speculation	  on	  the	  Kremlin’s	  intentions	  circulated	  widely	  following	  China’s	  entry,	  in	  contrast	  to	  a	  relatively	  small	  amount	  of	  conjecture	  about	  Beijing’s	  intentions.	  For	  many,	  Beijing’s	  intentions	  did	  not	  really	  matter;	  what	  mattered	  were	  those	  of	  the	  Kremlin.	  Some	  thought	  that	  the	  Russians’	  aim	  was	  the	  occupation	  of	  Japan,	  and	  others	  believed	  that	  the	  entire	  campaign	  in	  Korea	  and	  East	  Asia	  was	  a	  large-­‐scale	  feint	  operation	  to	  distract	  attention	  from	  Europe;	  the	  ultimate	  design,	  this	  thesis	  maintained,	  must	  be	  the	  occupation	  of	  Western	  Europe.99	  Based	  on	  such	  a	  perceived	  imagined-­‐reality	  of	  World	  War	  III,	  the	  winter	  of	  1950	  witnessed	  the	  escalation	  of	  fears	  and	  rumors	  of	  war,	  which	  led	  some	  toward	  extremism.	  A	  man	  from	  Plainfield,	  New	  Jersey,	  for	  instance,	  urged	  President	  Truman:	  “Please	  pour	  Atom-­‐bombs	  on	  Russia	  before	  they	  do	  it	  to	  us	  some	  bright	  Holiday	  Morning!	  […]	  Please	  mobirize	  [sic]	  completely!”	  In	  a	  similar	  tone,	  a	  man	  from	  Santa	  Barbara,	  California,	  wrote	  to	  Senator	  William	  Knowland,	  who	  already	  had	  been	  known	  for	  his	  “tough”	  stance:	  100	  
                                                98	  Letter,	  John	  Brogen	  to	  William	  Knowland,	  October	  12,	  1950,	  Box	  272,	  Papers	  of	  William	  Knowland	  (hereafter	  PWK),	  UC	  Berkeley	  Bancroft	  Library,	  Berkeley,	  California.	  	  99	  Letter,	  Walter	  Judd	  to	  McKinley,	  August	  17,	  1950,	  Box	  38,	  Papers	  of	  Walter	  Judd	  (hereafter	  PWJ),	  Hoover	  Institute	  Archives,	  Stanford	  University,	  California.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  such	  an	  attitude	  was	  commonplace;	  see,	  for	  example,	  Margaret	  Higgins,	  War	  in	  Korea	  (1951),	  215.	  	  100	  Letter,	  Harolds	  Bisbee	  to	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  December	  16,	  1950,	  Box	  1307,	  Official	  File	  471B,	  HSTL,	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Your	  suggestion	  that	  we	  drop	  a	  few	  [atomic]	  bombs	  upon	  Manchuria	  is	  a	  good	  one,	  this	  action	  should	  have	  been	  taken	  long	  ago.	  Why	  we	  must	  always,	  like	  cornered	  rats,	  have	  to	  fight	  for	  survival,	  why	  do	  we	  lack	  the	  guts	  to	  carry	  the	  battle	  to	  the	  enemy?	  Like	  every	  liberty	  loving	  American	  citizen	  I	  want	  to	  see	  out	  fighting	  men	  given	  a	  chance	  for	  their	  lives,	  it	  is	  time	  for	  our	  Chiefs	  of	  Staff	  to	  give	  the	  green	  light	  to	  General	  MacArthur	  and	  permit	  him	  to	  carry	  the	  battle	  into	  the	  enemy’s	  sources	  of	  supply,	  in	  this	  case,	  Manchuria.	  We	  are	  always	  so	  damn	  ethical,	  so	  afraid	  of	  hurting	  our	  actual	  and	  potential	  foes,	  that	  our	  boys	  are	  sacrificed	  upon	  the	  altars	  of	  timidity	  and	  stupidity.101	  	  These	  opinions	  were,	  to	  be	  sure,	  some	  of	  the	  most	  strenuous	  hard-­‐lines,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  minor	  opinions.	  Many	  political	  figures	  and	  government	  officials	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  such	  fears	  of	  World	  War	  III,	  continuously	  making	  adjustments	  to	  their	  postures	  and	  taking	  aggressive	  stances.	  	  In	  a	  meeting	  between	  the	  president	  and	  several	  congressmen,	  for	  instance,	  Colorado	  Republican	  Eugene	  Donald	  Millikin	  expressed	  his	  irritation	  in	  a	  similar	  tone:	  “Nobody	  abroad	  would	  be	  scared	  by	  anything	  we	  did	  unless	  we	  had	  'massive'	  strength.	  Just	  issuing	  a	  declaration	  [of	  national	  emergency]	  wouldn't	  scare	  anybody	  abroad	  unless	  we	  had	  an	  army	  to	  go	  along	  with	  it.”	  Pounding	  the	  table	  with	  his	  fist,	  the	  Senator	  concluded,	  “We	  ought	  to	  make	  ourselves	  as	  strong	  as	  possible	  as	  fast	  as	  possible.”102	  Keeping	  step,	  Charles	  A.	  Eaton,	  Republican	  Congressman	  from	  New	  Jersey	  and	  Chairman	  of	  the	  House	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Committee,	  escalated	  the	  tone	  of	  his	  critique,	  saying:	  “There	  [is]	  only	  one	  thing	  to	  do:	  to	  strip	  off	  our	  peace	  clothes	  and	  to	  show	  our	  muscle	  to	  the	  world.	  This	  [will]	  not	  slow	  down	  the	  Russians	  
                                                                                                                                            Independence,	  Missouri.	  	  	  101	  Letter,	  L.	  W.	  Neustadter	  to	  William	  Knowland,	  Box	  242,	  WKP,	  UC	  Berkeley	  Bancroft	  Library,	  Berkeley,	  California.	  	  	  102	  Eugene	  Donald	  Millikin’s	  comments	  in	  “Meeting	  of	  the	  President	  with	  Congressional	  Leaders	  in	  the	  Cabinet	  Room,”	  December	  13,	  1950,	  Folder	  3,	  SF	  No.	  44,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	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because	  they	  are	  determined	  to	  destroy	  us	  but	  it	  [will]	  make	  it	  clear	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  that	  we	  [are]	  determined	  to	  stop	  them	  and	  we	  are	  going	  to	  stop	  them.”103	  	  Such	  a	  hawkish	  tone	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  Republicans.	  Democratic	  Senator	  from	  Maryland,	  Millard	  Tydings,	  who	  had	  recently	  lost	  his	  senatorial	  election	  primarily	  because	  he	  was	  labeled	  as	  being	  too	  soft	  on	  communism,	  similarly	  adapted	  the	  toughest	  attitude.	  He	  said:	  	  The	  United	  States	  is	  in	  deadly	  peril.	  The	  question	  now	  is	  whether	  we	  can	  survive.	  […].	  The	  war	  in	  Korea	  has	  shown	  us	  how	  weak	  we	  are,	  and	  how	  strong	  the	  enemy	  is.	  The	  war	  is	  Korea	  has	  shown	  us	  how	  well-­‐equipped	  communist	  troops	  are	  and	  how	  well	  they	  can	  fight.	  We	  still	  have	  some	  time	  left,	  but	  damn	  little.104	  The	  grave	  tone	  was	  unmistakable.	  No	  wonder	  that,	  at	  that	  time,	  some	  people	  grew	  worried	  about	  the	  end	  of	  the	  world	  every	  time	  they	  saw	  and	  heard	  thunder	  and	  lightning.105	  It	  was	  such	  prevalent	  fears	  of	  World	  War	  III	  that	  impelled	  many	  Americans	  to	  support	  and	  take	  part	  in	  various	  kinds	  of	  mobilization	  and	  civil	  defense	  programs.	  	  Yet,	  another	  question	  remains:	  Why	  did	  such	  a	  particular	  version	  of	  “reality”	  become	  prevalent	  in	  American	  society	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950?	  The	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  fear	  and	  prospect	  of	  World	  War	  III	  was	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  Chinese	  and	  North	  Koreans	  were	  acting	  on	  behalf	  of	  Moscow’s	  global	  scheme.	  After	  all,	  if	  North	  Korean	  and	  Chinese	  actions	  were	  viewed	  as	  built	  on	  their	  own	  decisions,	  the	  logic	  of	  World	  War	  III	  could	  not	  have	  been	  maintained.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  earlier	  chapters,	  
                                                103	  “Meeting	  with	  the	  President	  with	  Congressional	  Leaders,”	  December	  13,	  1950,	  Papers	  of	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  (hereafter	  PHST),	  Student	  File	  44,	  Folder	  3,	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library	  (HSTL),	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  	  104	  Millard	  Tydings,	  comments	  in	  a	  meeting	  on	  December	  13,	  1950.	  Folder	  3,	  SF	  No.	  44,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  105	  John	  Kenneth	  White,	  Still	  Seeing	  Red:	  How	  the	  Cold	  War	  Shapes	  the	  New	  American	  Politics	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview	  Press,	  1997),	  4.	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the	  socialist	  camp	  did	  not	  have	  a	  monolithic	  unity,	  in	  terms	  of	  relationships	  and	  decision-­‐making	  regarding	  the	  Korean	  War.	  Thus,	  the	  questions	  are:	  Why	  did	  so	  many	  people	  believe	  in	  such	  worldview?	  What	  was	  the	  basis	  for	  that	  understanding	  of	  the	  world?	  	  	  	  
Prejudice	  Masquerading	  as	  Facts	  	   It	  is	  worthwhile	  to	  recall	  how	  Chinese	  intervention	  was	  perceived	  at	  the	  outset.	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  described	  the	  situation	  as	  he	  perceived	  it	  on	  December	  3,	  1950,	  as	  follows:	  “We	  are	  in	  an	  entirely	  new	  war	  against	  an	  entirely	  new	  power	  of	  great	  military	  strength	  and	  under	  entirely	  new	  conditions.”106	  Receiving	  disturbing	  news	  from	  Tokyo,	  President	  Truman	  lamented	  as	  such:	  “Unfortunately	  for	  us,	  the	  Chinese	  Communists	  had	  entered	  Korea	  without	  any	  provocation	  and	  they	  had	  come	  in	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  driving	  out	  General	  MacArthur’s	  forces.”107	  By	  mid-­‐December,	  the	  news	  of	  China’s	  entry	  had	  been	  widely	  acknowledged	  at	  home,	  inciting	  rampant	  criticism	  of	  the	  Truman	  administration’s	  complete	  failure	  to	  predict	  China’s	  decision.108	  Thus,	  it	  is	  understandable	  for	  MacArthur	  and	  Truman	  to	  emphasize	  the	  newness	  and	  abruptness	  of	  the	  situation,	  in	  view	  of	  their	  misjudgment	  in	  promising	  the	  public	  
                                                106	  Memorandum,	  MacArthur	  to	  Joint	  Chief	  of	  Staff,	  December	  3,	  1950,	  File	  11	  Box	  1,	  RG6,	  Papers	  of	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  (hereafter	  PDM),	  MacArthur	  Memorial	  Archives(hereafter	  MMA),	  Norfolk,	  Virginia.	  	  107	  Note	  of	  the	  President’s	  Meeting	  with	  Congressional	  Leaders,	  December	  13,	  1950,	  Folder	  3,	  Student	  File	  (hereafter	  SF)	  No.	  44,	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library	  (hereafter	  HSTL),	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  	  108	  Notes	  of	  the	  President’s	  Meeting	  with	  Congressional	  Leaders	  on	  December	  1,	  1950,	  Folder	  3,	  SF	  No.	  44,	  HSTL.	  Also	  see	  “Research	  Data	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Potential	  For	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Korean	  War,”	  which	  includes	  many	  columns	  and	  editorials	  written	  by	  Drew	  Pearson	  and	  Alsop	  brothers	  among	  others;	  Folder	  1,	  Box	  14,	  RG	  23,	  Papers	  of	  Charles	  A.	  Willoughby	  (hereafter	  PCAW),	  MMA,	  Norfolk,	  Virginia.	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that	  China	  would	  not	  attack	  and	  that	  the	  war	  would	  be	  over	  by	  Christmas	  of	  that	  year.	  	   Looking	  closely,	  however,	  the	  situation	  was	  not	  really	  as	  “new”	  as	  MacArthur	  asserted,	  nor	  was	  China’s	  intervention	  “without	  any	  provocation”	  as	  Truman	  alleged.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  Beijing	  had	  issued	  warnings	  repeatedly.109	  Intelligence	  reports	  warning	  of	  China’s	  moves	  had	  arrived	  in	  Tokyo	  and	  Washington.110	  The	  British	  and	  French	  governments	  had	  conveyed	  their	  concerns	  about	  it	  to	  the	  Truman	  administration,	  as	  well.111	  However,	  these	  warnings	  were	  not	  taken	  seriously.	  Premier	  Zhou	  Enlai’s	  warning	  was	  simply	  ignored	  as	  a	  bluff.112	  Intelligence	  reports	  calling	  for	  caution	  were	  dismissed	  as	  containing	  “no	  firm	  evidence.”113	  Much	  worse,	  such	  information	  was	  altered	  upon	  arrival	  at	  MacArthur’s	  ears,	  because	  he	  did	  not	  like	  to	  hear	  reports	  that	  differed	  from	  his	  conviction	  that	  China	  would	  never	  intervene.114	  A	  self-­‐appointed	  authority	  on	  “Oriental	  psychology,”	  MacArthur	  knew	  that	  Asians	  were	  “obedient,	  dutiful,	  child-­‐like,	  and	  quick	  to	  follow	  resolute	  leadership.”115	  Holding	  such	  preconceptions	  about	  “Asians,”	  the	  general	  remained	  
                                                109	  Shi	  Zhe,	  Zai	  lishi	  juren	  shenbian:	  Shi	  Zhe	  huiyi	  lu	  (Beijing:	  Zhong	  ang	  wenxian	  chubanshe,	  1991)	  
492-­‐493;	  William	  J	  Sebald,	  With	  MacArthur	  in	  Japan:	  A	  Personal	  History	  of	  the	  Occupation	  (New	  York,	  1965),	  173;	  Chen	  Jian,	  China’s	  Road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War:	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐American	  
Confrontation	  (New	  York,	  1994),	  169.	  	  110	  “Research	  Data	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Potential	  For	  Intervention	  in	  the	  Korean	  War,”	  PCAW,	  MMA;	  Also,	  see	  Willoughby’s	  Memorandum,	  “Brief	  of	  ‘Trends	  of	  High	  Level	  Washington	  Estimates	  on	  Chinese	  Communist	  Intervention	  in	  Korea,’”	  Willoughby	  to	  MacArthur,	  February	  23,	  1951,	  Folder	  11,	  Box	  1,	  PDM,	  MMA.	  111	  William	  Stueck,	  The	  Korean	  War:	  An	  International	  History	  (Princeton,	  1995),	  91-­‐96.	  	  112	  Sebald,	  With	  MacArthur	  in	  Japan,	  173;	  Chen	  Jian,	  China’s	  Road	  to	  the	  Korean	  War,	  169-­‐171.	  	  113	  Charles	  A.	  Willoughby,	  “Brief	  of	  ‘Trends	  of	  High	  Level	  Washington	  Estimates	  on	  Chinese	  Communist	  Intervention	  in	  Korea,’”	  PDM,	  MMA.	  114	  David	  Halberstam,	  The	  Coldest	  Winter:	  America	  and	  the	  Korean	  War	  (New	  York,	  2007),	  370-­‐80.	  Halberstam	  bitterly	  criticizes	  Willoughby	  of	  accommodating	  himself	  to	  MacArthur’s	  wishes.	  	  115	  Bruce	  Cumings,	  The	  Origins	  of	  the	  Korean	  War:	  The	  Roaring	  of	  the	  Cataract	  (Princeton,	  1990),	  97.	  MacArthur,	  in	  fact,	  enjoyed	  talking	  about	  the	  “Oriental	  psychology,”	  which,	  he	  believed,	  fundamentally	  different	  from	  the	  Western	  ideas.	  For	  example,	  he	  talked	  about	  it	  in	  length	  with	  Averell	  Harriman	  in	  early	  August	  1950,	  telling	  him	  that	  Orientals	  would	  not	  hate	  to	  die;	  MacArthur	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reluctant	  to	  publicly	  accept	  China’s	  full	  entry	  as	  late	  as	  December	  1950,	  showing	  a	  clear	  contrast	  to	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  who	  wrote	  in	  his	  diaries	  in	  late	  October	  that	  China’s	  full	  intervention	  was	  “without	  a	  doubt.”116	  In	  a	  sense,	  it	  was	  not	  a	  lack	  of	  information,	  but	  more	  a	  common	  prejudice	  concerning	  “China”	  and	  “Asians”	  that	  hindered	  policymakers	  in	  Tokyo	  and	  Washington	  in	  connecting	  pieces	  of	  information	  that	  would	  have	  suggested	  China’s	  actions.	  Intriguingly,	  the	  pattern	  that	  appeared	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950	  was	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  that	  observed	  during	  the	  Pacific	  War	  in	  the	  early	  1940s.	  As	  historian	  John	  Dower	  reveals,	  Japan,	  before	  World	  War	  II,	  was	  not	  considered	  a	  military	  threat.	  Many	  Americans	  knew	  that	  the	  Japanese	  could	  neither	  shoot,	  sail,	  nor	  fly	  because	  it	  was	  believed	  and	  “scientifically”	  proven	  that	  they	  had	  poor	  sight.	  Likewise,	  the	  high	  performance	  of	  Japan’s	  fighter	  plane—the	  Zero—was	  actually	  reported	  before	  Pearl	  Harbor	  but	  simply	  ignored.	  In	  Dower’s	  words,	  “prejudice	  masqueraded	  as	  facts.”	  117	  Then,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Japan’s	  attack	  on	  Pearl	  Harbor	  and	  the	  Philippines,	  MacArthur	  first	  refused	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  responsible,	  insisting	  that	  there	  must	  have	  been	  “white	  mercenaries.”	  Such	  a	  reaction	  was	  not	  just	  MacArthur’s.	  During	  
                                                                                                                                            explained,	  “They	  die	  quietly,	  folding	  their	  arms	  as	  a	  dove	  folding	  his	  wings,	  relaxing	  and	  dying.”	  See,	  Averell	  Harriman,	  “Trip	  to	  Korea,”	  Box	  305,	  Papers	  of	  Averell	  Harriman	  (hereafter	  PAH),	  Library	  of	  Congress	  (hereafter	  LC),	  Washington	  DC.	  	  116	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  Diaries,	  Folder	  11,	  Box	  48,	  Hoover	  Institution	  Archives	  [hereafter	  HIA],	  Stanford	  University	  [hereafter	  SU],	  Stanford,	  California.	  Like	  MacArthur,	  White	  House	  Press	  Secretary,	  Charles	  G.	  Ross,	  told	  Eben	  Ayers	  on	  November	  7,	  1950,	  that	  he	  could	  not	  determine	  whether	  the	  appearance	  of	  Chinese	  Communist	  troops	  in	  North	  Korea	  represented	  “a	  full-­‐scale	  attack	  or	  merely	  an	  effort	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  Chinese	  to	  protect	  utilities	  along	  the	  border.”	  See	  Eben	  Ayers,	  Truman	  in	  the	  White	  
House:	  The	  Diary	  of	  Eben	  A.	  Ayers	  (Columbia,	  MO,	  1991),	  380.	  117	  John	  Dower,	  War	  Without	  Mercy	  :	  Race	  and	  Power	  in	  the	  Pacific	  War	  (New	  York,	  1986),	  99-­‐104.	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the	  war,	  a	  common	  rumor	  maintained:	  “German	  experts	  are	  directing	  the	  Jap	  artillery.”118	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  1950,	  a	  similar	  pattern	  emerged.	  As	  Harold	  Isaacs’	  classic	  study	  describes,	  the	  Chinese	  had	  been	  widely	  thought	  to	  be	  “hopelessly	  backward	  and	  incapable	  of	  marshaling	  a	  military	  power”—a	  nineteenth-­‐century	  idea	  which	  had	  been	  rampant	  in	  the	  United	  States.119	  Isaacs’	  study	  found	  that	  typical	  terms	  often	  associated	  with	  the	  “Chinese”	  at	  that	  time	  were:	  “inert,”	  “submissive,”	  “servile,”	  “slow,”	  “illiterate,”	  “superstitious,”	  “ignorant,”	  and	  so	  on.120	  One	  publisher	  in	  the	  Midwest	  told	  an	  interviewer:	  “I	  never	  thought	  of	  the	  Chinese	  as	  belligerent.	  I	  never	  thought	  we	  would	  be	  risking	  war	  with	  them.	  A	  peasant	  country!	  It	  would	  have	  been	  inconceivable	  to	  me	  even	  five	  or	  ten	  years	  ago	  that	  we	  could	  have	  a	  war	  with	  China.”121	  	  Such	  an	  attitude	  was	  not	  necessarily	  a	  result	  of	  individual	  traits	  but	  of	  social	  construction.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  leading	  officials,	  such	  as	  Dean	  Acheson,	  George	  F.	  Kennan,	  and	  the	  president	  himself	  shared	  a	  similar	  view.	  Kennan,	  for	  example,	  tended	  to	  lump	  the	  peoples	  of	  Africa,	  Asia,	  the	  Middle	  East,	  and	  Latin	  America	  together	  as	  “impulsive,	  fanatical,	  ignorant,	  lazy,	  unhappy,	  and	  prone	  to	  mental	  disorders	  and	  other	  biological	  deficiencies”—a	  surprisingly	  mediocre	  preconception	  for	  the	  peerless	  intelligent	  diplomat.122	  Feelings	  of	  surprise	  many	  Americans	  had	  in	  facing	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War	  did	  not	  really	  from	  it	  truly	  coming	  from	  out	  
                                                118	  John	  Dower,	  War	  Without	  Mercy,	  102,	  105-­‐6.	  119	  Harold	  Isaacs,	  Scratches	  on	  Our	  Minds	  (New	  York,	  1958),	  237;	  T.	  Christopher	  Jespersen,	  American	  
Images	  of	  China,	  1931-­‐1949	  (Stanford,	  1996).	  120	  Ibid,	  97-­‐99.	  121	  Ibid,	  238.	  	  122	  See	  Thomas	  Borstelmann,	  The	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  Color	  Line	  (Cambridge,	  2001),	  48-­‐53;	  and	  Michael	  H.	  Hunt,	  Ideology	  and	  US	  Foreign	  Policy	  (New	  Haven,	  1987),	  162-­‐63.	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of	  the	  blue;	  it	  simply	  did	  not	  fit	  well	  with	  existing,	  dominant	  preconceptions	  about	  the	  Chinese.	  	  After	  China’s	  intervention	  became	  undeniable,	  conventional	  images	  of	  China	  had	  to	  be	  modified.	  Yet,	  this	  change	  did	  not	  occur	  as	  revision	  and	  reconsideration	  of	  conventional	  images	  of	  China	  and	  the	  Chinese,	  but	  merely	  as	  extension	  and	  adjustment	  of	  them.	  An	  example	  of	  this	  is	  the	  predominant	  understanding	  of	  China	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War,	  Beijing	  was	  rarely	  seen	  as	  a	  decision-­‐maker;	  it	  was	  widely	  supposed	  that	  the	  attack	  was	  made	  under	  the	  order	  and	  support	  of	  Moscow.	  It	  is	  worthwhile	  to	  think	  about	  how	  such	  a	  view	  was	  premised	  on	  existing	  prejudice	  toward	  the	  Chinese.	  For	  example,	  one	  interviewee	  in	  Isaacs’	  research,	  who	  later	  became	  a	  high	  official	  in	  the	  Eisenhower	  administration	  recollected:	  	  I	  was	  brought	  up	  to	  think	  [that]	  the	  Chinese	  couldn’t	  handle	  a	  machine.	  Now,	  suddenly,	  the	  Chinese	  are	  flying	  jets!	  The	  American	  idea	  was	  that	  Asiatics	  are	  nonmechanical,	  except	  the	  Japanese,	  and	  the	  Japanese	  were	  freaks,	  not	  really	  mechanical,	  just	  copied	  what	  others	  did.	  In	  practically	  everything	  one	  ever	  read…the	  Asiatic	  is	  always	  plowing	  with	  his	  fingernails	  and	  the	  European	  is	  handling	  the	  machine.	  Now	  the	  Chinese	  is	  flying	  jets!	  Disturbing,	  especially	  since	  you	  have	  several	  hundred	  million	  of	  them	  teamed	  up	  with	  the	  USSR.	  I	  always	  thought	  the	  Yellow	  Peril	  business	  is	  nonsense…	  Now	  I	  can	  visualize	  that	  Asiatics	  teamed	  up	  with	  the	  Slavs	  could	  indeed	  conquer	  the	  world!123	  	  	  In	  a	  similar	  tone,	  Life	  asserted,	  “China’s	  Red	  Army,	  a	  guerrilla	  rabble	  20	  years	  ago,	  had	  been	  built	  into	  a	  menacingly	  Russianized	  fighting	  force.”124	  An	  underlying	  belief	  was	  that	  the	  Chinese	  could	  not	  have	  done	  so	  by	  themselves.	  They	  were	  merely	  “rabble”	  who	  could	  not	  fly	  jets	  by	  themselves.	  	  
                                                123	  Ibid,	  226-­‐27.	  	  124	  “Aggressive	  China	  Becomes	  a	  Menace,”	  Life,	  November	  20,	  1950.	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To	  make	  sense	  of	  this	  drastic	  change,	  instead	  of	  considering	  the	  revision	  of	  prejudice,	  a	  new	  common	  narrative	  claimed	  the	  following:	  there	  must	  have	  been	  significant	  support	  or	  a	  push	  from	  a	  foreign	  power—the	  Russians.125	  This	  modified	  common	  sense	  in	  the	  United	  States	  maintained	  that	  the	  Kremlin	  forced	  and	  supported	  China	  in	  entering	  Korea	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union—an	  idea	  that	  matched	  perfectly	  with	  existing	  “knowledge”	  in	  the	  United	  States	  of	  the	  global	  cold	  war,	  however	  misleading	  it	  was.	  	  	  	  One	  good	  example	  of	  this	  perspective	  is	  a	  fake	  “translation”	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐Soviet	  Treaty	  of	  Friendship	  and	  Alliance	  and	  an	  image	  of	  it	  (Picture	  10)	  that	  began	  circulating	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950.	  While	  versions	  of	  speculations	  existed,	  such	  a	  “translation”	  typically	  maintained	  that	  China	  permitted	  Soviet	  troops	  to	  be	  stationed	  in	  China;	  that	  Beijing	  agreed	  to	  place	  the	  Chinese	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  under	  direct	  Soviet	  command	  to	  be	  turned	  into	  an	  International	  Communist	  Army;	  that	  China	  also	  agreed	  to	  provide	  ten	  million	  laborers	  to	  the	  USSR,	  and	  so	  on.126	  None	  of	  this	  was	  true.127	  These	  items	  reflected,	  more	  than	  anything	  else,	  conventional	  American	  views	  of	  China	  as	  a	  colonized	  country,	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  and	  as	  a	  place	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  submissive	  physical	  workers.	  	  A	  similar	  point	  can	  be	  found	  in	  American	  propaganda	  used	  in	  the	  Korean	  War,	  which	  reflected	  more	  about	  drawers’	  perspective	  and	  prejudice	  than	  actual	  situations,	  depicting	  Korean	  and	  Chinese	  as	  subordinates	  (Picture	  11).	  Such	  a	  
                                                125	  Iriye	  Akira,	  Bei-­‐Chu	  kankei	  no	  imeji	  [Images	  in	  American-­‐Sino	  Relations]	  (Tokyo,	  2002	  [1971]),	  223-­‐4.	  	  126	  Letter,	  American	  China	  Policy	  Association	  to	  editors	  of	  various	  magazines,	  Box	  11,	  Papers	  of	  Raymond	  Feely	  [hereafter	  PRF],	  Hoover	  Institution	  Archives,	  Stanford	  University,	  Stanford,	  California.	  	  	  127	  For	  details	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐Soviet	  relations	  and	  the	  treaty,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Odd	  Arne	  Westad,	  Brothers	  
in	  Arms:	  The	  Rise	  and	  Fall	  of	  the	  Sino-­‐Soviet	  Alliance,	  1945-­‐1963	  (Stanford,	  1998);	  Chen	  Jian,	  "The	  Sino-­‐Soviet	  Alliance	  and	  China's	  Entry	  into	  the	  Korean	  War,"	  CWIHP	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  1	  (1992).	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projection	  of	  domestic	  images	  of	  China	  over	  “reality”	  was	  nothing	  new	  phenomenon;	  as	  historian	  T.	  Christopher	  Jespersen	  observes	  in	  his	  study	  of	  American	  perceptions	  of	  China	  between	  the	  1930s	  and	  1940s,	  “[American]	  images	  and	  conceptions	  of	  China	  have	  been	  […]	  more	  the	  product	  of	  domestic	  forces	  than	  the	  result	  of	  anything	  else.”128	  However	  twisted	  it	  was,	  once	  accepted	  and	  took	  roots	  among	  the	  population,	  such	  a	  domestic	  perspective	  was	  no	  longer	  imagination;	  it	  became	  “reality.”	  Policymakers	  in	  Washington	  reflected	  such	  socially	  constructed	  worldview.	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,	  for	  example,	  personally	  warned	  Truman	  that:	  “Developments	  in	  Asia	  confirm	  that	  there	  is	  a	  comprehensive	  program,	  in	  which	  the	  Soviet	  and	  Chinese	  communists	  are	  cooperating.”129	  Assistant	  Secretary	  Dean	  Rusk	  was	  more	  brazen:	  “The	  Peiping	  [Beijing]	  regime	  may	  be	  a	  colonial	  Russian	  government—a	  Slavic	  Manchukuo	  on	  a	  larger	  scale.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  Government	  of	  China.	  […].	  It	  is	  not	  Chinese.”130	  The	  assumption	  in	  Rusk’s	  comment	  is	  based	  on	  the	  common	  preconception	  that	  China	  was	  a	  passive,	  colonized	  country,	  and	  that	  what	  was	  happening	  in	  China	  was,	  therefore,	  remote	  from	  the	  will	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people.	  	  The	  tendency	  to	  separate	  the	  Beijing	  government	  and	  the	  Chinese	  people	  was	  common	  not	  just	  among	  mainstream	  policymakers	  but	  also	  among	  leftists,	  who	  voiced	  their	  dislike	  of	  the	  corrupted	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  government	  and	  sympathies	  
                                                128	  T.	  Christopher	  Jespersen,	  American	  Images	  of	  China,	  188.	  	  129	  What	  is	  important	  about	  Dulles’	  view	  is	  not	  its	  uniqueness	  but	  its	  commonness.	  President	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Washington	  Raymond	  Allen,	  for	  example,	  used	  almost	  identical	  words	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  President.	  He	  wrote,	  “It	  is	  now	  apparent	  that	  the	  Kremlin	  and	  their	  Chinese	  Communists	  Allies	  are	  determined	  to	  achieve	  their	  ambitions	  in	  Eastern	  Asia—the	  conquest	  of	  Japan	  and	  Southeast	  Asia—even	  at	  the	  risk	  of	  general	  war.”	  Letter,	  Raymond	  Allen	  to	  HST,	  November	  29,	  1950,	  Box	  1306,	  OF	  471B,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  	  130	  “Editorial	  Note	  on	  conversations	  between	  Dean	  Rusk	  and	  John	  Foster	  Dulles,”	  May	  18,	  1951.	  FRUS	  
1950,	  Vol.	  7:	  Korea	  and	  China,	  Part	  2,	  1671-­‐72.	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with	  the	  Chinese	  people.	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace,	  who	  had	  just	  resigned	  from	  the	  presidency	  of	  the	  Progressive	  Party,	  for	  example,	  viewed	  Beijing	  as	  a	  satellite	  regime	  of	  Moscow	  and	  stated:	  “The	  danger	  we	  face	  today	  comes	  from	  the	  common	  man	  of	  Asia	  and	  Russia	  falling	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  men	  who	  are	  determined	  to	  dominate	  the	  world,”	  Wallace	  continued,	  “Ninety	  nine	  percent	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people	  are	  not	  communistic	  in	  any	  but	  the	  most	  superficial	  sense.”131	  While	  sympathetic	  at	  a	  glance,	  Wallace’s	  attitude	  was	  that	  of	  mingled	  paternalism	  and	  contempt,	  totally	  dismissing	  proactive	  agency	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  Chinese	  people.	  In	  a	  sense,	  this	  was	  another	  form	  of	  maintaining	  conventional	  views	  on	  passive,	  weak,	  and	  miserable	  images	  of	  the	  Chinese.	  	  Wallace’s	  view	  was	  actually	  another	  prevalent	  image	  of	  “reality:”	  that	  is,	  millions	  of	  Chinese	  captured	  by	  a	  handful	  of	  communists	  (Picture	  12).	  As	  political	  cartoons	  in	  the	  Saturday	  Evening	  Post	  depicted,	  a	  peasant-­‐like	  Chinese	  slave	  in	  chains	  was	  threatened	  by	  a	  communist	  with	  a	  rifle.132	  It	  is	  worth	  paying	  attention	  to	  how	  conventional	  prejudice	  toward	  the	  Chinese	  endured;	  the	  foreign,	  communist	  “Mao	  Tse-­‐tung”	  was	  depicted	  as	  small	  but	  aggressive,	  while	  the	  “Captive	  Millions”	  of	  the	  Chinese	  were	  illustrated	  as	  gigantic	  but	  weak,	  miserable,	  and	  passive—a	  stereotypical	  image	  of	  the	  Chinese	  who	  were	  in	  need	  of	  help.	  In	  contrasting	  Mao	  and	  the	  captive	  Chinese	  people	  in	  terms	  of	  size,	  this	  cartoon	  conveyed	  a	  message	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Chinese	  had	  simply	  fallen	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  a	  handful	  of	  communists	  against	  their	  will.	  	  
                                                131	  Letter,	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace	  to	  Jimmy	  Jemail,	  December	  16,	  1950,	  Box	  38,	  Series	  III,	  Papers	  of	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace	  (hereafter	  PHAW),	  University	  of	  Iowa	  (hereafter	  IU),	  Iowa	  City,	  Iowa;	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace,	  Speech	  on	  January	  21,	  1951,	  Box	  77,	  Series	  X,	  PHAW,	  IU,	  Iowa	  City,	  Iowa.	  	  132	  Saturday	  Evening	  Post,	  December	  16,	  1950.	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Many	  believed	  this,	  and	  some	  advocated	  for	  the	  need	  to	  support	  counterrevolutionary	  movements.	  A	  man	  in	  Colorado,	  for	  instance,	  said,	  “There	  is	  much	  unrest	  in	  Russia.	  There	  is	  in	  every	  satellite	  country	  an	  intense	  dislike	  for	  Russia	  if	  they	  could	  only	  voice	  the	  dislike.	  Why	  haven’t	  we	  cooperated	  with	  their	  underground?	  (This	  includes	  China).	  Why	  don’t	  we	  use	  the	  people	  of	  the	  underground	  and	  resistance	  movement?”133	  The	  assumption	  here	  was	  that	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  people	  in	  communist-­‐governed	  areas	  was	  not	  in	  support	  of	  their	  governments,	  and	  that	  they	  would	  revolt	  against	  communists	  and	  welcome	  Americans	  once	  the	  U.S.	  seriously	  supported	  them.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  these	  images	  of	  “reality”	  were	  not	  entirely	  mistaken.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  counterrevolutionary	  action	  was	  still	  active	  in	  China,	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  communist	  government	  was	  not	  yet	  consolidated.134	  For	  millions	  of	  Chinese	  who	  were	  suppressed	  and	  forced	  to	  evacuate	  from	  the	  mainland,	  the	  image	  of	  “Captive	  Millions”	  indeed	  represented	  reality.	  That	  said,	  these	  “facts”	  themselves	  cannot	  explain	  other	  kinds	  of	  “facts,”	  such	  as	  enthusiastic	  popular	  support	  for	  social	  change,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  anti-­‐colonial	  nationalism,	  among	  millions	  of	  Chinese,	  through	  which	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  gained	  popularity.135	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  Beijing	  and	  Moscow	  certainly	  maintained	  close	  contact	  regarding	  the	  Korean	  War.136	  Yet,	  
                                                133	  Letter,	  LaVere	  Roelfs	  to	  Averell	  Harriman,	  November	  21,	  1950,	  Box	  309,	  PAH,	  Library	  of	  Congress.	  	  134	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Jeremy	  Brown	  and	  Paul	  Pickowicz,	  Dilemmas	  of	  Victory:	  The	  Early	  Years	  of	  The	  
People's	  Republic	  of	  China	  (Cambridge,	  2007)	  and	  Bai	  Xi,	  Kaiguo	  dazhenfan	  [Great	  Suppressions	  at	  the	  
Time	  of	  Establishing	  Country]	  (Beijing,	  2006).	  135	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Maurice	  Meisner,	  Mao’s	  China	  and	  After	  (New	  York,	  1999	  [1977])	  and	  Elizabeth	  Perry,	  "Reclaiming	  the	  Chinese	  Revolution,"	  Journal	  of	  Asian	  Studies	  	  (2008),	  67:	  1147-­‐64.	  	  136	  For	  the	  studies	  of	  close	  contacts	  among	  Moscow,	  Beijing,	  and	  Pyongyang,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Kathryn	  Weathersby,	  "'Should	  We	  Fear	  This?'	  Stalin	  and	  the	  Danger	  of	  War	  with	  America"	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  39,	  Cold	  War	  International	  History	  Project,	  Woodrow	  Wilson	  International	  Center	  for	  Scholars,	  July	  2002;	  Vladislav	  Zubok	  and	  Constantine	  Pleshekov,	  Inside	  the	  Kremlin's	  Cold	  War:	  From	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this	  “fact”	  itself	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  Beijing	  entered	  the	  war	  under	  Moscow’s	  orders;	  as	  several	  scholars	  have	  pointed	  out,	  and	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  Beijing	  leadership’s	  personal	  characteristics,	  as	  well	  as	  Chinese	  domestic	  contexts,	  were	  much	  more	  vital	  factors	  in	  the	  Beijing’s	  decision	  to	  enter	  the	  Korean	  War.137	  Yet,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  logic	  of	  Moscow	  controlling	  Beijing	  and	  Pyongyang	  was	  “obvious”	  enough	  for	  further	  discussion,	  at	  least	  from	  the	  dominant	  American	  perspective,	  so	  that	  some	  people	  expressed	  wonder,	  if	  not	  irritation,	  at	  why	  others	  did	  not	  see	  this	  “reality”	  of	  the	  world	  and	  act	  accordingly.	  One	  military	  officer	  lamented:	  “If	  [other	  countries]	  are	  really	  aligned	  with	  us	  in	  ‘putting	  a	  stop	  to	  aggression’—which	  is	  an	  actual	  threat	  to	  all	  alike—Why	  in	  hell	  do	  they	  not	  come	  in,	  contribute	  their	  share	  to	  the	  common	  cause?”138	  	  Irritation	  of	  this	  kind	  was	  not	  considered	  hysterical,	  panicky,	  or	  aggressive.	  This	  was	  so	  because	  such	  irritation	  was	  considered	  legitimate,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  logic	  at	  that	  time.	  The	  world,	  according	  to	  this	  view,	  should	  have	  been	  more	  closely	  united	  together,	  as	  a	  cartoon	  in	  the	  Kansas	  City	  Star	  wished	  for	  (Picture	  13).139	  While	  such	  a	  desire	  itself	  was	  actually	  based	  on	  domestic	  and	  historical	  preconceptions—more	  straightforwardly,	  prejudice—in	  American	  society,	  it	  
                                                                                                                                            
Stalin	  to	  Khrushchev	  (Cambridge,	  1996);	  and	  Sergei	  Goncharov,	  John	  Lewis,	  and	  Xue	  Litai,	  Uncertain	  
Partners:	  Stalin,	  Mao,	  and	  the	  Korean	  War	  (Stanford,	  1993),	  among	  others.	  	  	  137	  For	  the	  	  studies	  of	  Chinese	  context	  and	  aspect,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Chen	  Jian,	  China’s	  Road	  to	  the	  
Korean	  War	  (New	  York,	  1994);	  Shu	  Kenei,	  Mo	  Takuto	  no	  Chosen	  Senso	  [Mao	  Zedong's	  Korean	  War]	  (Tokyo,	  1991);	  Niu	  Jun,	  Reisen-­‐ki	  Chugoku	  gaiko	  no	  seisaku	  kettei	  [China's	  Foreign	  Policy	  Decision	  
Making	  during	  the	  Cold	  War]	  (Tokyo,	  2007);	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  Mao	  Zedong	  yu	  Mosike	  de	  en	  en	  yuan	  yuan	  
[Mao	  Zedong’s	  Indebtedness	  and	  Bitterness	  toward	  Moscow]	  (Nanchang,	  1999);	  Jeremy	  Brown	  and	  Paul	  Pickowicz,	  Dilemmas	  of	  Victory.	  	  138	  Letter,	  Carter	  Clarke	  to	  Bonner	  Fellers,	  April	  30,	  1951,	  Folder	  9,	  Box	  1,	  RG44a,	  PBFF,	  MML,	  Norfolk,	  Virginia.	  	  139	  “If	  There	  Ever	  Was	  a	  Time	  for	  the	  Free	  World	  to	  Rally!”	  Kansas	  City	  Star,	  Deceber	  16,	  1950.	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appeared	  as	  natural,	  realistic,	  and	  even	  defensive	  in	  the	  light	  of	  a	  particular	  version	  of	  “reality”	  of	  the	  world	  at	  that	  time.	  	  Quite	  a	  few	  people,	  of	  course,	  did	  not	  agree,	  namely	  leftists	  and	  foreigners.	  Not	  sharing	  popular	  versions	  of	  “common	  sense,”	  some	  leftists	  viewed	  the	  situation	  differently.	  Fred	  Stover,	  President	  of	  the	  Iowa	  Farmers	  Union,	  for	  instance,	  observed	  that	  anti-­‐communist	  hysteria	  in	  America	  was	  becoming	  completely	  ridiculous.	  He	  sarcastically	  observed:	  “Americans	  are	  trying	  so	  hard	  now	  a	  days	  to	  be	  different	  from	  Russia	  and	  communists	  in	  every	  way	  that	  it	  shouldn’t	  surprise	  us	  if	  a	  lot	  of	  Americans	  develop	  such	  a	  case	  of	  neurosis	  that	  they	  will	  become	  nudists	  simply	  because	  they	  found	  out	  that	  communists	  wear	  clothes.140”	  Like	  Stover,	  foreign	  observers	  who	  did	  not	  share	  in	  this	  “reality”	  and	  “common	  sense”	  grew	  concerned	  about	  aggressive	  attitudes	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Anti-­‐communist	  socialist	  Thomas	  Norman,	  who	  traveled	  to	  India	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1951,	  for	  instance,	  reported	  that	  he	  read	  and	  heard	  considerable	  criticism	  of	  American	  “war	  hysteria,”	  and	  that	  there	  was	  much	  fear	  of	  America	  as	  a	  “war	  monger.”141	  Observing	  the	  hardening	  of	  popular	  attitudes	  and	  politicians’	  tones	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  by	  December	  1950,	  even	  America’s	  allies	  were	  becoming	  uneasy.	  U.S.	  Ambassador	  to	  France	  David	  Bruce,	  for	  example,	  reported	  that	  there	  was	  a	  feeling	  among	  French	  officials	  that	  “some	  brakes	  should	  be	  put	  on	  the	  ‘impetuous’	  leadership	  of	  the	  U.S.”142	  	  
	  
                                                140	  Letter,	  F.	  W.	  Stover	  to	  A.	  R.	  Guernsey,	  Box	  1,	  Series	  I,	  Papers	  of	  Fred	  Stover	  (hereafter	  PFS),	  University	  of	  Iowa,	  Iowa	  City,	  Iowa.	  141	  Thomas	  Norman,	  “Why	  No	  One	  Can	  Be	  Neutral,”	  4,	  in	  Box	  11,	  PRF,	  Hoover	  Institution	  Archives,	  Stanford	  University,	  Stanford,	  California.	  	  142	  Memorandum,	  The	  Ambassador	  David	  Bruce	  to	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  “Review	  of	  Political	  Development	  During	  the	  Months	  of	  September,	  October,	  and	  November,	  1950,”	  December	  13,	  1950,	  
FRUS	  1950	  Vol.	  III:	  Western	  Europe,	  1440.	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Sparks	  Within	  Clarified	  	  Sparks	  flew	  among	  the	  allies	  as	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  Clement	  Atlee	  hurriedly	  visited	  the	  White	  House	  in	  early	  December	  1950.	  Because	  he	  came	  immediately	  after	  Truman’s	  “statement”	  about	  the	  possible	  use	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  in	  Korea,	  the	  media	  focused	  sensationally	  on	  that	  issue.143	  Yet,	  in	  the	  over	  nine	  hours	  of	  the	  six	  meetings	  between	  Truman	  and	  Atlee	  in	  five	  days,	  the	  most	  controversial	  and	  recurrent	  issue,	  actually,	  involved	  how	  to	  evaluate	  China’s	  actions.144	  The	  focus	  was	  on	  whether	  Chinese	  communists	  were	  subservient	  “satellites,”	  and	  whether	  China’s	  intervention	  was	  a	  part	  of	  “Moscow’s	  game”—a	  part	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Atlee	  pointed	  out,	  “The	  Chinese	  don’t	  owe	  [the	  USSR]	  very	  much.	  […].	  There	  is	  a	  strong	  mixture	  of	  Chinese	  nationalism	  in	  their	  communist	  attitude.”	  Alluding	  to	  Tito	  of	  Yugoslavia,	  the	  British	  Prime	  Minister	  concluded,	  “They	  may	  wear	  the	  Red	  flag	  with	  a	  difference.”145	  Urging	  Truman	  to	  treat	  China	  as	  a	  Chinese	  issue	  and	  Korea	  as	  a	  Korean	  issue,	  instead	  of	  viewing	  both	  as	  parts	  of	  the	  Kremlin’s	  scheme,	  Atlee	  opposed	  the	  spread	  of	  war	  against	  the	  mainland,	  and	  insisted	  on	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  PRC,	  suggesting	  that	  it	  be	  given	  a	  seat	  at	  the	  United	  Nations.146	  	  	  For	  Acheson	  and	  Truman,	  however,	  Atlee’s	  suggestion	  was	  out	  of	  the	  question.	  “[I	  am]	  far	  less	  optimistic	  about	  China,”	  said	  Acheson,	  “Chinese	  Communists	  were	  servient	  to	  Moscow.	  All	  they	  do	  is	  based	  on	  the	  Moscow	  pattern,	  
                                                143	  William	  Stueck,	  The	  Korean	  War,	  130-­‐38.	  144	  For	  details	  of	  the	  Truman-­‐Atlee	  conference,	  see	  FRUS	  1950:	  Vol.	  III	  Western	  Europe,	  1706-­‐87.	  145	  FRUS	  1950:	  Vol.	  III	  Western	  Europe,	  1714-­‐15,	  1725-­‐26.	  146	  FRUS	  1950:	  Vol.	  III	  Western	  Europe,	  1762-­‐63.	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and	  they	  are	  better	  pupils	  even	  than	  the	  Eastern	  European	  satellites.”147	  In	  this	  comment,	  Acheson’s	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  “pupil,”	  characterizing	  China	  in	  comparison	  to	  Eastern	  European	  countries,	  is	  suggestive.	  As	  MacArthur	  in	  1951	  described	  Japan	  as	  a	  “boy	  of	  12”	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  German	  and	  Anglo-­‐Saxon,	  who	  were	  “45	  years	  of	  age,”148	  Acheson	  similarly	  compared	  Chinese	  and	  Eastern	  European	  communist	  countries;	  the	  former,	  in	  his	  mind,	  was	  a	  better	  “pupil”—a	  metaphor	  that	  fit	  well	  with	  conventional	  prejudice	  of	  the	  Chinese	  as	  being	  more	  passive,	  submissive,	  and	  dependent	  than	  Europeans.	  	  Acheson’s	  observation	  was	  nothing	  surprising	  in	  view	  of	  the	  American	  popular	  version	  of	  perceived-­‐reality.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  for	  many	  Americans	  at	  that	  time,	  it	  was	  “decadent”	  Europeans	  who	  rather	  continued	  to	  “close	  their	  eyes	  to	  the	  danger	  than	  squarely	  face	  it.”149	  The	  president	  of	  a	  trading	  company	  in	  Detroit,	  Michigan,	  opposed	  Atlee’s	  suggestion,	  saying:	  	  We	  all	  know	  that	  Russia	  is	  behind	  the	  moves	  in	  Red	  China.	  We	  know	  that	  Russia	  knows	  we	  are	  not	  prepared.	  …	  [N]ow	  is	  the	  time	  to	  get	  tough.	  Now	  is	  the	  time	  to	  tell	  Stalin	  that,	  if	  he	  doesn’t	  see	  that	  Red	  China	  gets	  out	  of	  Korea	  at	  once,	  we	  will	  use	  the	  [atomic]	  bomb,	  not	  only	  on	  Chinese	  concentrations	  but	  on	  the	  Kremlin	  as	  well.	  […]	  I	  believe	  if	  we	  were	  to	  drop	  a	  couple	  of	  [atomic]	  bombs	  on	  the	  Kremlin	  and	  pour	  it	  on	  them	  we	  might	  start	  a	  revolution	  within.150	  	  	  A	  San	  Francisco	  man	  similarly	  insisted,	  “Appeasement	  is	  a	  backward	  step.	  It	  did	  not	  work	  with	  Hitler;	  it	  will	  not	  work	  with	  Stalin.	  Americans	  will	  fight	  and	  fight	  alone	  if	  necessary.”151	  Another	  New	  Yorker	  asserted:	  “The	  people	  seem	  to	  understand	  better	  
                                                147	  FRUS	  1950:	  Vol.	  III	  Western	  Europe,	  1711-­‐12.	  148	  John	  Dower,	  War	  Without	  Mercy,	  142-­‐46,	  302-­‐3.	  	  149	  Roscoe	  Drummond,	  “The	  State	  of	  Europe;	  Danger	  from	  Within,”	  December	  1950,	  File	  2,	  SF	  No.	  44.	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  	  150	  Letter,	  Charles	  R.	  Kennedy	  to	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  December	  4,	  1950,	  Box	  1305,	  Official	  File	  471-­‐B,	  HSTP,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  151	  Letter,	  Esther	  R.	  to	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  December	  6,	  1950,	  File	  2,	  SF	  No.	  44,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	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than	  the	  diplomats	  that	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  Russian	  and	  Chinese	  brands	  of	  communism.”152	  What	  is	  important	  about	  these	  expressions	  of	  displeasure	  over	  Atlee’s	  attempt	  to	  convince	  Truman	  is	  not	  their	  peculiarity	  but	  commonness	  in	  society	  at	  that	  time.	  An	  editorial	  in	  the	  Pittsburgh	  Press	  concluded:	  “To	  assume	  that	  the	  American	  people	  will	  accept	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  Britain’s	  attitude	  toward	  those	  Red	  aggressors	  is	  a	  fantastic	  absurdity.”153	  It	  was	  a	  “fantastic	  absurdity”	  because	  the	  danger	  appeared	  to	  be	  so	  clear	  and	  present	  for	  many	  Americans.	  Fighting	  communism	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  looked	  to	  be	  of	  vital	  importance	  to	  protect	  Americans.154	  There	  were,	  to	  be	  sure,	  unignorable	  differences	  of	  opinions	  in	  American	  society.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  China	  experts	  at	  the	  time	  warned	  against	  dominant	  images	  of	  China	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Harvard	  Professor	  John	  King	  Fairbank,	  for	  instance,	  argued	  that	  the	  Chinese	  Revolution	  was	  fundamentally	  a	  matter	  for	  the	  Chinese	  people	  to	  decide,155	  and	  that	  Americans	  “must	  put	  the	  Communist	  victory	  in	  China	  down	  as	  a	  case	  of	  self-­‐determination,	  not	  of	  outside	  aggression.”156	  	  As	  a	  China	  specialist,	  he	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  inner	  dynamics	  of	  China,	  and	  this	  made	  him	  much	  more	  conscious	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  foreign	  influence.	  He	  wrote:	  	  The	  greatest	  error	  that	  Americans	  can	  make	  is	  to	  look	  at	  China	  but	  think	  only	  of	  Russian	  expansion.	  […].	  It	  is	  incredible	  that	  Modern	  China…could	  be	  brought	  into	  
                                                                                                                                            Missouri.	  152	  Letter,	  A.	  Cumings	  to	  William	  Knowland,	  Box	  272,	  PWK,	  UC	  Berkeley,	  Bancroft	  Library,	  Berkeley,	  CA.	  153	  Editorial,	  Pittsburgh	  Press,	  December	  10,	  1950,	  File	  2,	  SF	  No.	  44,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  	  154	  See,	  for	  instance,	  David	  Lawrence,	  “What	  Do	  We	  Mean	  By	  ‘Preventive	  War’?”	  US	  News	  &	  World	  
Report,	  September	  8,	  1950,	  and	  “War	  Now?	  Or	  When?	  Or	  Never?”	  Time,	  September	  18,	  1950.	  155	  John	  King	  Fairbank,	  The	  United	  States	  and	  China	  1st	  ed.	  (Cambridge,	  1948),	  xiii.	  	  156	  John	  King	  Fairbank	  et	  al.,	  Next	  Step	  in	  Asia	  (Cambridge,	  1949),	  18.	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the	  orbit	  of	  any	  foreign	  power—Russian,	  American,	  or	  any	  other—except	  in	  so	  far	  as	  China’s	  own	  inner	  development	  itself	  conduced	  to	  such	  an	  orientation.157	  	  Other	  China	  experts,	  such	  as	  Owen	  Lattimore	  of	  Johns	  Hopkins,	  Thomas	  A.	  Bisson	  of	  U.C.	  Berkeley,	  as	  well	  as	  John	  Paton	  Davies,	  John	  Stewart	  Service,	  and	  O.	  Edmund	  Clubb	  of	  the	  State	  Department	  expressed	  similar	  viewpoints,	  which	  could	  have	  deepened	  and	  diversified	  various	  conceptions	  of	  China.	  	  However,	  such	  did	  not	  happen	  at	  this	  time.	  The	  questions	  are:	  Why	  were	  most	  of	  these	  China	  experts	  silenced	  and	  suppressed	  in	  the	  early	  1950s?	  Why	  were	  some	  particular	  “facts”	  more	  magnified	  so	  that	  they	  became	  dominant	  views	  of	  “reality,”	  marginalizing	  other	  kinds	  of	  facts	  and	  realities?	  Why	  did	  the	  two	  images—“China	  and	  Korea	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  the	  USSR”	  and	  “Captive	  Millions”—become	  so	  pervasive?	  To	  answer	  these	  questions,	  we	  need	  to	  look	  at	  domestic	  dynamics	  of	  “translation”	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  When	  observing	  foreign	  affairs	  amidst	  a	  sea	  of	  information,	  domestic	  preconceptions	  functioned	  as	  filters,	  sorting	  what	  would	  be	  considered	  “factual”	  and	  what	  would	  not	  be.	  Images	  of	  submissive	  China	  became	  prevalent	  not	  necessarily	  because	  they	  properly	  reflected	  the	  real	  situation	  in	  China,	  but	  because	  they	  were	  well	  suited	  to	  existing	  prejudices	  at	  home	  about	  the	  Chinese.	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  the	  aforementioned	  China	  experts	  were	  marginalized	  in	  the	  McCarthy	  era—all	  except	  Fairbank	  actually	  lost	  their	  jobs—not	  because	  they	  told	  “lies”	  but	  because	  their	  perspectives	  did	  not	  fit	  with	  dominant	  views,	  and	  were	  considered	  dangerous	  elements.	  In	  other	  words,	  reality	  somewhere	  else	  did	  not	  shape	  understandings;	  rather,	  the	  frame	  of	  understanding	  chose	  and	  shaped	  what	  would	  be	  considered	  “facts”	  and	  “reality.”	  
                                                157	  Fairbank,	  The	  United	  States	  and	  China,	  3-­‐4.	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   With	  the	  shaping	  and	  consolidation	  of	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  “reality,”	  those	  who	  had	  disagreed	  with	  the	  mainstream	  orthodox	  view	  became	  conspicuous	  in	  their	  communities,	  and	  came	  to	  feel	  inhibited.	  A	  California	  psychologist,	  in	  fact,	  observed:	  	  A	  great	  many	  young	  men	  are	  approaching	  me	  professionally	  with	  questions,	  in	  a	  mood	  of	  extreme	  anxiety…	  [T]hey	  feel	  that	  the	  United	  States	  has	  become	  a	  police	  state,	  in	  which	  citizens	  are	  no	  longer	  free	  to	  speak	  frankly,	  and	  where	  to	  desire	  peace	  is	  considered	  subversive,	  almost	  unlawful.	  Life	  in	  the	  United	  States	  has	  become	  a	  sort	  of	  a	  nightmare	  to	  them.158	  	  As	  this	  observation	  suggests,	  in	  the	  process	  of	  making	  and	  consolidating	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  “reality,”	  what	  became	  clear	  were	  dividing	  lines	  between	  “us”	  and	  “them,”	  both	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  politics	  of	  truth-­‐making	  itself,	  conducted	  by	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  projects,	  did	  not	  create	  a	  consensus.	  Nor	  did	  it	  resolve	  disagreements	  in	  society.	  Rather	  it	  clarified	  them.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  governmental	  and	  non-­‐governmental	  efforts	  to	  make	  “truth”	  in	  this	  period	  set	  off	  enthusiastic	  support	  and	  participation,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  provoked	  opposition,	  on	  the	  other.	  To	  solve	  such	  conflicts	  when	  they	  surfaced,	  much	  more	  brutal	  and	  societal	  measures	  were	  necessitated:	  domestic	  social	  purges	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  during	  the	  early	  period	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  	  	   	  
                                                158	  Letter,	  Felix	  H.	  Bistram	  to	  HST,	  31	  August	  1950.	  Papers	  of	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  Truman	  Library,	  Independence,	  MO.	  
  311 
Chapter	  5:	  Pictures	  
	  
Picture	  1-­‐1:	  	  "'Wufan'	  yundong	  de	  zhaopian-­‐-­‐youxing	  shiwei	  renqun	  	  [Pictures	  of	  'Five-­‐Anti'	  movements-­‐-­‐People	  in	  demonstration]"	  January	  1952	  	  Shanghai,	  PRC	  H1-­‐14-­‐5-­‐54	  	  	  	  	  	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Shanghai,	  PRC	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Picture	  2:	  	  "Shanghai	  di	  shiliu	  mianfangsha	  chang	  fan	  Meidi	  xuanchuan	  	  banbao	  [Anti-­‐American	  imperialism	  blackboard	  at	  Shanghai	  	  No.	  Sixteenth	  cotton	  spinning	  factory]"	  1951	  Shanghai,	  PRC	  H1-­‐31-­‐6-­‐8	  	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Shanghai,	  PRC	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Picture	  3:	  
	  “Zhaoyang	  de	  yinmou	  [Plot	  in	  the	  same	  old	  way]”	  
Changjiang	  Ribao	  November	  10,	  1950	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Picture	  4-­‐1:	  	  	  "Shanghai	  di	  shiliu	  mianfangsha	  chang	  fan	  Meidi	  	  [Anti-­‐American	  imperialism	  movement	  at	  Shanghai	  	  No.	  Sixteenth	  cotton	  spinning	  factory]"	  1951	  Shanghai,	  PRC	  H1-­‐31-­‐6-­‐22	  	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Shanghai,	  PRC	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Picture	  4-­‐2:	  	  "Shanghai	  jinrong	  zhigong	  fandui	  Meidi	  wuzhuang	  	  Riben	  shiwei	  da	  youxing	  zhaopian	  [Shanghai	  banking	  staff	  and	  	  workers	  demonstrating	  against	  America	  rearming	  Japan]"	  March	  1951	  	  	  Shanghai,	  PRC	  H1-­‐23-­‐6-­‐45	  	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Shanghai,	  PRC	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Picture	  5-­‐1:	  	  
Changjiang	  Ribao	  December	  4,	  1950	  	  
	  	  	  In	  this	  cartoon,	  McArthur	  is	  described	  as	  threatening	  mainland	  China	  from	  Japan,	  	  with	  his	  left	  hand	  on	  Korea,	  his	  right	  hand	  on	  Vietnam,	  and	  his	  chin	  on	  Taiwan.	  	  
	   	  




Xian	  Qunzhong	  	  December	  3,	  1950	  	  
	  	  In	  this	  cartoon,	  the	  “American	  Imperialist”	  was	  Described	  as	  planning	  to	  attack	  mainland	  China	  From	  three	  directions,	  Korea,	  Taiwan,	  and	  Vietnam.	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Picture	  6:	  	  
Xinhua	  Ribao	  	  December	  11,	  1950	  	  
	  	  
Shanxi	  Ribao	  	  November	  1950	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Picture	  7-­‐1:	  	  
Jinbu	  Ribao,	  	  November	  21,	  1950	  	  
	  	  
Picture	  7-­‐2:	  	  
Renmin	  Ribao	  	  November	  24,	  1950.	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Picture	  8::	  	  “The	  Meaning	  on	  the	  Reverse”	  
Renmin	  Ribao	  November	  29,	  1950	  	  
	  	  
	  






Picture	  9:	  	   “What	  is	  the	  Plan	  for	  Civil	  Defense	  of	  the	  United	  States?”	  Civil	  Defense	  Program	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library,	  Independence	  Missouri	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Picture	  10:	  	  “ZhongSi	  youhao,	  zheshi	  Mao	  Zedong	  taohao	  de	  banfa”	  [The	  Sino-­‐Soviet	  Friendship,	  this	  is	  Mao	  Zedong’s	  method	  to	  fawn	  on]	  The	  Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  	  
	  	  In	  this	  propaganda	  cartoon	  produced	  by	  U.S.	  army	  intelligence,	  Mao	  Zedong	  	  fawn	  on	  Stalin,	  giving	  him,	  for	  instance,	  “Dalian,”	  “lüshun,”	  and	  “Changchun	  	  railroads.”	  The	  dish	  Mao	  Zedong	  is	  bringing	  read	  “Chinese	  sovereignty.”	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Picture	  11-­‐1:	  	  “Why	  must	  your	  leader	  bow	  to	  Russian	  master?”	  October	  3,	  1952	  The	  Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  
	  In	  this	  propaganda	  cartoon,	  a	  small	  figure	  of	  “Kim	  Il-­‐sung”	  is	  	  described	  as	  worshiping	  a	  statue	  “Communism”	  that	  has	  Stalin’s	  face.	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Picture	  11-­‐2:	  	  	  “Why	  die	  for	  China?”	  The	  Center	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  Independence,	  Missouri.	  	  
	  	  This	  propaganda	  cartoon	  shows	  a	  Russian	  is	  pushing	  Chinese	  communist,	  	  who,	  in	  turn,	  is	  pushing	  North	  Korean	  Soldier	  forward	  into	  the	  Korean	  War.	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Picture	  12:	  	  “Harvest	  Time	  for	  the	  ‘Agrarian	  Reformer’”	  
Saturday	  Evening	  Post	  December	  16,	  1950	  	  
	  	  	  
	   	  
  326 
Picture	  13:	  	  	  “If	  There	  Ever	  Was	  a	  Time	  for	  the	  Free	  World	  to	  Rally!”	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Chapter	  6:	  Between	  Mobilization	  and	  Participation	  	  	  	   [T]he	  civilians	  who	  are	  outside	  the	  combat,	  who	  do	  not	  fight,	  but	  talk,	  who	  write	  and	  embroil	  themselves	  in	  a	  factitious	  and	  lunatic	  agitation	  and	  are	  never	  exhausted;	  these	  are	  delivered	  over	  to	  the	  winds	  of	  feverish	  violence.	  And	  there	  is	  the	  danger.	  For	  they	  form	  opinion,	  the	  only	  opinion	  that	  can	  be	  expressed	  (all	  others	  are	  forbidden).1	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Romain	  Rolland,	  Above	  the	  Battle	  (1916)	  	  	  	   In	  the	  first	  six	  months	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  war	  situation	  shifted	  at	  a	  dizzying	  pace:	  North	  Korean	  armies’	  attack	  on	  the	  South	  in	  June,	  American	  forces’	  Inchon	  landing	  in	  September	  and	  crossing	  of	  38th	  Parallel	  northward	  in	  October,	  and	  China’s	  entry	  into	  the	  war	  in	  October	  and	  its	  forces’	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  southward	  in	  December.	  With	  such	  repeated	  turning	  of	  the	  tables	  taking	  place	  so	  rapidly,	  numerous	  cases	  of	  tragedy	  occurred	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  Korea:	  civilian	  massacres.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  well-­‐known	  incidents	  by	  now,	  which	  happened	  in	  Nogunri	  (Noguen-­‐ri),	  south	  of	  Taejun	  (Daejeon)	  in	  July	  1950,	  involved	  American	  soldiers’	  indiscriminate	  killing	  of	  several	  hundred	  civilians—including	  infants	  and	  elders.2	  Another	  case,	  occurring	  in	  Gwangju	  immediately	  following	  the	  Inchon	  Landing,	  involved	  North	  Korean	  forces	  killing	  six	  hundred	  arrested	  rightists.3	  Another	  case,	  occurring	  continuously	  near	  the	  Jirisan	  region	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1951,	  
                                                1	  Romain	  Rolland,	  Above	  the	  Battle	  translated	  by	  C.	  K.	  Ogden	  (Chicago:	  Open	  Court	  Pub.	  Co.,	  1916),	  101-­‐102.	  	  2Robert	  L	  Bateman,	  No	  Gun	  Ri:	  A	  Military	  History	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  Incident	  (Mechanicsburg,	  PA:	  Stackpole	  Books,	  2002);	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim,	  Senso	  to	  heiwa:	  Chosen	  hanto	  1950	  [War	  and	  Peace:	  the	  Korean	  Penninsula	  1950],	  translation	  of	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim's	  Hanguk	  1950:	  chonjaeng	  kwa	  pyonghwa,	  trans.	  by	  Mori	  Yoshinobu	  (Tokyo:	  Shakai	  hyoronsha,	  2009),	  257-­‐62;	  Bruce	  Cumings,	  The	  Origins	  of	  
the	  Korean	  War	  Vol.	  2:	  The	  Roaring	  of	  the	  Cataract,	  1947-­‐1950	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1990),	  706.	  	  3	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim,	  200.	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involved	  South	  Korean	  soldiers’	  indiscriminate	  massacre	  of	  1,500	  local	  residents	  suspected	  of	  helping	  enemies.4	  	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  mass	  killings,	  primarily	  conducted	  by	  state	  militaries,	  recent	  studies	  have	  begun	  revealing	  many	  different	  patterns	  of	  massacres,	  which	  occurred	  in	  the	  areas	  where	  regular	  armies	  were	  absent.	  For	  example,	  in	  the	  Yeonggwang	  region,	  35,000	  local	  residents—one	  fifth	  of	  the	  area’s	  entire	  population—were	  reportedly	  killed	  without	  much	  involvement	  of	  the	  regular	  army.	  Most	  victims,	  according	  to	  Korean	  scholar	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim,	  were	  slain	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  locals	  as	  the	  climax	  of	  long-­‐lasting	  struggles,	  such	  as	  those	  among	  leftists	  and	  rightists,	  as	  well	  as	  among	  landowners	  and	  sharecroppers,	  all	  of	  which	  were	  reignited	  and	  escalated	  with	  the	  turns	  of	  the	  war	  situation.5	  In	  another	  case,	  in	  the	  village	  of	  Sedeung-­‐ri	  on	  the	  southern	  island	  of	  Jindo,	  local	  struggles,	  not	  just	  between	  leftists	  and	  rightists	  in	  the	  village,	  but	  against	  collaborationists	  during	  the	  time	  of	  Japanese	  colonialism,	  as	  well	  as	  among	  clans	  and	  families	  in	  the	  village	  that	  flared	  up	  with	  changes	  in	  the	  war	  situation,	  eventually	  lead	  to	  mutual	  killings	  in	  the	  village.6	  	  Such	  mass	  killings	  during	  the	  wartime,	  which	  have	  been	  come	  to	  light	  in	  recent	  years,	  were	  indeed	  diverse,	  refusing	  any	  simple	  classification	  and	  labeling.	  Still,	  we	  can	  discern	  a	  number	  of	  common	  characteristics	  among	  them.	  First,	  most,	  if	  not	  all,	  were	  conducted	  under	  Cold	  War	  terms,	  such	  as	  “rounding-­‐up	  Communists”	  
                                                4	  Kim	  Dong	  choon	  (Kim	  Tong-­‐chun),	  Chosen	  Senso	  no	  shakaishi:	  hinan,	  senryo,	  gyakusatsu	  [A	  Social	  History	  of	  the	  Korean	  War:	  Evacuation,	  Occupation,	  Massacre]	  (Tokyo:	  Heibonsha,	  2008),	  263-­‐66,	  translation	  of	  Kim	  Tong-­‐chun's	  Chonjaeng	  kwa	  sahoe:	  uri	  ege	  Hanguk	  chonjaeng	  un	  muot	  ionna?	  5	  Park	  Myung-­‐lim,	  201.	  	  6	  Ibid,	  202.	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or	  “class	  struggle.”	  Second,	  nonetheless,	  quite	  a	  few	  massacres	  contained	  elements	  of	  local	  struggles	  residing	  in	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  historical	  settings	  underneath	  the	  mass	  slaughters.	  Such	  struggles	  included,	  for	  example,	  those	  between	  leftist	  and	  rightist	  residents,	  landowners	  and	  sharecroppers,	  wartime	  collaborationists	  and	  non-­‐collaborationists,	  Christians	  and	  non-­‐Christians,	  among	  clans,	  among	  families,	  among	  friends	  and	  neighborhoods,	  and	  so	  on.	  In	  many	  cases,	  these	  were	  the	  struggles	  that	  existed	  long	  before	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  but	  had	  remained	  “unresolved.”	  Third,	  in	  addition	  to	  large-­‐scale	  massacres	  conducted	  by	  military	  forces,	  intentionally	  or	  reflectively,	  many	  mass	  killings	  involved	  the	  participation	  of	  local	  people,	  in	  some	  cases	  quite	  directly,	  and,	  in	  other	  cases,	  by	  more	  indirect	  methods,	  such	  as	  rumors	  and	  mutual	  surveillance	  among	  locals	  that	  often	  exacerbated	  the	  degree	  of	  the	  mass	  killings.7	  In	  a	  sense,	  many	  massacres	  in	  Korea	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  having	  an	  element	  of	  social	  suppression	  at	  a	  local	  level	  that	  was	  rekindled	  and	  which	  exploded	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  	  Intriguingly,	  such	  experiences	  were	  not	  particularly	  unique	  to	  Korea.	  While	  degrees	  of	  violence	  differed	  widely,	  a	  similar	  pattern	  of	  social	  suppression	  appeared	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  in	  the	  early	  period	  of	  the	  Korean	  War:	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries	  in	  China,	  the	  White	  Terror	  in	  Taiwan,	  the	  crackdown	  on	  “un-­‐Filipino”	  activities	  in	  the	  Philippines,	  the	  Red	  Purge	  in	  Japan,	  and	  “anti-­‐communist”	  currents	  in	  Western	  societies,	  such	  as	  McCarthyism	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Each	  instance	  of	  domestic	  purging,	  of	  course,	  had	  its	  own	  local	  history,	  and	  
                                                7	  Similar	  accounts	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Bruce	  Cumings,	  The	  Korean	  War:	  A	  History	  (New	  York:	  2010),	  165-­‐203.	  Also,	  a	  Korean	  novelist	  Hwang	  Seok-­‐yeong	  wrote	  a	  best-­‐selling	  narrative,	  based	  on	  his	  interviews,	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  mutual	  killings	  that	  occurred	  in	  Sincheon	  in	  October	  1950;	  Hwang	  Seok-­‐yeong,	  Sonnimu	  [The	  Visitors]	  trans.	  by	  Chon	  Gyonmo.	  (Tokyo:	  Iwanami	  shoten,	  2004).	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all	  had	  different	  degrees	  of	  violence.	  Nevertheless,	  in	  each	  instance,	  locals	  similarly	  utilized	  the	  bipolar	  worldview	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  stifling	  social	  and	  cultural	  conflicts	  at	  home,	  often	  choosing	  a	  particular	  version	  of	  “reality”	  through	  the	  “purification	  ”	  of	  society,	  eventually	  creating	  a	  more	  “harmonious”	  and	  “orderly”	  society,	  in	  each	  case.	  Why	  did	  such	  similar	  suppressions	  occur	  simultaneously	  all	  over	  the	  world?	  How	  were	  they	  developed	  and	  conducted?	  Who	  purged	  whom	  for	  what	  purpose?	  What	  were	  the	  implications	  of	  such	  a	  worldwide	  phenomenon?	  	  In	  exploring	  these	  domestic	  social	  suppressions,	  the	  prime	  focus	  is	  to	  think	  about	  their	  meanings	  through	  looking	  into	  each	  society.	  The	  process	  is	  to	  trace	  what	  happened	  in	  society,	  rather	  than	  to	  investigate	  the	  center	  of	  political	  power.	  This	  is	  because,	  by	  primarily	  examining	  the	  center	  of	  power—such	  as	  intentions	  and	  decisions	  of	  powerful	  policymakers—we	  tend	  to	  pay	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  fundamental	  meanings	  of	  social	  events.	  The	  meaning,	  in	  this	  approach,	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  self-­‐evident,	  as	  it	  is	  often	  confused	  with	  policymakers’	  intentions,	  as	  if	  a	  social	  phenomenon	  were	  a	  result	  of	  their	  intentions,	  and	  as	  if	  the	  political	  center	  were	  the	  origin	  for	  social	  and	  cultural	  change.	  Instead,	  this	  chapter	  treats	  the	  center	  of	  power,	  not	  as	  the	  origin	  of,	  but	  a	  part	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  events.	  Thus,	  instead	  of	  beginning	  with	  the	  search	  for	  power	  holders’	  intentions,	  we	  delve	  into	  what	  happened	  in	  these	  suppressions,	  paying	  particular	  attention	  to:	  who	  purged	  whom	  for	  what	  purpose.	  The	  intentions	  of	  persons	  in	  power	  will	  be	  brought	  up	  for	  discussion,	  but	  the	  focus	  will	  not	  necessarily	  be	  on	  how	  they	  originated	  events	  in	  society,	  but	  how	  they	  reacted	  to	  them.	  Examining	  domestic	  purges	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  following	  two	  chapters	  intend	  to	  explicate	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  simultaneity	  and	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analogousness	  of	  these	  social	  suppressions,	  and	  to	  think	  about	  how	  these	  implications	  affect	  the	  meaning	  of	  this	  worldwide	  phenomenon	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period.	  	  	  
China:	  Reconsidering	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries	  On	  April	  28,	  1951,	  Shanghai’s	  famous	  Canidrome,	  a	  once	  fashionable	  and	  dazzling	  greyhound-­‐racing	  track,	  originally	  built	  in	  1928,	  was	  charged	  with	  a	  heated	  atmosphere	  from	  the	  morning.	  Squeezed	  against	  the	  oval	  of	  the	  immense	  greensward	  was	  a	  crowd	  of	  10,000	  people.	  A	  stage	  was	  set	  up	  in	  front	  of	  the	  central	  platform	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  sea	  of	  humanity,	  and,	  on	  the	  stage,	  were	  accused	  persons,	  bound	  by	  ropes	  or	  chains,	  with	  heads	  down,	  awaiting	  judgment,	  and	  listening	  to	  speeches	  by	  party	  officials,	  witnesses,	  students,	  and	  peasants.	  According	  to	  a	  British	  Manchester	  Guardian	  reporter,	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  people	  sang	  songs,	  waved	  red	  flags	  bearing	  the	  slogans	  of	  the	  regime,	  and	  howled	  imprecations	  against	  the	  accused	  persons.	  It	  was	  one	  of	  countless	  mass	  accusation	  meetings	  in	  Shanghai,	  conducted	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries	  (Zhenya	  fan-­‐
geming,	  or	  Zhenfan),	  a	  wave	  which	  swept	  over	  Shanghai	  and	  numerous	  other	  cities	  nationwide	  from	  late	  fall	  of	  1950	  through	  the	  summer	  of	  1951	  (Picture	  1).	  Such	  a	  mass	  meeting	  was	  reportedly	  preceded	  with	  a	  series	  of	  accusations	  and	  confessions,	  in	  each	  case	  followed	  by	  a	  customary	  question	  and	  answer	  between	  official	  prosecutors	  and	  the	  crowd.	  “Shall	  we	  shoot	  them?”	  a	  prosecutor,	  for	  instance,	  asked.	  
  333 
“Death	  to	  them!	  Death	  to	  them!”	  answered	  the	  crowd,	  “Take	  them	  back	  to	  the	  scene	  of	  their	  crime	  and	  kill	  them.”8	  On	  that	  day	  at	  Canidrome	  in	  Shanghai,	  the	  crowd	  sentenced	  to	  death	  more	  than	  200	  persons	  with	  such	  shouts,	  which	  local	  newspapers	  described	  “a	  unanimous	  roar.”	  These	  charges	  were	  reviewed	  and	  confirmed	  the	  next	  day	  by	  the	  Shanghai	  Military	  Control	  Commission.	  According	  to	  court	  documents,	  for	  example,	  Zhang	  Wanjin,	  a	  31-­‐year-­‐old	  ex-­‐policeman,	  who	  retained	  his	  position	  following	  the	  change	  of	  regime,	  was	  sentenced	  to	  imprisonment	  for	  the	  crime	  of	  spreading	  a	  rumor	  in	  1950,	  allegedly	  saying	  “Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  will	  counterattack	  this	  year,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  forces	  will	  land	  at	  ports	  nearby,	  attacking	  Shanghai	  from	  three	  directions—land,	  sea,	  and	  air.”9	  Likewise,	  Lian	  Zhenan,	  a	  33-­‐year-­‐old	  ex-­‐military	  doctor,	  was	  sentenced	  to	  imprisonment,	  charged	  with	  allegedly	  disrupting	  a	  “fan	  Mei-­‐fu-­‐Ri	  [Opposing	  America’s	  Support	  of	  Japan]”	  demonstration	  in	  Shanghai	  on	  the	  fourth	  of	  March	  in	  1951,	  by	  shouting	  of	  “reactionary”	  slogans.10	  Cheng	  Wei,	  a	  39-­‐year-­‐old	  man,	  was	  
                                                8	  “Public	  ‘Confession’	  and	  Execution,”	  Manchester	  Guardian,	  November	  14,	  1951,	  in	  “Reports,	  comments	  and	  information	  from	  many	  sources	  showing	  the	  extension	  of	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists	  over	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  China...,”	  FO371/92204,	  British	  National	  Archives	  (hereafter	  BNA),	  Kew,	  U.K;	  Time	  magazine’s	  series	  articles	  on	  China:	  “China:	  Mass	  Slaughter,”	  April	  30,	  1951,	  “China:	  Justice	  on	  the	  Radio,”	  May	  7,	  1951,	  and	  “China:	  Kill	  Mice!”	  May	  21,	  1951;	  Report	  on	  the	  Shanghai	  Military	  Control	  Commission	  in	  Xinwen	  ribao	  on	  July	  25,	  1951;	  Memorandum,	  Tientsin	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  U.K.,	  July	  13,	  1951,	  in	  “Reports,	  comments	  and	  information	  from	  many	  sources	  showing	  the	  extension	  of	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists	  over	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  China...,”	  FO371/92201,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  U.K..	  Also,	  see	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  “Reconsidering	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries,”	  China	  Quarterly,	  193	  (March	  2008),	  111;	  and	  Julia	  Strauss,	  “Morality,	  Coercion,	  and	  State	  Building	  by	  Campaign	  in	  the	  Early	  PRC:	  Regime	  Consolidation	  and	  After,	  1949-­‐1956,”	  in	  Julia	  Strauss	  ed.,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  PRC,	  
1949-­‐1976:	  The	  China	  Quarterly	  Special	  Issues	  New	  Series	  No.	  7	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  	  52-­‐53.	  9	  “Shanghai	  shi	  junshi	  guanzhi	  weiyuanhui	  panchu	  fangeming	  anfan	  de	  jueding	  shu	  [Shanghai	  Military	  Control	  Commission's	  written	  verdicts	  on	  the	  cases	  of	  counterrevolutionaries],”	  May	  12,	  1951,	  B1-­‐2-­‐1050-­‐45,	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives	  (hereafter	  SMA),	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  10	  “Shanghai	  shi	  junshi	  guanzhi	  weiyuanhui	  panchu	  fangeming	  anfan	  de	  jueding	  shu	  [Shanghai	  Military	  Control	  Commission's	  written	  verdicts	  on	  the	  cases	  of	  counterrevolutionaries],”	  April	  18,	  1951,	  B1-­‐2-­‐1050-­‐62,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	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sentenced	  to	  death,	  charged	  with	  allegedly	  spreading	  “reactionary”	  rumors,	  such	  as	  “The	  Nationalist	  Party	  is	  coming	  back.”	  According	  to	  a	  judgment	  document,	  available	  at	  the	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  he	  retorted,	  “Now	  everyone	  says	  Chairman	  Mao.	  But	  in	  the	  era	  of	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  everyone	  said	  Generalissimo	  Chiang,	  Generalissimo	  Chiang.	  Why	  did	  nobody	  say	  Chairman	  Mao	  at	  that	  time?	  We	  don’t	  need	  to	  be	  honest!”11	  As	  soon	  as	  their	  accusations	  were	  confirmed,	  such	  “criminals”	  were	  sent	  to	  public	  execution	  sites.	  Let	  us	  take	  a	  look	  an	  example	  of	  a	  public	  execution,	  observed	  by	  Norimura	  Kaneko,	  a	  Japanese	  girl	  who	  witnessed	  a	  mass	  execution	  meeting	  in	  the	  small	  city	  of	  Haicheng,	  near	  Shenyang,	  in	  late	  summer	  of	  1951.	  Norimura	  and	  her	  family	  continued	  to	  live	  in	  the	  area	  after	  Japan’s	  surrender	  in	  World	  War	  II,	  and,	  at	  that	  time,	  she	  was	  a	  student	  at	  a	  local	  junior	  school.	  	  It	  was	  a	  sweltering	  day.	  Norimura	  and	  her	  schoolmates	  walked	  to	  the	  beach	  along	  the	  Haicheng	  River	  without	  knowing	  what	  event	  would	  be	  held	  there.	  When	  they	  arrived	  in	  the	  late	  afternoon,	  a	  crowd	  of	  people	  was	  already	  there.	  Children	  were	  playing	  nearby.	  Many	  students	  from	  other	  schools	  arrived	  at	  the	  site,	  and	  there	  was	  a	  joyful	  mood	  in	  the	  air.	  As	  usual	  in	  this	  sort	  of	  gathering,	  singing	  began,	  and	  Norimura	  and	  her	  classmates	  joined	  in.	  Within	  an	  hour,	  a	  chorus	  of	  people	  began	  yelling	  “Crush	  the	  invasion	  of	  American	  imperialism!”	  “We	  will	  never	  allow	  spies’	  subversive	  activities!”	  An	  innumerable	  number	  of	  fists	  were	  raised	  in	  the	  air	  as	  the	  slogans	  were	  repeated.	  	  
                                                11	  “Shanghai	  shi	  junshi	  guanzhi	  weiyuanhui	  panchu	  fangeming	  anfan	  de	  jueding	  shu	  [Shanghai	  Military	  Control	  Commission's	  written	  verdicts	  on	  the	  cases	  of	  counterrevolutionaries],”	  B1-­‐2-­‐1063-­‐12,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	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“What	  on	  earth	  is	  going	  to	  happen?”	  Norimura	  wondered.12	  	  Before	  long,	  appeared	  a	  progression	  of	  men,	  their	  hands	  tied	  behind	  their	  backs.	  The	  first	  was	  a	  thin,	  middle-­‐aged	  man;	  he	  looked	  poor,	  his	  hair	  a	  mess.	  The	  second	  was	  a	  fair-­‐skinned	  young	  man	  who	  was	  crying	  in	  tears;	  his	  nose	  was	  running	  and	  his	  chin	  was	  dripping	  with	  his	  slobber.	  The	  next	  one	  surprised	  Norimura,	  because	  his	  loose	  trousers	  slipped	  down	  to	  his	  ankles,	  exposing	  his	  body	  below	  the	  waist,	  as	  he	  was	  dragged	  along	  by	  soldiers	  and	  walking	  awkwardly.	  The	  children	  laughed	  at	  him	  as	  he	  passed	  by.	  The	  rest	  of	  the	  crowd—men	  and	  women,	  young	  and	  old—likewise	  laughed	  derisively	  and	  convulsively,	  pointing,	  booing,	  and	  pouring	  ridicule	  and	  scorn	  on	  him.	  These	  prisoners	  of	  “counterrevolutionaries”	  passed	  by	  Norimura’s	  eyes	  one	  by	  one,	  and	  soon	  came	  to	  a	  stop	  about	  100	  feet	  from	  her,	  where	  they	  knelt	  as	  if	  bowing	  to	  the	  sun.	  Norimura	  suddenly	  noticed	  that	  there	  was	  a	  hole	  in	  front	  of	  them.	  	  “Shh!”	  “Shh!”	  “Quiet!”	  people	  said	  to	  one	  another.	  Soon	  the	  sound	  of	  a	  rifle	  cocking	  could	  be	  heard,	  and	  then	  a	  soldier	  held	  the	  muzzle	  of	  the	  rifle	  against	  a	  prisoner’s	  head.	  13	  Bang!	  With	  a	  crack,	  the	  man	  who	  had	  been	  crying	  fell	  silent	  and	  disappeared	  from	  Norimura’s	  sight.	  The	  executions	  continued,	  one	  by	  one.	  Even	  after	  they	  were	  
                                                12	  Norimura	  Kaneko,	  Zanryu	  shoujo	  no	  mita	  chousen	  sensou	  no	  koro	  [The	  Time	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  from	  the	  Eyes	  of	  a	  War-­‐displaced	  Japanese	  Girl]	  (Shakai	  shisosha:	  Tokyo,	  92),	  96-­‐98.	  13	  Ibid,	  98-­‐102.	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finished,	  excitement	  remained	  in	  the	  crowd.	  Some	  people	  tried	  to	  look	  into	  the	  hole,	  where	  the	  bodies	  of	  the	  prisoners	  had	  piled	  up.14	  Such	  a	  series	  of	  executions	  raised	  quite	  audible	  questions	  and	  critiques	  even	  at	  that	  time.	  According	  to	  an	  observation	  of	  popular	  attitudes	  by	  local	  officials	  in	  Beijing,	  some	  people	  said,	  “It	  was	  too	  lenient	  before,	  but	  now	  it	  is	  too	  harsh.”	  Others	  lamented,	  “It	  is	  pitiful	  to	  execute	  the	  old,	  and	  regrettable	  to	  kill	  the	  young.”	  Another	  was	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  those	  accused:	  “They	  committed	  to	  their	  accused	  acts	  perhaps	  due	  to	  the	  pressure	  from	  their	  livelihood;	  everyone	  would	  do	  the	  same	  if	  their	  living	  become	  strained.”	  Some	  even	  expressed	  doubts,	  “There	  have	  been	  too	  many	  executions.	  There	  must	  be	  some	  false	  charges.”	  Nevertheless,	  according	  to	  the	  local	  official’s	  observation,	  these	  opinions	  remained	  relatively	  in	  the	  minority,	  often	  quickly	  responded	  to	  in	  retorts	  by	  surrounding	  people:	  “Well,	  do	  you	  really	  know	  how	  they	  had	  murdered	  the	  people	  before?	  Those	  who	  were	  killed	  by	  these	  persons	  died	  in	  much	  more	  miserable	  ways.”15	  	  In	  this	  way,	  scenes	  of	  denunciation,	  execution,	  doubt,	  and	  containment	  of	  critiques	  were	  repeated	  in	  numerous	  places	  all	  over	  China	  between	  the	  fall	  of	  1950	  and	  summer	  of	  1951.	  As	  such,	  Beijing	  and	  Tianjin	  reportedly	  carried	  out	  various	  mass	  meetings,	  29,629	  and	  21,400	  of	  them,	  respectively,	  and,	  in	  Shanghai	  alone,	  more	  than	  33,000	  people	  were	  denounced	  and	  nearly	  29,000	  were	  charged	  as	  
                                                14	  Ibid,	  102-­‐105.	  15	  “Beijing	  qunzhong	  dui	  zhenya	  fangeming	  de	  fanying	  [Popular	  reactions	  in	  Beijing	  toward	  the	  suppression	  of	  counterrevolutionaries],”	  April	  9,	  1951,	  in	  Neibu	  cankao,	  Chinese	  University	  of	  Hong	  Kong	  (hereafter	  CUHK),	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC;	  “Lanzhou	  zhenya	  fangeming	  fenzi	  hou	  de	  shehui	  fanying	  [Social	  reactions	  after	  the	  suppression	  of	  counterrevolutionaries	  in	  Lanzhou],”	  April	  9,	  1951,	  in	  Neibu	  
cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC;	  and	  Julia	  Strauss,	  “Morality,	  Coercion,	  and	  State	  Building	  by	  Campaign	  in	  the	  Early	  PRC”	  in	  Strauss	  ed.,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  PRC,	  51.	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“counterrevolutionaries.”16	  It	  is	  no	  wonder	  that,	  reporting	  numbers	  of	  executions	  week	  after	  week	  became	  a	  routine	  for	  foreign	  diplomats.17	  In	  addition	  to	  delivering	  numbers	  of	  deaths,	  some	  British	  diplomats	  in	  Shanghai	  reported	  that	  their	  servants	  had	  suddenly	  disappeared,	  or	  been	  officially	  arrested	  for	  being	  “running	  dog[s]	  of	  the	  imperialists.”18	  We	  still	  do	  not	  know	  the	  precise	  numbers	  of	  executions	  and	  imprisonments	  during	  this	  period,	  and,	  in	  fact,	  British	  diplomats	  doubted	  that	  actual	  figures	  would	  far	  exceed	  those	  published,	  but	  it	  was	  officially	  acknowledged	  that	  roughly	  712,000	  people	  were	  executed,	  nationwide,	  1,290,000	  were	  imprisoned,	  and	  1,200,000	  became	  subject	  to	  house	  arrest.19	  	  	   The	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries	  has	  generally	  been	  considered,	  for	  good	  reason,	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party’s	  top-­‐down,	  coercive,	  political	  cleansing	  campaign,	  aimed	  at	  suppression	  of	  ex-­‐Nationalist	  Party	  members	  and	  sympathizers.20	  In	  particular,	  scholars	  have	  paid	  significant	  attention	  to	  the	  
                                                16	  Luo	  Ruiqing,	  “Weida	  de	  zhenya	  fangeming	  yundong	  [The	  great	  campaign	  to	  suppress	  counterrevolutionaries],”	  October	  1,	  1951,	  Renmin	  ribao.	  	  17	  See	  telegrams,	  memorandums,	  and	  reports	  sent	  from	  Beijing,	  Shanghai,	  Tianjin,	  Wuhan,	  Nanjing,	  and	  other	  places	  to	  the	  Foreign	  Office,	  U.K.	  between	  March	  and	  July	  1951.	  These	  documents	  can	  be	  found	  the	  record	  group	  between	  FO371/92192	  and	  FO371/92206,	  entitled	  “Reports,	  comments	  and	  information	  from	  many	  sources	  showing	  the	  extension	  of	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists	  over	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  China...,”	  BNA,	  Kew,	  U.K.	  18	  Telegram,	  Beijing	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  U.K.	  (April	  6,	  1951)	  in	  “Reports,	  comments	  and	  information	  from	  many	  sources	  showing	  the	  extension	  of	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists	  over	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  China...”	  FO371/92196,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  U.K.	  	  19	  These	  numbers	  were	  based	  on	  Deputy	  Public	  Security	  Minister	  Xu	  Zirong’s	  report	  in	  1954,	  which	  was	  recounted	  in	  Yang	  Kuisong’s	  “Reconsidering	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries,”	  
China	  Quarterly,	  193	  (March	  2008),	  120-­‐121.	  For	  the	  British	  official’s	  doubt,	  see	  a	  telegram	  from	  Shanghai	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK	  (June	  8,	  1951)	  in	  “Reports,	  comments	  and	  information	  from	  many	  sources	  showing	  the	  extension	  of	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists	  over	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  China...,”	  FO371/92198,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  U.K.	  20	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  “Reconsidering	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries,”	  China	  Quarterly,	  193	  (March	  2008),	  102-­‐121;	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  “Xin	  Zhongguo	  zhenfan	  yundong	  shimo	  [The	  story	  of	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Counterrevolutionaries	  in	  New	  China]”	  and	  "Shanghai	  zhenfan	  yundong	  de	  lishi	  kaocha	  [Historical	  examination	  on	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries	  in	  Shanghai],"in	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  Zhonghua	  renmin	  gongheguo	  jianguo	  shi	  yanjiu	  [A	  Study	  about	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Establishment	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China]	  Vol.	  1	  (Nancheng,	  PRC:	  Jiangxi	  renmin	  chubanshe,	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CCP’s	  roles—particularly	  those	  of	  Mao	  Zedong—in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  movement.	  While	  disagreements	  surely	  exist	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  stances	  and	  evaluation	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  most	  scholars	  approach	  this	  subject	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  traditional	  political	  history,	  that	  is,	  looking	  at	  a	  political	  event	  (the	  “Zhenfan	  movement”)	  largely	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  intentions	  of	  policymakers	  (“Mao	  Zedong”).	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  approach	  has	  a	  certain	  merit.	  The	  campaign	  developed	  with	  Mao’s	  directive	  issued	  on	  October	  10,	  1950,	  the	  so-­‐called	  the	  “double-­‐ten	  directive,”	  and	  further	  escalated	  in	  late	  January	  of	  1951	  under	  Mao’s	  instruction,	  and,	  thus,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  emphasize	  the	  responsibility	  of	  Mao	  Zedong.21	  Nonetheless,	  this	  approach	  has	  tended	  to	  confirm	  our	  traditional	  understanding	  of	  the	  movement,	  describing	  it	  as	  if	  Beijing’s	  leadership	  had	  a	  consistent	  intention	  and	  policy,	  as	  if	  the	  CCP	  controlled	  the	  expansion	  and	  contraction	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  as	  if	  ordinary	  people	  were	  merely	  passive	  followers—or	  victims—of	  the	  campaign,	  and	  as	  if	  the	  campaign	  followed	  a	  communist	  path	  peculiar	  to	  post-­‐1949	  China.	  These	  points	  have	  to	  be	  further	  examined.	  	  
                                                                                                                                            2009),	  168-­‐217	  and	  218-­‐259;	  Julia	  Strauss,	  “Morality,	  Coercion,	  and	  State	  Building	  by	  Campaign	  in	  the	  Early	  PRC:	  Regime	  Consolidation	  and	  After,	  1949-­‐1956,”	  in	  Julia	  Strauss	  ed.,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  
PRC,	  1949-­‐1976:	  The	  China	  Quarterly	  Special	  Issues	  New	  Series	  No.	  7	  (New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  37-­‐58;	  Julia	  Strauss,	  "Paternalist	  Terror:	  The	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries	  and	  Regime	  Consolidation	  in	  the	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China,	  1950-­‐1953,"	  
Comparative	  Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History,	  Vol.	  44,	  No.	  1	  (Jan.,	  2002),	  80-­‐105;	  Frederic	  Wakeman	  Jr.	  "'Cleanup':	  The	  New	  Order	  in	  Shanghai,"	  in	  Jeremy	  Brown	  and	  Paul	  Pickowicz	  ed.,	  Dilemmas	  of	  
Victory:	  The	  Early	  Years	  of	  the	  People's	  Republic	  of	  China	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  21-­‐58;	  Konno	  Jun,	  Chugoku	  shakai	  to	  taishu	  doin:	  Mo	  takuto	  jidai	  no	  seiji	  kenryoku	  to	  minshu	  [Chinese	  Society	  and	  Mass	  Mobilization:	  Political	  Power	  and	  People	  in	  the	  Era	  of	  Mao	  Zedong]	  (Tokyo:	  Ochanomizu	  shobou,	  2008);	  and	  Izutani	  Yoko,	  Chugoku	  kenkoku	  shoki	  no	  seiji	  to	  keizai:	  
Taishu	  undo	  to	  shakai	  shugi	  taisei	  [Politics	  and	  Economy	  in	  the	  Early	  Period	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China:	  Mass	  Movements	  and	  Socialist	  Regime]	  (Tokyo:	  Ochanomizu	  shobou,	  2007).	  21	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  “Reconsidering	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries,”	  China	  Quarterly,	  193	  (March	  2008),	  104-­‐105,	  107-­‐108.	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   First	  of	  all,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Beijing	  did	  not	  necessarily	  have	  a	  consistent	  intention	  or	  belief	  in	  supervising	  the	  Zhenfan	  movements	  from	  beginning	  to	  the	  end.	  As	  historian	  Yang	  Kuisong	  elaborately	  traces,	  Beijing’s	  policy	  followed	  a	  zigzag	  course	  even	  in	  this	  short	  period	  of	  time.	  For	  example,	  within	  just	  two	  months	  of	  issuing	  the	  double-­‐ten	  directive,	  Liu	  Xiaoqi	  sought	  to	  slow	  down	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  Zhenfan	  movement,	  and	  Mao	  Zedong	  agreed,	  suggesting	  that	  an	  “excessively	  nervous	  atmosphere”	  must	  not	  be	  created.	  And	  yet,	  a	  month	  later,	  in	  mid-­‐January	  of	  1951,	  Mao	  endorsed	  a	  number	  of	  large-­‐scale	  executions	  in	  western	  Hunan	  as	  a	  “completely	  necessary	  step,”	  an	  example	  which,	  Mao	  now	  thought,	  should	  be	  followed	  by	  all	  other	  provinces	  whether	  urban	  or	  rural.22	  	  	   Second,	  while	  the	  Zhenfan	  movement	  surely	  evolved	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  communist	  authority,	  the	  CCP	  was	  not	  necessarily	  controlling	  the	  course	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	  When	  Beijing	  sought	  a	  comprehensive	  contraction	  of	  the	  campaign	  after	  May	  of	  1951,	  for	  example,	  the	  waves	  of	  arrests	  and	  executions	  did	  not	  actually	  diminish	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  China.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  they	  continued	  to	  grow,	  despite	  the	  change	  in	  Beijing’s	  policy.	  In	  the	  East	  China	  region,	  for	  instance,	  an	  additional	  110,000	  people	  were	  arrested	  and	  nearly	  40,000	  were	  executed	  after	  Beijing	  tried	  to	  limit	  large-­‐scale	  and	  wild	  arrests	  and	  executions.23	  A	  similar	  pattern	  of	  Beijing	  seeking	  to	  soothe	  aggressive	  local	  sentiments	  appeared	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  matter	  of	  dealing	  with	  foreigners	  living	  in	  Chinese	  cities.	  Beijing	  was	  criticized	  as	  being	  cowardly	  when	  it	  set	  a	  policy	  of	  deporting	  foreigners	  who	  committed	  “counterrevolutionary”	  acts;	  according	  to	  one	  local	  official’s	  observation,	  some	  even	  
                                                22	  Ibid,	  106.	  23	  Ibid,	  117-­‐119.	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accused	  the	  government	  of	  being	  weak-­‐kneed	  and	  incompetent	  toward	  foreigners	  and	  foreign	  countries.24	  	  Why	  did	  Beijing	  not	  have	  a	  consistent	  policy,	  and	  why	  did	  it	  not	  control	  the	  campaign?	  In	  the	  first	  place,	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Zhenfan	  campaign	  was	  always	  linked	  with	  the	  war	  situation	  in	  Korea.	  For	  Beijing	  and	  communist	  officials,	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  appeared	  as	  an	  uncertain	  variable	  that	  could	  create	  harmful	  effects	  on	  the	  CCP’s	  domestic	  programs.	  For	  instance,	  a	  report	  from	  the	  regional	  communist	  office	  argued	  that	  a	  lukewarm	  attitude	  in	  the	  Zhenfan	  campaign	  would	  be	  blamed	  because,	  if	  the	  war	  situation	  radically	  changed	  and	  the	  tide	  turned	  against	  China,	  such	  an	  attitude	  might	  cause	  the	  CCP	  to	  be	  on	  the	  defensive	  and	  to	  have	  a	  difficult	  time	  making	  up	  for	  the	  loss.25	  As	  we	  can	  see	  in	  this	  comment,	  the	  
Zhenfan	  campaign	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  of	  a	  piece	  with	  progress	  in	  the	  Korean	  War,	  and,	  in	  fact,	  changes	  of	  policy	  in	  the	  movement	  coincided	  with	  changes	  in	  the	  war	  situation.	  	  In	  relation	  to	  this	  point,	  another	  uncertain,	  arguably	  more	  fundamental	  variable	  for	  communist	  officials	  was	  the	  state	  of	  popular	  attitudes	  at	  home	  that	  could	  easily	  be	  tilted	  by	  any	  change	  in	  the	  war	  situation.	  It	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  mass	  of	  people	  would	  react	  came	  to	  surface	  frequently	  at	  moments	  of	  policy	  change	  in	  the	  campaign.	  For	  example,	  when	  Beijing	  sought	  to	  
                                                24	  “Gonganbu	  guanyu	  qunzhon	  dui	  chuli	  waiji	  fan	  geming	  fenzi	  de	  fanying	  [Memorandum	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Public	  Security	  concerning	  popular	  responses	  toward	  the	  dealing	  of	  foreign	  counterrevolutionaries],”	  June	  25,	  1951,	  No.	  118-­‐00306-­‐15,	  Foreign	  Ministry	  Archives	  (hereafter	  FMA),	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  For	  the	  official	  policy	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Affairs	  Ministry,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  “Zhongyang	  guanyu	  waiguo	  fangeming	  de	  chuli	  wenti	  dao	  gedi	  de	  zhishi	  dian	  [Directive	  from	  the	  central	  government	  to	  various	  regions	  concerning	  the	  issue	  of	  dealing	  with	  foreign	  counterrevolutionaries],”	  August	  2,	  1951,	  No.	  118-­‐00306-­‐01,	  FMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  In	  this	  telegram,	  Beijing	  notified	  that,	  in	  general,	  foreigners	  who	  were	  considered	  counterrevolutionaries	  would	  be	  deported	  from	  the	  country,	  and	  basically	  would	  not	  be	  executed.	  	  25	  “Zhongnan	  guanyu	  zhenya	  fangeming	  de	  zhishi	  de	  dianbao	  [Telegram	  of	  the	  Mid-­‐South	  Regional	  Bureau	  concerning	  the	  directive	  of	  suppression	  of	  counterrevolutionaries],”	  November	  30,	  1950,	  No.	  118-­‐00306-­‐16,	  FMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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lower	  the	  temperature	  of	  the	  Zhenfan	  movements	  in	  December	  of	  1950,	  it	  was	  reasoned	  that	  “indiscriminate	  and	  multi-­‐directional	  strikes	  [should]	  be	  avoided	  lest	  the	  overall	  situation	  become	  too	  tense	  and	  we	  ourselves	  become	  isolated.”	  Mao	  Zedong	  supported	  this	  view,	  emphasizing	  that	  “If	  our	  cadres	  do	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  idea	  […]	  and	  not	  to	  stick	  strictly	  to	  it,	  […]	  the	  people	  will	  not	  support	  us.”26	  Then,	  when	  Beijing	  decided	  to	  take	  on	  a	  more	  aggressive	  and	  harsh	  policy	  in	  late	  January	  of	  1951,	  it	  was	  justified	  by	  Mao	  as	  such:	  “If	  we	  are	  irresolute	  and	  tolerant	  to	  this	  evil	  [of	  counterrevolutionaries],	  we	  will	  alienate	  the	  people.”27	  As	  we	  can	  see	  in	  these	  comments,	  Mao	  paid	  significant	  attention	  to	  the	  tide	  of	  popular	  attitudes	  when	  it	  came	  to	  policymaking.	  	  In	  a	  sense,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  say	  that	  the	  course	  of	  the	  Zhenfan	  movement	  was	  often	  swayed	  by	  circumstantial	  situations	  and	  Beijing’s	  time-­‐to-­‐time	  observations	  concerning	  them,	  rather	  than	  guided	  by	  the	  CCP’s	  ideological	  tendencies	  or	  Mao’s	  personal	  character.	  The	  unbridled	  rampancy	  and	  spread	  of	  the	  
Zhenfan	  movement	  further	  suggest	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  was	  not	  simply	  the	  end-­‐result	  of	  the	  CCP’s	  political	  suppressions,	  but	  had	  its	  own	  dynamics	  in	  breeding	  and	  developing	  itself—an	  aspect	  that	  has	  been	  less	  well	  examined:	  that	  is,	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Counterrevolutionaries	  Movement	  as	  social	  suppression	  and	  punishment.	  	  
Social	  Suppression	  
                                                26	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  “Reconsidering	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries,”	  China	  Quarterly,	  193	  (March	  2008),	  106.	  27	  Ibid,	  107.	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Let	  us	  briefly	  take	  a	  look	  at	  how	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Counterrevolutionaries	  Movement	  functioned	  in	  local	  scenes.	  Beyond	  ideological	  slogans	  and	  drastic	  spectacles	  in	  mass	  meetings,	  ordinary	  practices	  of	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Counterrevolutionaries	  Movement	  were	  less	  concerned	  with	  ideology	  and	  political	  struggles.	  For	  example,	  when	  the	  Association	  of	  Street	  Venders	  in	  Beijing	  adopted	  the	  campaign	  in	  their	  markets,	  they	  used	  it	  for	  their	  own	  purposes	  of	  tightening	  morals	  and	  order	  among	  their	  members.	  Their	  slogans	  in	  this	  campaign	  were:	  	  	  “No	  delay	  of	  tax	  payments.”	  	  “No	  cheating	  customers.”	  	  “Always	  issue	  receipts.”	  	  “Use	  standardized	  measuring	  instruments.”	  	  “Do	  not	  ask	  an	  artificially	  raised	  price.”	  	  “Keep	  street	  venders	  clean.”28	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	  these,	  “No	  pee	  and	  no	  shit	  on	  roadside	  and	  inside	  venders”	  was	  a	  campaign	  slogan	  that	  the	  Venders’	  Association	  advocated	  in	  their	  campaign	  against	  “counter-­‐revolutionaries.”29	  	  Many	  of	  these	  topics	  had	  no	  apparent	  connection	  to	  the	  CCP’s	  struggles	  against	  “counterrevolutionaries,”	  but,	  interestingly,	  these	  street	  venders’	  campaigns	  were	  framed	  and	  conducted,	  and	  worked	  efficiently	  under	  the	  name	  of	  “Suppression	  of	  Counterrevolutionaries.”	  It	  was	  claimed	  that	  street	  venders	  were	  fighting	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  war	  on	  the	  home	  front	  against	  counterrevolutionaries,	  that	  cooperation	  among	  venders	  could	  stabilize	  the	  Chinese	  economy	  and	  public	  order,	  and	  that	  their	  tax	  payments	  would	  support	  the	  fight	  against	  American	  Imperialism	  
                                                28	  “Beijing	  shi	  tanshang	  kang-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  jingsai	  yundong	  youguan	  wenjian	  [Documents	  related	  to	  Beijing	  street	  vendors’	  movements	  of	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea],”	  No.	  022-­‐012-­‐00497,	  pp.	  25,	  142,	  185-­‐187,	  and	  194,	  Beijing	  Municipal	  Archives	  (hereafter	  BMA),	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  	  29	  Ibid,	  194.	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on	  the	  front	  lines.30	  Here	  we	  can	  see	  how	  locals	  utilized	  the	  foreign	  war	  and	  how	  they	  adopted	  the	  banner	  of	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries.	  	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  locals	  participated	  in	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counter-­‐revolutionaries	  in	  their	  own	  ways.	  As	  in	  other	  places,	  residents	  in	  the	  Dong-­‐an	  Market	  in	  Beijing	  adopted	  the	  guilt-­‐by-­‐association	  system	  during	  the	  campaign;	  under	  this	  system,	  five	  households	  formed	  one	  group,	  monitoring	  one	  another,	  and,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  someone’s	  violation	  of	  promises,	  all	  members	  of	  the	  group	  would	  be	  punished.31	  Such	  a	  mutual	  surveillance	  system	  functioned	  quite	  efficiently.	  In	  one	  instance,	  when	  a	  street	  vender	  tried	  to	  make	  money	  by	  cheating	  a	  customer,	  it	  was	  reported	  that	  other	  booth	  keepers	  blamed	  him	  in	  unison.32	  In	  another	  case,	  local	  residents	  in	  Beijing	  carried	  out	  an	  activity	  of	  “Suppression	  of	  Counterrevolutionaries”	  by	  forming	  district	  patrol	  groups,	  though	  their	  primary	  aims,	  in	  addition	  to	  searching	  for	  “subversive”	  activities,	  were	  to	  prevent	  fires	  and	  thefts.33	  	  In	  another	  case,	  a	  neighbors’	  group	  interceded	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  husband’s	  violence	  in	  the	  home,	  carrying	  out	  an	  accusation	  meeting	  in	  their	  community,	  in	  which	  the	  man	  in	  question	  critiqued	  himself	  and	  promised	  not	  to	  use	  violence	  
                                                30	  Ibid,	  196.	  31	  “Dongan	  shichang	  kan-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  aiguo	  yundong…	  [Kang-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  patriotic	  movements	  in	  the	  Dongan	  Market…],”	  May	  14,	  1951,	  in	  “Beijing	  shi	  tanfan	  kan-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Planning	  and	  summing-­‐up	  of	  Beijing	  street	  vendors’	  workings	  of	  Resisting	  American	  and	  Assisting	  Korea],”	  No.	  022-­‐010-­‐00314,	  pp.	  42-­‐43,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  32	  “Beijing	  shi	  tanfan	  kan-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  gongzuo	  jihua	  [Planning	  and	  summing-­‐up	  of	  Beijing	  street	  vendors’	  workings	  of	  Resisting	  American	  and	  Assisting	  Korea],”	  May	  15,	  1951,	  No.	  022-­‐010-­‐00314,	  pp.	  96,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  33“Beijing	  shi	  tanshang	  kang-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  jingsai	  yundong	  youguan	  wenjian	  [Documents	  related	  to	  Beijing	  street	  vendors’	  movements	  of	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea],”	  No.	  022-­‐012-­‐00497,	  pp.	  132-­‐134,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	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anymore.34	  A	  resident	  in	  this	  district	  described	  the	  sprits	  of	  the	  neighborhood	  as	  radically	  improved	  after	  the	  establishment	  of	  neighbors’	  group;	  the	  area	  became	  cleaner,	  thefts	  were	  eliminated,	  bumpy	  roads	  were	  repaired,	  and	  residents’	  disputes	  were	  settled	  by	  the	  neighbors’	  group.35	  Clearly,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Street	  Venders’	  Association,	  the	  Dong-­‐an	  Market’s	  campaigns	  had	  almost	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  ideological	  and	  political	  struggles	  against	  “counterrevolutionaries.”	  Rather,	  when	  it	  came	  to	  daily	  practice,	  locals	  adopted	  and	  developed	  the	  campaign	  in	  a	  much	  more	  common	  way,	  which	  functioned	  not	  merely	  as	  the	  CCP’s	  political	  cleansing,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  social	  cleansing	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  and	  maintain	  order	  in	  communities.	  	  	   Looking	  at	  these	  local	  campaigns	  on	  the	  ground,	  one	  notes	  historical	  continuity.	  What	  local	  people	  aimed	  to	  achieve	  were,	  for	  instance,	  “preciseness”	  as	  opposed	  to	  corruption,	  “cleanliness”	  as	  opposed	  to	  filthiness,	  and	  “unity”	  as	  opposed	  to	  disorder,	  and	  so	  on.	  Needless	  to	  say,	  these	  were	  not	  new	  issues;	  rather,	  they	  had	  been	  quite	  familiar	  concerns	  in	  modern	  Chinese	  history	  since	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.	  In	  a	  sense,	  observing	  local	  campaigns,	  we	  can	  see	  the	  social	  aspect	  of	  the	  
Zhenfan	  campaign,	  which	  was	  not	  particularly	  unique	  to	  the	  post-­‐communist	  revolution	  period.	  	  In	  fact,	  even	  the	  Nationalist	  Party’s	  failed	  campaign,	  the	  New	  Life	  Movement,	  in	  the	  prewar	  period	  showed	  some	  similarity.	  According	  to	  historian	  Arif	  Dirlik,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  and	  GMD	  leaders	  in	  the	  1930s	  saw	  that	  the	  traditional	  life	  of	  the	  
                                                34	  Izutani	  Yoko,	  Chugoku	  kenkoku	  shoki	  no	  seiji	  to	  keizai:	  Taishu	  undo	  to	  shakai	  shugi	  taisei	  [Politics	  and	  Economy	  in	  the	  Early	  Period	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China:	  Mass	  Movements	  and	  Socialist	  Regime]	  (Tokyo:	  Ochanomizu	  shobou,	  2007),	  224-­‐225.	  	  35	  Ibid,	  225.	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Chinese	  could	  be	  summarized	  in	  a	  few	  words:	  filthiness,	  hedonism,	  laziness,	  self-­‐indulgence,	  and	  so	  on.	  That	  is	  why	  the	  GMD’s	  New	  Life	  Movements	  held	  up	  high	  eight	  criteria	  to	  be	  pursued:	  orderliness,	  cleanliness,	  simplicity,	  frugality,	  promptness,	  precision,	  harmoniousness,	  and	  dignity—some	  of	  which	  were	  quite	  identical	  to	  what	  was	  sought	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  the	  Zhenfan	  movement	  in	  the	  Communist	  era.36	  The	  crux	  of	  these	  values	  was,	  simply	  put,	  an	  effort	  toward	  “modernity,”	  or	  even	  blatant	  “Westernization,”	  despising	  and	  excluding	  traditional	  values	  of	  “Chineseness,”	  which	  tended	  to	  be	  described	  only	  in	  negative	  terms.	  Viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  there	  was	  not	  such	  a	  fundamental	  difference	  between	  the	  GMD’s	  and	  CCP’s	  movements.	  While	  terminology,	  of	  course,	  was	  different,	  both	  aimed	  at	  the	  “modernization”	  of	  China,	  and	  the	  making	  of	  a	  “nation-­‐state”	  by	  European	  standards.	  For	  that	  purpose,	  both	  rulers	  sought	  to	  mobilize,	  organize,	  and	  unite	  the	  people	  Sun	  Wen	  (Sun	  Yat-­‐sen)	  once	  described	  as	  “a	  heap	  of	  loose	  sand.”37	  The	  fundamental	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  lay	  in	  terms	  of	  method	  rather	  than	  content.	  In	  the	  Zhenfan	  campaign,	  “informants”	  and	  “investigators”	  were	  not	  necessarily	  official	  or	  secret	  police,	  as	  in	  the	  GMD	  era,	  but,	  largely,	  ordinary	  people.	  In	  fact,	  diverse	  “counterrevolutionary”	  acts	  were	  identified	  and	  reported	  less	  by	  official	  investigations	  than	  unofficially	  through	  rumors	  and	  private	  accusations	  among	  members	  of	  workplaces,	  schools,	  communities,	  neighborhoods,	  and	  families.	  In	  Shanghai	  alone,	  the	  authority	  received	  more	  than	  70,000	  written	  denunciations.38	  
                                                36	  Arif	  Dirlik,	  “The	  Ideological	  Foundations	  of	  the	  New	  Life	  Movements:	  A	  Study	  of	  Counterrevolution,”	  
Journal	  of	  Asian	  Studies,	  34,	  4	  (August	  1974),	  954-­‐958.	  37	  “A	  New	  Pattern	  of	  Life,”	  Manchester	  Guardian,	  November	  20,	  1950,	  in	  “Reports,	  comments	  and	  information	  from	  many	  sources	  showing	  the	  extension	  of	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists	  over	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  China...,”	  FO371/92192,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  U.K.	  38	  Konno	  Jun,	  Chugoku	  shakai	  to	  taishu	  doin:	  Mo	  takuto	  jidai	  no	  seiji	  kenryoku	  to	  minshu	  [Chinese	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The	  youth,	  in	  particular,	  were	  extremely	  active	  in	  informing	  on	  “counter-­‐revolutionaries;”	  a	  box	  set	  up	  at	  Fudan	  University	  in	  Shanghai,	  for	  instance,	  received	  more	  than	  700	  reports	  in	  a	  few	  months	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1951.39	  There	  were	  reportedly	  quite	  a	  few	  cases	  involved	  sons	  and	  daughters	  and	  wives	  informing	  on	  their	  fathers	  and	  husbands,	  and	  vise	  versa.40	  An	  official	  in	  Shanghai	  described:	  	  During	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries,	  a	  lot	  of	  young	  people	  actively	  joined	  in	  the	  movement,	  often	  informing	  on	  their	  own	  fathers,	  sisters-­‐in-­‐law,	  and	  even	  close	  friends,	  who	  were	  counterrevolutionaries.	  Such	  cases	  are	  too	  numerous	  to	  mention.	  A	  multitude	  of	  people	  cooperated	  with	  the	  Public	  Security	  Department	  to	  collect	  information,	  participate	  in	  surveillance,	  and	  arrest	  counterrevolutionaries.41	  	  Surveillance	  among	  the	  people,	  among	  students	  and	  workers,	  and	  among	  neighbors	  and	  family	  members,	  was	  so	  close,	  many	  individuals	  seemed	  to	  internalize	  the	  campaign,	  restricting	  their	  behaviors	  by	  themselves;	  some	  who	  came	  under	  suspicion	  voluntarily	  appeared	  at	  public	  security	  bureaus,	  describing	  their	  acts	  and	  groups,	  while	  others	  stopped	  going	  out	  and	  stayed	  at	  home.	  Some	  who	  possessed	  small	  weapons	  quietly	  left	  them	  at	  night	  at	  the	  doors	  of	  public	  security	  stations.42	  More	  tellingly,	  a	  massive	  number	  of	  people	  decided	  end	  their	  own	  lives.	  Statistical	  
                                                                                                                                            Society	  and	  Mass	  Mobilization:	  Political	  Power	  and	  People	  in	  the	  Era	  of	  Mao	  Zedong]	  (Tokyo:	  Ochanomizu	  shobou,	  2008),	  119-­‐120.	  	  39	  “1951	  nian	  bannian	  lai	  jinxing	  kang-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  aiguo	  zhuyi	  jiaoyu	  de	  qingkuang	  baogao	  [Situation	  report	  concerning	  the	  ongoing	  patriotism	  education	  of	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1951],”	  September	  21,	  1951,	  C21-­‐1-­‐108-­‐13,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  40	  “Jiaoqu	  funv	  Kang-­‐Mei	  Yuan-­‐Chao	  aiguo	  yundong	  4	  yue	  zongjie	  [The	  Summary	  of	  women's	  activities	  of	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  patriotic	  movements	  in	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Beijing	  in	  April],”	  April	  1951,	  No.	  084-­‐003-­‐00008,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC;	  and	  “China:	  Mass	  Slaughter,”	  April	  30,	  1951,	  Time	  magazine.	  41	  “Qingnian	  duan	  Shanghai	  shi	  wei	  guanyu	  zai	  Kang-­‐Mei	  Yuan-­‐Chao,	  Zhenya	  fangeming	  yu	  tudi	  gaige	  yundong	  zhong	  dui	  shehui	  qingnian	  gongzuo	  de	  zongjie	  [The	  youth	  group	  in	  the	  Shanghai	  city	  committee's	  final	  report	  concerning	  the	  activities	  toward	  the	  youth	  during	  the	  movements	  of	  Resisting-­‐America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea,	  Suppression	  of	  Counterrevolutionaries,	  and	  Land	  Reform],”	  October	  17,	  1951,	  No.	  C21-­‐1-­‐143,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  42	  “Jin	  shi	  fangeming	  fengzi	  luxu	  tanbai	  dengji	  jiaochu	  wuqi	  [Counterrevolutionaries	  in	  Beijing	  confessing,	  registering,	  and	  surrendering	  their	  weapons	  one	  after	  another],”	  April	  13,	  1951,	  Neibu	  
cankao,	  CUHK,	  Hong	  Kong,	  PRC.	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data	  taken	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1951	  shows	  that	  ages	  of	  suicides	  ranged	  from	  early	  twenties	  to	  early	  sixties,	  with	  those	  in	  their	  thirties	  the	  most	  numerous,	  and	  that	  quite	  a	  few	  wives	  of	  those	  executed	  as	  “counter-­‐revolutionaries”	  also	  had	  to	  choose	  death	  by	  themselves.43	  Interestingly,	  those	  who	  killed	  themselves	  involved	  diverse	  kinds	  of	  people,	  including	  not	  only	  landlords	  and	  ex-­‐Nationalist	  Party	  members,	  but	  also	  those	  categorized	  as	  roaming	  persons,	  local	  rebels,	  collaborators,	  and	  members	  of	  secret	  societies	  and	  religious	  sects,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  deemed	  “feudalistic”	  and	  “uncooperative.”44	  Such	  heterogeneity	  was	  not	  coincidental.	  It	  rather	  suggests	  that	  we	  reconsider	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Suppression	  of	  Counterrevolutionaries.	  In	  fact,	  the	  lists	  of	  those	  executed	  in	  this	  period	  similarly	  include	  diverse	  kinds	  of	  people.	  If	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries	  was	  purely	  a	  political	  repression	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Communist	  Party	  aimed	  at	  the	  elimination	  of	  adversaries,	  those	  who	  executed	  and	  killed	  themselves	  should	  have	  been	  mostly	  political	  and	  ideological	  “enemies,”	  such	  as	  landlords,	  businessmen,	  as	  well	  as	  ex-­‐Nationalist	  Party	  members	  and	  sympathizers.	  Yet,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  a	  large	  number,	  particularly	  those	  who	  worked	  under	  the	  GMD	  government,	  such	  as	  bureaucrats,	  policemen,	  teachers,	  and	  lower	  ranking	  officials,	  retained	  their	  positions	  and	  continued	  to	  work.	  	  Those	  who	  were	  actually	  condemned	  and	  eliminated	  during	  this	  campaign	  against	  “counterrevolutionaries,”	  in	  fact,	  involved	  much	  broader	  and	  diverse	  groups	  
                                                43	  “Shijiao	  quwei	  guanyu	  zhenya	  fangeming	  de	  qingkuang	  tongji	  biao;	  fangeming	  fenzi	  zisha	  dengji	  biao	  [Statistical	  tables	  concerning	  the	  situation	  of	  suppression	  of	  counterrevolutionaries	  in	  the	  outskirts	  of	  Shanghai;	  The	  tables	  registering	  the	  suicide	  of	  counterrevolutionaries],”	  July	  25,	  1951,	  No.	  71-­‐2-­‐94,	  SMA,	  Shanghai,	  PRC.	  44	  Ibid.	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of	  people,	  which	  fit	  more	  neatly	  in	  the	  category	  of	  “social	  enemies”	  than	  that	  of	  “political	  enemies.”	  They	  included,	  for	  example,	  members	  of	  religious	  sects	  such	  as	  
Yiguandao,	  powerful	  gangs	  such	  as	  the	  Yellow	  Or,	  and	  secret	  societies	  such	  as	  Triad,	  the	  Green	  Shirts,	  and	  the	  Elder	  Brothers,	  as	  well	  as	  common	  criminals	  and	  those	  involved	  in	  what	  were	  considered	  social	  evils	  such	  as	  bandits,	  murderers,	  robbers,	  local	  bullies,	  low	  level	  hoodlums,	  and	  brothel	  keepers	  and	  prostitutes.45	  As	  a	  British	  official	  in	  Beijing	  observed,	  many	  of	  those	  executed	  were	  not	  really	  “counterrevolutionaries,”	  but	  merely	  “little	  more	  than	  common	  criminals.”46	  	  Apparently,	  what	  these	  diverse	  people	  shared	  was	  not	  a	  single	  ideology.	  Further	  studies	  are	  needed,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  hypothesized	  that	  they	  represented	  elements	  in	  society	  embodying	  the	  drastic	  social	  chaos	  and	  changes	  that	  arose	  from	  the	  recent	  experiences	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  the	  Civil	  War.	  Viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Counterrevolutionaries	  had	  an	  aspect	  that	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  social	  “purification”—a	  backlash	  against	  social	  change.	  	  Such	  an	  aspect	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  “Sanfan	  wufan	  [Three-­‐Anti	  and	  Five-­‐Anti]”	  movements,	  which	  developed	  in	  1951-­‐53,	  following	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries.	  Originally,	  the	  “Three-­‐Anti”	  meant	  the	  Communist	  Party’s	  fight	  against	  three	  “evils”—corruption,	  extravagance,	  and	  bureaucratism—which	  
                                                45	  Memorandum,	  Beijing	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  U.K.,	  “A	  Final	  Report	  on	  China,”	  October	  1951,	  in	  “Reports,	  comments	  and	  information	  from	  many	  sources	  showing	  the	  extension	  of	  power	  of	  the	  ruling	  Chinese	  Communists	  over	  the	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  life	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  China...”	  FO371/92206,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  U.K;	  Telegram,	  Beijing	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  U.K.,	  January	  19,	  Ibid,	  FO371/92192,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  U.K;	  Telegrams,	  Beijing	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  U.K.,	  March	  3,	  and	  March	  6,	  1951,	  Ibid,	  FO371/92194,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  U.K;	  Telegram,	  Foreign	  Office,	  U.K.	  to	  Embassies,	  May	  11,	  1951,	  in	  “China:	  Political	  Situation,”	  DO133/27;	  Telegram,	  Beijing	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  April	  7,	  1952,	  in	  “China:	  Political	  Situation,”	  DO133/28,	  BNA,	  Kew,	  U.K;	  and	  Julia	  Strauss,	  “Morality,	  Coercion,	  and	  State	  Building	  by	  Campaign	  in	  the	  Early	  PRC,”	  in	  Strauss	  ed.,	  The	  History	  of	  the	  PRC,	  46-­‐48.	  	  46	  Telegram,	  Beijing	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  U.K.,	  March	  3,	  1951,	  in	  ““Reports,	  comments	  and	  information	  from	  many	  sources	  showing	  the	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  of	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  ruling	  Chinese	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supposedly	  represented	  evils	  of	  capitalism.	  When	  such	  an	  ideological	  slogan	  was	  conveyed	  and	  carried	  out	  on	  the	  ground,	  however,	  	  actual	  conduct	  criticized	  was	  less	  ideological	  and	  more	  related	  to	  personal	  characteristics	  and	  social	  behaviors,	  such	  as	  going	  to	  dance	  halls,	  using	  cars,	  having	  affairs	  with	  housemaids,	  and	  so	  on.47	  One	  document	  included	  a	  lengthy	  explanation	  of	  typical	  targets	  in	  the	  “Three-­‐Anti”	  movement:	  [P]ursuing	  personal	  and	  selfish	  pleasure,	  disliking	  cotton	  cloth,	  buying	  new	  leather	  shoes	  to	  replace	  with	  lower-­‐cut	  shoes,	  dining	  out	  on	  [costly]	  noodles	  instead	  of	  having	  breakfast	  in	  a	  factory,	  avoiding	  sitting	  around	  a	  one-­‐pot	  meal	  together	  and	  preferring	  a	  sumptuous	  meal,	  accompanying	  the	  dishes	  with	  rice,	  smoking	  a	  cigarette,	  wishing	  to	  live	  in	  a	  western	  room,	  envying	  an	  American	  top	  futon	  as	  comfortable,	  shunning	  a	  train	  as	  crowded	  and	  desiring	  to	  use	  a	  car	  or,	  at	  least,	  a	  tricycle,	  ride	  a	  tricycle	  just	  to	  go	  one	  kilometer,	  never	  negotiating	  price,	  avoiding	  cheap	  articles,	  and	  hoping	  to	  get	  things	  with	  high	  quality	  even	  though	  they	  are	  expensive.48	  	  	  Note	  that	  these	  instances	  did	  not	  problematize	  ideological	  tendencies	  of	  individuals	  so	  much.	  The	  focus	  was	  more	  on	  people’s	  attitudes	  and	  behaviors	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	  and	  what	  these	  instances	  share	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  antipathy	  toward	  things	  considered	  non-­‐Chinese,	  or	  put	  simply,	  grassroots	  dissatisfactions	  with	  elements	  of	  recent	  Westernization	  in	  Chinese	  society,	  which	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  nativist	  backlash	  against	  recent	  developments,	  most	  noticeably	  in	  large	  cities	  such	  as	  Shanghai	  and	  Tianjin.	  	  Putting	  it	  bluntly,	  the	  CCP’s	  mass	  movements,	  such	  as	  the	  Zhenfan	  and	  Sanfan	  movements,	  were	  not	  merely	  the	  party’s	  political	  campaigns.	  Rather,	  as	  they	  
                                                47	  Konno	  Jun,	  Chugoku	  shakai	  to	  taishu	  doin	  [Chinese	  Society	  and	  Mass	  Mobilization],	  102.	  	  48	  “‘Gongchang	  sanfan	  yundong	  tongbao’	  1952	  nian	  di	  2	  hao	  ['Bulletin	  of	  Sanfan	  movements	  in	  
Factories'	  Vol.	  2,	  1951],"	  February	  12,	  1952,	  in	  “‘Gongchang	  sanfan	  yundong	  tongbao’	  ji	  gongchang	  sanfan	  zonghe	  qingkuang	  [‘Bulletins	  of	  Sanfan	  movements	  in	  Factories’	  and	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  situation	  on	  the	  Sanfan	  movements	  in	  factories],"	  Quoated	  in	  Konno	  Jun,	  Chugoku	  shakai	  to	  taishu	  
doin	  [Chinese	  Society	  and	  Mass	  Mobilization],	  127.	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pervaded	  and	  escalated	  on	  the	  ground,	  they	  seemed	  to	  obtain	  other	  dimensions;	  that	  is,	  first	  of	  all,	  they	  were	  parts	  of	  a	  long-­‐standing	  project	  of	  “modernization”	  of	  China,	  and,	  second,	  simultaneously,	  parts	  of	  a	  contingent,	  large-­‐scale,	  nativist	  backlash,	  aiming	  at	  the	  making	  of	  a	  “harmonious”	  society	  through	  eliminating	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  diverse	  nonconformists	  and	  various	  elements	  of	  social	  “disorder,”	  including	  overly	  Western	  influences.	  	  	  	  
The	  Korean	  War	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  “Harmonious”	  Society	  	  In	  October	  1951,	  Luo	  Ruiqing,	  Minister	  of	  Public	  Security,	  praised	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries,	  saying	  that	  it	  “brought	  a	  stable	  situation	  nationwide	  which	  China	  has	  never	  had	  before	  in	  its	  history.”49	  In	  fact,	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  level	  of	  social	  stability,	  unprecedented	  “peace”	  and	  “harmony”	  came	  to	  China.	  In	  the	  city	  of	  Nanning,	  for	  instance,	  criminal	  cases	  decreased	  from	  4,314	  in	  1950	  to	  1,318	  in	  1951,	  and	  455	  in	  1954.50	  Likewise,	  In	  Jiangxi	  Province,	  which	  was	  known	  for	  a	  low	  standard	  of	  public	  safety,	  and	  where	  even	  CCP	  officials	  had	  to	  travel	  with	  large	  numbers	  of	  heavily-­‐armed	  guards,	  public	  security	  was	  greatly	  improved,	  making	  it	  possible	  for	  them	  to	  travel	  with	  only	  a	  few	  guards.51	  	  Observing	  such	  a	  situation,	  a	  British	  newspaper,	  the	  Manchester	  Guardian,	  which,	  of	  course,	  remained	  critical	  of	  the	  Zhenfan	  movement	  and	  its	  purges	  of	  
                                                49	  Luo	  Ruiqing,	  “Weida	  de	  zhenya	  fangeming	  yundong	  [The	  great	  campaign	  to	  suppress	  counterrevolutionaries],”	  October	  1,	  1951,	  Renmin	  ribao;	  Konno	  Jun,	  Chugoku	  shakai	  to	  taishu	  doin	  [Chinese	  Society	  and	  Mass	  Mobilization],	  92-­‐93.	  	  	  50	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  “Xin	  Zhongguo	  zhenfan	  yundong	  shimo	  [The	  Story	  of	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Counterrevolutionaries	  in	  New	  China]”	  in	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  Zhonghua	  renmin	  gongheguo	  jianguo	  shi	  
yanjiu	  [A	  Study	  about	  the	  History	  of	  the	  Establishment	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China]	  Vol.	  1	  (Nancheng,	  PRC:	  Jiangxi	  renmin	  chubanshe,	  2009),	  203-­‐204.	  	  51	  Ibid,	  204.	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nonconformists,	  accepted	  the	  “improvement”	  in	  public	  spirit	  in	  Chinese	  society,	  writing	  that	  “the	  country	  as	  whole	  is	  more	  unified	  and	  peaceful	  than	  at	  any	  time	  since	  1911.”52	  What	  the	  British	  newspaper	  paid	  attention	  to	  were,	  for	  example,	  the	  change	  in	  attitude	  of	  public	  officials,	  noting	  that	  they	  no	  longer	  saw	  the	  old	  familiar	  sight	  of	  a	  policeman	  slapping	  and	  kicking	  rickshaw	  coolies,	  and	  that	  public	  spiritedness	  was	  taking	  the	  place	  of	  excessive	  individualism.53	  Even	  if	  it	  entailed	  the	  killing	  of	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  people,	  and	  however	  cruel	  it	  was,	  the	  Zhenfan	  movement	  did	  provide	  a	  sort	  of	  “order”	  to	  an	  unprecedented	  degree	  through	  the	  “purification”	  of	  society	  and	  “settlement”	  to	  social	  confusion	  and	  conflicts.	  	  How	  did	  such	  an	  unprecedented	  order	  emerge?	  The	  CCP’s	  propaganda,	  to	  be	  sure,	  was	  significant,	  but	  far	  more	  fundamental	  was	  a	  background	  against	  which	  this	  propaganda	  could	  work	  efficiently:	  that	  is,	  first,	  the	  outbreak	  and	  development	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  second,	  the	  existence	  and	  escalation	  of	  domestic	  conflicts	  along	  with	  the	  war,	  and,	  third,	  more	  than	  anything	  else,	  nameless	  and	  countless	  ordinary	  people’s	  observations,	  judgments,	  and	  behaviors	  concerning	  both	  of	  these.	  It	  was	  the	  Korean	  War	  that	  forced	  many	  local	  people—in	  particular,	  the	  youth—to	  connect	  a	  foreign	  war	  with	  social	  problems	  and	  to	  re-­‐think	  their	  behavior.	  	  With	  the	  background	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  countless	  storekeepers	  competed	  to	  make	  donations,	  many	  shoemakers	  declared	  their	  intentions	  to	  repair	  soldiers’	  shoes	  for	  free,	  rickshaw	  coolies	  signed	  or	  gave	  their	  names	  for	  the	  Patriotic	  Pledge,	  
                                                52	  “The	  Credit	  in	  the	  Balance-­‐Sheet,”	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  1950,	  in	  “Reports,	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  political,	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  and	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  of	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  BNA,	  Kew,	  U.K.	  53	  Ibid.	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and	  students	  and	  workers	  participated	  in	  mobilization	  campaigns.54	  These	  were	  the	  people	  who	  surprised	  a	  tax	  office	  clerk	  in	  Beijing	  who,	  previously,	  had	  experienced	  the	  perpetual	  problem	  of	  non-­‐payment	  of	  overdue	  taxes	  in	  his	  district,	  because	  now	  taxpayers	  organized	  themselves	  and	  took	  initiative	  in	  paying	  taxes.55	  	  These	  were	  the	  people	  who	  sought	  to	  “solve”	  diverse	  social	  and	  local	  problems	  under	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  war,	  and	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counter-­‐revolutionaries.	  Thus,	  these	  were	  also	  the	  people	  on	  the	  grassroots	  level	  who	  informed	  on	  various	  acts	  of	  “counterrevolution”	  within	  workplaces,	  schools,	  neighborhoods,	  and	  families.	  These	  were	  the	  people	  who,	  as	  a	  result,	  cooperated	  and	  supported	  the	  CCP’s	  modernization	  and	  state-­‐making	  projects	  through	  mass	  movements.	  The	  top	  party	  official,	  Liu	  Shaoqi,	  in	  fact,	  recognized	  that	  the	  CCP’s	  domestic	  programs,	  in	  particular	  land	  reform	  and	  the	  suppression	  of	  counter-­‐revolutionaries,	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  without	  the	  Korean	  War.56	  	  This	  section	  has	  examined	  Chinese	  society	  and	  politics	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  through	  tracing	  the	  development	  and	  transformation	  of	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries,	  in	  which	  millions	  of	  people	  were	  killed	  or	  sent	  to	  prisons	  as	  “reactionaries.”	  With	  the	  opening	  of	  Chinese	  archives,	  to	  be	  sure,	  the	  literature	  on	  this	  topic	  has	  grown	  in	  the	  last	  decade,	  but	  most	  recent	  studies	  have	  
                                                54	  “Beijing	  shi	  tanfan	  kan-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  gongzuo	  jihua	  zongjie	  [Planning	  and	  summing-­‐up	  of	  Beijing	  street	  vendors’	  activities	  of	  Resisting	  American	  and	  Assisting	  Korea],”	  No.	  022-­‐010-­‐00314,	  pp.	  23-­‐25,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  	  55	  "Diwu	  quwei	  guanyu	  wuqu	  kang-­‐Mei	  yuan-­‐Chao	  yundong	  de	  chubu	  jihua,	  zongjie,	  baokao	  [The	  fifth	  district	  committee's	  planning,	  summary,	  and	  report	  concerning	  the	  Resisting	  America	  and	  Assisting	  Korea	  movements	  in	  the	  fifth	  district	  of	  Beijing],"	  040-­‐002-­‐00119,	  BMA,	  Beijing,	  PRC.	  56	  Yang	  Kuisong,	  “Reconsidering	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Suppress	  Counterrevolutionaries,”	  China	  Quarterly,	  193	  (March	  2008),	  105.	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tended	  to	  share	  a	  set	  of	  assumptions,	  viewing	  the	  phenomenon	  as	  political	  and	  ideological	  suppression,	  which	  was	  conducted	  by	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party—with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  Mao	  Zedong’s	  roles—thus	  describing	  it	  as	  following	  a	  communist	  path	  peculiar	  to	  post-­‐1949	  China.	  Through	  tracing	  the	  multifaceted	  development	  of	  the	  campaign,	  however,	  this	  section	  intends	  to	  complicate	  conventional	  understandings	  of	  its	  nature,	  agency,	  and	  function	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  arguing	  that,	  in	  essence,	  it	  was	  not	  simply	  the	  CCP’s	  ideology-­‐driven	  one-­‐man	  show,	  but	  also	  grassroots	  social	  punishment	  and	  suppression	  aimed	  at	  the	  “purification”	  of	  society,	  with	  the	  active	  involvement	  of	  everyday	  people.	  	  Viewed	  in	  this	  manner,	  the	  campaign	  was	  not	  necessarily	  unique	  to	  the	  Communist	  Party.	  Utilizing	  a	  societal	  perspective,	  my	  study	  rather	  describes	  this	  campaign	  as	  part	  of	  processes	  of	  social	  “tranquilizing,”	  aimed	  at	  the	  making	  of	  a	  “harmonious”	  society	  through	  eliminating	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  nonconformists	  and	  social	  minorities,	  that	  is,	  the	  “integration”	  of	  society.	  Interestingly,	  a	  different	  but	  somewhat	  similar	  process	  can	  be	  seen	  across	  the	  Taiwan	  Strait	  with	  the	  escalation	  of	  domestic	  purging	  in	  Taiwan	  particularly	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period:	  the	  White	  Terror.	  	  
	  
Taiwan:	  Reconsidering	  the	  “White	  Terror”	  At	  6:00	  a.m.	  on	  October	  1,	  1950,	  a	  court-­‐martial	  at	  the	  Headquarters	  of	  Public	  Security	  in	  Taiwan	  gave	  nine	  defendants	  a	  sentence	  of	  death	  for	  jointly	  plotting	  to	  overthrow	  the	  government	  and	  harboring	  “rebels,”	  ordering	  the	  execution	  to	  be	  conducted	  immediately.	  At	  6:30	  a.m.,	  the	  nine	  convicts—including	  Liu	  Quanli	  and	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others,	  mostly	  in	  their	  mid-­‐twenties	  and	  early-­‐thirties—were	  sent	  straightaway	  to	  the	  public	  execution	  ground,	  known	  as	  Machang	  ding,	  on	  the	  riverbank	  of	  the	  Danshui	  River	  in	  Taipei,	  where	  their	  sentence	  was	  carried	  out	  quickly.	  In	  spite	  of	  rain,	  according	  to	  a	  news	  report,	  a	  crowd	  of	  onlookers	  rushed	  to	  the	  scene,	  cheering,	  shouting,	  and	  applauding,	  as	  they	  saw	  the	  nine	  shot	  to	  death.	  The	  bodies	  were	  promptly	  removed	  and	  sent	  to	  a	  public	  cemetery	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  the	  city.57	  	  	   Such	  a	  public	  execution	  in	  the	  early	  morning	  became	  almost	  a	  ritual	  in	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  summer	  and	  fall	  of	  1950.	  Every	  time	  execution	  was	  held,	  the	  names,	  ages,	  and	  addresses	  of	  those	  executed	  were	  posted	  at	  train	  stations	  and	  markets,	  written	  in	  red	  letters.	  Placards	  and	  handbills	  soon	  appeared	  everywhere,	  reading,	  for	  example,	  “Spies	  are	  living	  just	  around	  you,”	  “Informing	  on	  spies	  is	  everyone’s	  responsibility,”	  “Knowing	  spies	  but	  not	  informing	  is	  a	  crime,”	  “Anti-­‐communism	  never	  compromises,	  anti-­‐communism	  requires	  unity,”	  and	  so	  on.58	  Such	  slogans	  permeated	  not	  just	  public	  space,	  but	  also	  packaging	  of	  home	  commodities	  and	  gifts,	  such	  as	  from	  cigarette	  cases,	  calendars,	  movie	  tickets	  and	  receipts,	  to	  paper	  fans	  and	  even	  cakes	  at	  weddings.59	  	  
                                                57	  Qiu	  Guozhen,	  Jindai	  Taiwan	  canshi	  dangan	  [Records	  of	  Tragic	  History	  in	  Modern	  Taiwan]	  (Taipei,	  Taiwan:	  Avanguard	  Publishing	  House,	  2007),	  205.	  For	  the	  description	  of	  similar	  executions,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Chen	  Yingtai,	  Huiyi:	  jianzheng	  Baisekonbu	  [Recollections:	  Testifying	  the	  White	  Terror]	  (Taipei,	  Taiwan:	  Tangshan	  chubanshe,	  2005),	  109.	  58	  Lin	  Shuyang,	  Cong	  2.28	  dao	  50	  niandai	  baise	  kongbu	  [From	  2.28	  to	  the	  White	  Terror	  in	  the	  1950s]	  (Taipei,	  Taiwan:	  Shibao	  wenhua	  chuban,	  1992),	  132;	  Lan	  Bozhou,	  Baise	  kongbu	  [The	  White	  Terror]	  (Taipei,	  Taiwan:	  Yangzhi	  wenhua	  shiye,	  1993)	  (1993),	  43;	  and	  Li	  Wanbei,	  (Gaoxiang	  shifan	  daxue,	  2008),	  22.	  59	  Hui	  Xunhui,	  “Taiwan	  wu-­‐ling	  niandai	  guozu	  xinangxiang	  zhong	  'gongfei/feidie'	  de	  jiangou	  [the	  constraction	  of	  'Communist	  bandits/spies'	  in	  the	  imagination	  of	  the	  Nationalists	  in	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  1950s]”	  (Tunghai	  University,	  Master	  thesis,	  2000),	  74.	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Slogans	  of	  this	  kind	  were	  not	  only	  visible	  everywhere	  but,	  literally,	  audible	  in	  many	  places	  in	  major	  cities,	  as	  loudspeakers	  set	  in	  the	  streets	  and	  markets	  repeated	  anti-­‐communist	  slogans	  and	  songs:	  	  Counteroffensive,	  counteroffensive,	  counteroffensive	  to	  the	  mainland	  Counteroffensive,	  counteroffensive,	  counteroffensive	  to	  the	  mainland	  The	  mainland	  is	  our	  land,	  the	  mainland	  is	  our	  territory	  Our	  land,	  our	  territory	  	  We	  cannot	  allow	  the	  Maoist	  bandits	  occupy	  our	  land	  	  We	  cannot	  let	  the	  Russians	  humiliate	  us	  as	  they	  wish	  We	  need	  to	  make	  a	  counteroffensive	  Counteroffensive	  to	  come	  back	  Counteroffensive	  to	  recover	  the	  mainland	  To	  recover	  the	  mainland	  60	  	  Newspapers	  and	  magazines,	  likewise,	  discussed	  the	  need	  to	  crack	  down	  on	  “spies,”	  reporting	  arrests	  and	  executions	  of	  “subversives,”	  and	  publishing	  articles,	  poems,	  and	  cartoons	  that	  often	  described	  various	  kinds	  of	  “heroic”	  stories	  of	  “patriots”	  informing	  on	  and	  arresting	  communists.61	  These	  were	  not	  merely	  slogans	  or	  stories.	  With	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Wartime	  Regulations	  for	  the	  Purge	  of	  Spies	  in	  June	  1950,	  finding	  and	  informing	  on	  subversives	  and	  suspected	  persons	  were	  not	  just	  encouraged	  but	  required	  by	  law.	  Members	  of	  governmental	  offices,	  military	  units,	  schools,	  factories,	  and	  various	  other	  organizations	  were	  required	  to	  exercise	  mutual	  surveillance.62	  
                                                60	  Li	  Wanbei,	  "Baise	  kongbu	  shounan	  zhe	  jiashu	  Ko-­‐Tsai	  A-­‐lee	  nvshi	  shengming	  gushi	  tanjiu	  [An	  inquiry	  into	  a	  life	  story	  of	  Mrs.	  Ko-­‐Tsai	  A-­‐lee	  who	  was	  a	  family	  member	  of	  a	  victim	  in	  the	  White	  Terror]	  (National	  Kaohsiung	  Normal	  University,	  Master	  thesis,	  2008),	  21	  61	  Editorial,	  “Lun	  sujian	  gongzuo	  [Discussing	  a	  purge	  of	  traitors],”	  Minsheng	  ribao,	  September	  29,	  1950,	  National	  Taiwan	  University,	  Taipei,	  Taiwan.	  Also,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Lin	  Shuyang,	  Cong	  2.28	  dao	  
50	  niandai	  baise	  kongbu,	  132;	  Lan	  Bozhou,	  Baise	  kongbu,	  43.	  	  62	  Chen	  Cuilian,	  “Taiwan	  jieyan	  shiqi	  de	  tewu	  yu	  baise	  kongbu	  fenwei	  [The	  reign	  of	  spy	  during	  the	  martial	  law	  in	  Taiwan	  and	  the	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  White	  Terror]”	  in	  Zhang	  Yanxian	  and	  Chen	  Meirong	  ed.	  Jieyan	  shiqi	  baise	  kongbu	  yu	  zhuanxing	  zhengyi	  lunwen	  ji	  (Taipei,	  Taiwan:	  WuSanlian	  Taiwan	  shiliao	  jijinhui,	  2009),	  65-­‐66.	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   This	  was	  the	  moment	  when	  the	  storm	  of	  purges,	  later	  called	  the	  White	  Terror,	  raged	  throughout	  Taiwan,	  particularly	  in	  the	  years	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  in	  which	  an	  estimated	  three	  to	  five	  thousand	  were	  executed,	  and	  eight	  thousand	  were	  imprisoned	  for	  decades	  to	  follow.63	  Data	  provided	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  2005	  shows	  that	  the	  number	  of	  arrests	  jumped	  to	  1,882	  cases	  in	  1950	  from	  212	  in	  1949,	  and	  remained	  high	  until	  1954.64	  According	  to	  Lin	  Shuyang,	  who	  was,	  himself,	  jailed	  in	  1950,	  arrests	  could	  be	  made	  by	  various	  institutions,	  such	  as	  police,	  military-­‐police,	  and	  intelligence	  agencies,	  without	  following	  legal	  procedure.65	  There	  was	  no	  need	  to	  present	  a	  warrant	  of	  arrest,	  no	  written	  indictment,	  no	  lawyer,	  no	  public	  trial,	  no	  right	  to	  appeal,	  and,	  occasionally,	  even	  the	  judgment	  document	  was	  omitted.	  Torture	  was	  routine,	  and	  often	  confessions	  were	  extorted	  or	  framed-­‐up.66	  Even	  those	  convicts	  not	  sentenced	  to	  death	  were	  often	  imprisoned	  quite	  a	  long	  time	  on	  an	  isolated	  island	  in	  the	  Philippine	  Sea,	  called	  Lyudao	  [Green	  Island];	  Lin	  Shuyang,	  for	  instance,	  was	  jailed	  nearly	  thirty-­‐five	  years,	  beginning	  in	  1950.67	  	  Studies	  of	  the	  “White	  Terror”	  have	  dramatically	  increased	  in	  number	  in	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  last	  decade.	  Still,	  a	  series	  of	  purges	  and	  violence	  in	  the	  1950s	  have	  received	  relatively	  minor	  attention,	  compared	  to	  the	  large	  volume	  of	  research	  concerning	  earlier	  repressions,	  namely,	  the	  2.28	  incident	  in	  Taiwan—a	  series	  of	  mass	  uprisings	  against	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  government	  occurring	  in	  the	  weeks	  
                                                63	  Lan	  Bozhou,	  Baise	  kongbu,	  21,	  48.	  64	  Su	  Ching-­‐hsuan,	  “Guojia	  jianzhi	  yu	  Baise	  konbu:	  Wushi	  nianday	  chuqi	  Taiwan	  zhengzhi	  anjian	  xingcheng	  zhi	  yuanyin”	  [State-­‐Building	  and	  the	  White	  Terror:	  The	  Causes	  of	  Political	  Persecution	  in	  the	  Early	  1950s	  in	  Taiwan]	  (National	  Taiwan	  University:	  Master	  Thesis,	  2008),	  14-­‐15.	  65	  Lin	  Shuyang,	  Cong	  2.28	  dao	  50	  niandai	  baise	  kongbu,	  133.	  	  66	  Ibid,	  133;	  Lan	  Bozhou,	  Baise	  kongbu	  (1993),	  43-­‐44.	  	  67	  Lin	  Shuyang,	  Cong	  2.28	  dao	  50	  niandai	  baise	  kongbu,	  133.	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following	  February	  28,	  1947.68	  Furthermore,	  when	  discussed,	  the	  series	  of	  suppressions	  in	  the	  early	  1950s	  has	  generally	  been	  viewed	  through	  the	  Cold	  War	  lens,	  lumped	  together	  as	  the	  “White	  Terror.”	  The	  implication	  of	  this	  naming	  is	  that	  the	  terror	  was	  conducted	  primarily	  by	  the	  state	  power,	  the	  Nationalist	  Party,	  as	  a	  means	  to	  eliminate	  communists	  and	  communist	  sympathizers	  in	  Taiwan,	  efforts	  supported	  by	  and	  part	  of	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  grand	  strategy	  of	  the	  United	  States.69	  	  The	  phenomenon	  we	  call	  the	  “White	  Terror”	  in	  the	  early	  1950s,	  however,	  deserves	  more	  attention	  and	  a	  much	  more	  fundamental	  reconsideration.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  as	  many	  researchers	  have	  pointed	  out,	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  those	  suppressed	  during	  this	  period	  were	  neither	  communists	  nor	  communist	  sympathizers.	  In	  fact,	  underground	  communists	  in	  Taiwan	  numbered	  only	  several	  hundred	  at	  that	  time,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  number	  of	  victims	  that	  easily	  surpassed	  ten	  thousand.70	  Who	  were	  those	  suppressed?	  Why	  were	  they	  persecuted?	  The	  victims,	  indeed,	  contained	  diverse	  groups	  of	  people,	  including	  not	  only	  communists	  and	  communist	  sympathizers,	  but	  also,	  for	  instance,	  members	  of	  social	  elites	  since	  the	  time	  of	  Japanese	  colonialism,	  such	  as	  intellectuals,	  doctors,	  lawyers,	  journalists,	  college	  students,	  and	  the	  literati,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  who	  hoped	  Taiwan	  would	  be	  an	  autonomous	  region	  in	  China,	  those	  insisting	  on	  the	  independence	  of	  Taiwan,	  the	  native	  populations	  of	  Taiwan	  who	  had	  been	  fighting	  for	  decades	  for	  autonomy,	  and	  so	  on.71	  	  
                                                68	  Kikuchi	  Kazutaka,	  “1950	  nen	  dai	  Taiwan	  Hakusyoku	  tero	  jyunan	  no	  kaioku	  [Recollections	  of	  the	  White	  Terror	  in	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  1950s]”	  in	  Kindai	  Chūgoku	  kenkyū	  ihō	  [Bulletin	  for	  Modern	  Chinese	  Studies]	  21	  (1999),	  49,	  81.	  	  69	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Lan	  Bozhou,	  Baise	  konbu	  (1993).	  	  70	  Ibid,	  66;	  Su	  Ching-­‐Hsuan	  (2008),	  45.	  71	  Lan	  Bozhou,	  Baise	  kongbu	  (1993),	  116;	  Su	  Ching-­‐Hsuan	  (2008),	  9-­‐11;	  and	  Wakabayashi	  Masahiro,	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   Examining	  the	  profiles	  of	  victims	  in	  this	  period	  would	  be	  an	  entry	  point	  to	  thinking	  about	  the	  actual	  nature	  of	  the	  suppression.	  Lin	  Yixu,	  a	  28-­‐year-­‐old	  elementary	  school	  teacher,	  for	  instance,	  was	  arrested	  in	  1950	  and	  sentenced	  to	  twelve	  years’	  imprisonment	  of	  attending	  a	  circle	  and	  reading	  progressive	  magazines,	  such	  as	  Guancha	  (Observation)	  and	  Zhanwang	  (Prospects).72	  	  Likewise,	  Lin	  Enkui,	  a	  28-­‐year-­‐old	  doctor,	  was	  arrested	  in	  1950	  for	  an	  almost	  identical	  reason.73	  Thousands	  of	  students	  and	  workers	  who	  studied	  and	  worked	  in	  Japan	  during	  wartime	  and	  returned	  to	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  early	  postwar	  period	  similarly	  suffered	  persecution.74	  Chen	  Shaoying,	  who	  worked	  and	  studied	  in	  Osaka	  during	  the	  war	  and	  returned	  to	  Taiwan	  in	  1946,	  was	  arrested	  in	  1950,	  even	  though	  he	  actually	  rejected	  a	  friend’s	  invitation	  to	  enter	  the	  communist	  party.75	  Furthermore,	  quite	  a	  few	  elites	  in	  the	  native	  populations	  in	  Taiwan,	  such	  as	  Watan	  Tang	  (Lin	  Zhaoming),	  who	  advocated	  for	  autonomy	  for	  their	  populations,	  were	  arrested	  in	  the	  early	  1950s.76	  Moreover,	  Deng	  Jinjiang,	  a	  29-­‐year-­‐old	  teacher	  at	  an	  agricultural	  school	  in	  Taidong,	  was	  arrested	  for	  simply	  expressing	  anti-­‐war	  thoughts,	  even	  though	  he	  was	  not	  involved	  in	  any	  anti-­‐war	  or	  leftist	  activities.77	  	  All	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  cases	  have	  generally	  been	  considered	  examples	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  false	  charges;	  these	  were	  tragedies,	  an	  epiphenomenon,	  which	  accidentally	  accompanied	  the	  Nationalist	  Party’s	  brutal	  suppression	  of	  communists	  
                                                                                                                                            
Taiwan	  (Tokyo,	  Chikuma	  shobo,	  2001),	  101.	  	  72	  Lin	  Yixu,	  an	  interview	  in	  Jieyan	  shiqi	  Taibei	  diqu	  zhengzhi	  anjian	  xiangguan	  renshi	  koushu	  lishi:	  
baise	  kongbu	  shijian	  chafang,	  Lü	  Fangshang	  ed.	  (Taipei,	  Taiwan,	  1999),	  18.	  73	  Lin	  Enkui,	  an	  interview	  in	  Gaoxiong	  xiang	  228	  ji	  wushi	  niandai	  Baise	  kongbu	  minzhong	  shi,	  Lan	  Bozhou	  ed.	  (Gaoxiong,	  Taiwan:	  Gaoxiong	  xian	  zhengfu,	  1997),	  306-­‐12.	  	  74	  Qiu	  Guozheng,	  173.	  75	  Chin	  Shouoei,	  Gailai	  seiken	  asseika	  no	  sei	  to	  shi	  (2003).	  76	  Qiu	  Guozheng,	  266-­‐68.	  77	  Ibid,	  199-­‐200.	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and	  communist	  sympathizers.	  Because	  they	  have	  been	  considered	  as	  such,	  not	  much	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  exploring	  what	  these	  “false	  charges”	  meant.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  memoirs	  and	  oral	  histories	  published	  in	  recent	  years	  has,	  rather,	  confirmed	  that	  many	  suffered	  under	  false	  charges	  and	  they	  were	  innocent	  victims	  of	  the	  “White	  Terror.”	  	  To	  begin	  with,	  however,	  thousands	  of	  “misrepresentations”	  look	  like	  an	  accidental	  epiphenomenon	  only	  because	  we	  view	  the	  White	  Terror	  as	  the	  Nationalist	  Party’s	  suppression	  of	  communists.	  Once	  we	  remove	  the	  Cold	  War	  lens	  and	  look	  at	  local	  situations	  in	  Taiwan	  at	  that	  time,	  however,	  the	  situations	  look	  different.	  It	  might	  be	  possible	  that	  the	  cases	  of	  “false	  charges”	  were	  not	  simple	  and	  incidental	  mistakes;	  rather,	  many	  of	  them	  might	  be,	  actually,	  the	  real	  targets	  of	  the	  suppression.	  The	  questions	  are:	  Who	  were	  the	  victims?	  What	  did	  they	  represent?	  Why	  did	  they	  have	  to	  suffer	  persecution	  at	  that	  time?	  To	  think	  about	  these	  questions,	  we	  need	  to	  turn	  back	  to	  the	  historical	  and	  social	  background	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  White	  Terror.	  	  
Local	  and	  Social	  Roots	  of	  the	  White	  Terror	  The	  White	  Terror	  did	  not	  begin	  suddenly	  in	  the	  summer	  and	  fall	  of	  1950.	  Many	  victims,	  in	  fact,	  were	  arrested	  based	  on	  behaviors	  and	  activities	  between	  1945	  and	  1949,	  in	  particular	  those	  during	  the	  2.28	  incident	  in	  1947.	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  White	  Terror	  was	  focused	  on	  questions	  raised	  and	  unresolved	  in	  Taiwanese	  society	  in	  the	  postwar	  period.	  The	  core	  question	  was	  what	  kind	  of	  society	  Taiwan	  would	  and	  should	  be.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  society	  and	  politics	  in	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	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had	  the	  appearance	  of	  chaos,	  being	  divided	  into	  diverse	  rival	  camps,	  not	  just	  between	  the	  GMD	  and	  CCP	  sympathizers,	  but	  also	  among	  Waishengren	  [settlers	  from	  the	  mainland	  after	  1945]	  and	  Benshengren	  [people	  who	  had	  been	  living	  in	  Taiwan,	  including	  Chinese	  settlers	  who	  came	  before	  1945;	  often	  described	  simply	  as	  Taiwanese],	  the	  native	  populations	  in	  Taiwan,	  as	  well	  as	  those	  advocating	  the	  unification,	  independence,	  or	  autonomous	  status	  of	  Taiwan.78	  To	  begin	  from	  the	  conclusion,	  the	  series	  of	  purges	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period	  functioned	  as	  a	  means	  to	  bring	  “settlement”	  to	  the	  disputes	  and	  disorder	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.	  Many	  victims	  in	  this	  period,	  in	  fact,	  epitomized	  the	  elements	  directing	  and	  aspiring	  to	  the	  various	  kinds	  of	  change—in	  a	  sense,	  chaos—of	  postwar	  Taiwanese	  society.	  Such	  local	  struggles	  began	  escalating	  immediately	  following	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  in	  August	  1945,	  which	  meant	  in	  Taiwan,	  the	  demise	  of	  Japanese	  colonialism	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  As	  many	  memoirs	  and	  oral	  histories	  suggest,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Japanese	  colonialism	  came	  with	  much	  joy	  and	  optimism	  for	  the	  future	  of	  Taiwan.	  Chen	  Mingzhong,	  a	  16-­‐year-­‐old	  student,	  for	  instance,	  had	  been	  frustrated	  with	  the	  discrimination	  between	  the	  Japanese	  and	  Taiwanese,	  and,	  thus,	  was	  excited	  about	  the	  arrival	  of	  GMD	  forces	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1945,	  hoping	  for	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  new	  era	  and	  new	  society	  where	  people	  would	  be	  treated	  equally,	  a	  realization	  of	  Sun	  Wen’s	  
Sanmin	  zhuyi	  [Three	  Principles	  of	  the	  People]—the	  principles	  of	  self-­‐determination,	  
                                                78	  Wang	  Huan,	  Liehuo	  de	  qingchun:	  Wuling	  niandai	  baise	  kongbu	  zhengyan	  (Taipei,	  Taiwan:	  Renjian	  chubanshe,	  1999),	  124-­‐25;	  Lin	  Shuzhi,	  Baise	  kongbu	  X	  dangan	  (Taipei,	  Taiwan:	  Qianwei	  chubanshe,	  1997),	  24.	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of	  democracy,	  and	  of	  livelihood.79	  Chen	  Minzhong’s	  hope,	  however,	  crumbled	  quickly	  as	  he	  found	  that	  many	  GMD	  soldiers	  and	  Chinese	  who	  had	  just	  come	  to	  Taiwan	  from	  the	  mainland	  tended	  to	  look	  down	  on	  local	  population	  as	  “slaves”	  of	  Japanese	  colonialism,	  causing	  numerous	  local	  conflicts	  between	  the	  Chinese	  and	  the	  local	  population.80	  A	  sentence	  that	  described	  the	  disappointment	  of	  the	  people	  in	  Taiwan	  in	  this	  period	  was:	  “Gou	  qu	  zhu	  lai	  [Dog	  has	  gone,	  pig	  has	  come].”81	  The	  legacy	  of	  Japanese	  colonialism	  complicated	  such	  local	  conflicts.	  With	  the	  “return”	  to	  China,	  use	  of	  the	  Japanese	  language	  was	  suddenly	  forbidden	  in	  1946,	  followed	  by	  a	  series	  of	  policies	  banning	  Japanese	  songs,	  books,	  newspapers,	  films,	  and	  literature	  in	  the	  public	  space	  in	  Taiwan.	  As	  a	  result,	  millions	  of	  Taiwanese,	  particularly	  those	  under	  fifty	  years	  old	  who	  had	  been	  using	  the	  Japanese	  since	  they	  were	  born,	  had	  to	  start	  over	  again	  and	  learn	  Mandarin.82	  This	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  for	  social	  elites	  in	  Taiwan.	  Worse	  still,	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Japanese	  empire	  touched	  off	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  Taiwanese	  economy	  as	  well	  as	  a	  food	  crisis,	  and	  such	  situations	  brought	  about	  growth	  in	  the	  unemployment	  rate	  and	  increases	  in	  pick-­‐pocketing,	  theft,	  and	  robbery,	  causing	  social	  unrest,	  particularly	  in	  urban	  areas.	  With	  this	  deterioration	  of	  public	  security,	  many	  urban	  residents	  set	  up	  gratings	  on	  windows,	  multiple	  locks	  on	  doors,	  and	  high	  walls	  around	  their	  houses.83	  	  	   Frustrations	  among	  local	  people	  mounted	  as	  the	  postwar	  situations	  grew	  worse	  as	  the	  Nationalist	  government	  suppressed	  demonstrations,	  labor	  strikes,	  and	  
                                                79	  Chen	  Mingzhong,	  an	  interview	  in	  Lan	  Bozhou	  ed.,	  Gaoxiong	  xian	  er	  er	  ba	  ji	  wuling	  niandai	  baise	  
kongbu	  minzhong	  shi,	  328-­‐30;	  Wang	  Huan,	  Liehuo	  de	  qingchun	  ,	  49-­‐54;	  Qiu	  Guozhen,	  166-­‐67.	  80	  Suemitsu	  Kin’ya,	  Taiwan	  gekidou	  no	  sengoshi:	  228	  jiken	  to	  sono	  zengo	  [Taiwan’s	  Turbulent	  Postwar	  History:	  Before	  and	  After	  the	  2.28	  Incident]	  (Taipei,	  Taiwan:	  Jillion,	  2006),	  54-­‐56.	  81	  Ibid,	  56-­‐58.	  82	  Ibid,	  70-­‐74.	  83	  Ibid,	  66.	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various	  kinds	  of	  demands	  from	  the	  Taiwanese	  in	  1946.	  Such	  resentments	  eventually	  provoked	  the	  eruption	  of	  a	  popular	  anti-­‐Nationalist	  revolt	  all	  over	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1947—the	  February	  28	  Incident,	  which	  began	  with	  small	  quarrels	  and	  fights	  between	  lower-­‐ranking	  Nationalist	  officials	  and	  local	  residents	  in	  Taipei	  on	  February	  27.84	  	  This	  section	  does	  not	  have	  space	  to	  discuss	  the	  process,	  scale,	  and	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  incident,	  but,	  while	  beginning	  with	  a	  small	  incident,	  it	  eventually	  grew	  into	  a	  series	  of	  popular	  mass	  revolts	  against	  the	  Nationalist	  government,	  and,	  more	  generally,	  against	  Waishengren,	  the	  newly	  arriving	  Chinese.	  At	  that	  time,	  the	  total	  population	  of	  Benshengren,	  or	  Taiwanese,	  was	  about	  6.5	  million,	  in	  contrast	  to	  about	  60,000	  Waishengren,	  or	  Chinese.85	  In	  the	  first	  few	  days,	  thus,	  local	  rebellions	  were	  quite	  successful;	  local	  people	  attacked	  governmental	  offices,	  killed	  quite	  a	  few	  
Waishengren,	  and	  even	  occupied	  a	  radio	  station	  in	  Taipei,	  to	  broadcast	  anti-­‐Nationalist	  speeches,	  presenting	  slogans	  such	  as	  “Defeat	  greedy	  officials,”	  “Stand	  against	  the	  evil	  of	  the	  Chinese,”	  “Autonomy	  for	  Taiwan,”	  and	  so	  on,	  which,	  again,	  touched	  off	  waves	  of	  uprisings	  in	  many	  cities	  and	  towns	  in	  the	  central	  and	  southern	  parts	  of	  Taiwan.86	  However,	  with	  the	  arrival	  of	  the	  GMD	  armies	  from	  the	  mainland	  in	  a	  week,	  the	  popular	  uprisings	  were	  literally	  crushed,	  with	  numerous	  cruel	  massacres	  in	  all	  major	  cities,	  causing	  the	  death	  of	  more	  than	  twenty	  thousand	  Taiwanese.87	  	  
                                                84	  Ibid,	  81-­‐83.	  85	  Ibid,	  80.	  86	  Ibid,	  89-­‐138;	  Qiu	  Guozhen,	  77-­‐78.	  	  87	  Suemitsu,	  Taiwan	  gekidō	  no	  sengoshi:,	  138-­‐149;	  Qiu	  Guozhen,	  79-­‐80.	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Nevertheless,	  the	  brutal	  suppression	  of	  revolts	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1947	  did	  not	  silence	  resistance,	  nor	  did	  it	  “solve”	  conflicts	  in	  society;	  rather,	  it	  intensified	  them.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  2.28	  incident	  marked	  a	  turning	  point.	  After	  that,	  anti-­‐government	  sentiments	  rapidly	  pervaded	  and	  became	  more	  popular,	  and,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  GMD’s	  repression,	  many	  put	  faith	  in	  leftist	  thought	  as	  a	  means	  of	  opposing	  the	  Nationalist	  government.88	  As	  on	  the	  mainland	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  the	  youth—in	  particular,	  college	  students—took	  a	  lead	  in	  spreading	  leftist	  agendas	  in	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  late	  1940s.89	  Zhang	  Dongcai,	  a	  20-­‐year-­‐old	  man	  in	  Taipei,	  for	  instance,	  was	  shocked	  by	  the	  military	  suppression	  of	  revolts	  in	  1947,	  and,	  like	  his	  friends,	  began	  avidly	  reading	  progressive	  magazines	  sent	  from	  Hong	  Kong	  and	  the	  mainland;	  he	  wrote	  in	  his	  diary	  on	  July	  24,	  1948:	  “I	  don't	  mind	  not	  eating	  any	  food	  for	  three	  days	  if	  I	  can	  read	  Guancha	  [Observation].”90	  As	  student	  movements	  spread	  like	  wildfire	  at	  universities	  on	  the	  mainland,	  college	  students	  in	  Taiwan,	  especially	  those	  at	  National	  Taiwan	  University,	  intensified	  their	  activities	  immediately	  following	  the	  February	  28	  incident.	  Maintaining	  a	  strong	  critique	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  government,	  student	  movements	  in	  Taiwan	  became	  revitalized	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1949,	  including	  students	  from	  universities	  and	  high	  schools	  not	  only	  in	  Taipei	  but	  also	  other	  major	  cities,	  with	  slogans,	  such	  as	  “Opposing	  policemen	  hitting	  people,”	  “Anti-­‐starvation,”	  “Anti-­‐civil	  war,”	  and	  so	  forth.91	  	  
                                                88	  Lin	  Shuyang,	  Cong	  228	  dao	  wushi	  niandai,	  141.	  	  89	  Xu	  Jinfa,	  “Zuoqing	  zhishi	  qingnian	  de	  suqing	  [The	  elimination	  of	  left-­‐leaning	  young	  intellectuals]”	  in	  Zhang	  and	  Chen	  ed.	  Jieyan	  shiqi	  baise	  kongbu	  yu	  zhuanxing	  zhengyi	  lunwen	  ji,	  98.	  	  90	  Wang	  Huan,	  Liehuo	  de	  qingchun:	  Wu	  ling	  niandai	  baise	  kongbu	  zhengyan	  [Burning	  Youth:	  Testimony	  of	  the	  White	  Terror	  in	  the	  1950s],	  5.	  	  91	  Lu	  Zhaolin,	  an	  interview	  in	  Jieyan	  shiqi	  Taibei	  diqu	  zhengshi	  anjian,	  620-­‐22.	  
  364 
Another	  stream	  of	  thought	  that	  gained	  popularity	  following	  the	  2.28	  incident	  was	  the	  call	  for	  independence,	  or	  autonomy,	  of	  Taiwan.	  Huang	  Guanghai,	  a	  23-­‐year-­‐old	  GMD	  soldier	  when	  he	  fled	  to	  Taiwan	  in	  1950,	  who	  came	  to	  sympathize	  with	  the	  Taiwanese	  and	  was	  later	  arrested,	  recalled:	  “Because	  it	  was	  clear	  by	  that	  time	  that	  the	  Japanese	  were	  not	  good	  and	  the	  Chinese	  were	  not	  good,	  either,	  then,	  the	  best	  way	  was	  the	  independence	  of	  Taiwan.	  Not	  governed	  by	  the	  Japanese,	  nor	  governed	  by	  the	  Chinese.”92	  In	  fact,	  the	  years	  following	  the	  2.28	  incident	  observed	  a	  surge	  in	  various	  activities	  and	  demands	  relating	  to	  the	  independence,	  or	  autonomy,	  of	  Taiwan.	  With	  the	  growth	  of	  student	  movements,	  a	  newsletter,	  Xin	  Taiwan	  [New	  Taiwan],	  began	  publication	  in	  April	  of	  1949	  at	  National	  Taiwan	  University,	  advocating	  democracy	  and	  autonomy	  for	  Taiwan.93	  During	  this	  period,	  in	  Jiayi	  and	  Taizhong	  in	  the	  central	  part	  of	  Taiwan,	  where	  some	  of	  the	  hardest	  battles	  were	  fought	  in	  the	  2.28	  incident,	  for	  example,	  many	  youth	  formed	  and	  participated	  in	  various	  associations	  circa	  1948,	  urging	  residents	  in	  Taiwan	  to	  see	  true	  natures	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  government,	  and	  insisting	  on	  autonomy.94	  In	  a	  similar	  manner,	  in	  1949,	  Watan	  Tang	  [Lin	  Shaoming	  in	  Chinese],	  a	  19-­‐year-­‐old	  student,	  and	  his	  friends	  formed	  an	  association	  that	  insisted	  on	  self-­‐help	  and	  high-­‐level	  autonomy	  for	  the	  native	  Taiwanese	  population,	  such	  as	  the	  Atayal	  (Taiyal),	  living	  in	  mountainous	  areas.95	  	  
                                                92	  Huang	  Guanghai,	  an	  interview	  in	  Jieyan	  shiqi	  Taibei	  diqu	  zhengshi	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  93	  Xu	  jinfa,	  135.	  94	  Qiu	  Guozhen,	  180-­‐181,	  and	  258-­‐259.	  95	  Ibid,	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  Tang	  (Lin	  Shaoming),	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  “1950	  nendai	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  hakushoku	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  Kindai	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  vol.	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  365 
With	  the	  development	  of	  such	  currents	  in	  post-­‐2.28	  Taiwanese	  society,	  communist	  ideology,	  to	  be	  sure,	  played	  important	  roles	  in	  providing	  logic	  and	  images	  of	  the	  future.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  many	  students	  and	  local	  people	  who	  adopted	  communist	  agendas	  did	  not	  do	  so	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  Beijing,	  let	  alone	  Moscow.	  When	  asked	  about	  a	  motivation	  for	  taking	  part	  in	  student	  movements,	  Huang	  Yukun,	  a	  teacher	  at	  a	  junior	  school	  in	  Tainan,	  in	  the	  southern	  part	  of	  Taiwan,	  for	  instance,	  said	  that	  he	  was	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  government’s	  handling	  of	  the	  2.28	  incident,	  and	  that	  he	  wanted	  to	  improve	  the	  lives	  of	  the	  Taiwanese.96	  In	  other	  words,	  many	  intellectuals	  and	  students,	  who	  were	  arrested	  in	  the	  White	  Terror	  in	  1950	  and	  following	  years,	  participated	  in	  student	  movements	  and	  embraced	  leftist	  thought	  in	  order	  to	  use	  these	  as	  useful	  tools	  to	  address	  their	  own	  discontents	  and	  resolve	  local	  conflicts.	  	  Dissatisfactions	  of	  this	  kind	  among	  many	  people	  in	  Taiwan	  were	  further	  exacerbated	  in	  1949,	  as	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  retreated	  from	  the	  mainland	  to	  Taiwan.	  With	  the	  arrival	  of	  GMD	  armies,	  refugees,	  and	  their	  families	  escalating	  at	  1949,	  the	  number	  of	  Waishengren,	  newly	  arriving	  Chinese,	  dramatically	  increased	  from	  60,000	  in1947,	  to	  1	  million	  in	  1950,	  and	  1.5	  million	  in	  the	  following	  years,	  changing	  the	  demography	  of	  Taiwanese	  society	  and,	  of	  course,	  heightening	  social	  conflicts	  at	  home.97	  By	  the	  time	  of	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  the	  escalation	  of	  the	  White	  Terror	  in	  1950,	  therefore,	  the	  seeds	  of	  social	  conflicts	  had	  reached	  a	  flash	  point,	  a	  stage	  in	  which	  any	  slightest	  provocation	  could	  touch	  off	  “war”	  within	  Taiwanese	  society.	  	  
                                                96	  Huang	  Yukun,	  an	  interview	  in	  Jieyan	  shiqi	  Taibei	  diqu	  zhengshi	  anjian,	  237-­‐40;	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  Jingfa,	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  97	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Thinking	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  victims	  of	  the	  White	  Terror	  epitomized	  various	  modes	  of	  change	  and	  conflict	  in	  postwar	  Taiwan,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  say	  that	  we	  cannot	  fully	  grasp	  the	  actual	  nature	  of	  the	  White	  Terror	  through	  the	  lenses	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  (East-­‐West	  confrontation),	  or	  that	  of	  the	  Chinese	  Civil	  War	  (CCP-­‐GMD	  confrontation).	  Rather,	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  was	  the	  tranquilizing	  of	  social	  “disorder”	  and	  making	  of	  a	  “harmonious”	  society,	  simply	  put,	  creating	  a	  new	  nation-­‐state	  of	  Nationalist	  Taiwan	  through	  silencing	  social	  conflicts	  and	  eliminating	  diverse	  sorts	  of	  malcontents	  and	  opponents,	  however	  cruel	  the	  process.	  	  	  
The	  Natures	  and	  Participants	  of	  the	  White	  Terror	  	   This	  point,	  that	  the	  real	  task	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  global	  and	  ideological	  confrontation	  than	  the	  practical	  process	  of	  overcoming	  social	  conflicts,	  becomes	  much	  clearer	  when	  we	  look	  at	  actual	  practices	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  promoted	  in	  this	  period,	  along	  with	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  White	  Terror.	  An	  examination	  of	  slogans	  might	  be	  an	  interesting	  point	  to	  begin.	  While	  commonplace	  slogans	  of	  “Return	  to	  the	  Mainland,”	  “Eliminate	  Communists,”	  and	  “Rescue	  Our	  Countrymen”	  appeared	  frequently,	  these	  slogans	  usually	  came	  with	  other	  catchwords,	  which,	  actually,	  often	  held	  precedence.	  A	  list	  of	  slogans	  in	  the	  Wartime	  Life	  Movement	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  published	  in	  Minshen	  Ribao,	  for	  instance,	  maintained	  various	  tasks	  in	  this	  order:	  	  1. Change	  Social	  Atmosphere	  2. Encourage	  Wartime	  Life	  3. Restrain	  Luxury	  and	  Extravagance	  	  4. Mobilize	  People	  for	  Production	  	  5. Eliminate	  Communists	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6. Defeat	  Soviet	  Imperialism98	  	  Note	  that,	  even	  though	  the	  entire	  movement	  was	  packaged	  in	  the	  colors	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  as	  far	  as	  daily	  practices	  were	  concerned,	  the	  first	  four	  slogans	  concerned	  social	  order	  and	  ways	  of	  life.	  	  Another	  list	  on	  the	  same	  page	  might	  be	  much	  more	  telling;	  it	  touted	  ten	  tasks,	  all	  concerned	  with	  social	  order	  and	  individual	  behaviors:	  “Keep	  Order,”	  “Be	  Punctual,”	  “Maintain	  Cleanliness,”	  “Encourage	  Production”	  “No	  Betting,”	  “No	  Alcohol”	  “No	  Need	  for	  Gorgeous	  Clothing,”	  “No	  need	  for	  Sumptuous	  Parties”	  and	  so	  forth.99	  Such	  a	  tendency	  clearly	  appeared	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  who	  was	  preoccupied	  with	  creating	  order	  at	  home.	  When	  contemplating	  current	  tasks	  and	  slogans	  in	  his	  diary	  in	  late	  August	  of	  1950,	  the	  words	  that	  appeared	  most	  were	  “Unity”	  and	  “Order,”	  followed	  by	  phrases	  such	  as	  “Obey	  the	  Law”	  and	  “Observe	  Rules”	  and	  so	  on.100	  	  These	  were	  not	  merely	  rhetorical	  slogans.	  As	  on	  the	  mainland,	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  promoted	  several	  mass	  campaigns	  under	  the	  umbrella	  banner	  of	  “Fan-­‐gong	  
kang-­‐E	  [Opposing	  Communists	  and	  Resisting	  Russians]”—a	  set	  of	  movements	  ostensibly	  fashioned	  according	  to	  Civil	  War	  and	  Cold	  War	  logics.	  When	  we	  look	  at	  specific	  programs,	  however,	  we	  can	  see	  actual	  aims	  focused	  on	  domestic	  problems.	  For	  example,	  the	  aforementioned	  Wartime	  Life	  Movement	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950	  aimed	  at	  changing	  life	  styles,	  urging	  people	  to	  avoid	  luxurious	  clothing,	  food,	  and	  
                                                98	  “Kouhao	  [Slogans],”	  Minsheng	  Ribao,	  August	  7,	  1950,	  NTU,	  Taipei,	  Taiwan.	  	  99	  “Guili	  [Disciplines],”	  Minsheng	  Ribao,	  August	  7,	  1950,	  NTU,	  Taipei,	  Taiwan.	  	  100	  Diary,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  August	  23,	  1950,	  Box	  48,	  CKSD,	  Hoover	  Institute,	  Stanford	  University,	  Stanford,	  CA.	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parties.101	  The	  Campaign	  to	  Promote	  Public	  Order	  aimed	  at	  improving	  the	  people’s	  manner;	  specific	  tasks	  included,	  for	  instance,	  forming	  a	  line	  at	  bus	  stops	  and	  train	  stations,	  and	  following	  rules	  in	  restaurants,	  theaters,	  and	  public	  areas,	  and	  so	  on—typical	  small	  issues	  that	  had	  created	  numerous	  quarrels	  and	  fights	  between	  the	  newly	  arriving	  Chinese	  and	  local	  residents.102	  	  The	  third	  mass	  movement	  that	  was	  enacted	  in	  December	  1951	  is	  noteworthy:	  the	  Campaign	  to	  Improve	  Hygiene,	  in	  which	  the	  Nationalist	  government	  instructed	  local	  district	  offices	  to	  be	  watchful	  of	  environmental	  hygiene	  in	  their	  cities	  and	  towns.	  Specific	  programs	  included,	  for	  example,	  cleaning-­‐up	  of	  trash,	  sanitation	  control	  in	  restaurants	  and	  bars,	  and	  education	  and	  inspection	  by	  officials.103	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek	  himself	  took	  the	  trouble	  to	  give	  lengthy	  instruction	  concerning	  improvement	  of	  hygiene.	  He	  said:	  	  Environmental	  hygiene	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  social	  reform.	  Now,	  people	  outside	  Taiwan	  are	  paying	  attention	  to	  us,	  and	  thus	  we	  need	  to	  take	  special	  notice	  of	  social	  reform.	  From	  now	  on,	  police	  need	  to	  look	  out	  for	  the	  cleanliness	  of	  restaurants,	  bars,	  theaters,	  and	  hotels,	  in	  particular,	  toilets	  and	  kitchens	  of	  these	  places,	  which	  should	  be	  inspected	  time	  to	  time	  to	  promote	  the	  improvement	  of	  hygiene.104	  	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  all	  of	  these	  slogans	  and	  campaigns,	  which	  were	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  individual	  life	  and	  social	  order,	  were	  justified	  and	  promoted	  by	  the	  logics	  of	  the	  Civil	  War	  and	  Cold	  War;	  it	  was	  claimed,	  for	  instance,	  that	  these	  were	  tasks	  all	  necessary	  to	  rescue	  those	  “left”	  on	  the	  mainland,	  and	  to	  
                                                101	  Minsheng	  ribao,	  August	  7,	  1950.	  	  102	  Hui	  Xunhui,	  (2000),	  45-­‐46.	  	  103	  Quoted	  in	  Hui	  Xunhui,	  44-­‐45.	  104	  Ibid.	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support	  the	  fight	  on	  the	  frontlines.	  “Everything,”	  it	  was	  urged,	  “should	  serve	  the	  frontlines	  and	  the	  victory	  there.”105	  	  Logic	  of	  this	  kind	  was	  most	  useful	  for	  rulers	  because	  it	  could	  quickly	  and	  efficiently	  silence	  opponents	  and	  malcontents	  under	  the	  cry	  of	  achieving	  a	  higher	  goal.	  “Let’s	  stop	  discussing	  the	  differences	  among	  political	  factions	  or	  occupational	  posts,”	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  in	  fact,	  said	  in	  April	  1951,	  “Let’s	  achieve	  an	  unfinished	  Nationalist	  Revolution	  through	  cooperating	  efforts	  under	  the	  great	  objective	  of	  Opposing	  Communists	  and	  Resisting	  Russians.”106	  Taking	  full	  advantage	  of	  the	  utility	  of	  this	  logic,	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  government	  quickly	  enacted	  a	  series	  of	  laws,	  one	  after	  another,	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period:	  the	  Wartime	  Regulation	  to	  Purge	  Spies	  in	  1950;	  the	  Law	  to	  Stimulate	  the	  Arrest	  of	  Spies	  in	  1951;	  the	  Law	  Concerning	  Self-­‐Surrender	  of	  Communists	  in	  1951;	  and	  the	  Platform	  for	  the	  Mobilization	  of	  the	  Opposing	  Communism	  and	  Resisting	  Russians	  Movement	  in	  1952,	  to	  name	  a	  few.107	  	  Following	  the	  Marshall	  Law	  and	  the	  Regulation	  for	  Suppression	  of	  Rebellion,	  both	  enacted	  in	  1949,	  these	  legal	  measures	  functioned	  to	  marginalize	  and	  eliminate	  dissenters’	  voices,	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  stabilization	  of	  social	  order	  and	  consolidation	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  Party’s	  footholds.	  At	  a	  glance,	  it	  is	  thus	  reasonable	  to	  view	  Nationalist	  Party	  leaders—in	  particular,	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek—as	  primary	  architects	  and	  executors	  of	  the	  White	  Terror	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  making	  a	  “conflict-­‐free”	  nation-­‐state	  of	  Nationalist	  Taiwan.	  Therefore,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  the	  majority	  of,	  if	  
                                                105	  “Zhenshi	  shenghua	  yungdong	  [The	  Wartime	  Life	  Movement],”	  Mingsheng	  ribao,	  August	  7,	  1950,	  NTU,	  Taipei,	  Taiwan.	  	  	  106	  Chiang	  Kai-­‐shek,	  April	  3,	  1951,	  No.	  132-­‐142,	  Dengshiguan	  [Nationalist	  Party	  Archives],	  Taipei,	  Taiwan.	  	  107	  Qiu	  Guozhen,	  132;	  Hui	  Xunhui,	  138-­‐39,	  171-­‐72.	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not	  all,	  existing	  literature	  focuses,	  critically,	  on	  the	  roles	  played	  by	  the	  party.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  would	  be	  hasty	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  party	  was	  the	  sole	  culprit.	  There	  were	  other	  less	  noticeable,	  and	  thus	  less	  well	  understood	  actors	  in	  the	  entire	  phenomenon	  called	  the	  White	  Terror:	  the	  quiet	  mass	  of	  people.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  making	  of	  “consensus”	  in	  society	  is	  not	  just	  beneficial	  for	  the	  rulers	  of	  the	  society,	  but	  also	  agreeable	  and	  even	  attractive	  for	  a	  large	  number	  of	  ordinary	  people,	  particularly	  those	  belonging	  to	  the	  majority.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  White	  Terror,	  people’s	  participation	  was	  observable	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mainland	  China,	  quite	  a	  few	  people	  actively	  participated	  in	  diverse	  activities,	  such	  as	  cooperating	  and	  joining	  in	  mass	  campaigns,	  conducting	  surveillance,	  and	  informing	  on	  “suspicious”	  persons	  in	  schools,	  workplaces,	  and	  neighborhoods	  (Picture	  2).108	  The	  act	  of	  informing	  became	  common	  and	  popular	  in	  this	  period	  primarily	  because	  of	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  reward	  money,	  paid	  to	  informants.109	  In	  a	  similar	  manner,	  for	  instance,	  one	  publisher	  in	  Taipei	  held	  a	  contest	  for	  “anti-­‐communist”	  literature,	  calling	  for	  novels,	  articles,	  songs,	  poems,	  and	  dramas.	  It	  soon	  received	  more	  than	  1,700	  entries.110	  The	  existence	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  informants,	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  entries	  to	  the	  contest,	  suggests	  that	  many	  ordinary	  people	  were	  not	  just	  passive	  actors	  or	  victims	  of	  the	  terror	  as	  usually	  described,	  but,	  to	  some	  extent,	  collaborative	  participants	  in	  the	  phenomenon.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  such	  straightforward	  attendants,	  there	  was	  another	  kind	  of	  “participant”	  in	  the	  White	  Terror,	  which	  might	  be	  more	  characteristic	  of	  Taiwan	  in	  
                                                108	  Qiu	  Guozhen,	  132;	  A	  poster	  is	  from	  Taiwan	  shi	  100	  jian	  dashi,	  38.	  109	  Zhou	  Kunru,	  an	  interview	  in	  Jieyan	  shiqi	  Taibei	  diqu	  zhengshi	  anjian,	  593;	  and	  Chen	  Cuilian,	  66.	  110	  Ziyou	  Zhongguo	  mingzhong	  fangong	  yundong	  (April	  1953),	  21-­‐24.	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this	  period:	  those	  who	  participated	  through	  absence.	  These	  people	  continuously	  tried	  not	  to	  involve	  themselves	  in	  victims’	  affairs,	  deliberately	  cut	  off	  communications	  and	  relationships	  with	  “suspicious”	  persons,	  and	  chose	  to	  withdraw	  and	  disconnect	  themselves	  from	  any	  activities	  and	  topics	  related	  to	  politics,	  attitudes	  that	  aided,	  more	  than	  anything	  else,	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  order	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  the	  Nationalist	  Party	  for	  the	  nearly	  four	  decades	  that	  followed.	  	  Family	  members	  of	  “suspicious”	  persons	  knew	  this	  point	  well.	  A	  mother	  of	  one	  “suspicious”	  person,	  for	  instance,	  remembered	  how	  quickly	  people	  changed	  attitudes	  and	  how	  cold	  they	  could	  be.111	  Another	  example	  is	  Feng	  Shoue,	  who	  was	  arrested	  in	  1950	  with	  his	  elder	  brother,	  and	  had	  to	  spent	  ten	  years	  in	  jail	  for	  attending	  a	  “suspicious”	  reading	  group.	  When	  she	  was	  released	  in	  1960,	  she	  still	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  find	  a	  job,	  to	  become	  acclimatized,	  and	  to	  get	  married	  because	  of	  the	  label	  of	  “rebellious	  family”	  that	  had	  been	  placed	  on	  her.	  She	  soon	  learned	  knitting	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  open	  a	  knitting	  store;	  yet,	  when	  her	  landlord	  found	  out	  her	  background,	  she	  was	  forced	  out.	  It	  was	  just	  like	  a	  transfer,	  she	  later	  recollected,	  from	  a	  small	  prison	  to	  a	  larger	  prison.	  112	  In	  such	  a	  larger	  prison	  called	  society,	  guards	  were	  not	  necessarily	  GMD	  officials	  and	  supporters,	  but	  the	  mass	  of	  people—friends,	  classmates,	  colleagues,	  neighbors,	  and	  even	  oneself—who	  watched	  out	  for	  words	  and	  deeds,	  consciously	  and	  unconsciously	  avoiding	  joining	  in	  any	  political	  issues	  that	  might	  cause	  trouble—that	  is,	  actually,	  a	  certain	  manner	  of	  “participation”	  in	  politics,	  which	  constantly	  
                                                111	  Wang	  Huan,	  Liehuo	  de	  qingchun,	  53-­‐54.	  112	  Wang	  Huan,	  Liehuo	  de	  qingchun,	  68,	  and	  80-­‐81.	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suppressed	  the	  seeds	  of	  social	  conflicts,	  and	  which	  contributed	  to	  the	  formation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  an	  “orderly”	  and	  “harmonious”	  society	  for	  a	  long	  time.	  It	  was	  quite	  reasonable	  that,	  in	  the	  early-­‐	  to	  mid-­‐1980s,	  when	  political	  movements	  for	  democratization	  spread	  in	  Taiwan,	  one	  slogan	  involved	  the	  overcoming	  of	  the	  “General	  Headquarters	  of	  Public	  Security	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  each	  individual.”113	  	  Looking	  at	  such	  an	  internalized	  attitude	  and	  political	  culture,	  one	  might	  find	  the	  legacy	  of	  Japanese	  colonialism	  that	  ruled	  Taiwan	  from	  the	  end	  of	  nineteenth	  century	  to	  1945.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  the	  peculiar	  mode	  of	  such	  a	  style	  of	  “participation”	  in	  politics—that	  is,	  participation	  by	  nonparticipation—might	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  direct	  legacy	  of	  colonialism.	  Such	  an	  attitude	  had	  perhaps	  been	  quite	  common	  among	  residents	  in	  Taiwan	  under	  Japanese	  rule	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  in	  particular,	  after	  diverse	  activities	  of	  resistance	  were	  crushed.114	  Second,	  more	  importantly,	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Empire	  meant,	  in	  Taiwan	  and	  other	  parts	  of	  Asia,	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  process	  of	  decolonization.	  For	  the	  ruling	  circles,	  this	  was,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  a	  process	  of	  re-­‐colonization	  on	  their	  own	  terms.	  Yet,	  even	  for	  ordinary	  people,	  the	  production	  of	  social	  order	  through	  rulers’	  re-­‐colonization	  could	  be	  less	  detestable	  than	  constant	  divisions	  and	  disputes—in	  a	  sense,	  war—at	  home,	  which	  appeared	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  	  Viewed	  in	  this	  was,	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  White	  Terror	  in	  Taiwan	  in	  the	  early	  1950s	  was	  not	  just	  an	  end	  result,	  a	  stationary	  state,	  caused	  by	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Rather,	  it	  was	  a	  continuous	  process	  of	  re-­‐colonization—nation-­‐state	  building	  of	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  Wakabayashi,	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  Tamura	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  162-­‐63;	  Lin	  Shuyang,	  137;	  and	  Lan	  Bozhou,	  48.	  	  	  114	  Qiu	  Guozhen,	  16-­‐37;	  Suemitsu,	  22-­‐28.	  
  373 
Nationalist	  Taiwan—in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  a	  chaotic	  postwar	  period,	  with	  wide	  and	  regular	  participation—if	  that	  included	  participation	  by	  absence—of	  nameless,	  numberless	  people	  in	  society.	  The	  Cold	  War,	  here,	  did	  not	  appear	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  as	  often	  described,	  but,	  rather,	  a	  necessary	  condition	  that	  enabled	  the	  process	  of	  “overcoming”	  social	  and	  cultural	  wars	  in	  postwar	  Taiwan.	  And,	  thus,	  an	  imagined	  reality	  of	  the	  global	  Cold	  War	  was	  continuously	  imagined	  and	  required	  to	  exist	  as	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  world	  in	  order	  to	  create	  and	  then	  maintain	  order	  at	  home.	  	  
	  
The	  Philippines:	  Rethinking	  the	  Crackdown	  on	  “Un-­‐Filipino	  Activities”	  Such	  a	  pattern	  might	  not	  be	  particularly	  unique	  to	  Taiwan.	  Like	  many	  other	  places	  in	  Asia	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  the	  Philippines,	  for	  example,	  entered	  into	  a	  situation	  almost	  like	  a	  civil	  war	  immediately	  following	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  Even	  before	  the	  return	  of	  U.S.	  forces	  to	  the	  islands,	  diverse	  anti-­‐Japanese	  guerrillas	  had	  liberated	  many	  areas,	  already	  beginning	  to	  administrate	  cities	  and	  towns	  in	  those	  areas	  on	  their	  own	  terms.	  The	  largest	  among	  many	  was	  the	  Hukbalahap,	  or	  the	  Huks,	  the	  People’s	  Anti-­‐Japanese	  Liberation	  Army,	  which	  developed	  during	  wartime,	  bringing	  together	  communists,	  reformers,	  professionals,	  intellectuals,	  the	  middle	  class,	  workers,	  and,	  above	  all,	  peasants,	  in	  hailing	  anti-­‐Japanese	  resistance,	  land	  reform	  and	  social	  justice.115	  As	  historian	  Vina	  A.	  Lanzona	  describes,	  however,	  the	  Huks	  not	  only	  challenged	  the	  government,	  but	  also	  questioned	  dominant	  social	  values,	  particularly	  involving	  gender,	  in	  Philippine	  society.116	  The	  participation	  of	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  Benedict	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  116	  Vina	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  and	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  the	  Philippines	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women	  in	  the	  Huks	  during	  World	  War	  II	  changed	  traditional	  images	  and	  roles	  of	  women,	  challenging	  conventional	  norms	  concerning	  what	  women	  should	  and	  should	  not	  do.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  the	  Huks	  represented	  was	  a	  challenge	  toward	  not	  only	  political	  but	  also	  social	  conditions.117	  	  The	  popularity	  of	  the	  Huks	  increased	  in	  the	  late	  1940s,	  eventually	  touching	  off	  a	  large-­‐scale	  revolt,	  later	  known	  as	  the	  Huk	  Rebellion,	  which	  reached	  its	  zenith	  in	  1949	  and	  1950.118	  This	  uprising,	  however,	  was	  subdued	  quickly	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950	  and	  months	  that	  followed	  with	  a	  change	  in	  the	  logic	  involved	  in	  describing	  the	  situation	  under	  the	  Cold	  War	  terms,	  and	  with	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crackdown	  on	  “Un-­‐Filipino”	  activities.	  On	  the	  morning	  of	  October	  20,	  1950,	  for	  instance,	  government	  intelligence	  officers	  simultaneously	  raided	  twenty-­‐two	  places	  in	  the	  capital	  of	  the	  Philippines,	  Manila,	  arresting	  more	  than	  a	  hundred	  “communists,”	  including	  a	  15-­‐year-­‐old	  boy	  and	  18-­‐year-­‐old	  girl.119	  They	  were	  arrested	  for	  being	  members	  of	  “communist-­‐inspired	  Hukbalahap,”	  allegedly	  plotting	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  government	  and	  the	  conquest	  of	  the	  world	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  Moscow.120	  In	  line	  with	  these	  raids,	  conservative	  outlawed	  the	  communist	  party	  in	  the	  Philippines	  in	  October	  1950.	  A	  Governor	  of	  Pampanga,	  Jose	  Lingad,	  urged:	  “I	  believe	  that	  in	  view	  of	  the	  grave	  international	  situation,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  untimely	  to	  propose	  that	  we	  outlaw	  the	  Communists	  and	  the	  Hukbalahap	  organizations.”121	  	  
                                                                                                                                            (2009),	  7-­‐14.	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   With	  the	  dispatch	  of	  Philippine	  troops	  to	  Korea	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  “anti-­‐communist”	  organizations	  were	  on	  the	  rise	  in	  Philippine	  society	  in	  the	  months	  that	  followed.	  An	  umbrella	  association,	  the	  “Anti-­‐Communist	  League	  of	  the	  Philippines”	  was	  organized	  in	  1951,	  claiming	  to	  represent	  90,000	  members	  of	  nineteen	  organizations,	  and	  individuals	  including	  veterans,	  business,	  religious,	  and	  patriotic	  groups	  of	  Filipinos,	  as	  well	  as	  foreign	  nationals	  such	  as	  Americans	  and	  Britons—a	  traditional	  groups	  of	  ruling	  circles.122	  Describing	  the	  Korean	  War	  as	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  East-­‐West	  battle,	  these	  “anti-­‐communist”	  organizations	  urged	  Filipinos	  to	  learn	  of	  the	  “shocking	  crimes	  of	  Communism	  in	  the	  Philippines.”123	  With	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  “Special	  Committee	  on	  Un-­‐Filipino	  Activities,”	  which	  was	  modeled	  after	  the	  “House	  Un-­‐American	  Activities	  Committee,”	  diverse	  forces	  of	  nonconformists	  and	  anti-­‐government	  groups	  were	  subdued	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.124	  	  The	  Huks,	  in	  particular,	  suffered	  a	  fatal	  blow,	  and	  were	  eventually	  wiped	  out	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1950s.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  as	  Benedict	  Kerkvliet	  points	  out,	  many	  participants	  in	  peasant	  and	  guerrilla	  movements	  did	  want	  to	  see	  the	  realization	  of	  agrarian	  reform	  and	  social	  justice,	  but	  did	  not	  desire	  the	  overthrow	  or	  elimination	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  UK,	  “Trial	  of	  twenty-­‐six	  members	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Philippines	  on	  May	  12th,”	  May	  28,	  1951,	  in	  FO371/92932:	  “Internal	  Affairs	  in	  the	  Philippines;	  outlawing	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party,”	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  124	  “Report	  on	  the	  Functions	  of	  the	  Special	  Committee	  on	  Un-­‐Filipino	  Activities,”	  published	  by	  the	  Special	  Committee	  on	  Un-­‐Filipino	  Activities,	  May	  15,	  1951,	  in	  FO371/92933:	  “Internal	  Affairs	  in	  the	  Philippines;	  outlawing	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party,”	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	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of	  the	  government,	  let	  alone	  any	  alleged	  control	  from	  Moscow.125	  Thus,	  when	  discussions	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  conflicts	  were	  covered	  by	  questions	  of	  national	  and	  international	  affairs,	  many	  stopped	  discussing	  social	  problems,	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  “nation,”	  efficiently	  suppressing	  elements	  of	  social	  changes	  in	  postwar	  Philippine	  society.	  Within	  a	  few	  years,	  thus,	  the	  challenge	  represented	  by	  the	  Huks	  against	  conventional	  political	  and	  social	  conditions	  was	  silenced,	  under	  the	  call	  for	  “unity.”	  	  	  	   Indeed,	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  functioned	  quite	  well	  both	  in	  silencing	  domestic	  disputes	  and	  calling	  for	  unity.	  “The	  Philippines	  now	  stands	  at	  the	  cross-­‐roads,”	  said	  Judge	  Castelo	  in	  a	  courtroom	  in	  Manila	  in	  May	  1951.	  “If	  the	  Philippines	  is	  awake,	  it	  will	  survive	  the	  deadly	  communist	  conspiracy	  in	  its	  midst.	  If	  not,	  it	  will	  suffer	  the	  fate	  of	  all	  gullible	  and	  communist-­‐indoctrinated	  nations	  in	  the	  world.”126	  Referring	  to	  the	  alleged	  international	  situations,	  the	  Judge	  then	  called	  for	  the	  unity	  among	  the	  people.	  	  It	  now	  becomes	  the	  duty	  of	  all	  loyal	  Filipino	  citizens,	  regardless	  of	  their	  creed	  and	  political	  affiliations,	  to	  bind	  themselves	  together	  and	  join	  the	  vast	  movement	  of	  freedom-­‐loving	  peoples	  of	  the	  world	  in	  combating	  Communism	  in	  its	  fundamental	  principles	  and	  purposes.127	  	  This	  was	  the	  logic	  used	  frequently	  in	  the	  Philippines	  and	  other	  places	  in	  this	  period.	  Ostensibly,	  unity	  among	  nations	  was	  a	  method	  to	  achieve	  a	  goal	  of	  fighting	  against	  communism.	  Yet,	  actually,	  method	  and	  goal	  were	  in	  reverse;	  unity	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  
                                                125	  Kerkvliet,	  254-­‐56.	  126	  Memorandum,	  Manila	  to	  Foreign	  Office,	  UK,	  “Trial	  of	  twenty-­‐six	  members	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  the	  Philippines	  on	  May	  12th,”	  May	  28,	  1951,	  in	  FO371/92932:	  “Internal	  Affairs	  in	  the	  Philippines;	  outlawing	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party,”	  BNA,	  Kew,	  UK.	  127	  Ibid.	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method	  but	  itself	  a	  goal,	  and	  fighting	  Communism	  was	  not	  the	  aim	  but	  a	  process	  to	  achieve	  unity.	  	  Such	  a	  reverse	  in	  logic,	  indeed,	  was	  a	  common	  feature	  in	  the	  social	  and	  political	  repressions	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  this	  chapter—those	  occurring	  in	  Korean,	  Chinese,	  Taiwanese,	  and	  Filipino	  societies	  simultaneously	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  At	  a	  glance,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  see	  such	  calls	  for	  “unity”	  in	  places	  just	  experiencing	  the	  processes	  of	  decolonization	  following	  the	  demise	  of	  the	  Japanese	  Empire.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  brutal	  suppressions	  in	  these	  societies,	  in	  fact,	  occurred	  at	  a	  crossroads	  between	  state	  mobilization	  for	  their	  re-­‐colonization	  projects	  and	  popular	  participation	  in	  seeking	  their	  own	  “orderly”	  and	  “harmonious”	  societies.	  Thus,	  we	  may	  regard	  such	  brutal	  repressions	  as	  unique	  phenomena	  occurring	  only	  in	  newly	  developing—in	  many	  cases,	  totalitarian—states	  in	  Asia.	  When	  we	  take	  a	  global	  perspective,	  however,	  we	  see	  that	  such	  is	  not	  the	  case.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  the	  aforementioned	  reverse	  of	  logic	  was	  ubiquitous	  at	  that	  time,	  and,	  more	  importantly,	  similar	  social	  and	  political	  repressions	  occurred	  simultaneously	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world,	  such	  as	  Japan,	  Britain,	  and	  the	  United	  States.	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Chapter	  6	  Pictures:	  
	  
Picture	  1-­‐1:	  	  "Pudong	  yangsiqu	  tudi	  gaige	  douzheng	  [A	  mass	  meeting	  of	  	  land	  reform	  struggle	  against	  landlords	  at	  the	  Yangsi	  disrict	  in	  Pudong]"	  Shanghai,	  PRC	  1951	  H1-­‐23-­‐33-­‐29	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Shanghai,	  PRC	  	  
	  	  	  	   	  
  379 
	  
Picture	  1-­‐2:	  	  "Shanghai	  shi	  xinchengqu	  Fan	  laotai	  zai	  zhenya	  fangeming	  dahui	  shang	  	  kongsu	  eba	  Jin	  Tuozi	  dui	  ta	  de	  pohai	  zuixing	  [Mrs.	  Fan	  accusing	  a	  local	  despot	  	  Jin	  Tuozi	  of	  his	  crime	  of	  suppressing	  her	  at	  a	  mass	  meeting	  of	  the	  suppression	  	  of	  counterrevolutionaries	  in	  the	  Xincheng	  district	  in	  Shanghai].	  1951	  Shanghai,	  PRC	  H1-­‐23-­‐33-­‐33	  Shanghai	  Municipal	  Archives,	  Shanghai,	  PRC	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Picture	  2:	  	  “Arresting	  Spies	  and	  You	  will	  Get	  a	  Massive	  Reward”	  In	  Li,	  Xiaofeng.	  Taiwan	  shi	  100	  jian	  da	  shi	  	  [100	  Major	  Events	  in	  the	  History	  of	  Taiwan]	  	  Vol.	  2	  (Taipei,	  Taiwan:	  Yushan	  she,	  1999),	  38	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Chapter	  7:	  “Enemies	  Within	  Our	  Gates”	  
	   Europe	  is	  like	  a	  besieged	  town.	  Fever	  is	  raging.	  Whoever	  will	  not	  rave	  like	  the	  rest	  is	  suspected.	  And	  In	  these	  hurried	  times	  when	  justice	  cannot	  wait	  to	  study	  evidence,	  every	  suspect	  is	  a	  traitor.	  Whoever	  insists,	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  war,	  on	  defending	  peace	  among	  men	  knows	  that	  he	  risks	  his	  own	  peace,	  his	  reputation,	  his	  friends,	  for	  his	  belief.1	  	  	  Romain	  Rolland,	  “Our	  Neighbor	  The	  Enemy”	  (1915)	  	  	  	   Brutal	  repression	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  postcolonial	  societies,	  which	  were	  in	  a	  process	  of	  nation	  building,	  with	  a	  need	  to	  create	  order	  and	  unity	  through	  eliminating	  thousands	  of	  “others”	  within	  society.	  Purges	  of	  similarly	  massive	  scales,	  while	  differing	  in	  degrees	  of	  violence,	  occurred	  in	  former-­‐colonial	  countries	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  ostensibly	  as	  manifestations	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  that	  explosively	  flared	  up	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950:	  the	  Red	  Purge	  in	  Japan,	  the	  increase	  in	  anti-­‐strike	  and	  anti-­‐labor	  waves	  in	  Britain,	  and	  McCarthyism	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  Were	  there	  any	  similarities	  between	  these	  suppressions	  and	  those	  in	  postcolonial	  societies?	  Why	  did	  they	  occur	  all	  at	  once?	  As	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  China,	  Taiwan,	  and	  the	  Philippines,	  these	  phenomena	  have	  customarily	  been	  treated	  as	  separate	  occurrences,	  and	  viewed	  through	  a	  Cold	  War	  lens,	  and,	  thus,	  often	  described	  as	  end	  results	  of	  the	  global	  confrontation	  on	  the	  ground.	  Examining	  them	  in	  this	  way,	  it	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  existing	  literature	  tended	  to	  consolidate,	  rather	  than	  question,	  the	  conventional	  notions	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  In	  an	  effort	  to	  raise	  questions	  about	  this	  framework,	  itself,	  however,	  this	  chapter	  revisits	  these	  domestic	  purges	  in	  order	  to	  reconsider	  the	  meanings	  of	  such	  
                                                1	  Romain	  Rolland,	  “Our	  Neighbor	  The	  Enemy,”	  in	  Above	  the	  Battle	  (1916),	  141-­‐42.	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events	  that	  simultaneously	  escalated	  in	  this	  short	  time	  period.	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  the	  primary	  focus,	  here,	  is	  to	  reassess	  the	  meaning	  of	  these	  suppressions	  through	  tracing	  what	  happened	  within	  societies,	  rather	  than	  prioritizing	  investigations	  of	  power	  holders’	  intentions.	  This	  is	  because,	  once	  we	  approach	  a	  social	  phenomenon	  through	  the	  examination	  of	  social	  and	  political	  elites,	  we	  are	  apt	  not	  to	  consider	  its	  meaning,	  since	  such	  is	  often	  confused	  with	  those	  elites’	  intentions.	  Thus,	  this	  chapter	  instead	  looks	  into	  each	  society,	  itself,	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  social	  mechanisms	  of	  suppression.	  The	  simple	  question	  to	  be	  raised	  here	  is:	  Who	  purged	  whom	  for	  what	  purpose?	  	  	   One	  might	  raise	  doubts	  about	  the	  manner	  of	  treating	  equally,	  for	  instance,	  McCarthyism	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Counterrevolutionaries	  in	  China,	  because	  they	  were	  different	  in	  many	  ways.	  However,	  such	  a	  notion	  that	  they	  were	  utterly	  and	  inherently	  distinct	  is	  exactly	  what	  this	  study	  attempts	  to	  challenge.	  Understanding	  the	  many	  important	  differences	  among	  and	  between	  these	  suppressions,	  this	  study	  shows	  certain	  similarities	  through	  analyzing	  and	  examining	  the	  social	  and	  local	  functions	  of	  these	  purges.	  In	  doing	  this,	  this	  chapter	  maintains	  that	  the	  series	  of	  domestic	  purges	  in	  this	  period	  was	  not	  so	  much	  characteristic	  of	  a	  particular	  ideology	  or	  regime,	  but	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  a	  simultaneous	  worldwide	  phenomenon,	  based	  on	  shared	  experiences	  of	  postwar	  situations.	  As	  we	  will	  discuss	  at	  the	  end	  of	  this	  chapter,	  such	  purges	  functioned	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  “protecting”	  society,	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  played	  important	  roles.	  What	  become	  clear	  are,	  thus,	  not	  just	  the	  imagined	  nature	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  but	  the	  social	  needs	  of	  such	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imagination	  in	  many	  places	  in	  the	  postwar	  world.	  Let	  us	  begin	  to	  examine	  the	  massive	  purge	  that	  escalated	  in	  Japan	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  	  	  	  
Japan:	  Reconsidering	  the	  “Red	  Purge”	  	   At	  3	  pm	  on	  July	  28,	  1950,	  thirty-­‐one	  workers	  at	  Mainichi	  Shinbun	  [Mainichi	  Newspaper]	  in	  Tokyo	  were	  called	  to	  their	  bosses’	  offices,	  most	  individually,	  and	  told	  that	  they	  were	  fired,	  on	  the	  spot.	  The	  only	  reason	  they	  were	  given	  was	  that	  the	  news	  media	  had	  an	  important	  responsibility	  in	  driving	  out	  communists	  and	  communist	  sympathizers	  from	  the	  company.	  The	  same	  notification	  was	  conveyed	  simultaneously	  at	  other	  major	  newspaper	  companies,	  such	  as	  Asahi	  and	  Yomiuri.	  These	  were	  a	  few	  of	  numerous	  cases	  of	  mass	  dismissals	  at	  companies,	  schools,	  and	  governmental	  offices	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  summer	  and	  fall	  of	  1950,	  during	  which	  roughly	  13,000	  people	  were	  fired—a	  phenomenon	  commonly	  known	  as	  the	  “Red	  Purge”	  in	  Japan.	  	  As	  the	  naming	  suggests,	  the	  waves	  of	  mass	  dismissals	  have	  been	  viewed	  conventionally	  through	  a	  Cold	  War	  lens.	  The	  traditional	  understanding	  is	  that	  this	  was	  a	  purge	  of	  communists	  and	  communist	  sympathizers,	  primarily	  conducted	  under	  orders	  from	  the	  General	  Headquarters	  (GHQ),	  the	  U.S.	  Occupation	  Headquarters	  in	  Tokyo.	  Given	  such	  a	  presumption,	  interestingly,	  or	  strangely,	  there	  has	  not	  been	  so	  much	  discussion	  of	  who	  actually	  planned	  and	  conducted	  this	  so-­‐called	  Red	  Purge.	  In	  the	  existing	  literature,	  as	  historian	  Hans	  Martin	  Kramer	  points	  out,	  the	  answer	  has	  been	  almost	  taken	  for	  granted.2	  It	  was	  the	  Americans.	  It	  was	  the	  
                                                2	  Hans	  Martin	  Kramer,	  “Just	  Who	  Reversed	  the	  Course?	  The	  Red	  Purge	  in	  Higher	  Education	  during	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GHQ	  and	  Washington.	  Their	  purpose	  in	  the	  Red	  Purge	  was,	  it	  is	  commonly	  argued,	  to	  make	  Japan	  a	  fortress	  against	  the	  threat	  of	  Soviet	  expansionism	  in	  East	  Asia.	  However,	  through	  examination	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Red	  Purge,	  this	  section	  questions	  the	  conventional	  narrative,	  suggesting	  that	  we	  are	  missing	  something	  important	  by	  perceiving	  this	  phenomenon	  as	  the	  “Red”	  Purge.	  	  The	  practice	  of	  firing	  employees,	  of	  course,	  was	  not	  a	  new	  phenomenon,	  but	  it	  did	  not	  reach	  its	  peak	  until	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  primarily	  because	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  powerful	  opposition.	  In	  an	  extreme	  case,	  occurring	  in	  Nagano	  in	  early	  1950,	  a	  worker	  received	  notifications	  of	  dismissal	  seventy	  times,	  but	  could	  fight	  back	  because	  of	  strong	  support	  from	  labor	  union	  members.3	  Such	  a	  case	  is	  rare	  but	  still	  understandable	  in	  view	  of	  the	  enormous	  influence	  of	  labor	  and	  leftist	  movements	  in	  postwar	  Japan.	  The	  event	  that	  changed	  this	  was	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  on	  June	  25,	  1950,	  which	  affected	  both	  radicals’	  and	  conservatives’	  ways	  of	  thinking,	  decisively	  changing	  the	  social	  and	  political	  environment	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.	  	  Immediately	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  apprehensions	  grew	  among	  the	  ruling	  circles	  in	  Japan.	  What	  they	  worried	  about	  was	  not	  so	  much	  a	  direct	  Soviet	  attack,	  but	  an	  alleged	  internal	  danger:	  a	  “red	  menace”	  at	  home.	  One	  declassified	  document	  shows,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  military	  official	  personally	  warned	  Prime	  Minister	  Yoshida	  Shigeru	  that,	  if	  the	  war	  spread	  to	  Japan,	  it	  would	  be	  guerrilla	  warfare,	  and	  guerrilla	  riots	  led	  by	  “Red	  Japanese”	  would	  occur	  everywhere	  in	  the	  
                                                                                                                                            the	  Occupation	  of	  Japan,”	  Social	  Science	  Japan	  Journal	  (November	  2004),	  1-­‐18.	  	  3	  Fujikawa	  Yoshitaro,	  oral	  interview	  in	  Kawanishi	  Hirosuke,	  Kikigaki:	  Densan	  no	  gunzo	  [Oral	  Recollections:	  Figures	  in	  the	  All	  Japan	  Electricity	  Workers	  Union]	  (Tokyo:	  Heigensha,	  1992),	  244.	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country,	  creating	  a	  nationwide	  threat	  with	  which	  the	  newly	  established	  National	  Police	  Reserve	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  cope.4	  Conservative	  politicians	  had	  been	  particularly	  worried	  about	  leftists’	  nation-­‐wide	  networks	  and	  organizations	  that	  could	  disturb	  the	  social	  order.5	  Yoshida,	  likewise,	  was	  concerned	  that	  radicals’	  riots	  would	  influence	  even	  the	  fate	  of	  his	  administration.6	  	  Conservatives’	  anxiety	  of	  this	  kind	  was	  certainly	  exaggerated,	  but	  not	  altogether	  mistaken	  in	  view	  of	  the	  popularity	  of	  leftist	  thought	  in	  postwar	  Japan.	  In	  the	  summer	  of	  1950,	  radicals	  in	  Japan	  happily	  spread	  rumors	  that	  the	  People’s	  Liberation	  Army	  was	  coming,	  and	  that	  the	  same	  pattern	  of	  revolution	  would	  occur	  in	  Japan	  near	  future.7	  Such	  a	  mood	  took	  on	  an	  air	  of	  “truth”	  due	  to	  the	  social	  unrest	  prevailing	  in	  Japan	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  and	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1950,	  with	  numerous	  clashes	  between	  labor	  unions	  and	  police	  forces	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  country.8	  A	  renowned	  Japanese	  intellectual,	  Takeuchi	  Yoshimi	  nicely	  summarized	  the	  air	  of	  the	  period.	  He	  wrote:	  	  In	  1950,	  war	  and	  revolution	  was	  not	  prediction	  but	  reality.	  The	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  was	  established	  in	  the	  previous	  year,	  and	  the	  Korean	  War	  occurred	  in	  that	  year.	  Many	  believed	  a	  revolution	  in	  Japan	  was	  inevitable.	  I	  wonder	  that	  no	  one	  at	  that	  time	  expected	  tranquility	  ten	  years	  hence.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  Japanese	  Communist	  Party	  (JCP)’s	  platform	  from	  a	  moderate	  to	  an	  aggressive	  course—a	  drastic	  shift	  occurring	  in	  early	  1950	  as	  a	  result	  
                                                4	  “Meguro	  gaisho	  kantei	  ni	  okeru	  yushikisha	  kaigo	  [Memo	  on	  the	  Advisory	  Committee	  Meeting	  at	  the	  Official	  Residence	  of	  the	  Foreign	  Ministry	  in	  Meguro],”	  October	  5,	  1950,	  Nihon	  Gaiko	  Bunsho:	  Heiwa	  
jyoyaku;	  Taibei	  Kosho	  [Documents	  on	  Japanese	  Foreign	  Policy:	  Treaty	  of	  Peace	  with	  Japan;	  Negotiation	  
with	  the	  US]	  (hereafter	  NGB:	  Negotiation	  with	  the	  US),	  (Tokyo,	  2007),	  41.	  	  5	  “Problems	  in	  the	  Various	  Reforms	  for	  the	  Democratization	  of	  Japan,”	  November	  9,	  1950,	  NGB:	  
Negotiation	  with	  the	  US,	  85.	  	  6	  Yoshida	  Shigeru,	  Kaiso	  Junen	  [Reminiscence	  of	  the	  Ten-­‐Years]	  Vol.	  2	  (Tokyo,	  1957),	  260-­‐78.	  7	  Letter,	  Chiba	  Kiyoshi	  to	  Ashida	  Hitoshi,	  Papers	  of	  Ashida	  Hitoshi	  (hereafter	  PAH),	  Correspondence	  File,	  No.	  266.	  National	  Diet	  Library	  (hereafter	  NDL),	  Tokyo,	  Japan;	  Asahi	  Shinbun,	  July	  5,	  1950.	  	  8	  Kawanishi,	  Kikigaki	  [Oral	  Recollections],	  273.	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of	  Moscow’s	  critique	  concerning	  the	  JCP’s	  unique	  course	  of	  “peaceful	  revolution”—strengthened	  the	  plausibility	  of	  the	  scenario.	  It	  was	  such	  a	  context—rising	  fears	  and	  hopes	  provided	  by	  the	  Korean	  War—that	  prepared	  a	  social	  atmosphere	  to	  make	  the	  escalation	  of	  mass	  firings	  much	  easier.	  	  	   The	  first	  wave	  of	  mass	  dismissals	  occurred	  in	  the	  newspaper	  industry.	  Immediately	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  General	  MacArthur	  issued	  an	  statement,	  declaring	  a	  need	  to	  remove	  communists	  in	  the	  newspaper	  industries,	  who	  were	  “inciting	  the	  irresponsible	  and	  lawless	  minority	  elements	  of	  society	  to	  oppose	  law,	  disturb	  order,	  and	  subvert	  the	  general	  welfare.”9	  Based	  on	  this	  announcement,	  fifty	  newspaper	  companies	  nationwide	  unilaterally	  notified	  a	  total	  of	  704	  employees	  that	  they	  were	  being	  terminated.	  These	  ranged	  from	  major	  newspapers	  like	  Asahi	  Shinbun	  (104	  dismissed	  among	  5,200	  staff),	  Mainichi	  Shinbun	  (49	  among	  5,000),	  and	  Yomiuri	  Shinbun	  (34	  among	  2,200)	  to	  small	  local	  newspapers	  such	  as	  Nihonkai	  Shinbun	  (9	  among	  90)	  at	  Tottori,	  as	  well	  as	  Shinyo	  Shinbun	  (1	  among	  50)	  at	  Matsumoto,	  Nagano.10	  	  Many,	  of	  course,	  refused	  to	  accept	  sudden	  termination	  and	  tried	  to	  continue	  to	  fight.	  Some	  simply	  went	  to	  their	  workplaces,	  but	  were	  forcefully	  removed	  by	  security	  guards	  and	  plainclothes	  policemen.	  Others	  sought	  help	  from	  unions	  at	  their	  companies,	  but,	  in	  many	  cases,	  were	  almost	  completely	  ignored.	  Still	  others	  took	  the	  matter	  to	  court,	  but	  many	  of	  their	  cases	  were	  turned	  down,	  as	  most	  courts	  
                                                9	  Sodei	  Rinjiro	  ed.,	  Yoshida	  Shigeru	  –	  Makkasa	  ofuku	  shokanshu	  1945-­‐1951	  [The	  Collection	  of	  
Correspondence	  between	  Yoshida	  Shigeru	  and	  MacArthur	  1945-­‐1951]	  (Tokyo,	  2000),	  English	  side,	  205-­‐6.	  	  10	  1950-­‐nen	  7-­‐gatsu	  28-­‐nichi:	  Asahi	  Shinbunsha	  no	  reddo	  paji	  shogenroku	  [July	  28,	  1950:	  The	  Collection	  
of	  Testimonies	  about	  the	  Red	  Purge	  at	  the	  Asahi	  Newspaper]	  (Tokyo,	  1981),	  28-­‐29.	  Also,	  Hirata	  Tetsuo,	  
Reddo	  paji	  no	  shiteki	  kyumei	  [Historical	  Inquiring	  into	  the	  Red	  Purge]	  (Tokyo,	  2002),	  214.	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concluded	  that	  they	  did	  not	  have	  jurisdiction	  over	  MacArthur’s	  orders	  during	  the	  occupation.11	  But	  what	  most	  severely	  and	  effectively	  discouraged	  discharged	  persons	  from	  continuing	  to	  fight,	  according	  to	  many	  persons’	  recollections,	  was	  the	  abrupt	  changes	  in	  attitudes	  of	  their	  colleagues,	  union	  members,	  and	  personal	  friends.	  “I	  felt	  I	  suddenly	  became	  a	  person	  with	  an	  infectious	  disease.	  Everyone	  stopped	  talking	  to	  me,”	  said	  a	  female	  worker	  at	  Asahi	  Shinbun,	  Kuboi	  Mitsuko,	  who	  had	  just	  been	  dismissed.	  She	  remembered	  that	  her	  colleagues	  literally	  turned	  their	  faces	  away	  when	  she	  happened	  to	  meet	  them.12	  	  	  
The	  Spread	  of	  Mass	  Firing	  in	  the	  Fall	  of	  1950	  The	  wave	  of	  mass	  dismissals	  that	  first	  became	  serious	  in	  the	  newspaper	  industry	  spread	  to	  ordinary	  companies	  at	  a	  much	  larger	  scale	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  in	  industries	  including	  coal,	  steel,	  shipbuilding,	  chemistry,	  railways,	  mining,	  and	  so	  on.13	  We	  still	  don’t	  know	  the	  exact	  number	  of	  dismissal,	  but	  at	  least	  13,000	  employees	  were	  laid	  off	  at	  this	  time.	  As	  historian	  Miyake	  Akimasa	  points	  out,	  the	  scale	  of	  the	  Red	  Purge	  is	  difficult	  to	  measure	  because	  small	  businesses	  and	  companies	  were,	  from	  the	  beginning,	  excluded	  from	  statistics.14	  These	  waves	  of	  mass	  firings	  were	  deemed	  the	  “Red	  Purge,”	  and	  the	  common	  understanding	  was	  
                                                11	  Similar	  experiences	  can	  be	  found	  in	  various	  court	  documents,	  such	  as	  in	  charge	  sheets,	  which	  are	  kept	  in	  the	  Collection	  of	  Red	  Purge	  Documents	  in	  the	  Ohara	  Shakai	  Mondai	  Kenkyujo	  [The	  Ohara	  Institute	  for	  Social	  Studies]	  (hereafter	  OISS)	  in	  Hosei	  University,	  Tokyo.	  A	  group	  of	  discharged	  persons	  in	  Yomiuri,	  Mainichi,	  and	  Asashi,	  for	  instance,	  sued	  the	  company,	  and	  their	  statements	  described	  these	  struggles;	  for	  these	  companies,	  see	  Files	  No.	  20-­‐5.	  Also,	  see	  various	  testimonies	  in	  	  
1950-­‐nen	  7-­‐gatsu	  28-­‐nichi	  [July	  28,	  1950]	  [July	  28,	  1950:	  The	  Collection	  of	  Testimonies	  about	  the	  Red	  
Purge	  at	  the	  Asahi	  Newspaper]	  (Tokyo,	  1981),	  12	  See,	  for	  example,	  court	  documents	  in	  the	  Collection	  of	  Red	  Purge	  Documents	  in	  the	  OISS.	  Also,	  see	  
1950	  nen	  7	  gatsu	  28	  nichi	  	  [July	  28,	  1950],	  66	  and	  132.	  13	  “Shakai	  undo	  tsushin	  [Newsletters	  for	  Social	  Movements],”	  November	  1,	  1950,	  Collections	  of	  Journals,	  OISS,	  Hosei	  University,	  Tokyo,	  Japan.	  	  	  14	  Miyake	  Akimasa,	  Reddo	  paji	  to	  wa	  nani	  ka	  [What	  was	  the	  Red	  Purge?]	  (Tokyo,	  1994),	  7-­‐10.	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that	  they	  were	  planned	  and	  conducted	  by	  the	  United	  States	  in	  order	  to	  create	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  country	  in	  East	  Asia.	  	  However,	  once	  we	  look	  the	  situation	  carefully,	  the	  mass	  firings	  of	  1950	  seem	  more	  than	  just	  a	  Red	  Purge.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  second	  wave	  of	  the	  Red	  Purge	  was	  essentially	  different	  from	  the	  first.	  Clearly	  keeping	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  mind,	  the	  earlier	  Red	  Purge	  aimed	  at	  picking	  off	  “communists,”	  however	  vague	  the	  meaning	  of	  that	  term,	  and	  was	  based	  on	  MacArthur’s	  statement;	  the	  second	  wave,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  carried	  out	  based	  on	  judgments	  of	  each	  company,	  and	  targeted	  anything	  “destructive”	  to	  the	  company.15	  In	  terms	  of	  the	  second	  waves	  of	  mass	  terminations	  in	  other	  industries,	  there	  was	  no	  single	  order	  issued	  by	  the	  GHQ.	  In	  essence,	  the	  mass	  dismissals	  in	  those	  companies,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  termination	  of	  more	  than	  13,000	  workers,	  were	  planned,	  conducted,	  and	  maintained	  through	  judgments	  of	  each	  company,	  and	  each	  had	  its	  own	  reasoning	  and	  criteria	  for	  who	  should	  be	  let	  go	  and	  why.	  One	  criterion,	  compiled	  by	  the	  largest	  mining	  company	  in	  Japan,	  Mitsui	  Miike	  
Coal	  Mine,	  shows	  how	  diverse	  the	  objects	  of	  this	  “Red	  Purge”	  were.	  The	  long	  list	  of	  twenty-­‐two	  itemized	  categories	  targeted	  not	  only	  communists,	  party	  members,	  and	  those	  who	  had	  left	  or	  been	  removed	  from	  the	  party,	  but	  also	  various	  kinds	  of	  “sympathizers”	  who,	  for	  example,	  had	  tried	  to	  help	  those	  who	  were	  fired.	  It	  targeted	  even	  those	  who	  could	  “possibly”	  behave	  in	  such	  a	  way,	  or	  “possibly”	  hinder	  the	  company’s	  operations.16	  With	  criteria	  so	  broad	  and	  vague,	  how	  did	  this	  second	  wave	  
                                                15	  “Redo	  paji	  kanshi	  [Brief	  History	  of	  Red	  Purge],”	  Collections	  of	  Documents	  related	  to	  the	  Red	  Purge,	  No.	  17-­‐4,	  OISS,	  Hosei	  University,	  Tokyo.	  16	  “Shakei	  undo	  tsushin	  [Newsletters	  for	  Social	  Movements],”	  October	  25,	  1950,	  Collections	  of	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of	  mass	  dismissals	  function	  on	  the	  ground?	  Observing	  the	  development	  of	  the	  “Red	  Purge,”	  the	  Labor	  Division	  of	  the	  GHQ	  warned	  that	  it	  must	  not	  be	  mixed	  up	  with	  the	  rationalization	  of	  companies.17	  Various	  archival	  documents	  show,	  however,	  that	  the	  actual	  practice	  of	  this	  “Red	  Purge”	  was	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  termination	  of	  “communists”;	  more	  often,	  it	  was	  utilized	  in	  various	  and	  local	  ways,	  as	  an	  excuse.	  	  	  
The	  Case	  of	  Nippon	  Kokan	  [Japan	  Steel	  Tube	  Company]	  	  Take	  one	  small	  case	  as	  an	  example:	  that	  of	  Nippon	  Kokan	  [Nippon	  Steel	  Tube	  Company],	  which	  fired	  190	  workers	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950.	  The	  dispute	  began	  with	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  company	  president,	  Kawata	  Shige,	  on	  October	  23,	  stating	  that	  he	  was	  compelled	  to	  discharge	  workers	  “who	  hindered	  the	  smooth	  operation	  of	  the	  company’s	  business	  or	  refused	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  company.”18	  However,	  if	  this	  is	  a	  criteria	  for	  firing	  “communists	  and	  communist	  sympathizers,”	  the	  company	  could	  dismiss	  almost	  anyone	  it	  did	  not	  like,	  couldn’t	  it?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  this	  company,	  that’s	  what	  happened.	  	  Even	  GHQ	  officials,	  often	  considered	  operators	  of	  the	  “Red	  Purge,”	  were	  alarmed,	  as	  one	  staff	  member	  in	  the	  Labor	  Division	  described	  the	  trend	  as	  an	  “abuse	  of	  the	  Red	  Purge.”19	  The	  Chief	  of	  the	  Division,	  Robert	  Amis,	  for	  example,	  warned	  the	  management	  of	  Nippon	  Kokan:	  	  What	  I	  have	  said	  before	  is	  not	  being	  followed	  by	  the	  management.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  management	  is	  taking	  advantage.	  Concrete	  reasons	  for	  dismissal	  should	  be	  given.	  If	  reasons	  for	  dismissal	  cannot	  be	  cited	  correctly,	  defer	  the	  discharge.	  When	  a	  
                                                                                                                                            Journals,	  OISS,	  Hosei	  University,	  Tokyo.	  Also,	  see	  Miyake,	  Reddo	  paji	  to	  wa	  nani	  ka,	  87-­‐88.	  	  17	  “Mr.	  Kaite’s	  Comments	  on	  he	  ‘Red	  Expulsion,’”	  September	  23,	  1950,	  File	  11,	  Box	  5,	  Papers	  of	  Valery	  Burati	  (hereafter	  PVB),	  Wayne	  State	  University	  (hereafter	  WSU),	  Detroit,	  MI.	  18	  “The	  Announcement	  of	  the	  President,”	  October	  23,	  1950,	  File	  12,	  Box	  5,	  PVB,	  WSU,	  Detroit,	  MI.	  	  	  	  	  19	  Letter,	  Valery	  Burati	  to	  Philip	  B.	  Sullivan,	  May	  10,	  1951,	  File	  13,	  Box	  1,	  PVB,	  WSU,	  Detroit,	  MI.	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dismissed	  employee	  does	  not	  fall	  under	  the	  reason,	  he	  should	  be	  returned	  to	  his	  post,	  and	  wages	  during	  his	  dismissal	  should	  be	  paid.20	  	  	  The	  company	  ignored	  this	  warning	  at	  this	  point.	  	  	  Meanwhile,	  Ishijima	  Seiichi,	  a	  27-­‐year-­‐old	  worker	  at	  the	  company’s	  Tsurumi	  Plant,	  wrote	  a	  lengthy	  petition	  to	  Robert	  Amis,	  asking	  for	  help,	  explaining	  that,	  although	  he	  was	  an	  active	  union	  member	  at	  his	  plant,	  he	  had	  never	  been	  a	  communist,	  nor	  a	  communist	  sympathizer.	  He	  appealed	  that	  the	  company	  disliked	  him	  because,	  as	  a	  union	  member,	  he	  had	  “found	  many	  defects	  in	  the	  way	  the	  management	  of	  the	  company	  [was]	  carried	  out”	  and	  because	  he	  “submitted	  his	  opinion	  about	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  management.”21	  	  Mr.	  Ishijima’s	  letter,	  which	  contained	  a	  detailed	  counterargument	  to	  the	  company’s	  charges,	  was	  translated	  and	  taken	  seriously.	  Amis,	  then,	  examined	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  Ishijima’s	  letter	  with	  the	  help	  of	  Japan’s	  Labor	  Ministry,	  whose	  officials	  interviewed	  Ishijima	  and	  concluded	  the	  he	  was	  not	  a	  communist.	  Based	  on	  this	  information,	  Amis	  met	  with	  company	  officers	  and	  urged	  them	  to	  re-­‐employ	  Ishijima.	  	  This	  time	  the	  company	  reacted.	  They	  invited	  Mr.	  Ishijima	  to	  a	  dinner	  and	  told	  him	  that	  the	  company	  admitted	  he	  was	  not	  a	  communist.	  Yet,	  they	  still	  refused	  to	  re-­‐employ	  him	  and	  asked	  to	  make	  a	  deal,	  offering	  him	  a	  sum	  of	  250,000	  Japanese	  yen,	  on	  condition	  that	  he	  would	  not	  challenge	  the	  management	  again	  before	  the	  GHQ	  or	  the	  public.22	  Mr.	  Ishijima	  was	  in	  a	  tough	  spot.	  Having	  children	  and	  a	  wife,	  and	  
                                                20	  “Mr.	  Amis	  gives	  warning	  to	  the	  management,”	  October	  26,	  1950,	  File	  13,	  Box	  5,	  PVB,	  WSU,	  Detroit,	  MI.	  21	  “Memo	  for	  Mr.	  Amis,”	  January	  24,	  1951,	  File	  15,	  Box	  5,	  PVB,	  WSU,	  Detroit,	  MI.	  22	  Memorandum,	  “To	  Mr.	  Amis,”	  no	  date,	  File	  15	  Box	  5,	  PVB;	  and	  “Memo	  for	  Mr.	  Amis,”	  February	  8,	  1951,	  File	  15	  Box	  5,	  PVB,	  WSU,	  Detroit,	  MI.	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without	  a	  possibility	  of	  returning	  to	  the	  company,	  he	  apparently	  accepted	  this	  offer.	  We	  do	  not	  have	  any	  further	  records	  involving	  him.	  GHQ	  officials	  were	  confused	  and	  disturbed	  by	  the	  company’s	  refusal	  to	  re-­‐hire	  Mr.	  Ishijima,	  in	  spite	  of	  GHQ’s	  repeated	  warnings.	  One	  Japanese	  official	  at	  the	  Labor	  Ministry	  explained	  them	  that,	  even	  though	  he	  was	  not	  a	  communist,	  he	  might	  be	  considered	  some	  kind	  of	  a	  “trouble-­‐maker”	  for	  the	  company	  because	  he	  had	  actively	  criticized	  the	  management	  as	  one	  of	  the	  founding	  organizers	  of	  a	  union	  at	  his	  factory	  in	  Tsurumi.23	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  was	  Japan’s	  Labor	  Minister,	  not	  the	  GHQ,	  who,	  in	  early	  October	  1950,	  presented	  a	  “guideline”	  for	  the	  Red	  Purge	  in	  companies,	  and	  accepted	  the	  dismissal	  of	  not	  only	  members	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  and	  fellow-­‐travelers	  but	  also	  “those	  inveterate	  active	  trouble	  makers,	  taking	  leadership	  roles	  in	  activities,	  inciting	  others,	  or	  being	  original	  planners	  of	  incitation,	  thus	  causing	  real	  injury	  to	  the	  safety	  and	  peace	  of	  the	  enterprise.”24	  With	  this	  vague	  definition	  of	  “trouble	  makers,”	  many	  companies	  took	  advantage.	  Such	  cases	  are	  numerous,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  Niigata	  
Tekkosho,	  a	  small	  iron	  works	  in	  Niigata	  Prefecture,	  where	  three	  dozen	  workers,	  mostly	  active	  union	  members,	  were	  fired	  as	  “trouble-­‐makers”	  for	  being	  “uncooperative,”	  “disturbing,”	  and	  “undesirable”	  elements	  in	  the	  company.	  One	  worker	  noticed	  that	  dismissals	  of	  workers	  were	  especially	  numerous	  in	  groups	  where	  labor-­‐management	  negotiations	  had	  been	  fierce.25	  	  
                                                23	  “Memo	  for	  Mr.	  Amis,”	  January	  24,	  1951,	  File	  15,	  Box	  5,	  PVB,	  WSU,	  Detroit,	  MI.	  24	  “Exclusion	  of	  Communistic	  Destructive	  Elements	  in	  Enterprise,”	  no	  date,	  File	  13,	  Box	  5,	  PVB;	  and	  	  “Nikkan	  Rodo	  Tsushin”	  [Daily	  Labor	  Bulletin],	  October	  18,	  1950,	  File	  13,	  Box	  5,	  PVB,	  WSU,	  Detroit,	  MI.	  	  25	  “Niigata	  Tekkosho	  File,”	  No.	  20-­‐11,	  Collection	  of	  Documents	  related	  to	  the	  Red	  Purge,	  OISS,	  Hosei	  University,	  Tokyo.	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Similar	  conduct	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Japan’s	  major	  transport	  company,	  
Nittsu,	  Here,	  800	  “reds”	  were	  fired;	  many	  were,	  actually,	  guilty	  only	  of	  participating	  in	  wildcat	  strikes	  earlier	  in	  the	  summer	  of	  1950.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Dai	  Nippon	  Boseki	  [Dai	  Nippon	  Spinning	  Company],	  such	  a	  tendency	  was	  so	  conspicuous	  that	  Valery	  Burati,	  a	  GHQ	  official	  in	  the	  Labor	  Division,	  described	  the	  company	  as	  “one	  of	  the	  worst	  offenders	  in	  the	  field	  of	  textiles	  in	  taking	  advantage	  of	  [the]	  ‘red	  purge’	  to	  dismiss	  anti-­‐communists	  who	  were,	  in	  fact,	  aggressive	  union	  officers.”26	  As	  this	  comment	  shows,	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  “Red	  Purge”	  went	  far	  beyond	  the	  control	  of	  the	  GHQ,	  developing	  to	  cover	  up	  what	  were,	  in	  reality,	  labor	  and	  social	  disputes.	  	  	  
Internal	  Dispute	  in	  Labor	  Unions	  However,	  it	  is	  still	  simplistic	  to	  describe	  the	  “Red	  Purge”	  simply	  as	  a	  phenomenon	  in	  which	  the	  management	  took	  advantage	  of	  the	  mood	  to	  solve	  labor	  disputes.	  This	  is	  because	  struggles	  were	  fought,	  not	  only	  between	  management	  and	  the	  labor,	  but	  also	  among	  members	  within	  labor	  unions.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  Densan	  [All	  Japan	  Electric	  Workers	  Union],	  for	  example,	  a	  dispute	  between,	  at	  least	  on	  the	  surface,	  “communist”	  and	  “non-­‐communist”	  factions	  had	  been	  developing	  since	  1947.	  This	  internal	  dispute	  culminated	  at	  the	  union’s	  annual	  conference	  in	  Nara	  in	  May	  1950,	  which	  was	  eventually	  canceled	  due	  to	  a	  violent	  clash	  between	  the	  two	  factions.	  Following	  this	  incident,	  the	  mainstream	  “non-­‐communist”	  faction	  of	  the	  union	  circulated	  a	  communiqué,	  requiring	  the	  full	  membership	  of	  approximately	  130,000	  to	  re-­‐register,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  approval	  of	  110,000	  members	  and	  
                                                26	  Letter,	  Val	  Burati	  to	  Greechhalgh?	  International	  Federation	  of	  Textile	  Workers’	  Association,	  UK,	  May	  23,	  1951,	  File	  13,	  Box	  1,	  PVB,	  WSU,	  Detroit,	  MI.	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refusal	  from	  20,000.	  When,	  under	  the	  climate	  of	  the	  Red	  Purge	  in	  late	  August,	  the	  management	  announced	  the	  dismissal	  of	  2,137	  “key	  figures”	  among	  those	  who	  refused	  to	  re-­‐register,	  the	  labor	  union	  accepted	  it,	  because	  they	  were	  not	  “union	  members”	  anymore.27	  	  Underneath	  the	  image	  of	  ideological	  struggle	  between	  “communist”	  and	  “non-­‐communist”	  factions,	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  matter,	  thus,	  seemed	  to	  be	  a	  conflict	  over	  a	  sense	  of	  belonging.	  What	  was	  really	  criticized	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  factional	  disputes	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  ideological	  tendencies	  than	  a	  lack	  of	  love	  for	  their	  company.	  The	  aforementioned	  statement	  of	  the	  president	  at	  Nippon	  Kokan	  [Japan	  Steel	  Piping	  Company],	  for	  instance,	  criticized	  a	  “few	  workers”	  under	  the	  alleged	  influence	  of	  “outsiders”	  by	  specifically	  pointing	  them	  out	  as	  those	  who	  “always	  made	  agitating	  remarks	  and	  acted	  according	  to	  directions	  given	  by	  the	  outsiders.”28	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  labor	  union,	  too,	  similar	  remarks	  can	  be	  found.	  For	  example,	  Sasaki	  Rhyosaku,	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  figures	  of	  Densan	  [All	  Japan	  Electric	  Workers	  Union]	  between	  1946	  and	  1952,	  pointed	  out	  a	  strong	  attachment	  to	  the	  company	  among	  mainstream	  labor	  union	  leaders	  and	  members,	  while	  disdaining	  those	  who	  did	  not	  have	  such	  feelings	  as	  “communistic	  folks.”29	  Even	  beyond	  private	  enterprise,	  similar	  attitudes	  can	  be	  observed.	  At	  an	  elementary	  school	  in	  Gunma	  Prefecture,	  for	  instance,	  several	  teachers	  were	  fired	  for	  various	  reasons,	  such	  as	  “uncooperative	  attitudes,”	  “discord	  with	  colleagues,”	  “criticism	  of	  local	  and	  national	  politics,”	  and	  so	  on.	  As	  is	  apparent	  in	  these	  examples,	  
                                                27	  Kawanishi,	  Kikigaki	  [Oral	  Recollections],	  169,	  239-­‐40,	  263,	  303,	  and	  373.	  	  28	  Similar	  remarks	  can	  be	  found	  in	  various	  statements	  of	  “Densan”	  [All	  Japan	  Electricity	  Union]	  and	  “Kawasaki	  Seitetsu”	  [Kawasaki	  Steel	  Company]	  in	  this	  period.	  29	  Sasaki	  Ryosaku,	  oral	  interview	  in	  Kawanishi,	  Kikigaki	  [Oral	  Recollections],	  77.	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many	  cases	  of	  the	  so-­‐called	  Red	  Purge	  actually	  involved	  a	  screening	  of	  nonconformists,	  dissenters,	  and	  malcontents	  within	  workplaces.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  actual	  Red	  Purge	  of	  1950	  was	  not	  necessarily	  about	  ideology,	  but	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  desirable	  style	  of	  “order”	  and	  “harmony”	  in	  workplaces	  and	  society,	  although	  it	  spread	  with	  the	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  Red	  Scare	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  	  	   Through	  connecting	  with	  existing	  local	  issues,	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  Red	  Purge	  went	  further,	  to	  a	  level	  that	  Labor	  Division’s	  Burati	  described	  as	  the	  “destruction	  of	  labor	  movements.”30	  From	  these	  examples,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  say	  that	  the	  Red	  Purge	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  product	  of	  the	  GHQ’s	  direction,	  despite	  the	  common	  understanding	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  at	  that	  time	  and	  since.	  In	  fact,	  William	  Murcutt,	  Chief	  of	  the	  Economic	  and	  Scientific	  Section	  (ESS)	  told	  Chief	  of	  the	  Labor	  Division,	  Robert	  Amis,	  in	  August	  1950	  that	  the	  “GHQ	  must	  not	  be	  involved	  in	  dismissals.”31	  Amis	  recalled	  years	  later:	  	  It	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  believe	  a	  criticism	  that	  I	  directed	  the	  Red	  Purge.	  I	  did	  not	  begin	  it.	  I	  believe	  that	  it	  came	  out	  from	  the	  inside	  of	  Japan’s	  labor	  unions	  […]	  for	  they	  wanted	  to	  exclude	  communist	  factions.	  It	  came	  neither	  from	  the	  Government	  Section	  nor	  MacArthur;	  it	  came	  from	  the	  Japanese	  themselves.	  […].	  I	  got	  embroiled	  by	  leaders	  of	  the	  management	  and	  labor.	  They	  often	  invited	  me	  to	  dinner,	  took	  pictures,	  and	  used	  it	  that	  they	  were	  close	  to	  me	  and	  that	  I	  was	  hoping	  the	  Red	  Purge.32	  	  	  Conventionally,	  historians	  have	  been	  skeptical	  about	  Amis’	  remark,	  viewing	  Amis	  as	  feigning	  ignorance,	  because	  scholars	  have	  firmly	  believed	  in	  the	  absolute	  rule	  of	  U.S.	  
                                                30	  Letter,	  Burati	  to	  Sullivan,	  May	  10,	  1951,	  File	  13,	  Box	  1,	  PVB,	  WSU,	  Detroit,	  MI.	  31	  Letter,	  Burati	  to	  Sullivan,	  September	  6,	  1950,	  File	  12,	  Box	  1,	  PVB,	  WSU,	  Detroit,	  MI.	  32	  Robert	  Amis,	  oral	  interview	  in	  Takemae	  Eiji,	  Shogen	  Nihon	  senryoshi:	  GHQ	  Rodoka	  no	  gunzo	  [Oral	  Testimonies	  of	  the	  Occupation	  of	  Japan:	  The	  Figures	  in	  the	  Labor	  Division	  in	  the	  GHQ]	  (Tokyo:	  Iwanami,	  1983),	  324-­‐25.	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occupation	  power	  in	  Japan.33	  This	  view,	  of	  course,	  has	  a	  certain	  merit;	  after	  all,	  the	  GHQ	  intervened	  at	  various	  critical	  moments,	  such	  as	  the	  dismissal	  of	  “communists”	  in	  the	  newspaper	  industry.	  Nonetheless,	  Amis’	  recollection	  does	  not	  seem	  like	  a	  mere	  fraud.	  In	  fact,	  this	  is	  the	  period	  when	  the	  GHQ	  gradually	  lost	  its	  special	  aura	  of	  the	  Occupation	  of	  Japan.	  Through	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Red	  Purge,	  the	  American	  officers	  experienced	  being	  ignored	  and	  used	  by	  Japanese	  actors,	  and	  many	  realized,	  as	  Burati	  wrote	  in	  a	  personal	  letter,	  “the	  Occupation	  [had]	  gone	  to	  seed.”34	  The	  Japanese	  politicians	  and	  labor	  leaders	  likewise	  had	  been	  learning	  about	  this	  tendency,	  and	  realized	  that	  they	  could	  negotiate,	  or	  even	  flatly	  reject,	  the	  GHQ’s	  “orders.”35	  	  	  Through	  connecting	  with	  internal,	  existing	  struggles	  on	  the	  ground,	  the	  waves	  of	  the	  Red	  Purge	  spread	  widely,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  intention	  of	  SCAP	  officials	  in	  the	  Labor	  Division.	  The	  Red	  Scare	  mood	  then	  spread	  to	  the	  employment	  front	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  and	  many	  companies,	  particularly	  banks	  and	  department	  stores,	  began	  systematically	  using	  private	  investigation	  agencies	  to	  check	  applicants’	  backgrounds	  and	  political	  attitudes.	  This	  kind	  of	  climate	  reminded	  some	  people	  of	  wartime	  Japan	  under	  the	  tight	  control	  of	  the	  Public	  Security	  Preservation	  Law	  of	  1925,	  which	  provided	  a	  legal	  basis	  for	  imprisonment	  of	  communists	  and	  socialists,	  as	  well	  as	  liberals	  and	  Christians,	  and	  which	  later	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  suppression	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  opposition	  that	  did	  not	  comply	  with	  Japan’s	  war	  effort.	  	  	  
                                                33	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Takemae,	  Shogen	  Nihon	  senryoshi	  [Oral	  Testimonies	  of	  the	  Occupation	  of	  Japan]	  and	  Miyake	  Akimasa,	  Reddo	  paji	  to	  wa	  nani	  ka	  [What	  was	  the	  Red	  Purge?].	  	  34	  Letter,	  Burati	  to	  Sullivan,	  August	  22,	  1950,	  File	  12,	  Box	  1,	  PVB,	  WSU,	  Detroit,	  MI.	  35	  Sasaki	  Ryosuke,	  oral	  interview	  in	  Kawanishi,	  Kikigaki	  [Oral	  Recollections],	  56.	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Social	  Reactions	  to	  the	  Red	  Purge	  	   It	  was	  such	  feelings	  of	  a	  “return”	  to	  wartime	  that	  precipitated	  the	  agitation	  of	  the	  student	  movement.	  While	  the	  wave	  of	  student	  movements	  had	  been	  growing	  since	  the	  early	  days	  of	  the	  postwar	  period,	  it	  was	  the	  years	  between	  1950	  and	  1953,	  in	  particular,	  that	  marked	  their	  full	  zenith.36	  On	  September	  29,	  1950,	  for	  instance,	  1,500	  students	  gathered	  at	  Waseda	  University	  in	  opposition	  to	  the	  firing	  of	  “red”	  professors	  at	  Waseda,	  Hosei,	  and	  Tokyo	  Universities.37	  Anti-­‐Red	  Purge	  movements	  spread	  quickly	  among	  students,	  and,	  a	  week	  later,	  in	  October	  1950,	  about	  3,000	  students	  rallied	  at	  Tokyo	  University	  (Picture	  1).38	  	  One	  bulletin,	  issued	  during	  this	  demonstration,	  expressed	  students’	  concerns	  and	  ways	  of	  thinking	  very	  well;	  it	  read:	  Today’s	  Red	  Purge,	  which	  began	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  is	  essentially	  different	  from	  those	  similar	  ones	  we	  have	  been	  fighting	  since	  last	  year.	  Today’s	  Red	  Purge	  not	  only	  prepares	  for	  a	  new	  war	  but	  also	  turns	  Japan	  into	  a	  battlefield.	  Already,	  many	  factories	  in	  Japan	  have	  begun	  producing	  weapons	  openly,	  and	  propaganda	  for	  war	  has	  been	  promoted	  day	  by	  day.	  Furthermore,	  now,	  the	  smell	  of	  gunpowder	  has	  blanketed	  the	  campus,	  and	  military	  research	  at	  the	  university	  is	  spreading	  around	  us.	  Under	  such	  a	  situation,	  what	  does	  the	  Red	  Purge	  today	  mean?	  Our	  wartime	  history	  tells	  us	  the	  meaning	  of	  it.39	  	  The	  wave	  of	  student	  movements	  became	  widely	  known	  to	  the	  general	  public	  when	  a	  violent	  riot	  erupted	  at	  Waseda	  on	  October	  17,	  in	  which	  police	  made	  a	  wholesale	  mass	  arrest	  of	  143	  students—the	  first	  such	  event	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Japan.40	  	  Kobe	  Mitsuo,	  one	  of	  eighty-­‐nine	  students	  eventually	  suspended	  from	  the	  school	  for	  an	  indefinite	  period,	  wrote:	  “I	  am	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Japanese	  
                                                36	  Shiryo	  sengo	  gakusei	  undo	  [Source	  Book	  for	  Postwar	  Student	  Movements],	  Vol.	  2	  (1950-­‐1951)	  and	  Vol.	  3	  (1952-­‐1955),	  (Tokyo,	  1969).	  	  37	  Waseda	  daigaku	  shinbun,	  October	  1,	  1950.	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  NDL,	  Tokyo.	  	  	  38	  Todai	  Gakusei	  Shinbun,	  October	  5,	  1950.	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  NDL,	  Tokyo;	  Todai	  toso	  nyusu,	  October	  11,	  1950	  and	  October	  24,	  1950.	  The	  Student	  Movement	  File,	  OISS,	  Hosei	  University,	  Tokyo.	  39	  A	  statement	  draft	  for	  the	  anti-­‐red	  purge	  rally	  held	  in	  October	  1950.	  The	  Student	  Movement	  File,	  OISS,	  Tokyo.	  	  40	  “Sodai	  de	  kuzen	  no	  gakusei	  fushoji	  [Unprecedented	  Student	  Scandal	  at	  Waseda],”	  Mainichi	  Shinbun,	  October	  18,	  1950;	  Asahi	  Shinbun,	  October	  18,	  1950,	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  NDL,	  Tokyo.	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Communist	  Party,	  nor	  am	  I	  a	  communist.	  Needless	  to	  say	  not	  a	  ‘tool’	  of	  it.	  I	  am	  just	  an	  everyday	  sort	  of	  a	  student.	  I	  just	  feel	  extremely	  angry	  with	  a	  powerful	  force	  that	  suppresses	  freedom.	  I	  am	  sure	  all	  of	  us	  remember	  the	  ravages	  of	  war.”41	  	  From	  these	  statements	  above,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  point	  of	  contention	  had	  gradually	  shifted	  from	  anti-­‐Red	  Purge	  to	  anti-­‐war.	  Such	  student	  and	  peace	  movements	  developed	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period,	  which	  culminated	  in	  the	  May	  Day	  demonstration	  of	  1952	  (Picture	  2).42	  The	  evolution	  of	  student	  movements	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  is	  itself	  very	  interesting.	  However,	  what	  this	  section	  intends	  to	  focus	  on	  is	  not	  so	  much	  anti-­‐Red	  Purge	  student	  movements,	  but	  social	  reactions	  to	  these	  movements.	  	  	   In	  brief,	  the	  general	  reaction	  in	  society	  toward	  anti-­‐Red	  Purge	  movements	  was	  cold.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  primary	  concern	  for	  the	  general	  public	  was	  not	  so	  much	  the	  “Red	  Purge”	  but	  the	  seeming	  threat	  to	  order	  in	  society.	  For	  instance,	  major	  newspapers	  were	  critical	  of	  the	  students.	  Describing	  the	  student	  movements	  as	  an	  “unprecedented	  scandal,”	  an	  editorial	  of	  the	  Mainichi	  Shinbun,	  for	  instance,	  warned,	  “College	  students	  should	  not	  behave	  like	  spoiled	  children.”	  The	  newspaper	  went	  on	  to	  say	  that	  the	  “scandal”	  was	  directed	  under	  the	  “guidance	  of	  small	  and	  peculiar	  group	  of	  students,”	  that	  student	  activism	  was	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  “kind	  of	  sport	  among	  certain	  happy	  people,”	  and	  that	  the	  youth	  and	  women	  were	  
                                                41	  Waseda	  Daigaku	  Shinbun,	  December	  1,	  1950.	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  NDL,	  Tokyo.	  42	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Masuda	  Hajimu,	  “Fear	  of	  World	  War	  III:	  Social	  Politics	  of	  Japan’s	  Re-­‐armament	  and	  Peace	  Movements	  during	  the	  Korean	  War,	  1950-­‐53,”	  Journal	  of	  Contemporary	  History	  (forthcoming).	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particularly	  vulnerable	  to	  communist	  propaganda.43	  The	  Asahi	  Shinbun,	  likewise,	  wrote	  that	  such	  extreme	  actions	  should	  be	  stopped	  to	  protect	  social	  order.44	  	  	   The	  point	  in	  contention	  involved	  preserving	  order	  in	  society.	  Even	  college	  newspapers,	  like	  Waseda	  Daigaku	  Shinbun	  [Waseda	  University	  Newspaper],	  which	  had	  supported	  student	  political	  activity,	  changed	  their	  tone,	  and	  stated,	  “Students	  must	  not	  be	  rioters	  at	  any	  time.	  The	  incident	  was	  by	  no	  means	  orderly	  behavior.”45	  From	  their	  perspective,	  the	  anti-­‐Red	  Purge	  movement	  was	  bad	  not	  because	  of	  its	  point	  of	  view,	  in	  itself,	  but	  its	  disturbance	  of	  social	  order.	  For	  many,	  whatever	  the	  content	  of	  their	  arguments,	  the	  students	  need	  to	  be	  punished	  because	  they	  violated	  public	  order	  and	  security.	  In	  order	  to	  recover	  order—and	  to	  quiet	  the	  students—two	  measures	  were	  taken:	  first,	  to	  remove	  a	  number	  of	  the	  “leaders”	  of	  popular	  movements,	  and,	  second,	  to	  utilize	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  which	  proved	  quite	  useful	  in	  restoring	  order	  at	  home.46	  	  	   In	  a	  sense,	  struggles	  over	  the	  “Red	  Purge”	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  social	  contest	  between	  two	  versions	  of	  “reality”	  in	  postwar	  Japan—that	  is,	  contingency	  and	  historical	  continuity.	  One	  “reality”	  is	  that	  a	  large	  number	  of	  the	  Japanese	  people,	  especially	  the	  young	  and	  urbanites,	  enthusiastically	  embraced	  postwar	  reforms	  following	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  Many	  Japanese	  raised	  doubts	  about	  established	  orders	  and	  values,	  welcoming	  radical	  changes	  and	  reforms,	  producing	  waves	  of	  labor,	  student,	  and	  women’s	  movements	  (Picture	  3).47	  Nonetheless,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  
                                                43	  “Sodai	  de	  kuzen	  no	  gakusei	  fushoji	  [Unprecedented	  Student	  Scandal	  at	  Waseda],”	  Mainichi	  Shinbun,	  October	  18,	  1950,	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  NDL,	  Tokyo	  44	  Asahi	  Shinbun,	  October	  18,	  1950,	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  NDL,	  Tokyo.	  45	  Waseda	  Daigaku	  Shinbun,	  October	  21,	  1950.	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  NDL,	  Tokyo.	  46	  Asahi	  Shinbun,	  December	  9,	  1950;	  Mainichi	  Shinbun,	  December	  19,	  1950.	  47	  John	  W.	  Dower,	  Embracing	  Defeat:	  Japan	  in	  the	  Wake	  of	  World	  War	  II	  (New	  York:	  W.W.	  Norton,	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there	  were	  other	  groups	  of	  people,	  particularly	  elderly	  and	  rural	  residents,	  who	  detested	  postwar	  reforms,	  and	  who	  desired	  to	  restore	  “normal”	  social	  relations	  and	  order	  at	  home	  (Picture	  4).	  In	  general,	  scholarly	  work	  have	  heavily	  focused	  on	  progressive	  changes	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  such	  as	  those	  presented	  by	  labor,	  woman,	  student,	  and	  peace	  movements,	  while	  paying	  remarkably	  little	  attention	  to	  other	  people	  who	  did	  not	  welcome	  such	  changes.	  Yet,	  there	  were,	  in	  fact,	  quite	  a	  few	  kinds	  of	  those	  people.	  According	  to	  one	  opinion	  poll	  taken	  at	  the	  height	  of	  labor	  movements	  in	  1948,	  for	  instance,	  more	  than	  a	  half	  of	  those	  who	  polled	  in	  Tokyo	  and	  Kyoto	  were	  angry	  about	  recurring	  labor	  strikes.	  According	  to	  this	  poll,	  women,	  in	  particular,	  opposed	  the	  strike	  involving	  buses	  and	  surface	  railways	  in	  Kyoto	  and	  Tokyo.	  Interestingly,	  many	  did	  not	  oppose	  the	  amounts	  demanded	  by	  labor	  unions;	  they	  opposed	  the	  method	  of	  their	  demand—striking.48	  	  
“No	  Reform	  Anymore”:	  Grassroots	  Social	  Conservatism	  	   Such	  oppositional	  attitudes	  toward	  the	  radical	  manner	  of	  changes	  in	  society	  clearly	  appeared	  in	  the	  1952	  national	  election—the	  first	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  U.S.	  occupation,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  return	  of	  the	  conservative	  party	  to	  national	  politics.	  Observing	  election	  result,	  literary	  scholar	  Togawa	  Yukio	  wrote:	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Liberal	  Party	  gets	  a	  majority	  after	  all	  demonstrates	  the	  popular	  will.	  It	  suggests	  the	  wish	  of	  the	  voiceless	  people,	  which	  seems	  to	  be:	  “No	  reform	  anymore.”	  People	  are	  finally	  able	  to	  live	  like	  decent	  human	  beings	  seven	  years	  since	  the	  defeat	  in	  the	  war.	  Of	  course,	  they	  have	  grievances	  and	  anxiety,	  but	  for	  now	  people	  want	  to	  
                                                                                                                                            1999).	  48	  “Attitudes	  of	  Tokyo	  and	  Kyoto	  Residents	  toward	  Strikes	  of	  Government	  Workers,"	  August	  1948,	  Reports	  of	  the	  Public	  Opinion	  and	  Sociological	  Research	  Division	  (CIE),	  PSD-­‐1,	  Reel	  1,	  Page	  71-­‐81,	  Modern	  Japanese	  Political	  History	  Materials	  Room,	  NDL,	  Tokyo.	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preserve	  the	  status	  quo.	  After	  drastic	  reforms,	  one	  after	  the	  other,	  people	  usually	  feel,	  for	  better	  or	  worse,	  “It’s	  all	  right	  as	  it	  is.	  Don’t	  change	  anything	  anymore.”	  I	  think	  now	  is	  the	  time	  for	  such	  a	  period.49	  	  Togawa’s	  observation	  was,	  perhaps,	  too	  moderate,	  because	  the	  victory	  of	  the	  conservative	  party	  did	  not	  mean	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  status	  quo	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.	  It	  was	  a	  clear	  choice	  to	  restore	  traditional,	  accustomed	  order	  in	  Japan,	  which	  was	  marred,	  from	  the	  conservatives’	  perspective,	  only	  during	  the	  wartime	  and	  occupation	  period.50	  However,	  he	  had	  a	  sharp	  eye	  for	  grasping	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  society	  that	  had	  come	  to	  dislike	  drastic	  social	  changes.51	  	  	   As	  a	  way	  to	  examine	  such	  an	  social	  atmosphere,	  one	  can	  read	  hundreds	  of	  letters	  and	  postcard	  in	  the	  National	  Diet	  Library	  in	  Tokyo,	  written	  by	  ordinary	  people	  and	  sent	  to	  various	  local	  and	  national	  level	  politicians	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950	  and	  1951.	  Some	  of	  them	  quite	  vividly	  give	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  social	  and	  political	  atmosphere	  of	  the	  period.	  The	  first	  is	  from	  an	  anonymous	  resident	  in	  Kyoto,	  sent	  to	  a	  local	  politician	  in	  1951.	  This	  letter	  is	  interesting	  because	  it	  expresses	  an	  aversion	  to	  recent	  social	  changes	  and	  shows	  a	  much	  deeper	  concern,	  about	  the	  lack	  of	  “chusin	  [center]”	  in	  postwar	  Japan:	  I	  believe	  the	  course	  of	  action	  we	  have	  taken	  since	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  war	  in	  every	  field,	  particularly	  politics	  and	  education,	  must	  lead	  the	  destruction	  of	  our	  nation.	  Such	  a	  way	  simply	  won’t	  work	  to	  fight	  communism	  at	  all.	  […].	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  turn	  our	  mother	  country	  into	  a	  battlefield.	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  turn	  our	  country	  into	  the	  Balkans	  in	  East	  Asia,	  nor	  another	  Korea.	  I	  want	  to	  save	  our	  country	  by	  our	  hands,	  and,	  no	  matter	  what,	  to	  protect	  it	  from	  a	  foreign	  invasion.52	  	  
                                                49	  Togawa	  Yukio,	  Waseda	  Gakusei	  Shinbun,	  October	  7,	  1952.	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  NDL,	  Tokyo.	  	  50	  For	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  conservatives,	  such	  as	  Yoshida	  Shigeru,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  John	  W.	  Dower,	  
Empire	  and	  Aftermath:	  Yoshida	  Shigeru	  and	  the	  Japanese	  Experience,	  1878-­‐1954	  (Cambridge,	  MA,	  1979).	  	  	  51	  See,	  also,	  Ronald	  Dore’s	  earlier	  field	  work,	  such	  as	  Land	  reform	  in	  Japan	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1959)	  and	  City	  life	  in	  Japan:	  A	  Study	  of	  a	  Tokyo	  Ward	  (Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  1958).	  	  52	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  Anonymous	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  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  long	  letter,	  the	  author	  got	  to	  the	  crux	  of	  his	  concerns:	  We,	  the	  people	  of	  this	  nation,	  wish	  to	  have	  the	  center.	  The	  solidarity	  of	  the	  nation	  is	  of	  vital	  importance.	  Nobody	  in	  our	  country	  will	  accept	  lines	  of	  argument,	  such	  as	  ‘for	  freedom,’	  ‘for	  peace,’	  or	  ‘for	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  standard	  of	  living.’	  Most	  importantly,	  we	  don’t	  want	  to	  throw	  away	  our	  long	  tradition.	  Nor	  do	  we	  want	  to	  give	  up	  our	  history.	  Only	  in	  this	  manner	  will	  we	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  independence	  and	  to	  cooperate	  with	  the	  anti-­‐communist	  front	  on	  the	  Western	  side.53	  	  In	  stressing	  the	  “threat”	  of	  communism,	  what	  the	  anonymous	  writer	  longed	  for	  seemed	  to	  be	  to	  reassemble	  a	  shattered	  social	  order—or,	  broadly,	  a	  national	  identity.	  For	  this	  author,	  however	  biased	  his	  interpretation,	  foreign	  events	  and	  the	  war	  in	  Korea	  provided	  a	  chance	  to	  strengthen	  and	  promote	  domestic	  concerns.	  	  Indeed,	  society	  had	  changed	  a	  lot	  in	  the	  postwar	  period.	  The	  center	  seemed	  to	  be	  “lost”	  and	  traditional	  orders	  were	  “disturbed.”	  Students	  began	  rioting,	  women	  began	  disobeying,	  and	  workers	  expanding	  their	  efforts	  to	  fight	  back.	  For	  example,	  a	  group	  of	  housewives	  in	  a	  suburban	  community	  near	  Tokyo	  began	  signature	  campaigns	  on	  June	  25,	  1951,	  the	  one	  year	  anniversary	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  in	  opposition	  to	  any	  war	  and	  rearmament.	  Their	  community	  paper	  revealed	  that	  women	  were	  in	  fact	  a	  driving	  force,	  reporting	  that	  one	  old	  woman	  devoted	  herself	  to	  the	  campaign,	  that	  mothers	  earnestly	  joined	  it,	  and	  that	  young	  girls	  were	  eager	  to	  help	  it,	  and	  so	  forth.	  The	  paper	  also	  reported	  reactions	  of	  men;	  one	  housewife	  confessed	  that	  her	  husband	  refused	  to	  sign,	  and	  another	  reported	  that	  she	  was	  questioned	  about	  how	  signatures	  could	  prevent	  war.54	  The	  rise	  of	  new	  actors,	  such	  as	  students	  and	  women,	  and	  new	  methods,	  such	  as	  signature	  campaigns	  and	  mass	  demonstrations,	  in	  society	  and	  politics	  made	  a	  
                                                53	  Ibid.	  54	  Akarui	  machi	  [Bright	  Community],	  July	  25,	  1951,	  Papers	  of	  Nakamura	  Mitsuo	  [hereafter	  PNM],	  No.	  137,	  Modern	  Japanese	  Political	  History	  Materials	  Room,	  NDL,	  Tokyo.	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large	  portion	  of	  the	  conservative	  population	  of	  Japan	  anxious,	  and	  even	  resentful.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  angry	  men	  might	  have	  been	  a	  58-­‐year-­‐old	  doctor,	  named	  Hidaka	  Hiroshi,	  in	  the	  small	  city	  of	  Yonago,	  Shimane	  Prefecture.	  He	  was	  worried	  about	  the	  postwar	  emergence	  of	  women	  into	  social	  and	  political	  arenas,	  whose	  brains,	  he	  believed,	  were	  “ignorant	  and	  uncomprehending.”	  He	  wrote	  in	  April	  1951:	  	  I	  feel	  gloomy	  about	  the	  superficiality	  of	  Japan’s	  national	  character	  and	  its	  society	  today	  when	  I	  see	  such	  women,	  jumping	  on	  the	  bandwagon	  of	  the	  current	  of	  the	  times,	  getting	  positions	  in	  important	  posts	  such	  as	  mayor	  or	  congressman.	  Women	  who	  put	  forth	  practically	  impossible	  arguments	  against	  rearmament	  are	  virtually	  traitors	  to	  our	  country.	  It	  is	  no	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  so	  in	  view	  of	  today’s	  world	  situation.”55	  	  	  This	  letter	  is	  interesting	  because	  of	  his	  use	  of	  the	  “real	  world	  situation”	  to	  express	  his	  disgust	  about	  the	  rising	  status	  of	  women	  in	  postwar	  Japan.	  He	  continued:	  	  From	  very	  early	  ages,	  a	  saying	  “There	  are	  women	  behind	  history”	  always	  means	  tragedy	  and	  collapse.	  Women’s	  participation	  in	  politics	  rarely	  produced	  positive	  results,	  and,	  regardless	  of	  East	  or	  West,	  there	  are	  many	  examples	  of	  a	  saying,	  “A	  woman	  showing	  her	  cleverness	  fails	  to	  sell	  the	  cow.”	  While	  we	  cannot	  take	  legal	  measures	  to	  ban	  women’s	  political	  involvement,	  we	  should	  seriously	  question	  the	  appointment	  of	  women	  to	  important	  and	  practical	  posts	  in	  politics.	  The	  anti-­‐rearmament	  argument	  is,	  after	  all,	  a	  purely	  empty	  theory	  that	  ignores	  the	  real	  situation	  in	  the	  world.	  I	  seriously	  doubt	  the	  existence	  of	  their	  conscience.56	  	  In	  the	  end	  of	  his	  long	  letter,	  he	  recommended	  not	  conducting	  a	  referendum	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  amending	  of	  the	  Constitution.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  “ignorant”	  women	  might	  cause	  an	  unfavorable	  result.	  This	  letter	  is	  interesting	  because	  of	  its	  clear	  expression	  of	  a	  grassroots	  conservatism,	  which	  detested	  social	  changes	  in	  the	  postwar	  period.	  Moreover,	  it’s	  interesting	  to	  note	  his	  use	  of	  the	  East-­‐West	  confrontation	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  contain	  social	  conflicts,	  such	  as,	  the	  rise	  of	  women	  in	  society.	  Of	  course,	  this	  letter	  was	  not	  written	  as	  a	  representative	  voice	  of	  
                                                55	  Letter,	  Hidaka	  Hiroshi	  to	  Ashida	  Hitoshi,	  PAH,	  Correspondence	  File,	  No.272,	  NDL,	  Tokyo.	  56	  Ibid.	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a	  particular	  group,	  but	  it	  conveys	  a	  feeling	  of	  the	  people	  who	  quietly	  supported	  the	  social	  purges	  of	  1950,	  and	  silenced	  anti-­‐Red	  Purge	  movements.	  In	  fact,	  practice	  of	  the	  “Red	  Purge”	  continued	  in	  communities	  beyond	  companies	  and	  organization.	  According	  to	  memoirs,	  many	  experienced	  difficulty	  in	  getting	  jobs	  and	  were	  ostracized	  in	  their	  hometowns,	  which	  resulted	  in,	  in	  extreme	  cases,	  suicide,	  divorce,	  and	  the	  dissolution	  of	  families	  for	  years.57	  	  	  	  This	  section	  has	  examined	  the	  practice	  of	  the	  mass	  terminations	  of	  1950,	  opposition	  to	  such	  mass	  dismissals,	  and	  social	  backlash	  to	  this	  opposition.	  Through	  tracing	  the	  series	  of	  actions	  and	  reactions,	  it	  has	  examined	  three	  points,	  concerning	  the	  actors,	  nature,	  and	  function	  of	  the	  Red	  Purge.	  The	  questions	  raised	  here	  are:	  Who	  purged	  whom	  for	  what	  purpose?	  What	  was	  the	  Red	  Purge,	  after	  all?	  	  	   The	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  has	  suggested	  that	  it	  was	  the	  GHQ	  and	  Washington	  that	  ordered	  the	  purge	  of	  communists	  and	  communist	  sympathizers	  in	  order	  to	  create	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  country	  in	  East	  Asia.	  However,	  the	  findings	  of	  this	  study	  do	  not	  fit	  neatly	  into	  such	  a	  Washington-­‐directed	  model.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  many	  dismissals	  in	  ordinary	  companies	  were	  actually	  carried	  out	  through	  ordinary	  employers’	  own	  decisions,	  and	  factional	  disputes	  in	  labor	  unions	  facilitated	  the	  mass	  dismissal	  of	  certain	  groups	  of	  people.	  Second,	  most	  of	  
                                                57	  Takekura	  Kin'ichiro,	  Kirarera	  batten:	  Shiryo	  reddo	  paji	  [Got	  Fired:	  Documents	  on	  the	  Red	  Purge]	  (Fukuoka,	  1980).	  Also,	  see	  various	  memoirs	  and	  local	  history	  books,	  such	  as	  Tokyo	  Hachi-­‐ni-­‐roku	  kai	  ed.,	  1950-­‐nen	  8-­‐gatsu	  26-­‐nichi:	  Densan	  reddo	  paji	  30-­‐shunen	  kinen	  bunshu	  [August	  26,	  1950:	  The	  Thirty-­‐Year	  Anniversary	  Collection	  of	  the	  Densan	  Red	  Purge]	  (Tokyo,	  1983);	  Asahi	  Shinbunsha	  Reddo	  Paji	  Shogenroku	  Kanko	  Iinkai	  ed.,	  1950-­‐nen	  7-­‐gatsu	  28-­‐nichi:	  Asahi	  Shinbunsha	  no	  reddo	  paji	  
shogenroku	  [July	  28,	  1950:	  The	  Collection	  of	  Testimonies	  on	  the	  Asahi	  Newspaper	  Red	  Purge]	  (Tokyo,	  1981);	  Amagasaki	  reddo	  paji	  mondai	  kondankai	  ed.,	  Kaiso	  Amagasaki	  no	  reddo	  paji	  [Recollections:	  Red	  Purge	  in	  Amagasaki]	  (Osaka,	  2002);	  and	  Fukushima-­‐ken	  minshushi	  kenkyukai	  ed.,	  Hatsudensho	  
no	  reddo	  paji:	  Densan	  Inawashiro	  bunkai	  [The	  Red	  Purge	  in	  Power	  Plant:	  Densan's	  Inawashiro	  Branch]	  (Tokyo,	  2001).	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those	  expelled	  were	  not	  necessarily	  communists	  or	  fifth	  columnists.	  Third,	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  Labor	  Division	  of	  the	  GHQ	  even	  tried	  to	  stop	  “abuse	  of	  the	  Red	  Purge,”	  and	  many	  were,	  nevertheless,	  fired	  due	  to	  disturbing	  the	  “order”	  and	  “harmony”	  of	  their	  workplaces.	  Finally,	  opposition	  to	  the	  Red	  Purge	  was	  muted	  among	  the	  majority	  in	  society,	  who	  chose	  to	  say:	  “no	  reform	  anymore.”	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  say	  that	  the	  actual	  agency	  of	  the	  Red	  Purge	  was	  not	  so	  much	  the	  GHQ	  and	  Washington	  as	  tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  local	  people	  in	  Japan.	  Viewing	  it	  this	  way,	  this	  study	  intends	  to	  complicate	  the	  conventional	  Washington-­‐centered	  approach,	  and	  suggests	  a	  broader	  social	  understanding	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  rooted	  in	  historical	  and	  local	  struggles	  in	  Japan.	  Then,	  once	  we	  re-­‐examine	  the	  issue	  of	  agency,	  we	  must	  face	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  characterization	  of	  events.	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  was	  it	  really	  a	  “Red”	  Purge?	  Aren’t	  we	  missing	  something	  important	  by	  labeling	  and	  perceiving	  events	  simply	  as	  the	  Red	  Purge?	  Of	  course,	  there	  were	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  events	  that	  fit	  nicely	  with	  the	  Red	  Purge	  model.	  However,	  this	  section	  argues	  that	  there	  were	  other	  aspects	  that	  would	  be	  better	  conceived	  broadly	  as	  “social	  suppression”	  or	  “social	  punishment,”	  conducted	  by	  nameless	  and	  numberless	  local	  people	  in	  attempts	  to	  contain	  social	  changes	  and	  restore	  and	  maintain	  order.	  Viewing	  the	  waves	  of	  mass	  dismissals	  in	  1950,	  not	  as	  the	  “Red	  Purge”	  but	  as	  social	  suppression,	  this	  section	  avoids	  describing	  it	  as	  a	  peculiar	  phenomenon	  that	  occurred	  under	  the	  abnormal	  climate	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  intends	  to	  approach	  it	  as	  a	  common,	  everyday	  occurrence	  that	  could	  develop	  at	  any	  time	  and	  place	  under	  similar	  social	  and	  historical	  conditions.	  Indeed,	  something	  quite	  similar	  occurred	  in	  Europe:	  Anti-­‐striking	  trend	  in	  Britain.	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Britain:	  “Name	  the	  Traitors!	  Expose	  Enemies	  within	  Our	  Gates”	  On	  Thursday,	  September	  14,	  1950,	  nearly	  a	  half	  of	  all	  London	  buses	  were	  off	  the	  roads.	  In	  a	  mess	  of	  the	  traffic	  in	  the	  city,	  the	  most	  congested	  spot	  was	  at	  Victoria	  Station	  where	  thousands	  of	  people	  arriving	  from	  suburbs	  and	  country	  found	  that	  many	  bus	  routes	  had	  been	  canceled.	  It	  was	  an	  unofficial	  strike,	  carried	  out	  by	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Transport	  Workers’	  Union,	  against	  the	  recruitment	  of	  woman	  bus	  conductors,	  which	  would,	  they	  argued,	  weaken	  busmen’s	  bargaining	  strength	  in	  demanding	  higher	  pay.	  The	  next	  day,	  the	  strike	  spread	  from	  13	  to	  20	  bus	  garages	  in	  the	  city	  with	  more	  than	  11,000	  drivers	  and	  conductors	  out,	  and	  nearly	  2,000	  busses	  off	  the	  roads.	  In	  addition,	  some	  tram	  drivers	  and	  port	  workers	  joined	  in	  the	  strike.	  58	  It	  was	  not	  rare	  to	  see	  such	  an	  outbreak	  and	  spread	  of	  unofficial	  strikes	  in	  postwar	  British	  society	  because	  during	  this	  period	  workers’	  claims	  were	  often	  blocked	  by	  the	  union,	  rather	  than	  employers	  (Picture	  5).59	  What	  was	  less	  usual	  was	  the	  degree	  of	  social	  criticism.	  “Anyone	  who	  goes	  on	  strike	  now	  will	  do	  so	  knowing	  that	  he	  is	  helping	  traitors,”	  declared	  the	  Daily	  Graphic,	  “He	  will	  range	  himself	  with	  the	  enemies	  of	  Britain—with	  the	  fifth	  column	  within	  this	  country	  that	  takes	  is	  orders	  from	  foreigners	  who	  seek	  to	  destroy	  us.”60	  The	  bus	  strike	  happened	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  release	  of	  the	  first	  British	  casualty	  list	  in	  Korea,	  
                                                58	  “1,200	  London	  Buses	  off	  Roads	  Today,”	  September	  14,	  1950,	  Daily	  Mail;	  “Rush-­‐hour	  chaos,”	  September	  15,	  1950,	  Evening	  Standard;	  “11,000	  Busmen	  Out	  in	  London,”	  September	  15,	  1950,	  Daily	  
Mail;	  “Stalin’s	  Stooges,”	  September	  17,	  1950,	  Sunday	  Graphic;	  “Last	  bus	  strikers	  vote	  to	  go	  back,”	  September	  18,	  1950,	  Daily	  Herald;	  “All	  bus	  service	  running	  today,”	  September	  18,	  1950,	  Time,	  British	  Library	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  Colindale,	  UK.	  	  59	  “Busmen	  Drew	  Up	  Terms:	  15,700	  on	  Strike,”	  September	  16,	  1950,	  Manchester	  Guardian	  in	  HO45/25546,	  National	  Archives,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  60	  “Now	  Name	  the	  Traitor,”	  September	  16,	  1950,	  Daily	  Graphic,	  HO45/25546,	  Kew,	  UK.	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and	  this	  provided	  the	  basic	  background	  for	  the	  intensification	  of	  the	  tone	  of	  criticism	  of	  strikes	  at	  home.61	  The	  Minister	  of	  Labour,	  George	  A.	  Isaacs,	  for	  example,	  said	  at	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  on	  September	  15:	  	  I	  am	  speaking	  at	  a	  time	  when	  our	  men	  are	  facing	  serious	  risks	  in	  Korea,	  and	  when	  it	  is	  essential	  that	  there	  should	  be	  no	  danger	  of	  interference	  with	  their	  supplies	  and	  support.	  […].	  The	  plot	  is	  for	  workers	  on	  the	  docks,	  road	  transport,	  meat-­‐carrying	  and	  the	  markets	  to	  strike	  in	  key	  places.	  The	  ultimate	  purpose	  is	  to	  slow	  the	  rearmament	  drive	  and	  hold	  up	  reinforcement	  and	  supplies	  to	  the	  fighting	  front	  in	  Korea.	  None	  of	  the	  strikes	  may	  be	  big,	  but	  the	  total	  effect	  is	  intensified	  to	  cripple	  industrial	  activity	  and	  spread	  discontent.62	  	  	  Middle-­‐	  and	  low-­‐brow	  popular	  newspapers	  fell	  into	  step,	  calling	  strikers	  “traitors,”	  “plotters,”	  and	  “wreckers.”	  Britain’s	  best-­‐selling	  newspaper,	  Daily	  Express,	  warned	  in	  its	  editorial:	  “No	  one	  knows	  when	  the	  enemy	  will	  strike	  next;	  maybe	  it	  will	  be	  in	  bloodless	  fashion	  in	  the	  ports	  of	  Britain.”63	  The	  aforementioned	  Daily	  Graphic	  ran	  an	  article,	  complaining	  that	  the	  Minister	  did	  not	  provide	  names	  of	  leading	  strikers,	  insisting,	  “Name	  the	  traitors!	  Name	  the	  plotters	  who	  seek	  to	  use	  British	  workers	  as	  tools	  in	  their	  dark	  design.	  Expose	  these	  enemies	  within	  our	  gates.”64	  Another	  popular	  conservative	  newspaper,	  the	  Daily	  Mail,	  likewise	  published	  a	  lengthy	  comment	  on	  September	  16,	  harshly	  condemning	  the	  bus	  strikes:	  	  What	  are	  the	  intentions	  of	  these	  traitors?	  […].	  The	  London	  bus	  strike	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  only	  the	  start	  of	  their	  wretched	  scheme.	  If	  they	  have	  their	  way	  the	  whole	  country	  may	  be	  crippled,	  for	  Red	  agents	  are	  known	  to	  be	  fomenting	  discord	  throughout	  all	  the	  key	  industries	  and	  services.	  What	  is	  more,	  they	  are	  still	  allowed	  to	  go	  about	  their	  evil	  business	  unchecked.	  No	  doubt	  the	  men	  who	  strike	  or	  are	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  doing	  so	  have	  some	  legitimate	  grievances.	  But	  the	  Communists	  who	  seize	  on	  such	  complaints	  have	  no	  thought	  for	  the	  workers.	  […].	  Their	  [Workers’]	  grievances	  are	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  little	  real	  importance	  compared	  with	  the	  danger	  which	  the	  whole	  country	  faces,	  and	  there	  is	  not	  one	  just	  industrial	  wrong	  which	  cannot	  now	  be	  settled	  amicably	  by	  negotiation.	  We	  must	  neutralise	  our	  Fifth	  Column.	  But	  how?	  […].	  
                                                61	  “Opinion,”	  September	  16,	  1950,	  Daily	  Express,	  HO45/25546,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  62	  For	  Isaacs’	  speech,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Daily	  Mail,	  Daily	  Herald,	  Daily	  Express,	  on	  September	  16,	  1950,	  HO45/25546,	  Kew,	  UK.	  63	  Editorial,	  September	  16,	  1950,	  Daily	  Express,	  HO45/25546,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  64	  “Now	  Name	  the	  Traitor,”	  September	  16,	  1950,	  Daily	  Graphic,	  HO45/25546,	  Kew,	  UK.	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Certainly	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  arrest	  them	  on	  some	  minor	  charge	  and	  jail	  them	  for	  a	  couple	  of	  months	  or	  so.	  These	  men	  are	  traitors	  to	  the	  nation	  and	  must	  be	  held	  until	  all	  danger	  is	  past,	  how	  ever	  long	  that	  may	  be.	  If	  present	  laws	  are	  inadequate	  new	  ones	  must	  be	  framed,	  and	  speedily.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  punishment	  but	  of	  protection.65	  	  	  As	  suggested	  in	  this	  editorial,	  legal	  measures	  against	  strikers	  and	  members	  of	  the	  Communist	  Party	  became	  a	  hot	  issue	  of	  discussion	  in	  Britain	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950.66	  In	  fact,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  gas	  workers’	  strike	  that	  occurred	  in	  late	  September,	  which	  involved	  approximately	  1,500	  gasmen	  in	  London,	  ten	  leading	  figures	  of	  the	  strike	  were	  arrested	  and	  imprisoned	  for	  a	  month.67	  	  	   Faced	  with	  the	  explosion	  of	  criticism	  toward	  strikes	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  participants	  were	  bewildered.	  “Who,	  me,	  an	  agitator?	  Don’t	  talk	  silly,”	  a	  39-­‐year-­‐old	  member	  of	  the	  Merseyside	  Port	  Workers’	  Committee,	  said,	  “I	  am	  a	  member	  of	  the	  town’s	  Liberal	  Party	  executive.”	  Another	  24-­‐year-­‐old	  man,	  likewise,	  asked	  a	  reporter,	  “Do	  I	  look	  like	  a	  saboteur?	  I	  am	  happily	  married.	  I	  am	  a	  supporter	  of	  the	  Labour	  Party.”	  A	  32-­‐year-­‐old	  man	  added,	  “We	  were	  all	  democratically	  elected	  by	  the	  dockers	  for	  this	  job.”68	  These	  members	  argued	  that	  such	  an	  allegation	  that	  they	  all	  were	  communists	  would	  not	  solve	  any	  wage	  and	  condition	  problems	  on	  the	  docks.	  Nonetheless,	  strikes	  were	  rapidly	  losing	  support	  from	  within.	  A	  35-­‐year-­‐old	  strike	  leader,	  Henry	  Prutton,	  said:	  
                                                65	  “Moscow’s	  Mission,”	  September	  16,	  1950,	  Daily	  Mail,	  HO45/25546,	  Kew,	  UK.	  	  66	  “Deakin	  Calls	  For	  Ban	  On	  Reds,”	  September	  17,	  1950,	  Star,	  HO45/25546,	  Kew,	  UK;	  “Red	  Agitators	  maybe	  Outlawed,”	  September	  17,	  1950,	  Daily	  Mail,	  British	  Library	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  Colindale,	  UK.	  67	  “Troops	  for	  Gaswokers?”	  September	  26,	  1950,	  Daily	  Express;	  “Gas	  Strikers	  Wavering,”	  September	  29,	  1950,	  Daily	  Mail;	  “Gas:	  Navy	  is	  Going,”	  October	  3,	  1950,	  Daily	  Express;	  “The	  Navy’s	  Here,”	  October	  4,	  1950,	  Daily	  Express,	  “Gasman	  Going	  Back,”	  October	  6,	  1950,	  Daily	  Mail,	  and	  “‘Repeal	  Order	  1305’	  Call,”	  October	  9,	  1950,	  Daily	  Mail,	  British	  Library	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  Colindale,	  UK.	  For	  the	  Order	  1305,	  a	  legal	  basis	  for	  the	  imprisonment	  of	  10	  workers,	  see,	  “Order	  1305:	  The	  Position	  Today,”	  
Labour	  Research,	  in	  Working-­‐Class	  Movement	  Library,	  Manchester,	  UK.	  	  68	  “Dockers	  say,	  ‘We’re	  not	  agitators,’”	  September	  16,	  1950,	  Daily	  Mail,	  HO45/25546,	  Kew,	  UK.	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Now	  I	  appeal	  to	  …	  members	  to	  draw	  back	  before	  it	  is	  too	  late.	  I	  have	  had	  my	  share	  of	  strikes.	  But	  on	  this	  issue	  I	  appeal	  to	  all	  trade	  unionists	  here	  to	  accept	  the	  guidance	  of	  their	  officials.	  A	  strike	  now	  would	  be	  a	  blow	  at	  our	  boys	  fighting	  in	  Korea.69	  	  	  As	  in	  other	  places	  we	  have	  seen,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  discussions	  of	  social	  conflicts	  were	  replaced	  with	  the	  issues	  of	  alleged	  global	  conflict	  and	  national	  security.	  One	  union	  leader	  analyzed	  that	  workers	  had	  gone	  back	  to	  work	  because	  they	  realized	  their	  faces	  were	  being	  trodden	  on	  to	  serve	  communist	  interests.70	  In	  fact,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  London	  bus	  strike,	  a	  “mass	  meeting”	  originally	  planned	  was	  aborted	  because	  no	  speaker	  arrived	  and	  very	  few	  attended.71	  The	  strikes,	  in	  a	  sense,	  collapsed	  from	  within.	  	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  strikers	  were	  blamed	  not	  because	  of	  the	  particular	  contents	  of	  their	  claims,	  such	  as	  demands	  for	  higher	  pay,	  but	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  demands	  were	  made—striking.	  As	  appeared	  in	  a	  cartoon	  in	  the	  Daily	  Mail	  (Picture	  6),	  “workers”	  were	  often	  depicted	  as	  uncontrollable	  and	  disobedient	  elements—an	  enemy	  of	  “orderly”	  society,	  rather	  than	  an	  enemy	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.72	  In	  a	  sense,	  a	  hidden	  motivation	  of	  anti-­‐strike	  sentiments	  was	  based	  not	  so	  much	  on	  ideological	  or	  political	  ideas	  as	  a	  desire	  for	  a	  return	  to	  an	  “orderly”	  and	  “normal”	  society	  following	  the	  turbulent	  years	  of	  the	  wartime	  and	  postwar	  periods.	  	  Indeed,	  such	  anti-­‐strike	  sentiments	  intensified	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  parallel	  with	  the	  development	  of	  resentment	  toward	  the	  Labour	  Party	  that	  had	  been	  in	  power	  since	  1945.	  With	  the	  country	  at	  war,	  and	  with	  mounting	  criticism	  toward	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  Daily	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  70	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strikers	  and	  leftists	  in	  general,	  in	  fact,	  the	  winter	  of	  1950-­‐1951	  marked	  the	  moment	  of	  a	  dramatic	  swing	  of	  popular	  attitudes	  away	  from	  Labour,	  and	  mostly	  favor	  of	  the	  Conservatives.73	  The	  Gallup	  Poll,	  for	  instance,	  raised	  the	  Conservatives	  five	  points	  and	  reduced	  Labour	  by	  the	  same	  number,	  increasing	  the	  Conservative	  lead	  to	  thirteen	  points.	  In	  late	  February,	  the	  lead	  extended	  to	  fourteen—the	  biggest	  lead	  Gallup	  had	  given	  either	  party	  since	  it	  marked	  Labour	  at	  eighteen	  points	  ahead	  in	  January	  1945.74	  	  At	  a	  glance,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  ignited	  a	  flare-­‐up	  of	  anti-­‐communist	  sentiments	  that	  had	  been	  already	  in	  the	  air,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  contributed	  to	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Labour	  government.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  rise	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  was	  conspicuous.	  A	  bi-­‐monthly	  magazine,	  Popular	  Pictorial,	  for	  instance,	  devoted	  an	  entire	  issue	  in	  February	  1951	  exclusively	  to	  the	  Communist	  menace,	  meeting	  with	  an	  exceedingly	  good	  reception,	  with	  early	  sales	  reaching	  100,000	  copies	  above	  normal	  circulation.75	  Similarly,	  low-­‐	  and	  middlebrow	  popular	  newspapers	  kept	  attacking	  the	  Labour	  government,	  labeling	  it	  as	  “socialist”	  and	  “communist.”76	  At	  a	  glance,	  the	  political	  power	  of	  the	  left	  was	  tamed	  under	  the	  Cold	  War	  climate	  with	  mounting	  criticism	  from	  conservatives.	  	  Underneath	  such	  loaded	  Cold	  War	  terms,	  here,	  again,	  existed	  the	  desire	  for	  a	  return	  to	  “normalcy.”	  To	  begin	  with,	  as	  historian	  Robert	  Taylor	  points	  out,	  many	  working-­‐	  and	  middle-­‐class	  people	  sought	  to	  better	  their	  lives	  only	  within	  a	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surprisingly	  narrow	  framework,	  instead	  of	  radically	  changing	  their	  world.77	  Many	  workers	  were	  fed	  up	  with	  restrictions	  on	  small	  pleasures	  they	  had	  enjoyed	  before	  the	  war,	  and	  middle-­‐class	  people	  were	  increasingly	  resentful	  of	  Labour-­‐imposed	  austerity	  in	  the	  postwar	  years.78	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  such	  a	  fading	  of	  support	  occurred	  not	  necessarily	  because	  of	  a	  change	  of	  political	  opinions	  among	  supporters,	  but	  due	  to	  disappointments	  concerning	  daily-­‐life	  experiences	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  such	  as	  increasing	  costs	  of	  living,	  as	  well	  as	  food	  and	  housing	  shortages—the	  top	  three	  issues	  for	  the	  national	  election	  in	  1951,	  in	  which	  the	  Conservatives	  came	  to	  power	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  1945.79	  	  These	  issues	  were	  not	  merely	  the	  material	  and	  economic	  problems	  they	  appeared	  at	  a	  glance.	  They	  were,	  in	  effect,	  the	  topics	  on	  the	  frontlines	  of	  social	  wars.	  In	  a	  dispute	  about	  what	  should	  be	  considered	  “normal”	  life,	  Labour	  and	  strikers	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  blocking	  the	  return	  to	  “ordinary”	  life,	  or	  incapable	  of	  creating	  a	  route	  toward	  the	  restoration	  of	  such	  a	  life.	  The	  housing-­‐shortage	  issue,	  for	  instance,	  forced	  many	  families	  to	  change	  their	  ways	  of	  living:	  a	  family	  living	  in	  a	  single	  room,	  a	  couple	  living	  in	  their	  parents’	  house,	  families	  sharing	  a	  house,	  and	  so	  on.80	  The	  cost	  of	  living	  issue—always	  the	  number	  one	  issue	  for	  the	  1951	  election	  campaigns	  for	  both	  parties—might	  be	  more	  telling,	  since	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  to	  contain	  social	  conflicts	  concerning	  the	  images	  of	  women	  in	  society.	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As	  in	  Japan	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  World	  War	  II	  changed	  the	  roles	  of	  women	  in	  British	  society.	  During	  wartime	  many	  women	  worked	  outside	  their	  homes,	  and	  many	  continued	  to	  work	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  as	  well.	  According	  to	  a	  study	  by	  the	  Research	  Department	  of	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1951,	  there	  were,	  in	  fact,	  more	  women	  at	  work	  than	  during	  the	  peak	  period	  of	  the	  war;	  the	  total	  number	  was	  assessed	  at	  7,276,000	  in	  April	  of	  1951,	  as	  opposed	  to	  7,265,000	  in	  September	  of	  1943,	  meaning	  that	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  working	  population	  was	  women.	  The	  primary	  cause	  of	  this	  was	  commonly	  explained	  as	  economic	  need.81	  An	  article	  in	  the	  conservative	  Daily	  Mail	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  “loneliness”	  that	  sent	  women	  to	  work.82	  Whatever	  the	  causes,	  in	  this	  period,	  many	  men	  had	  to	  let	  their	  wives	  go	  out	  to	  work	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  the	  war,	  or	  even	  for	  the	  first	  time	  ever.	  A	  man	  reportedly	  deplored	  the	  situation	  in	  anger,	  turning	  his	  back	  on	  Labour:	  “I	  was	  Labour	  until	  my	  wife	  went	  away	  for	  three	  weeks,	  and	  I	  had	  to	  do	  the	  shopping.	  That	  was	  enough!”83	  	   When	  male	  workers	  like	  this	  man	  complained	  about	  the	  “cost	  of	  living,”	  many	  actually	  lamented	  social	  changes,	  such	  as	  those	  involving	  the	  notions	  of	  gender,	  accompanied	  by	  the	  increasing	  cost	  of	  living.	  The	  crux	  of	  the	  resentment,	  thus,	  was	  disappointment	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  “normal”	  life	  had	  not	  been	  restored	  even	  five	  years	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	  Further	  research	  is	  needed,	  but	  quite	  a	  few	  British	  women	  in	  this	  period,	  too,	  seemed	  to	  desire	  the	  return	  to	  such	  a	  “normal”	  life.	  	  According	  to	  the	  research	  by	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  many	  female	  workers	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remained	  reluctant	  about,	  or	  even	  opposed	  to,	  taking	  part	  in	  labor	  movements,	  and,	  in	  fact,	  working-­‐	  and	  middle-­‐class	  women	  were	  considered	  pivotal	  elements	  in	  the	  victory	  of	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  in	  1951.84	  	  Viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  swing	  to	  the	  Conservatives	  circa	  1950-­‐1951	  was	  not	  necessarily	  due	  to	  mounting	  Cold	  War	  pressures	  but	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  domestic	  desires	  of	  restoring	  the	  “normal”	  social	  order	  and	  ordinary	  life	  of	  peacetime,	  which	  was,	  from	  this	  viewpoint,	  interrupted	  only	  in	  the	  wartime	  and	  postwar	  periods.	  It	  makes	  sense,	  thus,	  that	  strikes	  in	  this	  period	  were	  crushed	  due	  to	  the	  disturbance	  of	  order,	  rather	  than	  strikers’	  claims,	  in	  themselves.	  Such	  a	  longing	  for	  a	  return	  to	  the	  “normalcy”	  can	  be	  found	  symbolically	  in	  an	  editorial	  in	  the	  Daily	  Mail	  on	  New	  Year’s	  Day	  of	  1951,	  entitled	  “Don’t	  be	  afraid	  to	  have	  fun.”	  It	  urged	  Britons:	  “Let	  us	  get	  back	  some	  of	  the	  silliness	  of	  life,	  returning	  to	  the	  giggle,	  and	  to	  an	  abandonment	  to	  the	  fun	  of	  the	  moment.”85	  Viewing	  the	  anti-­‐strikes	  and	  anti-­‐labor	  trend	  not	  merely	  as	  anticommunism	  but	  more	  broadly	  as	  a	  series	  of	  social	  suppressions,	  and	  not	  as	  a	  unique	  phenomenon,	  this	  section	  avoids	  describing	  the	  event	  as	  a	  peculiar	  phenomenon	  in	  Britain.	  Instead,	  this	  section	  has	  discussed	  such	  a	  phenomenon	  as	  a	  common,	  everyday	  occurrence	  that	  could	  develop	  in	  any	  place	  under	  similar	  social	  and	  historical	  conditions.	  In	  fact,	  if	  we	  see	  it	  as	  reflecting	  social	  suppression	  against	  “disorder,”	  we	  can	  see	  the	  development	  of	  a	  similar	  pattern	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  Following	  the	  cases	  of	  China,	  Taiwan,	  Philippines,	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  Papers	  of	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  Oxford	  University,	  Oxford,	  UK.	  OX6.	  85	  “Don’t	  be	  afraid	  to	  have	  fun,”	  January	  1,	  1951,	  Daily	  Mail,	  British	  Library	  Newspaper	  Reading	  Room,	  Colindale,	  UK.	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Japan,	  and	  Britain,	  our	  final	  example	  is	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic:	  so-­‐called	  “McCarthyism”	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  
The	  United	  States:	  Reconsidering	  McCarthyism	  This	  section	  explores	  the	  politics	  of	  social	  suppression	  in	  the	  United	  States	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period,	  usually	  referred	  to	  as	  McCarthyism.	  Since	  the	  late	  1950s,	  various	  writers	  and	  scholars	  have	  provided	  explanations	  and	  interpretations	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  making	  up	  an	  enormous	  quantity	  of	  literature.86	  By	  the	  late	  1990s,	  it	  had	  become	  a	  cliché	  among	  scholars	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  term	  “McCarthyism”	  is	  misleading.	  The	  term	  highlights	  Wisconsin	  Senator	  Joseph	  McCarthy,	  discounting	  the	  important	  roles	  of	  other	  national	  and	  local	  politicians	  in	  both	  the	  Republican	  and	  Democratic	  parties.87	  It	  neglects	  the	  enormous	  power	  wielded	  by	  federal	  government	  offices,	  such	  as	  the	  FBI.88	  It	  dismisses	  popular,	  grassroots	  dimensions	  of	  the	  phenomenon.89	  It	  describes	  the	  event	  as	  an	  aberration,	  ignoring	  the	  long	  history	  of	  red	  scare	  politics	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  actually	  has	  been	  an	  inextricable	  part	  of	  political	  processes	  since	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century.90	  It	  
                                                86	  For	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  on	  historiography	  of	  McCarthyism,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Ellen	  Schrecker,	  “McCarthyism	  and	  the	  Red	  Scare,”	  in	  Jean-­‐Christophe	  Agnew	  and	  Roy	  Rosenzweig,	  A	  Companion	  to	  
Post-­‐1945	  America	  (Malden,	  MA,	  2006),	  371-­‐84.	  	  	  87	  Richard	  Freeland,	  The	  Truman	  Doctrine	  and	  the	  Origins	  of	  McCarthyism:	  Foreign	  Policy,	  Domestic	  
Politics,	  and	  Internal	  Security,	  1946-­‐1948	  (New	  York,	  1971);	  Frank	  Kofsky,	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  and	  the	  
War	  Scare	  of	  1948:	  A	  Successful	  Campaign	  to	  Deceive	  the	  Nation	  (New	  York,	  1993).	  	  88	  Ellen	  Schrecker,	  Many	  Are	  the	  Crimes:	  McCarthyism	  in	  America	  (Boston,	  1998).	  Schrecker	  investigates	  FBI	  files	  and	  archival	  documents,	  and	  stresses	  a	  “concerted	  campaign	  by	  a	  loosely	  structured,	  but	  surprisingly	  self-­‐conscious,	  network	  of	  political	  activists	  who	  had	  been	  working	  for	  years	  to	  drive	  Communism	  out	  of	  American	  life.”	  	  89	  Richard	  Fried,	  The	  Russians	  Are	  Coming!	  The	  Russians	  Are	  Coming!:	  Pageantry	  and	  Patriotism	  in	  
Cold-­‐War	  America	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  Fried	  describes	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  Red	  Scare	  in	  the	  postwar	  period	  as	  a	  metamorphosed	  product	  of	  popular,	  grassroots	  patriotism.	  	  90	  Michael	  J.	  Heale,	  McCarthy’s	  Americans:	  Red	  Scare	  Politics	  in	  State	  and	  Nation,	  1935-­‐1965	  (Athens,	  GA,	  1998).	  Heale	  argues	  that	  McCarthyism	  was	  neither	  the	  contingent	  product	  of	  popular	  hysteria,	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slights	  the	  decisive	  impact	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  which	  played	  more	  important	  roles	  than	  McCarthy	  himself	  in	  igniting	  the	  climate	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  in	  that	  period.91	  In	  sum,	  the	  literature	  shows	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  scholars	  agree	  with	  historian	  M.	  J.	  Heale,	  who	  points	  out	  that	  the	  Senator	  from	  Wisconsin	  “had	  done	  very	  little	  or	  nothing	  to	  create	  the	  phenomenon	  he	  had	  come	  to	  personify.”92	  Yet,	  most	  studies	  share	  two	  assumptions.	  First,	  we	  usually	  conceive	  of	  McCarthyism	  as	  anti-­‐communist	  red	  hunting.	  The	  battle	  line	  here	  was,	  we	  assume,	  over	  ideology.	  However,	  in	  labeling	  and	  perceiving	  the	  phenomenon	  as	  McCarthyism,	  we	  tend	  to	  miss	  other	  diverse	  incidents	  of	  social	  suppression	  conducted	  during	  this	  period,	  which	  silenced	  various	  social	  conflicts	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  anti-­‐communism.	  Such	  local	  struggles	  involved,	  for	  instance,	  racial,	  labor,	  and	  gender	  tensions.	  As	  this	  section	  examines	  below,	  many	  targets	  in	  this	  period	  were	  not	  communists	  or	  communist	  sympathizers,	  but,	  for	  instance,	  African	  Americans,	  women,	  labor	  activists,	  and	  gays	  and	  lesbians,	  as	  well	  as	  advocates	  of	  New	  Deal	  programs	  such	  as	  public	  housing	  and	  universal	  health	  care.	  What	  these	  groups	  represented	  was	  not	  communist	  ideology	  but	  elements	  of	  newly	  emerging	  social	  conflicts,	  which	  had	  developed	  through	  experiences	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  
                                                                                                                                            nor	  the	  production	  of	  gifted	  demagogues,	  but	  part	  of	  the	  long-­‐standing	  historical	  political	  process	  in	  American	  culture.	  91	  Philip	  Jenkins,	  Cold	  War	  At	  Home:	  The	  Red	  Scare	  in	  Pennsylvania,	  1945-­‐1960	  (Chapel	  Hill,	  NC,	  1999).	  Jenkins	  maintains	  that	  McCarthyism	  should	  be	  termed	  the	  “Korean	  War	  Red	  Scare”	  because	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  fundamentally	  changed	  the	  whole	  political	  environment.	  92	  M.	  J.	  Heale,	  McCarthy’s	  Americans,	  xi.	  Of	  course,	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  McCarthy	  did	  not	  play	  roles.	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Robert	  Griffith,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Fear:	  Joseph	  R.	  McCarthy	  and	  the	  Senate,	  2nd	  ed.	  (Amherst,	  MA,	  1987	  [1970])	  and	  David	  Oshinsky,	  A	  Conspiracy	  So	  Immense:	  The	  World	  of	  Joe	  
McCarthy	  (New	  York,	  2005	  [1983]).	  Both	  Griffith	  and	  Oshinsky	  highlight	  the	  individual	  roles	  of	  Joseph	  McCarthy	  as	  a	  creator	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	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Reexamining	  McCarthyism	  in	  this	  way,	  this	  section	  intends	  to	  reconsider	  its	  nature	  and	  function.	  Second,	  this	  section	  questions	  another	  common	  assumption	  in	  the	  existing	  literature:	  McCarthyism	  as	  an	  American	  phenomenon.	  Whether	  describing	  it	  as	  derived	  from	  one	  gifted	  demagogue	  or	  from	  other	  politicians	  and	  officials,	  or	  as	  an	  expression	  of	  grassroots	  patriotism	  or	  the	  long	  tradition	  of	  red	  scare	  politics	  in	  American	  politics,	  many	  studies	  confine	  themselves	  to	  the	  field	  of	  American	  history.	  Of	  course,	  such	  a	  practice,	  in	  itself,	  is	  not	  wrong.	  Yet,	  seeing	  McCarthyism	  more	  broadly	  as	  the	  politics	  of	  social	  suppression,	  and	  viewing	  it	  from	  a	  global	  and	  comparative	  perspective,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  was	  not	  unique	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  have	  see	  thus	  far,	  the	  Korean	  War	  period	  was	  a	  moment	  of	  social	  suppression	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Keeping	  a	  global	  and	  comparative	  perspective	  in	  mind,	  therefore,	  this	  section	  pays	  attention	  to	  actors	  and	  methods	  of	  social	  suppression	  through	  tracing	  the	  evolution	  of	  anti-­‐communist	  movements.	  The	  questions	  raised	  here	  are:	  Who	  purged	  who	  and	  to	  what	  purpose?	  How	  was	  this	  suppression	  conducted?	  In	  addition,	  through	  examination	  of	  the	  actors	  and	  methods	  of	  suppression,	  this	  section	  attempts	  to	  delve	  more	  deeply	  into	  existing	  local	  struggles	  underneath	  ostensible	  battles	  of	  “anti-­‐communism.”	  The	  ultimate	  goal,	  thus,	  is	  not	  simply	  to	  revisit	  and	  elucidate	  a	  new	  interpretation	  of	  McCarthyism,	  but	  to	  reconsider	  the	  nature	  and	  function	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Let	  us	  begin	  with	  examining	  politics	  of	  social	  suppression	  in	  the	  summer	  and	  fall	  of	  1950,	  particularly	  looking	  at	  who	  purged	  who	  and	  how	  it	  spread	  and	  functioned.	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Politics	  of	  Anticommunism	  	   In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  marked	  a	  decisive	  moment	  for	  the	  proliferation	  and	  intensification	  of	  red	  scare	  politics	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  1950.	  While	  Joseph	  McCarthy	  gave	  his	  famous	  Wheeling	  speech	  in	  early	  February,	  he	  was	  more	  criticized	  than	  believed	  during	  the	  spring.	  Even	  Republican-­‐leaning	  magazines	  Life	  and	  Time	  ignored	  the	  Wisconsin	  Senator	  until	  late	  April,	  when	  they	  began	  denouncing	  his	  groundless	  attacks.93	  As	  historian	  Robert	  P.	  Newman	  describes,	  it	  was	  the	  Korean	  War	  that	  “rescued”	  McCarthy.94	  When	  Chinese	  Communist	  forces	  intervened	  in	  Korea	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  fear	  and	  suspicion	  multiplied.	  One	  leftist	  observed	  the	  mood	  at	  that	  time:	  “The	  war	  fever	  is	  running	  so	  high	  in	  this	  country	  and	  the	  left	  is	  so	  intimidated	  that	  trying	  to	  talk	  for	  peace	  with	  reason	  and	  calmness	  is	  almost	  as	  useless	  as	  shouting	  in	  the	  teeth	  of	  a	  hurricane.”95	  In	  such	  a	  climate,	  the	  war	  in	  Korea	  was	  believed	  to	  be	  part	  of	  a	  global	  confrontation,	  and	  various	  kinds	  of	  leftists,	  perceived	  to	  be	  fifth-­‐columnists,	  were	  closely	  watched	  on	  a	  daily	  basis.	  	  	  	   Such	  an	  environment	  of	  surveillance	  did	  not,	  of	  course,	  simply	  emerged	  automatically;	  it	  was	  encouraged.	  It	  was	  President	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  who	  urged	  government	  officials	  and	  ordinary	  people	  to	  report	  any	  suspicious	  activities:	  “I	  suggest	  that	  all	  patriotic	  organizations	  and	  individuals	  likewise	  report	  all	  such	  
                                                93	  See	  articles	  and	  editorials	  in	  Life	  and	  Time	  between	  February	  and	  April	  in	  1950.	  	  94	  Robert	  P.	  Newman,	  “The	  Lingering	  Poison	  of	  McCarranism,”	  Address	  at	  the	  Carolinas	  Speech	  Communication	  Association	  meeting,	  Clemson,	  September	  28,	  1984,	  in	  Scrap	  Clipping	  File,	  Papers	  of	  Pat	  McCarran	  (hereafter	  PPM),	  Nevada	  Historical	  Society	  (hereafter	  NHS),	  Reno,	  NV.	  95	  Letter,	  Mrs.	  Martin	  Thompson	  to	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace,	  August	  9,	  1950,	  Papers	  of	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace	  (hereafter	  PHAW),	  Box	  37,	  Series	  III:	  Correspondence,	  University	  of	  Iowa	  (hereafter	  UI),	  Iowa	  City,	  IA.	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information	  relating	  to	  espionage,	  sabotage,	  and	  subversive	  activities	  to	  the	  Federal	  Bureau	  of	  Investigation	  in	  this	  same	  manner.”96	  With	  such	  advocacy,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  numerous	  reports	  were	  delivered	  to	  local	  and	  national	  government	  offices,	  as	  well	  as	  local	  newspapers.	  Some,	  if	  not	  the	  majority,	  were	  trivial	  and	  paranoid.	  In	  Glendale,	  a	  northeastern	  suburb	  of	  Los	  Angeles,	  for	  instance,	  irate	  parents	  reported	  the	  spread	  of	  “red	  propaganda”	  discovered	  in	  children’s	  card	  collections	  (Picture	  7).	  A	  10-­‐cent	  pack	  of	  children’s	  trading	  cards,	  according	  to	  a	  report,	  included	  a	  card	  depicting	  a	  Russian	  soldier	  standing	  with	  smiling	  children	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Kremlin,	  with	  the	  red	  hammer-­‐and-­‐stickle	  communist	  banner	  over	  their	  heads.	  The	  superintendent	  of	  the	  elementary	  school	  quickly	  banned	  bringing	  card	  collections	  to	  school.	  A	  similar	  incident	  occurred	  in	  San	  Francisco,	  when	  a	  series	  of	  murals	  in	  the	  lobby	  of	  the	  Rincon	  Annex,	  the	  main	  downtown	  post	  office,	  touched	  off	  a	  heated	  debate	  about	  whether	  they	  included	  “communist	  propaganda,”	  and	  if	  they	  were	  art	  or	  propaganda.	  Examples	  of	  this	  kind	  might	  appear	  strange,	  or	  even	  funny,	  from	  today’s	  viewpoint,	  but,	  at	  that	  time	  such	  was	  not	  the	  case.	  They	  were	  delivered	  and	  taken	  seriously,	  and	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  note	  that	  these	  reports	  were	  
voluntarily	  sent	  to	  officials	  and	  editors.	  	  	   It	  is	  no	  wonder	  that,	  in	  September	  1950,	  Congress	  overturned	  President	  Truman’s	  veto	  of	  the	  Internal	  Security	  Act	  of	  1950—often	  called	  the	  McCarran	  Act—which	  required	  the	  registration	  of	  “communist”	  organizations	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  blocked	  members	  of	  these	  organizations	  from	  citizenship,	  and	  established	  an	  investigative	  board	  to	  examine	  persons	  suspected	  of	  engaging	  in	  subversive	  
                                                96	  “Statement	  by	  the	  President,”	  July	  24,	  1950,	  Papers	  of	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  (hereafter	  PHST),	  Student	  File	  52,	  File	  2-­‐8,	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library	  (hereafter	  HSTL),	  Independence,	  MO.	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activities.97	  	  Behind	  congressional	  support	  for	  the	  act	  was	  the	  large	  portion	  of	  population	  that	  detested	  “communists,”	  whatever	  that	  meant.	  One	  Ohioan	  wrote	  an	  angry	  letter	  to	  the	  White	  House:	  	  Mr.	  President:	  	  Are	  you	  a	  Communist?	  Or	  are	  you	  a	  Communist	  sympathizer?	  If	  neither,	  why	  do	  you	  object	  to	  the	  McCarran	  Communist	  control	  bill	  […]?	  We	  should	  have	  a	  law	  to	  hang	  every	  spy	  in	  peace	  time	  as	  well	  as	  war	  time.	  We	  should	  have	  laws	  made	  especially	  to	  deal	  with	  them.	  They	  are	  given	  too	  much	  protection	  here	  under	  our	  ordinary	  laws,	  and	  they	  should	  not	  have	  that	  protection.	  And	  there	  should	  be	  a	  law	  saying	  that	  any	  kind	  of	  criticism	  from	  them	  would	  be	  reason	  to	  banish	  them	  from	  this	  country.	  They	  don’t	  have	  to	  live	  here	  and	  are	  not	  wanted	  if	  they	  don’t	  like	  the	  kind	  of	  treatment	  they	  get	  here.98	  	  	  Another	  Wisconsin	  woman	  wrote,	  in	  a	  similar	  tone:	  	  As	  a	  devoted	  and	  hundred	  percent	  American	  citizen,	  I	  feel	  that	  I	  cannot	  stand	  by	  and	  do	  nothing	  while	  our	  country	  is	  being	  overrun	  by	  Communists.	  I	  feel	  I	  must	  write	  you	  my	  viewpoints.	  […].	  I	  say	  every	  Communist	  should	  be	  rounded	  up	  and	  sent	  to	  Russia	  on	  the	  next	  boat,	  only	  then,	  can	  you	  expect	  to	  rid	  this	  country	  of	  aggression	  and	  any	  further	  aggression	  of	  evils	  ruling	  [sic]	  in	  this	  country!99	  	  	  In	  such	  a	  climate	  of	  anti-­‐communist	  sentiments,	  those	  who	  might	  be	  perceived	  as	  “communistic”	  subdued	  their	  voices.	  Many	  liberals	  and	  progressives	  began	  to	  fear	  being	  called	  “liberal.”100	  Quite	  a	  few	  professors	  in	  the	  University	  of	  California	  system,	  who	  had	  been	  fighting	  for	  years	  over	  the	  loyalty	  oath	  controversy	  at	  the	  University,	  quickly	  compromised	  with	  the	  administrator’s	  requirement	  to	  take	  the	  loyalty	  oath	  as	  the	  war	  in	  Korea	  escalated.101	  Henry	  A.	  Wallace,	  a	  former	  president	  of	  the	  Progressive	  Party,	  who	  resigned	  his	  position	  due	  to	  his	  support	  for	  American	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  About	  McCarran	  Act.	  	  98	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  M.	  Keatle	  to	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	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  11,	  1950,	  PHST,	  Box	  1717,	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  File	  (hereafter	  OF)	  2750B,	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  MO.	  	  	  99	  Letter,	  Mary	  Ann	  Matugeg,	  August	  25,	  1950,	  PHST,	  Box	  881,	  OF	  263,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  MO.	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  “People	  Fear	  being	  called	  ‘Liberal,’”	  March	  9,	  1951,	  Palo	  Alto	  Times,	  in	  the	  McCarthy	  Era	  Newspaper	  Clippings,	  1946-­‐1954	  (hereafter	  MENC),	  Box	  1,	  Special	  Collections	  and	  University	  Archives,	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  University	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  CA.	  	  	  101	  “UC	  Professor	  Who	  Balked	  at	  Oath	  Are	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  Relenting,”	  July	  15,	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military	  action	  in	  Korea,	  likewise,	  excused	  the	  McCarran	  Act,	  saying	  that	  the	  law	  reflected	  the	  sentiments	  of	  the	  people	  in	  a	  time	  of	  crisis,	  simply	  commenting,	  “The	  greater	  the	  menace,	  the	  greater	  the	  sacrifice.”102	  	  Still,	  the	  experiences	  of	  such	  public	  figures	  and	  big	  names	  might	  have	  been	  easier,	  since	  many	  of	  them	  at	  least	  had	  outlets	  for	  their	  opinions.	  Many	  common	  people	  who	  were	  similarly	  silenced	  at	  that	  time,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  had	  far	  fewer	  such	  opportunities.	  The	  experience	  of	  Helen	  MacMartin,	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Progressive	  Party	  of	  Vermont	  in	  the	  small	  town	  of	  Burlington	  (pop.	  33,155	  in	  1950),	  exemplifies	  a	  typical	  five-­‐step	  suppression	  on	  the	  ground.	  	  The	  first	  step	  was	  the	  change	  in	  human	  relations	  in	  her	  community.	  Just	  few	  days	  after	  MacMartin’s	  disapproval	  of	  American	  military	  actions	  in	  Korea	  was	  published	  in	  a	  local	  newspaper	  in	  July	  1950,	  she	  received	  a	  letter	  from	  a	  friend:	  	  I	  cannot	  believe	  that	  you	  have	  personally	  sold	  out	  to	  the	  Communist	  Cause—though	  everything	  you	  have	  said	  in	  the	  article	  [in	  the	  local	  newspaper]	  would	  indicate	  so.	  I	  am	  writing	  because	  I	  do	  believe	  that	  you	  will	  listen	  to	  what	  I	  have	  to	  say,	  and	  because	  I	  hope	  there	  is	  still	  some	  hope	  for	  saving	  a	  person	  for	  the	  good	  of	  peace	  and	  democracy	  in	  which	  I	  think	  you	  believe,	  and	  because	  I	  hate	  to	  see	  a	  person	  persecuted.103	  	  	  MacMartin	  quickly	  replied:	  	  No,	  I	  am	  not	  a	  Communist,	  have	  not	  “sold	  out”	  as	  you	  put	  it.	  If	  my	  convictions	  lead	  me	  more	  and	  more	  to	  know	  that	  Fascism	  and	  monopoly	  capitalism	  and	  imperialism	  of	  the	  U.S.	  is	  the	  great	  threat	  of	  our	  day	  and	  of	  many	  years	  back,	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  I	  embrace	  Communism.	  Unfortunately	  for	  me	  and	  for	  many	  like	  me,	  just	  because	  the	  Communists	  believe	  this	  also,	  we	  are	  called	  Communists.	  I	  am	  afraid	  this	  sort	  of	  pressure	  has	  had	  its	  effect	  on	  Henry	  Wallace.	  […].	  Tom,	  I	  wish	  I	  could	  talk	  with	  you.	  But	  I	  don’t	  suppose	  you	  would	  be	  seen	  having	  lunch	  with	  me	  again.104	  	  	  No	  further	  reply	  came	  from	  the	  friend.	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  Des	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  and	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  Letter,	  Tom	  Braine	  to	  Helen	  MacMartin,	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  of	  the	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  Letter,	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The	  second	  was	  a	  public	  attack	  in	  a	  local	  newspaper.	  The	  Burlington	  Daily	  
News	  devoted	  an	  entire	  editorial	  to	  censuring	  MacMartin;	  it	  read,	  	  Her	  ranting	  against	  ‘American	  imperialism’	  when	  American	  soldiers	  are	  dying	  on	  Korean	  battlefields	  is	  disgusting.	  […].	  The	  wild	  bleating	  of	  Mrs.	  MacMartin	  marks	  her	  as	  a	  woman	  gone	  too	  far	  in	  her	  political	  thinking,	  as	  one	  who	  has	  been	  carried	  away	  by	  ideological	  confusions.	  […].	  The	  political	  aims	  and	  aspirations	  of	  Mrs.	  MacMartin	  are	  detestable	  in	  this	  time	  of	  grave	  crisis.105	  	  As	  in	  this	  case,	  local	  newspapers	  often	  took	  initiatives	  in	  decrying	  “communist”	  sentiments.	  In	  other	  places,	  such	  as	  in	  Winston-­‐Salem,	  North	  Carolina,	  for	  instance,	  local	  newspapers	  conducted	  an	  “American-­‐version”	  of	  a	  petition	  drive	  to	  counter	  “communist”	  signature-­‐collecting	  campaigns.106	  In	  addition	  to	  newspapers,	  local	  branches	  of	  various	  social	  organizations—in	  particular	  churches	  and	  the	  American	  Legion—often	  took	  initiatives	  in	  attacking	  “reds”	  within	  communities.107	  In	  a	  rural	  area	  of	  Wisconsin,	  local	  American	  Legion	  officers,	  for	  instance,	  warned	  residents	  not	  to	  sign	  “Red	  fifth-­‐column’s	  efforts	  to	  destroy	  morale	  in	  this	  nation.”108	  Back	  to	  the	  story	  of	  Helen	  MacMartin,	  the	  third	  step	  was	  a	  general	  boycott	  in	  the	  community.	  MacMartin	  tried	  to	  fight	  back,	  sending	  letters	  to	  local	  papers,	  hoping	  they	  would	  be	  published.	  She	  also	  continued	  to	  write	  to	  her	  friends,	  asking	  them	  to	  stand	  up	  for	  her.	  These	  letters,	  however,	  were	  ignored.109	  The	  fourth	  step	  was	  estrangement	  from	  family	  members;	  she	  was	  harshly	  condemned	  by	  her	  sister	  as	  a	  “dupe”	  and	  “fool”	  who	  wanted	  to	  “wear	  a	  martyr’s	  crown.”	  After	  a	  fierce	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  to	  Jessie,	  August	  6,	  1950,	  PPP,	  Box	  2,	  File	  12,	  UI,	  Iowa	  City,	  IA.	  106	  Letter,	  Winston-­‐Salem	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  MacMartin,	  September	  20,	  1950,	  PPP,	  Box	  3,	  File	  12,	  UI,	  Iowa	  City,	  IA.	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conversation,	  MacMartin	  realized	  that	  it	  was	  almost	  impossible	  to	  talk	  with	  her.110	  Finally,	  in	  the	  last	  step,	  she	  lost	  her	  job	  caring	  for	  an	  elderly	  man	  in	  her	  neighborhood.111	  	  In	  examining	  MacMartin’s	  case,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  persecution	  was	  not	  official.	  Actual	  oppression	  took	  place	  in	  society,	  and	  “persecutors”	  were	  not	  necessarily	  politicians,	  lawyers,	  or	  FBI	  officials,	  but	  neighbors,	  friends,	  family	  members,	  and	  employers.	  With	  regard	  to	  method,	  there	  was	  no	  formal	  prosecution,	  no	  hearing,	  no	  trial.	  She	  was	  punished	  though	  rumors,	  a	  boycott,	  and	  an	  unofficial	  “trial”	  of	  publicity.	  This	  kind	  of	  case	  was,	  in	  fact,	  rather	  common.	  Many	  of	  those	  summoned	  to	  official	  hearings,	  such	  as	  the	  HUAC	  hearing,	  at	  that	  time	  were	  not	  
officially	  convicted.	  A	  large	  majority	  were,	  in	  fact,	  not	  sentenced	  at	  all;	  many,	  however,	  found	  that	  their	  private	  employers	  immediately	  fired	  them,	  resulting	  in	  mass	  dismissals.112	  	  Such	  mass	  terminations	  were	  not	  irrelevant	  to	  regulatory	  changed	  announced	  by	  President	  Truman	  announced	  in	  April	  1951,	  regarding	  the	  applicability	  of	  the	  Loyalty	  Program.	  With	  his	  announcement,	  a	  dismissal	  that	  previously	  had	  to	  “show	  reasonable	  grounds”	  needs	  only	  “reasonable	  doubts.”113	  Not	  surprisingly,	  this	  change	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  broadening	  grounds	  for	  dismissals	  and	  suppression,	  first	  in	  governmental	  sectors,	  and	  then	  in	  other	  sectors	  at	  a	  similar	  manner.	  One	  34-­‐year-­‐old	  African	  American	  in	  New	  York,	  for	  instance,	  lost	  his	  job	  in	  
                                                110	  Letter,	  Helen	  MacMartin	  to	  Max	  and	  Grace	  Granich,	  August	  11,	  1950,	  PPP,	  Box	  3,	  File	  12,	  UI,	  Iowa	  City,	  IA.	  111	  Letter,	  Helen	  MacMartin	  to	  Carl	  Ramsey,	  February	  7,	  1951,	  PPP,	  Box	  3,	  File	  13,	  UI,	  Iowa	  City,	  IA.	  	  112	  “The	  Reminiscences	  of	  Joseph	  Gordon	  (Occupation	  of	  Japan)”	  in	  the	  Oral	  History	  Collection	  of	  Columbia	  University,	  New	  York	  City,	  NY.	  	  113	  “Loyalty	  Board	  Fires	  Service,”	  December	  14,	  1951,	  Rockford	  Morning	  Star,	  in	  Papers	  of	  John	  Service	  (PJS),	  Oversized	  Box	  1,	  Bancroft	  Library,	  University	  of	  California,	  Berkeley,	  CA.	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the	  post	  office	  through	  the	  Loyalty	  Program	  due	  to	  a	  record	  of	  joining	  a	  “communist-­‐led”	  group	  that	  criticized	  discrimination	  and	  prejudice	  when	  he	  was	  18	  years	  old.	  He	  found	  another	  job	  as	  a	  truck	  driver,	  with	  a	  lower	  salary	  than	  his	  previous	  job,	  but	  soon	  was	  fired	  again	  when	  his	  employer	  found	  this	  past	  record.	  As	  these	  examples	  show,	  persecution	  escalated	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  political	  initiatives	  and	  social	  implementation,	  both	  of	  which	  contributed	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  a	  climate	  of	  doubt	  and	  mutual	  surveillance.	  	  Another	  hidden	  but	  powerful	  “executor”	  of	  social	  suppression	  was	  self-­‐censorship.	  Fearing	  being	  assaulted	  publicly,	  many	  changed	  their	  stances	  and	  behaviors	  on	  their	  own.	  Many	  who	  had	  previously	  signed	  petitions	  for	  the	  Progressive	  Party,	  for	  instance,	  began	  asking	  local	  branches	  to	  remove	  their	  names	  from	  those	  petitions.	  Some	  asked	  to	  withdraw	  from	  membership.	  Other	  asked	  to	  stop	  receiving	  any	  publications	  which	  might	  attract	  attention	  from	  their	  neighbors.114	  One	  Wisconsinite	  wrote	  to	  the	  secretariat	  of	  the	  party:	  “Please	  do	  not	  send	  me	  any	  more	  letters	  or	  papers	  of	  the	  Progressive	  Party.	  I	  am	  not	  interested.	  So	  please	  discontinue	  any	  mail	  dealing	  with	  the	  Party.”115	  Another,	  similarly,	  wrote:	  “You	  will	  save	  yourself	  time	  and	  mailing	  costs	  if	  you	  remove	  our	  names	  from	  your	  mailing	  list.	  You	  will	  also	  save	  us	  the	  trouble	  of	  receiving	  and	  opening	  your	  political	  literature.”116	  Some	  wrote	  in	  a	  more	  apologetic	  mood	  that	  their	  decisions	  to	  withdraw	  were	  made	  to	  defend	  themselves.	  One	  Denver	  woman,	  for	  instance,	  
                                                114	  Letter,	  Fred	  Behne	  to	  the	  Headquarter	  Office,	  July	  30,	  1950,	  PPP,	  Box	  5,	  File	  22,	  UI,	  Iowa	  City,	  IA.	  Such	  letters	  are	  numerous	  in	  Progressive	  Party’s	  correspondences	  in	  the	  summer	  and	  fall	  of	  1950.	  115	  Letter,	  Joe	  Riblake	  to	  the	  Headquarter	  Office,	  September	  14,	  1950,	  PPP,	  Box	  5,	  File	  22,	  UI,	  Iowa	  City,	  IA.	  	  116	  Letter,	  Mike	  and	  Marilyn	  Gorski	  to	  the	  Headquarter	  Office,	  September	  14,	  1950,	  PPP,	  Box	  5,	  File	  22,	  UI,	  Iowa	  City,	  IA.	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explained	  the	  reason	  she	  had	  to	  resign	  from	  the	  Women’s	  International	  League	  for	  Peace	  and	  Freedom	  as	  such:	  “I	  have	  my	  job	  to	  consider	  and	  my	  place	  in	  the	  community	  life.”117	  	  	  
	  “Enemies	  Among	  Us”	  Behind	  such	  practices	  of	  self-­‐censorship,	  social	  implementation,	  and	  political	  initiatives	  was	  a	  large	  body	  of	  common	  citizenry,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  image	  of	  it.	  After	  all,	  the	  Truman	  administration	  set	  up	  the	  mechanism	  of	  the	  Loyalty	  and	  Security	  Program	  in	  March,	  1947	  not	  because	  it	  perceived	  actual	  security	  risks	  in	  the	  government	  but,	  primarily,	  because	  it	  saw	  political	  opportunities	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  decisive	  defeat	  of	  Democratic	  Party	  in	  November,	  1946.118	  Many	  employers,	  too,	  were	  not	  worried	  about	  any	  particular	  threat	  posed	  by	  “reds.”	  What	  concerned	  them	  more	  was	  the	  deterioration	  of	  their	  company’s	  public	  image	  that	  might	  result	  from	  retaining	  people	  suspected	  of	  being	  communists	  or	  communist	  sympathizers.119	  Many	  leftists’	  self-­‐restraint	  and	  self-­‐censorship,	  likewise,	  was	  the	  result	  of	  personal	  fears	  that	  “other”	  people	  might	  criticize	  them.	  In	  a	  sense,	  they	  were	  responding	  to	  what	  they	  believed	  to	  be	  the	  mainstream	  opinions	  of	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  the	  common	  people.	  	  What,	  then,	  were	  such	  opinions?	  There	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  measure	  popular	  attitudes,	  including	  consulting	  opinion	  polls,	  surveys,	  popular	  magazines,	  and	  memoirs	  from	  that	  period.	  Another	  way	  is	  to	  analyze	  letters	  sent	  to	  politicians	  and	  
                                                117	  Ellen	  Schrecker,	  "McCarthyism:	  Political	  Repression	  and	  the	  Fear	  of	  Communism,"	  Social	  Research	  Vol.	  71,	  No	  3	  (2004),	  1071.	  118	  Ellen	  Schrecker,	  "McCarthyism:	  Political	  Repression	  and	  the	  Fear	  of	  Communism,"	  1046.	  	  119	  Ibid,	  1047	  and	  1069.	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governmental	  officials.	  These	  letters,	  to	  be	  sure,	  do	  not	  represent	  any	  particular	  group,	  but	  often	  reflect	  subjective	  views	  of	  individuals	  in	  society	  in	  a	  vivid	  way.	  One	  quite	  common	  thread	  among	  such	  letters	  was	  American	  nationalism.	  A	  woman	  in	  Wheeling,	  West	  Virginia	  wrote	  to	  the	  President	  on	  August	  9,	  1950:	  	  Why	  must	  our	  boys	  die	  fighting	  Communists	  in	  Korea	  and	  they	  are	  allowed	  to	  roam	  freely	  among	  us	  and	  go	  on	  with	  their	  fight	  against	  us?	  In	  being	  so	  careful	  to	  guard	  the	  Constitution[al]	  Right[s]	  of	  this	  bunch	  of	  traitors,	  Congress	  is	  not	  guarding	  the	  rights	  of	  our	  true	  citizens.	  […].	  This	  is	  pure	  nonsense	  […].	  Let’s	  drive	  these	  traitors	  underground	  and	  then	  dig	  them	  out	  like	  rats.	  Let’s	  make	  America	  safe	  for	  Americans.120	  	  	  A	  woman	  in	  Wisconsin	  similarly	  wrote	  to	  the	  White	  House:	  I	  say	  each	  and	  every	  person	  who	  does	  not	  care	  for	  American	  ways	  of	  living	  in	  freedom	  and	  liberty,	  but	  prefers	  Russian	  ways	  should	  be	  made	  to	  go	  and	  live	  there.	  […].	  May	  the	  Good	  Lord,	  give	  you…strength	  and	  courage	  to	  discharge	  those	  who	  are	  not	  100%	  True	  American.121	  	  	  	  Another	  woman,	  in	  Brewer,	  Maine,	  took	  a	  pen	  in	  August	  11,	  1950:	  Mr.	  President:	  In	  this	  hour	  of	  great	  trial	  and	  tribulation	  for	  the	  peoples	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  office	  of	  the	  President	  of	  the	  United	  States	  must	  indeed	  be	  a	  tremendous	  responsibility.	  That	  responsibility	  should	  be	  faced	  squarely	  and	  in	  a	  typical	  American	  manner!	  	  I	  have	  before	  me	  the	  complete	  text	  of	  your	  message	  to	  Congress,	  concerning	  the	  subversive	  action	  within	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  I	  assure	  you	  that	  this	  letter	  is	  not	  prompted	  by	  hysteria.	  	  The	  threat	  of	  communism	  in	  our	  own	  country	  is	  as	  far-­‐reaching	  and	  dangerous	  as	  anywhere	  in	  the	  world.	  We	  must	  band	  together	  to	  rid	  us	  of	  this	  scourge.	  The	  excuses	  must	  be	  thrown	  out	  as	  having	  no	  place	  in	  this	  fight	  for	  the	  preservation	  of	  human	  dignity!	  While	  our	  men	  are	  in	  Korea	  fighting	  the	  communists	  and	  all	  they	  stand	  for,	  there	  are	  thousands	  of	  these	  same	  communists	  going	  about	  their	  dastardly	  plotting	  right	  here	  in	  these	  United	  States!	  I	  implore	  you	  to	  exercise	  your	  power	  as	  President	  and	  grant	  the	  F.B.I.	  the	  right	  to	  round	  up	  these	  criminals.	  Do	  we	  compromise	  with	  thieves,	  murderers	  and	  the	  like?	  No!	  And	  yet	  these	  thieves	  of	  decency	  go	  about	  openly,	  carrying	  on	  their	  meetings,	  printing	  their	  newspapers	  of	  revolution,	  endeavoring	  to	  undermine	  our	  every	  effort,	  and	  this	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  freedom	  of	  speech	  and	  rights!	  The	  evasive	  issue	  of	  not	  wanting	  to	  drive	  the	  communists	  underground	  is	  a	  tragic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  Bill	  of	  Rights!	  The	  most	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  Letter,	  Mary	  Margaret	  Freese	  to	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  August	  9,	  1950,	  PHST,	  Box	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  121	  Letter,	  Mary	  Ann	  Matugeg	  to	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  ,	  August	  25,	  1950,	  PHST,	  Box	  881,	  OF	  263,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  MO.	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dangerous	  communists	  are	  already	  operating	  underground!	  They	  must	  be	  ferreted	  out	  and	  communism	  must	  be	  destroyed!	  	  Mr.	  President,	  talk	  to	  the	  people	  of	  the	  United	  Nations,	  assure	  them	  that	  we	  will	  work	  unceasingly	  towards	  this	  goal,	  and	  then	  live	  up	  to	  this	  promise!	  The	  day	  communism	  is	  outlawed	  will	  bring	  another	  glorious	  page	  in	  the	  history	  of	  freedom!122	  	  	  Not	  only	  the	  president,	  but	  other	  major	  politicians	  received	  hundreds	  of	  such	  letters.	  Democratic	  Senator	  from	  Nevada	  Pat	  McCarran,	  for	  instance,	  was	  urged	  to	  bring	  justice	  to	  those	  who	  were	  un-­‐American,	  who	  were	  “hoping	  to	  destroy	  our	  American	  way	  of	  life.”123	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  a	  Republican	  Senator	  from	  California	  was	  urged	  to	  see	  what	  the	  nation	  wanted:	  “We	  want	  some	  Americans	  with	  real	  old	  fashioned	  ideas	  and	  ideals	  to	  represent	  us	  in	  Washington.”124	  What	  is	  clear	  in	  these	  letters	  is	  sheer	  hatred	  of	  “communists,”	  as	  well	  as	  enormous	  affection	  for	  “America.”	  What	  is	  not	  so	  clear	  is	  who	  exactly	  “communists”	  were	  and	  what,	  precisely,	  “America”	  was.	  These	  are	  taken	  for	  granted.	  The	  authors	  of	  these	  letters	  did	  not	  specifically	  spell	  these	  out,	  not	  because	  they	  did	  not	  know,	  but	  because,	  perhaps,	  the	  definitions	  were	  too	  clear	  to	  them	  to	  mention.	  The	  meaning	  of	  “America,”	  for	  them,	  was	  part	  of	  common	  sense,	  and	  the	  meaning	  of	  “communism”	  was,	  likewise,	  less	  about	  political	  ideas	  or	  institutions	  than	  anything	  deemed	  unharmonious	  with	  such	  images	  of	  “America.”	  	  The	  crux	  of	  the	  matter,	  therefore,	  had	  more	  to	  do	  with	  the	  state	  of	  social	  order	  than	  political	  ideas	  or	  machinery.	  A	  father	  of	  nine	  children	  in	  the	  tiny	  village	  of	  McGrath,	  Alaska,	  for	  instance,	  wrote	  that	  he	  would	  not	  hesitate	  to	  make	  any	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  Maryorie	  Quigg	  to	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  August	  11,	  1950,	  PHST,	  Box	  881	  OF	  263,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  MO.	  123	  Letter,	  Violette	  Speciale	  to	  Pat	  McCarran,	  December	  17,	  1950,	  PPM,	  Box	  51,	  NHS,	  Reno,	  NV.	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  Letter,	  C.S.	  Smith	  to	  William	  Knowland,	  December	  4,	  1950,	  Papers	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  William	  Knowland	  (hereafter	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  242,	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sacrifice	  in	  fighting	  communism,	  and	  that	  he	  would	  do	  this	  because	  he	  would	  like	  his	  nine	  children	  “to	  grow	  up	  in	  a	  lawful	  and	  orderly	  society.”125	  Like	  this	  father,	  many	  just	  wanted	  to	  defend	  their	  way	  of	  life.	  Seen	  this	  way,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  letters	  above	  expressed,	  these	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  hysterical,	  irrational	  responses.	  Rather,	  such	  attitudes	  were	  considered	  righteous	  and	  patriotic,	  and,	  thus,	  many	  Americans	  embraced	  them	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  their	  communities	  and	  families.	  	  Yet,	  here	  existed	  the	  politics	  of	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion.	  What	  kind	  of	  communities	  and	  families	  did	  people	  want	  to	  defend?	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  kinds	  of	  communities	  and	  families	  did	  they	  not	  want	  to	  protect?	  What	  kinds	  of	  things	  should	  be	  considered	  “American”	  and	  what	  were	  not	  “American”?	  These	  questions	  were	  actually	  more	  difficult	  to	  articulate	  than	  many	  letters	  writers	  would	  assume.	  This	  was	  because	  the	  definitions	  and	  realities	  of	  community,	  family,	  and	  society	  were	  radically	  changing	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  primarily	  due	  to	  various	  social	  changes	  arising	  from	  the	  turbulent	  experiences	  of	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  World	  War	  II.	  	  These	  two	  gigantic	  historical	  events	  altered	  social	  relationships,	  generating	  new	  social	  conflicts	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  war.	  Such	  an	  emergence	  of	  conflict	  was	  particularly	  notable	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  racial,	  labor,	  and	  gender	  relations.	  	  In	  brief,	  many	  African	  Americans	  who	  fought	  in	  World	  War	  II	  began	  advocating	  a	  “double	  victory,”	  meaning	  a	  victory	  not	  just	  over	  foreign	  enemies	  but	  also	  over	  domestic	  discrimination,	  beginning	  an	  escalation	  of	  their	  civil	  rights	  movements.	  Likewise,	  quite	  a	  few	  women,	  who	  acquired	  jobs	  and	  social	  status	  in	  wartime,	  wanted	  to	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  Letter,	  Ralph	  W.	  Slone	  to	  E.	  L.	  Bartlett,	  December	  5,	  1950,	  PHST,	  Box	  1307,	  OF	  471B,	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retain	  new	  social	  positions	  beyond	  “mother”	  and	  “wife,”	  and	  many	  workers,	  who	  had	  obtained	  new	  authority	  during	  the	  New	  Deal	  period,	  fiercely	  fought	  management	  in	  the	  early	  postwar	  period.	  Finally,	  homosexuals,	  who	  found	  fellows	  in	  the	  army	  and	  did	  not	  return	  to	  their	  rural	  hometowns	  after	  the	  war,	  began	  creating	  a	  new	  subculture	  in	  urban	  areas.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  these	  areas	  of	  transformation	  were	  exactly	  where	  suppression	  was	  most	  fierce	  in	  the	  so-­‐called	  McCarthy	  era.	  Such	  social	  oppression	  spread	  broadly	  but	  quietly	  because	  most	  casualties	  did	  not	  have	  outlets	  to	  speak	  up.	  My	  next	  section	  examines	  such	  actual	  social	  conflicts,	  which	  were	  silenced	  in	  the	  name	  of	  anti-­‐communism.	  	  	  
“Society	  Must	  Be	  Defended”	  	  	   If	  so-­‐called	  McCarthyism	  was	  not	  just	  an	  anti-­‐communist	  purge,	  what	  was	  it?	  What	  kinds	  of	  struggles	  lay	  behind	  the	  banner	  of	  the	  Cold	  War?	  Who	  purged	  who	  and	  for	  what	  purposes?	  This	  section	  briefly	  surveys	  casualties	  in	  several	  areas:	  race,	  labor,	  gender,	  and	  various	  social	  norms	  and	  common	  sense.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  among	  the	  people	  severely	  repressed	  during	  the	  McCarthy	  era	  were	  African	  Americans	  and	  civil	  rights	  activists	  (Picture	  8).	  While	  the	  effects	  of	  anti-­‐communism	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  on	  these	  groups	  have	  been	  well	  researched,	  recent	  scholars	  have	  tended	  to	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  “beneficial”	  aspects	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  for	  the	  civil	  rights	  movements.126	  Yet,	  as	  historian	  Manning	  Marable	  argues,	  anti-­‐communist	  politics	  was,	  indeed,	  a	  “destructive	  force	  within	  civil	  rights	  groups,	  and	  more	  broadly	  within	  
                                                126	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Mary	  L.	  Dudziak,	  Cold	  War	  Civil	  Rights:	  Race	  and	  the	  Image	  of	  American	  
Democracy	  (Princeton,	  NJ,	  2000);	  Elaine	  Tyler	  May,	  “Postscript	  to	  the	  1999	  edition,”	  Homeward	  
Bound:	  American	  Families	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  Era	  revised	  and	  updated	  ed.	  (New	  York,	  1999),	  205-­‐208.	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the	  black	  community.”127	  In	  fact,	  an	  African	  American	  leader	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  Coleman	  Young,	  recalled:	  “It	  was	  all	  but	  impossible	  for	  a	  black	  person	  to	  avoid	  the	  Communist	  label	  as	  long	  as	  he	  or	  she	  advocated	  civil	  rights	  with	  any	  degree	  of	  vigor.”128	  Similar	  misfortune	  befell	  not	  only	  African	  American	  activists	  but	  the	  Progressive	  Party’s	  white	  southerners,	  who	  had	  advocated	  for	  the	  abolition	  of	  segregation.129	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that,	  in	  the	  South,	  elite	  conservatives	  and	  the	  white	  working	  class	  adopted	  red	  scare	  politics,	  which	  in	  many	  ways,	  as	  historian	  Jeff	  Wood	  describes,	  were	  a	  “byproduct	  of	  the	  region’s	  massive	  resistance	  to	  integration.”	  In	  the	  Korean	  War	  period,	  both	  elites	  and	  grassroots	  southerners	  escalated	  their	  critiques	  of	  civil	  rights	  activists	  as	  “communistic”	  and	  “un-­‐American,”	  contributing	  to	  the	  defense	  of	  the	  southern	  way	  of	  life—segregation—in	  the	  name	  of	  patriotism	  and	  to	  the	  marginalization	  of	  elements	  of	  social	  conflict	  in	  the	  name	  of	  national	  security.	  	  Similar	  sentiments	  appeared	  in	  growing	  northern	  cities,	  where	  the	  influx	  of	  African	  Americans	  and	  Mexican	  Americans	  in	  the	  wartime	  and	  postwar	  periods	  created	  and	  exacerbated	  racial	  tensions	  among	  residents.	  In	  Detroit,	  for	  instance,	  more	  than	  half	  of	  those	  polled	  expressed	  “unfavorable”	  attitudes	  toward	  integration,	  while	  only	  eighteen	  percent	  expressed	  “favorable”	  views	  toward	  the	  “full-­‐
                                                127	  Manning	  Marable,	  “Series	  Editor's	  Forward”	  in	  Robbie	  Lieberman	  and	  Clarence	  Lang,	  
Anticommunism	  and	  the	  African	  American	  Freedom	  Movement:	  Other	  Side	  of	  Story	  (New	  York,	  2009),	  xi.	  128	  Martha	  Biondi,	  To	  Stand	  and	  Fight:	  The	  Struggle	  For	  Civil	  Rights	  in	  Postwar	  New	  York	  City	  (Boston,	  2003),	  190.	  129	  Letter,	  Herman	  Wright	  to	  Carter	  Wesley,	  PPP,	  UI,	  Iowa	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  IA.	  
  429 
acceptance	  of	  Negroes.”130	  Such	  racial	  tension	  on	  the	  ground	  flared	  over	  public	  housing	  programs	  for	  lower-­‐income	  households	  in	  cities	  like	  Detroit,	  Milwaukee,	  and	  Los	  Angeles.	  In	  the	  late	  1940s,	  white	  residents	  criticized	  a	  public	  housing	  program	  as	  a	  “Negro	  housing	  project,”	  expressing	  their	  concerns	  about	  the	  “colored	  problem”—or	  “Black	  invasion”—in	  their	  traditionally	  white	  neighborhood	  because,	  those	  locals	  thought,	  “Eighty	  percent	  [of	  Blacks]	  are	  animals”	  and	  “They	  think	  they	  own	  the	  city.”131	  One	  irate	  housewife	  in	  Detroit	  wrote:	  “What	  about	  us,	  who	  cannot	  afford	  to	  move	  to	  a	  better	  location	  and	  are	  surrounded	  by	  colored?	  […].	  Most	  of	  us	  invested	  our	  life’s	  savings	  in	  property	  and	  now	  we	  are	  in	  constant	  fear	  that	  the	  neighbor	  will	  sell	  its	  property	  to	  people	  of	  a	  different	  race.”132	  With	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950,	  local	  opponents	  of	  public	  housing	  programs	  reframed	  their	  attitudes,	  condemning	  the	  same	  programs	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  racial	  struggles	  but	  those	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  struggle.	  One	  resident	  of	  Los	  Angeles,	  for	  instance,	  wrote	  a	  letter	  to	  a	  local	  councilman,	  describing	  the	  city’s	  housing	  program	  as	  the	  “Russian	  Communistic	  Socialistic	  Housing	  Project,	  which	  is	  trying	  to	  destroy	  our	  freedom,	  liberty,	  and	  our	  free	  enterprise	  system.”133	  Amidst	  this	  sea	  change,	  one	  city	  council	  member	  and	  former	  supporter	  of	  the	  housing	  program	  changed	  position,	  attacking	  it	  as	  the	  “creeping	  cancer	  of	  socialism	  which	  will	  bring	  us	  to	  socialism	  and	  social	  decay.”134	  The	  application	  of	  this	  new	  Cold	  War	  logic	  to	  existing	  racial	  struggles	  can	  be	  found	  in	  regard	  to	  other	  cities’	  similar	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  Politics:	  Race,	  Rights,	  and	  the	  Reaction	  against	  Liberalism	  in	  the	  Urban	  North,	  1940-­‐1964,"	  Journal	  of	  American	  History,	  82,	  no.2,	  (1995):	  555.	  131	  Ibid,	  556.	  132	  Ibid,	  555.	  133	  Don	  Parson,	  "The	  Decline	  of	  Public	  Housing	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  the	  Red	  Scare:	  The	  Significance	  of	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Public	  Housing	  War,"	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  History,	  33,	  no.	  3	  (2007):	  407.	  	  	  134	  Ibid,	  407.	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projects,	  such	  as	  those	  in	  Milwaukee	  and	  Detroit,	  where	  criticism	  of	  housing	  projects	  successfully	  slowed	  and	  trimmed	  the	  speed	  and	  size	  of	  projects.	  In	  these	  cases,	  too,	  white	  neighborhoods	  applied	  McCarthyite	  anticommunist	  logic	  to	  solve	  social	  and	  racial	  conflicts.135	  	  	  In	  a	  similar	  manner,	  a	  national	  health	  care	  program	  was	  killed	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period.	  This	  program	  had	  previously	  been	  opposed	  by	  the	  majority	  of	  doctors	  and	  nurses	  because,	  they	  argued,	  it	  would	  lower	  the	  quality	  of	  medical	  service,	  science,	  and	  institutions	  in	  the	  United	  States.136	  With	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  public	  housing	  programs,	  opponents	  now	  utilized	  a	  new	  Cold	  War	  logic	  to	  solve	  an	  existing	  conflict.	  Immediately	  following	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  president	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  made	  a	  speech,	  aired	  on	  radio	  networks	  nationwide,	  harshly	  censuring	  state-­‐controlled	  medical	  care;	  he	  said:	  “American	  medicine	  has	  become	  the	  focal	  point	  in	  a	  struggle	  which	  may	  determine	  whether	  America	  remains	  free,	  or	  whether	  we	  are	  to	  become	  a	  Socialist	  State.”137	  	  Such	  a	  critique	  worked	  well.	  With	  mounting	  criticism,	  fashioned	  according	  to	  Cold	  War	  logic,	  Democrats	  abandoned	  the	  national	  health	  care	  program	  in	  1950.138	  	  
                                                135	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Thomas	  J.	  Sugrue,	  "Crabgrass-­‐Roots	  Politics:	  Race,	  Rights,	  and	  the	  Reaction	  against	  Liberalism	  in	  the	  Urban	  North,	  1940-­‐1964,"	  Journal	  of	  American	  History,	  82,	  no.2,	  (1995):551-­‐578;	  Don	  Parson,	  "The	  Decline	  of	  Public	  Housing	  and	  the	  Politics	  of	  the	  Red	  Scare:	  The	  Significance	  of	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Public	  Housing	  War,"	  Journal	  of	  Urban	  History,	  33,	  no.	  3	  (2007):	  400-­‐417;	  and	  Eric	  Fure-­‐Slocum,	  "Housing,	  Race,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  a	  Labor	  City,"	  in	  Shelton	  Stromquist	  ed.,	  Labor's	  
Cold	  War:	  Local	  Politics	  in	  a	  Global	  Context	  (Urbana,	  IL,	  2008),	  163-­‐203.	  136	  Letter,	  Alabama	  State	  Association	  of	  Nurse	  Anesthetists	  to	  Pat	  McCarran,	  March	  17,	  1950,	  Box	  51,	  PPM,	  NHS,	  Reno,	  NV;	  Letter,	  Reno	  Business	  and	  Professional	  Women’s	  Club	  to	  Pat	  McCarran,	  June	  19,	  1950,	  Box	  51,	  PPM,	  NHS,	  Reno,	  NV.	  	  137	  “Presidential	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  Address	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  Henderson	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  President,	  American	  Medical	  Association,”	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  27,	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  PPM,	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  NHS,	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Another	  kind	  of	  social	  conflict	  completely	  silenced	  in	  this	  period	  was	  labor	  disputes.	  One	  political	  cartoon	  in	  the	  Kansas	  City	  Star	  captured	  an	  ideal	  version	  of	  labor-­‐management-­‐government	  relations;	  in	  this	  drawing,	  “Management,”	  “American	  People,”	  and	  “Labor”	  agreed	  on	  Uncle	  Sam’s	  “Defense	  Program,”	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  reality	  (Picture	  9).139	  Needless	  to	  say,	  the	  actual	  situation	  was	  not	  so	  neat.	  A	  “consensus,”	  if	  it	  existed,	  was	  created	  not	  necessarily	  through	  consensus	  but,	  often,	  through	  coercion.	  At	  a	  Buick	  plant	  in	  Flint,	  Michigan,	  for	  instance,	  right-­‐wing	  workers	  purged	  “radical”	  and	  “communistic”	  workers	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1950.	  At	  a	  Ford	  plant	  in	  Linden,	  New	  Jersey,	  likewise,	  workers	  who	  tried	  to	  pass	  out	  “Hands	  Off	  Korea”	  leaflets	  were	  rounded	  up,	  beaten	  up,	  and	  literally	  thrown	  out	  of	  the	  factory.	  	  As	  historian	  Seth	  Wigderson	  explicates,	  right-­‐wingers	  utilized	  anti-­‐communist	  logic	  to	  fight	  opposing	  factions,	  and	  conservative	  employers	  utilized	  the	  same	  logic	  to	  dismiss	  radical	  workers,	  resolving	  tensions	  in	  workplaces.140	  Moreover,	  opinion	  polls	  throughout	  the	  postwar	  period	  indicated	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  those	  who	  polled	  were	  annoyed	  with	  the	  behavior	  and	  demands	  of	  labor	  unions	  (Picture	  10).141	  Another	  group	  suppressed	  through	  the	  application	  of	  Cold	  War	  logic	  was	  gays	  and	  lesbians.142	  According	  to	  historian	  John	  D’Emilio,	  dismissals	  of	  “sexual	  
                                                139	  “We	  Owe	  It	  To	  Our	  Fighting	  Men,”	  Kansas	  City	  Star,	  September	  13,	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  140	  Seth	  Wigderson,	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  Wages	  of	  Anticommunism:	  U.S.	  Labor	  and	  the	  Korean	  War,”	  in	  Shelton	  Stromquist	  ed.,	  Labor's	  Cold	  War:	  Local	  Politics	  in	  a	  Global	  Context	  (Urbana,	  IL,	  2008),	  231.	  141	  See,	  for	  instance,	  “Strike	  in	  Public	  Service	  Industires,”	  April	  17,	  1946;	  “Strikes	  and	  Lockouts,”	  April	  29,	  1946;	  “Labor	  Strike,”	  May	  29,	  1946;	  “Labor	  Strikes,”	  June	  14,	  1946;	  “Strikes	  and	  Lockouts,”	  November	  22,	  1946;	  “Factory	  Workers’	  Wage,”	  January	  13,	  1947;	  and	  “Most	  Important	  Problem,”	  January	  31,	  1947,	  in	  The	  Gallup	  Poll:	  Public	  Opinion,	  1935-­‐1971:	  Vol.	  1,	  1935-­‐1948	  (New	  York:	  Random	  House,	  1972),	  570,	  573,	  580,	  583,	  608,	  618,	  and	  623.	  All	  of	  these	  Gallup’s	  polls	  generally	  show	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  those	  who	  polled	  had	  negative	  opinions	  toward	  labor.	  However,	  as	  George	  Lipsitz	  suggests,	  other	  polls	  show	  gradual	  increase	  in	  the	  support	  for	  labor	  in	  early	  1946.	  See	  Lipsitz,	  
Rainbow	  at	  Midnight,	  116.	  142	  See,	  for	  instance,	  David	  K.	  Johnson,	  The	  Lavender	  Scare:	  The	  Cold	  War	  Persecution	  of	  Gays	  and	  
Lesbians	  in	  the	  Federal	  Government	  (Chicago,	  2004).	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perverts”	  from	  civilian	  posts	  in	  the	  federal	  government	  averaged	  only	  five	  per	  month	  from	  1947	  to	  the	  early	  months	  of	  1950.	  The	  figure	  increased	  twelve	  fold	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  year.	  Eventually,	  a	  total	  of	  more	  than	  800	  persons	  were	  fired	  from	  governmental	  sectors	  as	  a	  result	  of	  “investigation	  into	  allegations	  of	  homosexuality.”143	  The	  logic	  maintained	  that	  their	  sexual	  aberrations	  made	  them	  “pressure	  prone,”	  maintaining	  that	  they	  might	  leak	  classified	  information	  if	  a	  communist	  took	  advantage	  of	  fears	  of	  exposure.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  subculture	  of	  gays	  and	  lesbians	  increased	  its	  visibility	  in	  society	  after	  the	  nationwide	  coming-­‐out	  experience	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  challenging	  conventional	  sexual	  roles.	  144145	  	  By	  the	  same	  token,	  similar	  repression,	  visible	  and	  invisible,	  was	  enforced	  in	  regard	  to	  another	  element	  of	  the	  change	  in	  gender	  relations:	  working	  women	  and	  feminism	  in	  general—a	  phenomenon	  that	  grew	  through	  experiences	  of	  the	  Depression	  and	  World	  War	  II.	  Even	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  working	  mothers	  began	  facing	  criticism	  that	  their	  jobs	  really	  belonged	  to	  men,	  that	  their	  real	  happiness	  was	  in	  marriage	  and	  child-­‐care,	  and	  that	  a	  “good”	  mother	  sought	  no	  fulfillment	  outside	  the	  home	  (Picture	  11).146	  Such	  a	  tendency	  accelerated	  under	  the	  name	  of	  the	  “civil	  defense”	  program	  that	  was	  revived	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  One	  advertising	  film,	  for	  example,	  proudly	  told	  viewers	  that	  the	  civil	  defense	  program	  would	  be	  a	  “revival	  of	  old	  American	  tradition,”	  saying:	  	  
                                                143	  John	  D’Emilio,	  “The	  Homosexual	  Menace:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Sexuality	  in	  Cold	  War	  America,”	  in	  John	  D'Emilio,	  Making	  Trouble:	  Essays	  on	  Gay	  History,	  Politics,	  and	  the	  University	  (New	  York,	  1992),	  229.	  144	  Ibid,	  256.	  145	  Ibid,	  234.	  146	  Ibid,	  236;	  Molly	  Ladd-­‐Taylor	  and	  Lauri	  Umansky,	  "Bad"	  Mothers:	  The	  Politics	  of	  Blame	  in	  
Twentieth-­‐Century	  America	  (New	  York,	  1998),	  12-­‐14.	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When	  the	  Indians	  struck,	  the	  man	  would	  run	  the	  stockade,	  the	  woman	  would	  load	  the	  rifles,	  the	  older	  children	  would	  take	  care	  of	  the	  small	  […].	  Each	  member	  of	  the	  group	  had	  an	  assigned	  job	  to	  do	  in	  the	  common	  defense	  of	  his	  community.	  	  	  Simply	  speaking,	  the	  implication	  was	  that	  a	  man	  works	  outside,	  and	  a	  woman	  stays	  at	  home,	  helping	  with	  men’s	  work.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  metaphor	  of	  “family”	  imposed	  certain	  social	  roles,	  such	  as	  father,	  mother,	  and	  children,	  as	  given	  categories,	  implicitly	  discouraging	  individuals	  to	  cross	  boundaries.	  As	  historian	  Elaine	  Taylor	  May	  points	  outs,	  the	  logic	  of	  national	  security	  functioned	  not	  simply	  as	  containment	  of	  communism	  on	  a	  global	  level,	  but	  also	  containment	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  women	  at	  home,	  functioning	  to	  restore	  and	  maintain	  traditional	  order	  at	  a	  domestic	  level.	  	  It	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  advocates	  of	  “anticommunism”	  directed	  their	  criticism	  toward	  another	  element	  of	  social	  disorder:	  immigration.	  One,	  Nevada	  Senator	  Pat	  McCarran,	  whose	  name	  was	  often	  attached	  to	  the	  Internal	  Security	  Act	  of	  1950,	  the	  so-­‐called	  Anti-­‐Communist	  Act,	  for	  instance,	  said:	  	  The	  time	  has	  long	  since	  passed	  when	  we	  can	  afford	  to	  open	  our	  borders	  indiscriminately	  to	  give	  unstinting	  hospitality	  to	  any	  person	  whose	  purpose,	  whose	  ideological	  goal,	  is	  to	  overthrow	  our	  institutions	  and	  replace	  them	  with	  the	  evil	  oppression	  of	  totalitarianism.147	  	  	  	  	  Concerning	  the	  deterioration	  of	  “Americaness,”	  McCarran	  argued	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  accept	  immigrants	  only	  from	  Western	  Europe,	  not	  from	  Southern	  and	  Eastern	  Europe,	  let	  alone	  Asia	  or	  Latin	  America.148	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  “The	  Lingering	  Poison	  of	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  Reno,	  NV;	  For	  McCarran’s	  primary	  obsession	  with	  immigration	  issue,	  see,	  for	  example,	  Michael	  J.	  Ybarra,	  Washington	  Gone	  Crazy:	  Senator	  Pat	  McCarran	  and	  the	  Great	  American	  Communist	  Hunt	  (Hanover,	  2004).	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Indeed,	  the	  call	  for	  “America	  for	  Americans”	  was	  celebrated	  in	  the	  year	  of	  1950.149	  This	  explains	  the	  enormous	  popularity	  of	  “one-­‐hundred	  percent	  American”	  senator	  Joseph	  McCarthy	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  year;	  at	  this	  time,	  he	  received	  two	  thousand	  invitations	  to	  talk,	  more	  than	  all	  other	  Republican	  spokesmen	  combined.150	  Richard	  Nixon,	  a	  rookie	  candidate	  for	  California	  Senator	  in	  the	  midterm	  election	  in	  1950,	  did	  not	  miss	  an	  opportunity	  to	  fashion	  himself	  an	  “All	  American	  Senator,”	  accusing	  a	  rival	  candidate,	  Helen	  G.	  Douglas,	  of	  “[fighting]	  everything	  which	  has	  made	  America	  great,”	  and	  “[fostering]	  everything	  we	  consider	  un-­‐American.”151	  Needless	  to	  say,	  his	  tactics	  worked;	  Nixon	  made	  his	  debut	  as	  a	  freshman	  senator	  the	  following	  spring.	  	  The	  “communist”	  label	  was	  convenient	  for	  many	  elite	  and	  grassroots	  conservatives	  because	  it	  was	  vague	  enough	  to	  use	  to	  attack	  anyone	  who	  had	  been	  critical	  of	  society’s	  conventional	  norms.	  Senator	  Walter	  Judd	  claimed	  that	  “Communists	  emphasize	  all	  the	  bad	  conditions	  in	  our	  country—Jim	  Crowism,	  the	  discrimination,	  the	  slums,	  inadequate	  education	  or	  medical	  care.”152	  Logic	  of	  this	  kind	  was	  versatile,	  as	  it	  was	  often	  used	  in	  reverse;	  someone	  who	  emphasized	  bad	  conditions	  must	  be	  a	  “communist.”	  One	  anticommunist	  pamphlet,	  in	  fact,	  included	  a	  series	  of	  typical	  Q	  and	  A’s:	  “How	  can	  you	  tell	  a	  Communist?”	  The	  answer	  read:	  “Get	  
                                                149	  Letter,	  Richard	  Brown	  to	  Harry	  S.	  Truman,	  July	  10,	  1951,	  PHST,	  Box	  1330,	  OF	  471-­‐B,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  MO.	  150	  Robert	  Justin	  Goldstein,	  Political	  Repression	  in	  Modern	  America	  from	  1870	  to	  the	  Present	  (Boston,	  1978),	  325.	  	  151	  Letter,	  John	  L.	  Linn	  to	  William	  Knowland,	  October	  24,	  1950,	  Papers	  of	  William	  Knowland	  (hereafter	  PWK),	  Cartoon	  90,	  “Political	  Files,	  1950	  Campaigns,”	  Bancroft	  Library,	  UCB,	  Berkeley,	  CA;	  Letter,	  H.	  A.	  Jarvis	  to	  William	  Knowland,	  October	  1,	  1950,	  PWK,	  Cartoon	  90,	  “Political	  Files,	  1950	  Campaigns,”	  Bancroft	  Library,	  UCB,	  Berkeley,	  CA.	  152	  Walter	  Judd,	  “Does	  China	  Mean	  World	  War	  III?”	  Speech	  delivered	  before	  the	  Economic	  Club	  of	  New	  York,	  March	  13,	  1951,	  Papers	  of	  Walter	  Judd	  (hereafter	  PWJ),	  Box	  40,	  Folder	  1,	  Hoover	  Institution,	  Stanford	  University,	  Stanford,	  CA.	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him	  in	  an	  argument	  about	  the	  United	  States.	  He	  can	  tell	  you	  plenty	  of	  things	  wrong	  with	  this	  country.”153	  Seen	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  silencing	  accomplished	  through	  “anticommunist”	  politics	  during	  the	  so-­‐called	  McCarthy	  era	  was	  indeed	  more	  multifarious	  than	  we	  usually	  think,	  involving	  African	  Americans,	  civil	  rights	  activists,	  radical	  labor	  members,	  gays	  and	  lesbians,	  working	  women,	  and	  immigrants,	  as	  well	  as	  advocates	  of	  public	  housing	  programs	  and	  national	  health	  care,	  and	  so	  forth.	  What	  they	  shared	  was	  not	  a	  communist	  ideology	  but	  a	  tendency	  to	  challenge	  conventional	  social	  values,	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly.	  They	  represented	  newly	  emerging	  social	  conflicts	  through	  various	  kinds	  of	  social	  change	  during	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  World	  War	  II.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  actual	  nature	  of	  McCarthyism	  had	  less	  to	  do	  with	  anticommunism	  than	  a	  more	  general	  conservative	  backlash,	  not	  necessarily	  in	  terms	  of	  political	  conservatism,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  conservatism.	  	  Such	  a	  tendency	  showed	  up	  clearly	  in	  questions	  posed	  in	  various	  loyalty	  hearings,	  which	  covered	  topics	  including	  not	  only	  political	  ideology,	  pacifism,	  the	  Korean	  War,	  and	  the	  Cold	  War,	  but	  also	  religion,	  church	  attendance,	  race	  relations,	  and	  sexual	  morality.154	  Questions	  asked	  in	  loyalty	  and	  security	  hearings,	  for	  instance,	  included:	  	  Have	  you	  ever	  danced	  with	  a	  white	  girl?	  	  Have	  you	  ever	  had	  dinner	  with	  a	  mixed	  group?	  	  Have	  you	  ever	  had	  Negroes	  in	  your	  home?	  Did	  you	  ever	  write	  a	  letter	  to	  the	  Red	  Cross	  about	  segregation	  of	  blood?	  	  Do	  you	  go	  to	  church?	  	  
                                                153	  United	  States	  Congress	  House	  Un-­‐American	  Activities	  Committee,	  100	  Things	  You	  Should	  Know	  
About	  Communism	  revised	  ed.	  (Washington,	  1950),	  70.	  154	  Ralph	  S.	  Brown,	  Loyalty	  and	  Security:	  Employment	  Tests	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (New	  Haven,	  1958),	  492.	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What	  do	  you	  think	  about	  sex	  before	  marriage?155	  	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  examinees	  could	  avoid	  answering	  these	  questions	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  Fifth	  Amendment,	  as	  many	  did.	  Yet,	  quite	  a	  few	  simply	  found	  that	  their	  employers	  arbitrarily	  dismissed	  them	  or	  urged	  them	  to	  resign.	  An	  employee	  at	  the	  State	  Department,	  for	  instance,	  was	  urged	  to	  resign	  because	  “her	  first	  child	  arrived	  too	  soon	  after	  her	  marriage.”	  Several	  men	  were	  dismissed	  on	  grounds	  of	  “fornication”	  and	  “[keeping]	  a	  mistress	  while	  on	  remote	  station”	  and	  so	  on.156	  	  It	  is	  reasonable	  to	  say	  that	  so-­‐called	  McCarthyism	  purged	  not	  only	  communists	  and	  communist	  sympathizers	  but	  also	  functioned	  to	  identify	  “un-­‐American	  activities,”	  restore	  order,	  and	  purify	  society.	  It	  is	  no	  wonder	  to	  find	  a	  parallel	  between	  the	  actual	  functions	  of	  McCarthyism	  and	  those	  of	  civil	  defense	  programs,	  both	  of	  which	  developed	  in	  American	  society	  in	  the	  postwar	  period,	  and	  both	  of	  which	  arguably	  pointed	  to	  the	  “defense”	  of	  social	  order.	  Contrary	  to	  its	  appearance,	  the	  essence	  of	  civil	  defense	  programs	  did	  not	  primarily	  aim	  at	  the	  protection	  of	  individual	  lives;	  The	  underlying	  motivation	  was	  rather	  to	  prevent	  “social	  chaos,”	  such	  as	  mass	  panic	  and	  social	  disorder,	  which	  was	  believed	  to	  happen	  aftermath	  of	  nuclear	  attack.157	  Thus,	  it	  make	  sense	  that	  many	  people	  prefering	  to	  maintain	  social	  order,	  regardless	  policymakers	  or	  private	  citizens,	  actively	  participated	  in	  waves	  of	  McCarthyism	  and	  civil	  defense	  programs	  as	  a	  means	  to	  restore	  and	  maintain	  preferable	  order	  at	  home.	  	  
                                                155	  Eleanor	  Bontecou,	  The	  Federal	  Loyalty-­‐Security	  Program	  (Ithaca,	  NY,	  1953),	  138-­‐39;	  Goldstein,	  
Political	  Repression	  in	  Modern	  America	  (1978),	  303-­‐304;	  and	  Schrecker,	  "McCarthyism:	  Political	  Repression	  and	  the	  Fear	  of	  Communism,"	  Social	  Research	  Vol.	  71,	  No	  3	  (2004),	  1067.	  	  156	  Brown,	  Loyalty	  and	  Security	  (1958),	  261.	  157	  Guy	  Oakes,	  The	  Imaginary	  War:	  Civil	  Defense	  and	  American	  Cold	  War	  Culture	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1994),	  38-­‐42.	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Viewing	  McCarthyism	  as	  anticommunist	  politics,	  we	  tend	  to	  describe	  those	  who	  were	  oppressed	  even	  though	  they	  were	  not	  communists	  or	  communist	  sympathizers	  as	  innocent	  victims	  of	  false	  accusations.	  This	  view	  characterizes	  this	  period	  as	  a	  time	  of	  groundless	  attacks	  and	  malicious	  slanders,	  which,	  later,	  the	  Wisconsin	  Senator	  was	  believed	  to	  personify.	  However,	  seeing	  McCarthyism	  as	  social	  screening	  and	  suppression	  of	  nonconformists,	  dissenters,	  and	  malcontents	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  protect	  desirable	  order	  and	  harmony	  in	  society,	  we	  can	  recognize	  that	  the	  diverse	  groups	  who	  were	  suppressed	  were	  the	  real	  targets,	  rather	  than	  innocent	  victims.	  Simply	  put,	  they	  were	  “culprits”	  of	  causing,	  or	  potentially	  causing,	  social	  disorder.	  In	  a	  sense,	  the	  entire	  phenomenon	  of	  McCarthyism	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion	  to	  defend	  harmonious	  society.	  	  The	  term	  “McCarthyism”	  cleverly	  concealed	  such	  an	  essence	  of	  the	  phenomenon.	  Perceiving	  it	  as	  McCarthyism,	  we	  tend	  to	  view	  it	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  Wisconsin	  senator’s	  reckless	  and	  irrational	  behavior.	  McCarthy	  himself	  could	  not	  make	  a	  counterargument,	  because	  he	  died	  soon	  after,	  in	  1957.	  After	  all,	  a	  dead	  man	  tells	  no	  tales.	  Placing	  the	  responsibility	  on	  the	  senator,	  the	  term	  has	  obscured,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  the	  liability	  of	  members	  of	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  and	  major	  labor	  unions.	  As	  historians	  Philip	  Jenkins	  and	  Ellen	  Schrecker,	  have	  revealed,	  liberals	  were	  motivators	  rather	  than	  simple	  victims.158	  What	  is	  more,	  however,	  the	  term	  skillfully	  hides	  the	  culpability	  of	  ordinary	  people	  who	  participated	  and	  conducted	  social	  purges	  within	  communities,	  workplaces,	  and	  families.	  Framing	  the	  phenomenon	  as	  McCarthyism,	  thus,	  blurs	  the	  actors	  and	  essence	  of	  “McCarthyism”:	  
                                                158	  Philip	  Jenkins,	  Cold	  War	  At	  Home	  (1999)	  and	  Schrecker,	  Many	  Are	  the	  Crimes	  (1998).	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tens	  of	  thousands	  of	  elite	  and	  grassroots	  “assailants”	  and	  “victims,”	  who	  fought	  postwar	  social	  struggles	  over	  desirable	  order	  in	  American	  society.	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Backlash	  of	  Grassroots	  Social	  Conservatism	  	   Seeing	  the	  phenomena	  of	  various	  domestic	  suppressions	  circa	  1950-­‐1951	  in	  Japan,	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  chapter	  sheds	  new	  light	  on	  our	  understanding	  not	  only	  of	  each	  occurrence,	  such	  as	  the	  Red	  Purge,	  anti-­‐strike	  and	  ant-­‐Labour	  trends,	  and	  McCarthyism,	  respectively,	  but	  also	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  simultaneity	  of	  these	  events	  as	  a	  whole.	  Each	  phenomenon,	  to	  be	  sure,	  had	  its	  own	  history	  and	  local	  roots,	  and	  they	  developed	  in	  its	  own	  way,	  individually.	  Yet,	  they	  shared	  particular	  characteristics	  with	  a	  certain	  aim.	  Most	  existing	  literature	  on	  each	  subject	  would	  point	  to	  it	  as	  Cold	  War	  suppression	  aiming	  at	  the	  elimination	  of	  communists	  and	  communist	  sympathizers,	  viewing	  each	  as	  a	  consequential	  event,	  an	  aftereffect	  of	  the	  global	  Cold	  War.	  This	  conventional	  view	  appears	  most	  plausible	  when	  we	  accept	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  approach	  each	  subject	  through	  that	  particular	  lens.	  	  Taking	  off	  the	  Cold	  War	  lens,	  and	  looking	  into	  local	  and	  social	  disputes	  on	  the	  ground,	  however,	  the	  situations	  look	  different.	  What	  these	  phenomena	  shared	  seems	  to	  be,	  rather,	  a	  backlash	  of	  social	  conservatism	  aimed	  at	  the	  restoration	  of	  “normal”	  order	  and	  social	  relations,	  through	  purging	  thousands	  of	  nonconformists	  at	  home.	  Viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  domestic	  suppressions	  we	  have	  examined	  in	  this	  chapter	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  parts	  of	  worldwide	  phenomenon	  of	  domestic	  purging,	  which	  broke	  out	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  Korean	  War:	  the	  Suppression	  of	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Counterrevolutionaries	  in	  China,	  the	  White	  Terror	  in	  Taiwan,	  the	  crackdown	  on	  “un-­‐Filipino”	  activities	  in	  the	  Philippines,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  Red	  Purge	  in	  Japan,	  anti-­‐strike	  trend	  in	  Britain,	  and	  McCarthyism	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Taken	  together,	  these	  events	  that	  developed	  separately	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  parts	  of	  a	  simultaneous	  global	  phenomenon,	  based	  on	  contemporaneous	  experiences	  of	  the	  postwar	  period.	  First	  and	  foremost,	  all	  of	  these	  societies	  experienced	  World	  War	  II	  and	  various	  kinds	  of	  dynamic	  social	  change,	  which	  provoked	  various	  kinds	  of	  social,	  cultural,	  and	  political	  conflicts	  at	  home.	  Second,	  these	  various	  domestic	  purges	  more	  or	  less	  appeared	  as	  backlashes	  to	  “solve”	  these	  local	  conflicts,	  aiming	  to	  tranquilize	  “chaotic”	  situations,	  creating	  “harmonious”	  social	  order	  in	  each	  society.	  Third,	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  which	  was	  witnessed	  concurrently	  across	  the	  globe	  evoked	  many	  people	  of	  memories	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  providing	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  doubt	  and	  fear	  that	  justified	  and	  escalated	  the	  “purification”	  of	  society	  in	  many	  places	  in	  the	  world.	  Fourth,	  all	  of	  these	  “purifying”	  campaigns	  were	  developed	  at	  a	  crossroads	  of	  state	  mobilization	  and	  people’s	  participation,	  functioning	  to	  protect,	  or,	  in	  some	  cases,	  create	  unity	  through	  utilizing	  a	  binary	  distinction	  between	  “us”	  and	  “them.”	  Fifth,	  last	  but	  not	  least,	  in	  each	  instance,	  the	  Cold	  War	  logic	  of	  the	  East-­‐West	  confrontation	  proved	  its	  utility	  in	  silencing	  domestic	  disagreements	  and	  “resolving”	  local	  struggles	  under	  a	  banner	  of	  “security”	  on	  a	  perpetual	  basis.	  	  	   Viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  what	  becomes	  clear	  is	  the	  actuality	  of	  local	  conflicts,	  the	  imagined	  nature	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  the	  social	  needs	  of	  such	  an	  imagined	  reality	  to	  overcome	  “war”	  at	  home.	  To	  put	  it	  bluntly,	  in	  a	  sense,	  the	  actual	  divide	  existed	  not	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so	  much	  between	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  states,	  but	  within	  each	  society,	  with	  each,	  in	  turn,	  requiring	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  maintain	  “harmonious”	  order	  and	  life	  at	  home.	  From	  this	  angle,	  each	  instance	  of	  local	  suppression	  was	  not	  so	  much	  the	  result	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  but	  itself	  was	  part	  of	  the	  engine,	  a	  component,	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  making	  and	  maintenance	  of	  a	  gigantic	  imagined	  reality	  in	  the	  postwar	  world.	  The	  architects	  and	  participants	  of	  this	  world	  were,	  thus,	  not	  only	  power	  holders	  in	  the	  metropolis	  of	  each	  society,	  but	  also	  millions	  of	  ordinary	  people	  in	  cities	  and	  villages	  all	  over	  the	  world	  who	  consciously	  and	  unconsciously	  engaged	  in	  the	  “purification”	  of	  their	  societies	  and	  maintenance	  of	  social	  order	  at	  home.	  It	  was	  such	  an	  ascent	  of	  people’s	  participations	  in	  and	  societal	  needs	  of	  the	  imagined	  reality	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  that	  made	  a	  particular	  discourse	  into	  the	  actuality	  of	  the	  postwar	  period,	  internally	  functioning	  to	  sustain	  and	  perpetuate	  the	  “real”	  Cold	  War	  for	  decades	  to	  follow.	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Chapter	  7	  Pictures:	  	  
Picture	  1-­‐1:	  	  “Students'	  Demonstration	  Opposing	  the	  Red	  Purge	  at	  Tokyo	  University	  “	  
Mainichi	  Shinbun	  October	  5,	  1950,	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Picture	  1-­‐2:	  	  "The	  Waseda	  University	  Incident;	  The	  Burning	  of	  Residents’	  Registration	  Cards"	  1950,	  Tokyo,	  Japan	  No.	  S5-­‐04-­‐009	  Ohara	  Institute	  for	  Social	  Studies	  Tokyo,	  Japan	  
	  
	  
	  In	  this	  picture,	  students	  at	  Waseda	  University	  burnt	  their	  residents'	  registration	  cards	  to	  express	  their	  opposition	  to	  rearmament	  and	  possible	  conscription.	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Picture	  2-­‐1:	  	  "Communist	  May	  Day	  Riots,	  Tokyo"	  May	  02,	  1952	  Tokyo,	  Japan	  Time	  and	  Life	  Pictures	  
	  
	  	  A	  sign	  carried	  read,	  “Oppose	  Rearmament,	  Refuse	  Conscription.”	  	  
Source:http://images.google.com/hosted/life/l?imgurl=00503bd24dec1455	  
Photographer:	  Margaret	  Bourke-­‐White	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Picture	  2-­‐2:	  
	  "The	  22nd	  May	  Day"	  May	  1951,	  Tokyo,	  Japan	  No.	  S2-­‐03-­‐007	  Ohara	  Institute	  for	  Social	  Studies	  Tokyo,	  Japan	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Photographer:	  Margaret	  Bourke-­‐White	  	  
	   	  





	  “Communist	  May	  Day	  Riots”	  May	  1,	  1950,	  Tokyo,	  Japan	  Time	  and	  Life	  Pictures	  	  	  
	  	  
Source:	  http://images.google.com/hosted/life/l?imgurl=1d0222e33c1c0105	  
Photographer:	  Michael	  Rougier	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Picture	  2-­‐5:	  
	  “May	  Day	  in	  Tokyo”	  May	  1,	  1952	  No.	  12-­‐29-­‐3-­‐8	  Collection	  of	  Photographs	  MacArthur	  Memorial	  Archives	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Photographer:	  Michael	  Rougier	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Picture	  3:	  	  	  “May	  Day	  Demonstration	  in	  Tokyo”	  May	  1,	  1952	  No.	  PHB0167	  The	  Photographic	  Collection	  of	  Georges	  Dimitria	  Boria	  MacArthur	  Memorial	  Archives,	  Norfolk,	  VA.	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Picture	  4:	  	  	  “Constitution	  Promulgation	  Day	  &	  Hirohito”	  November	  3,	  1946	  Time	  and	  Life	  Pictures	  	  
	  	  Source:	  http://images.google.com/hosted/life/l?imgurl=32933c141200dbbb	  Photographer:	  John	  Florea	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Picture	  5:	  	  “Last	  Strike;	  Dock	  Strike”	  Salisbury,	  UK,	  1951	  Working	  Class	  Movement	  Library	  Salford,	  United	  Kingdom	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Picture	  6:	  	  “Desire	  Caught	  By	  Tail”	  October	  11,	  1950	  
Daily	  Mail	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Picture	  7:	  	  “Red	  Propaganda	  Discovered	  Hidden	  in	  Children’s	  Card	  Collections”	  December	  14,	  1950	  
Los	  Angeles	  Times	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Picture	  8:	  	  Demonstration,	  1946-­‐48?	  Collection	  of	  Photographs	  Records	  of	  the	  Progressive	  Party	  (MsC	  160)	  University	  of	  Iowa	  Libraries,	  Iowa	  City,	  Iowa	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Picture	  9:	  	  “We	  Owe	  It	  To	  Our	  Fighting	  Men”	  September	  13,	  1950	  
Kansas	  City	  Star	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Picture	  10:	  	  
	  "MGM	  workers	  on	  strike,	  studio	  workers	  passing	  picket	  lines"	  Hollywood,	  CA,	  US	  October	  1946	  
	  
	  
	   	  
Source:	  http://images.google.com/hosted/life/l?imgurl=673b6b21d8450dd6	  
Photographer:	  Peter	  Stackpole	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Picture	  11:	  
	  “Women	  for	  Peace	  Discover	  D.C.	  Can	  Be	  Chilly	  in	  August”	  August	  9,	  1950	  
Washington	  Times	  Herald	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Conclusion:	  People’s	  War—The	  Cold	  War	  as	  Social	  Politics	  	   The	  present	  epoch	  will	  perhaps	  be	  above	  all	  the	  epoch	  of	  space.	  We	  are	  in	  the	  epoch	  of	  simultaneity:	  we	  are	  in	  the	  epoch	  of	  juxtaposition,	  the	  epoch	  of	  the	  near	  and	  far,	  of	  the	  side-­‐by-­‐side,	  of	  the	  dispersed.	  We	  are	  at	  a	  moment,	  I	  believe,	  when	  our	  experience	  of	  the	  world	  is	  less	  that	  of	  a	  long	  life	  developing	  through	  time	  than	  that	  of	  a	  network	  that	  connects	  points	  and	  intersects	  with	  its	  own	  skein.	  	  Michel	  Foucault,	  “Of	  Other	  Spaces”1	  	  	   There	  is	  a	  general	  folk	  belief,	  derived	  largely	  from	  Burke	  and	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  historians,	  that	  political	  stability	  is	  of	  slow,	  coral-­‐like	  growth;	  the	  result	  of	  time,	  circumstances,	  prudence,	  experience,	  wisdom,	  slowly	  building	  up	  over	  the	  centuries.	  Nothing	  is,	  I	  think,	  farther	  from	  the	  truth	  [...].	  Political	  stability,	  when	  it	  comes,	  often	  happens	  to	  a	  society	  quite	  quickly,	  as	  suddenly	  as	  water	  becomes	  ice.	  	  	   J.	  H.	  Plumb2	  	   This	  study	  explores	  the	  rapid	  solidification	  of	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  the	  early	  postwar	  era,	  particularly	  during	  the	  Korean	  War,	  intending	  to	  reveal	  the	  constructed	  and	  imagined	  nature	  of	  the	  conflict.	  What	  made	  the	  Cold	  War	  different	  from	  other	  wars,	  such	  as	  the	  Korean	  War	  or	  Vietnam	  War,	  was	  that	  it	  did	  not	  exist	  in	  a	  particular	  time	  and	  place.	  Rather,	  it	  existed	  not	  because	  it	  existed,	  but	  because	  people	  thought	  it	  existed.	  It	  was,	  in	  a	  sense,	  an	  imagined	  reality,	  which	  came	  to	  be	  shared	  and	  consolidated	  globally	  and	  simultaneously	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Korean	  War.	  During	  the	  decades	  that	  followed,	  the	  Cold	  War	  appeared	  to	  be	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  world,	  and,	  thus,	  questions	  raised	  at	  that	  time	  tended,	  more	  or	  less,	  to	  focus	  on	  how	  it	  came	  to	  happen	  and	  why—a	  manner	  of	  
                                                1	  Michael	  Faucault,	  “Of	  Other	  Spaces,”	  Jay	  Miskowiec,	  trans.,	  in	  Diacritics	  (Spring	  1986):	  22,	  cited	  in	  Charles	  S.	  Maier,	  “Consigning	  the	  Twentieth	  Century	  to	  History:	  Alternative	  Narratives	  for	  the	  Modern	  Era,”	  The	  American	  Historical	  Review,	  Vol.	  105,	  No.	  3	  (Jun.,	  2000),	  825.	  2	  J.	  H.	  Plumb	  quoted	  in	  Tony	  Judt,	  Postwar:	  A	  History	  of	  Europe	  Since	  1945	  (New	  York:	  Penguin,	  2006),	  241.	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research	  characterized	  by	  looking	  back	  to	  the	  “origins”	  of	  the	  conflict	  from	  a	  viewpoint	  accepting	  of	  its	  actuality.	  Today,	  the	  Cold	  War	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  event	  of	  a	  past	  long	  gone,	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  inquiry	  has	  changed.	  Now	  the	  questions	  are:	  What	  was	  the	  so-­‐called	  Cold	  War?	  How	  did	  it	  emerge	  and	  solidify	  in	  the	  early	  postwar	  period?	  How	  did	  millions	  of	  people	  in	  the	  world	  believed	  in	  such	  an	  imagined	  reality,	  and	  why?	  	   These	  are	  the	  basic	  questions	  raised	  in	  this	  study.	  Answering	  them,	  however,	  is	  a	  much	  more	  complicated	  task	  than	  one	  might	  expect.	  Reasons	  for	  this	  are	  numerous.	  To	  begin	  with,	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  Cold	  War	  began	  immediately	  following	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II	  and	  affected	  political,	  economic,	  social,	  and	  cultural	  settings	  in	  many	  places	  of	  the	  world	  thereafter	  has	  remained	  firmly	  entrenched,	  even	  today.	  As	  a	  result,	  many	  diverse	  phenomena	  occurring	  at	  that	  time	  have	  been	  observed	  and	  historicized	  through	  a	  Cold	  War	  lens,	  highlighting	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  facts	  as	  more	  meaningful	  while	  marginalizing	  other	  sets	  as	  less	  meaningful,	  and,	  then,	  such	  cognition	  and	  knowledge	  concerning	  various	  phenomena	  in	  this	  period,	  in	  turn,	  has	  buttressed	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War—a	  continual	  cycle	  that	  has	  reinforced	  the	  world	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  at	  that	  time	  and	  since.	  Furthermore,	  given	  the	  gigantic	  scale	  of	  the	  conflict,	  considerable	  number	  of	  societies	  involved,	  and	  lengthy	  period	  of	  time	  spanned,	  scholars	  can	  easily	  feel	  daunted	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  work	  required	  in	  obtaining	  a	  broader	  viewpoint	  on	  it.	  	  Therefore,	  this	  dissertation	  has	  taken	  the	  following	  steps.	  First,	  instead	  of	  dealing	  with	  decades	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  it	  limits	  its	  focus	  to	  the	  period	  between	  1945	  and	  1953,	  in	  particular,	  the	  months	  in	  the	  early	  period	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  between	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June	  1950	  and	  the	  spring	  of	  1951,	  a	  historical	  moment	  that	  fundamentally	  defined	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  number	  of	  societies	  would	  behave	  in	  the	  decades	  that	  followed.	  For	  the	  most	  difficult	  task	  of	  breaking	  through	  the	  Cold	  War	  lens,	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  take	  a	  number	  of	  detours;	  my	  research	  has	  revisited	  various	  phenomena,	  decisions	  and	  actions	  that	  have	  been	  commonly	  conceived	  as	  effects	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  and	  re-­‐examined	  each	  in	  light	  of	  local	  histories	  and	  actors.	  The	  central	  purpose	  of	  such	  a	  re-­‐examination	  is	  to	  show	  that	  each	  had	  its	  own	  local	  and	  social	  contexts	  as	  it	  evolved.	  	  	   This	  approach,	  however,	  has	  led	  to	  a	  vexatious	  outcome.	  Because	  it	  has	  to	  discuss	  local	  contexts	  in	  considerable	  detail,	  this	  dissertation	  has	  to	  include	  a	  number	  of	  diverse	  and	  seemingly	  disparate	  topics,	  which	  have	  been	  marginalized	  and	  concealed	  by	  the	  Cold	  War	  fantasy:	  domestic	  politics,	  election	  campaigns,	  racism,	  anticolonialism,	  decolonization,	  nation-­‐building,	  labor	  movements,	  student	  movements,	  feminist	  movements,	  massacres,	  mass	  firings,	  and	  various	  social	  suppressions	  and	  purges	  in	  China,	  Taiwan,	  Japan,	  Britain,	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Chinese	  Revolution,	  U.S.	  occupation	  of	  Japan,	  postcolonial	  Taiwanese	  and	  Korean	  politics,	  and	  Washington’s	  and	  Beijing’s	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  policies	  during	  the	  Korean	  War.	  As	  a	  result,	  some	  readers	  might	  simply	  be	  confused.	  They	  might	  want	  to	  have	  a	  much	  clearer,	  more	  straightforward	  explanation	  of	  what	  the	  Cold	  War	  was,	  rather	  than	  reading	  about	  complex	  local	  problems	  in	  different	  places.	  However,	  that	  is	  exactly	  what	  many	  people	  seemed	  to	  demand	  in	  the	  early	  postwar	  period.	  The	  logic	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  attractive	  for	  many	  people	  because	  it	  provided	  a	  seemingly	  clear,	  coherent,	  simple,	  and	  logical	  explanation	  for	  what	  were	  in	  reality	  messier	  and	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more	  chaotic	  situations	  at	  home	  and	  abroad.	  That	  is	  why,	  instead	  of	  quickly	  providing	  a	  clear	  line,	  this	  dissertation	  seeks	  	  to	  reveal	  intricate	  stories	  in	  view	  of	  local	  and	  social	  history.	  The	  ultimate	  aim	  here	  is	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  realities,	  revealing	  actual	  conflicts	  underneath	  the	  Cold	  War	  logic.	  	  	  Through	  such	  lengthy	  and	  multitudinous	  detours,	  this	  research	  makes	  a	  series	  of	  points	  that	  characterize	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  period.	  First,	  the	  world	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  materialized	  not	  simply	  through	  decisions	  and	  actions	  of	  particular	  policymakers	  in	  a	  specific	  country.	  Rather,	  the	  “reality”	  gained	  its	  verisimilitude	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  unintentional	  interactions	  among	  many	  participants	  through	  a	  process	  of	  domestic	  translation	  of	  foreign	  events	  through	  local	  lenses.	  The	  term	  “misperception”	  has	  often	  been	  used	  to	  explain	  this	  process,	  but	  needs	  more	  explanation.	  By	  nature,	  “misperception”	  presumes	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  “true”	  perception,	  drawing	  a	  clear	  line	  between	  “understanding”	  and	  “misunderstanding.”	  Yet,	  in	  studying	  multiple	  societies	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  no	  such	  clear	  distinction;	  “misperception”	  is	  just	  one	  way	  of	  understanding,	  based	  on	  perceptions	  in	  different	  contexts.	  In	  fact,	  any	  “misperception”—like	  the	  common	  Chinese	  perception	  of	  America	  invading	  China,	  or	  the	  widespread	  American	  perception	  of	  Moscow	  attacking	  the	  West—was,	  in	  some	  ways,	  a	  “correct”	  and	  “rational”	  understanding	  in	  view	  of	  local	  and	  historical	  backgrounds	  at	  that	  time.	  In	  other	  words,	  underneath	  the	  image	  of	  a	  unified,	  coherent	  Cold	  War,	  people	  in	  different	  locations	  were	  fighting	  different	  kinds	  of	  wars.	  The	  “reality”	  of	  the	  global	  conflict	  was	  developed	  and	  cemented	  through	  such	  a	  chain	  of	  reactions	  and	  series	  of	  local	  translations.	  In	  other	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words,	  the	  “reality”	  cannot	  be	  realized	  without	  interactions	  through	  local	  translation;	  it	  was	  a	  product	  of	  relationality.	  The	  binding	  knot	  that	  combined	  such	  processes	  of	  fighting	  different	  kinds	  of	  wars	  under	  the	  image	  of	  a	  unified	  Cold	  War	  was,	  more	  or	  less,	  memories	  and	  experiences	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  After	  all,	  for	  many	  people	  in	  Europe,	  East	  and	  Southeast	  Asia,	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  war	  was	  not	  just	  an	  event	  in	  the	  past.	  Because	  of	  its	  massive	  scale	  of	  mobilization	  and	  participation,	  many	  held	  diverse	  kinds	  of	  memories	  of	  the	  war.	  Furthermore,	  because	  of	  its	  shocking	  cruelty,	  such	  memories	  tended	  to	  be	  uncompromising,	  as	  if	  they	  were	  the	  only	  “truth,”	  which,	  in	  turn,	  functioned	  as	  lessons	  constraining	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  people	  observed	  and	  contemplated	  the	  future	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  a	  sense,	  it	  was	  not	  just	  a	  tragedy	  in	  the	  past;	  rather,	  it	  was	  an	  image	  of	  the	  future.	  	  No	  wonder,	  therefore,	  that	  many	  policymakers	  and	  ordinary	  people	  feared	  the	  outbreak	  of	  World	  War	  III	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  which	  many	  interpreted	  as	  the	  first	  “hot”	  war	  between	  the	  two	  superpowers—a	  way	  of	  thinking	  that,	  in	  turn,	  consolidated	  a	  specific	  perception	  of	  the	  world	  outside	  Korea	  as	  barely	  remaining	  at	  the	  stages	  of	  “cold”	  war.	  This	  point	  might	  become	  clearer	  if	  we	  think	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  not	  an	  entirely	  universal	  phenomenon	  in	  the	  early	  1950s.	  There	  was,	  in	  fact,	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  verisimilitude	  of	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War;	  in	  general,	  it	  achieved	  a	  high	  degree	  where	  World	  War	  II	  left	  massive	  scars,	  while	  retaining	  a	  low	  degree	  in	  areas	  where	  damage	  from	  the	  war	  was	  relatively	  less	  harsh,	  including	  Latin	  America,	  Africa,	  and	  South	  Asia.	  Although	  many	  countries	  in	  these	  areas	  later	  joined	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  world	  in	  the	  late	  1950s	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and	  1960s,	  they	  were	  not	  so	  much	  inside	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  circa	  1950.	  Further	  research	  is	  needed,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  built	  on	  the	  ground	  of	  memories	  and	  experiences	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  at	  least	  at	  its	  moment	  of	  materialization.	  	  As	  long	  as	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population	  supported	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  policymakers	  in	  the	  metropolis	  of	  each	  society	  could	  not	  get	  away	  from	  it;	  nor	  did	  they	  wish	  to	  escape	  from	  it.	  When	  the	  United	  States	  decided	  to	  enter	  the	  Korean	  War	  and	  crossed	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  northward,	  and	  when	  China	  decided	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  and	  crossed	  the	  parallel	  southward,	  these	  decisions	  were	  not	  so	  much	  made	  through	  clean-­‐cut	  Cold	  War	  thinking.	  Nor	  were	  they	  simply	  results	  of	  leaders’	  personalities	  and	  ideologies.	  More	  than	  anything	  else,	  policymakers	  in	  both	  Washington	  and	  Beijing	  paid	  significant	  attention	  to	  contingent	  situations	  surrounding	  them,	  including	  domestic	  politics,	  election	  campaigns,	  social	  and	  cultural	  circumstances,	  and	  popular	  attitudes,	  contemplating	  possible	  outcomes	  and	  repercussions.	  	  	   Such	  a	  pattern	  clearly	  appeared	  when	  the	  war	  became	  unpopular	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1951.3	  With	  a	  rapid	  shift	  in	  social	  attitudes,	  some	  politicians	  quickly	  and	  quietly	  modified	  their	  stances.	  Robert	  Taft,	  who	  had	  been	  one	  of	  the	  most	  hawkish	  critics	  of	  the	  Truman	  administration,	  and	  who	  had	  advocated	  crossing	  of	  the	  38th	  Parallel	  northward,	  for	  instance,	  now	  grumbled	  that	  he	  would	  have	  stayed	  out	  of	  Korea	  from	  the	  outset	  if	  he	  had	  been	  president	  in	  June	  
                                                3	  “Korea,”	  The	  Gallup	  Poll:	  Public	  Opinion,	  1935-­‐1971	  (New	  York,	  1972),	  960-­‐61.	  The	  poll	  was	  taken	  between	  January	  1	  and	  5,	  1951,	  and	  released	  on	  January	  22,	  1951.	  9	  percent	  of	  those	  polled	  had	  no	  opinion;	  Steven	  Casey,	  Selling	  the	  Korean	  War,	  205-­‐6.	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of	  1950.	  In	  light	  of	  the	  new	  situation,	  Taft	  suggested,	  he	  would	  “get	  out	  and	  fall	  back	  to	  a	  defensive	  position	  in	  Japan	  and	  Formosa,”	  as	  if	  completely	  unaware	  of	  what	  he	  had	  argued	  half	  a	  year	  earlier.4	  	  Members	  of	  the	  Truman	  administration	  were	  keenly	  aware	  of	  such	  changes	  in	  popular	  sentiments,	  and	  began	  discussing	  the	  possibility	  of	  retreating	  from	  Korea	  in	  a	  “face-­‐saving	  way.”	  5	  At	  any	  time	  for	  any	  administration,	  such	  would	  not	  be	  an	  easy	  task,	  and	  President	  Truman,	  himself,	  said	  that	  the	  United	  States	  must	  hold	  the	  line	  for	  a	  “long	  long	  time”	  in	  order	  not	  to	  “lose	  face”	  by	  withdrawing	  in	  a	  hurry.6	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Dean	  Acheson	  later	  recalled	  the	  situation	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  cease-­‐fire	  resolution	  in	  January	  1951,	  frankly	  admitting	  that	  the	  administration	  did	  not	  want	  to	  accept	  the	  resolution:	  “[The	  cease-­‐fire	  resolution]	  obviously	  was	  a	  very	  difficult	  one	  for	  us	  to	  support	  in	  view	  of	  the	  present	  attitude—the	  then	  attitude	  of	  public	  opinion	  and	  the	  existing	  status	  of	  affairs	  in	  Korea.”7	  Deeply	  concerned	  with	  the	  tide	  of	  popular	  impressions	  resulting	  from	  their	  actions,	  the	  administration	  utilized	  all	  available	  policy	  options	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  increasing,	  or,	  they	  hoped,	  fortifying	  support	  for	  the	  administration.	  One	  example	  is	  President	  Truman’s	  direction	  to	  General	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  in	  mid-­‐January.	  In	  a	  top-­‐secret	  telegram,	  the	  president	  explained	  that	  the	  situation	  in	  Korea	  had	  been	  
                                                4	  “Daily	  Opinion	  Summary,”	  January	  1951,	  National	  Archives,	  College	  Park,	  MD;	  Casey	  205.	  	  5	  The	  term	  “face-­‐saving	  way”	  was	  expressed	  by	  Vice	  President.	  “Minutes	  of	  National	  Security	  Council	  Meeting,	  3:05pm,	  November	  28m	  Tuesday	  at	  the	  White	  House,”	  Folder	  "Attlee	  Meeting	  -­‐	  December	  1950,"	  Box	  149,	  Foreign	  Affairs	  File,	  Subject	  File,	  President's	  Secretary's	  Files,	  HSTP,	  HSTL,	  Independence,	  MO;	  FRUS	  1950,	  Vol.	  VII:	  Korea,	  1242-­‐49.	  6	  Ibid.	  7	  Dean	  Acheson,	  Princeton	  Seminars,	  February	  14,	  1954;	  Reel	  6,	  Track	  2,	  10-­‐11,	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  Library,	  Independence,	  MO.	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receiving	  the	  “utmost	  attention”	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  gave	  the	  general	  several	  major	  strategic	  purposes,	  including:	  	  A)	  To	  demonstrate	  that	  aggression	  will	  not	  be	  accepted	  by	  us…and	  to	  provide	  a	  rallying	  point	  around	  which	  the	  spirits	  and	  energies	  of	  the	  free	  world	  can	  be	  mobilized	  to	  meet	  the	  world-­‐wide	  threat	  which	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  now	  poses.	  	  	  B)	  To	  deflate	  the	  dangerously	  exaggerated	  political	  and	  military	  prestige	  of	  Communist	  China	  which	  now	  threaten	  to	  undermine	  the	  resistance	  of	  non-­‐Communist	  Asia	  and	  to	  consolidate	  the	  hold	  of	  Communism	  on	  China	  itself	  […].	  	  J)	  To	  alert	  the	  people	  behind	  the	  iron	  curtain	  that	  their	  masters	  are	  bent	  upon	  wars	  of	  aggression	  and	  that	  this	  crime	  will	  be	  resisted	  by	  the	  free	  world.8	  	  	  Apparently,	  administrators’	  primary	  concern	  was	  not	  so	  much	  about	  military	  tactics	  or	  geopolitics,	  but	  the	  politics	  of	  impressions	  at	  home.	  The	  concern	  was	  not	  really	  with	  winning	  or	  losing	  territory	  in	  Korea	  in	  itself,	  but	  with	  far-­‐reaching	  repercussions	  of	  the	  fighting	  in	  Korea	  on	  popular	  attitudes	  at	  home,	  which	  often	  shifting	  with	  the	  winning	  or	  losing	  of	  territory	  in	  Korea.	  	  In	  formulating	  Korean	  War	  policy,	  policymakers	  were	  haunted	  by	  fears	  concerning	  whether	  they	  appeared	  tough	  enough,	  whether	  they	  looked	  anti-­‐communist,	  or	  in	  China’s	  case,	  anti-­‐American,	  enough,	  whether	  they	  were	  patriotic	  enough,	  and	  whether	  they	  were	  appealing	  enough.	  In	  a	  sense,	  they	  did	  not	  necessarily	  originate	  policies	  or	  strategies,	  nor	  did	  they	  control	  the	  situations.	  Nor	  did	  they	  impose	  certain	  policies	  as	  they	  wished.	  Instead	  of	  originating,	  they	  were	  reacting.	  Instead	  of	  leading	  society,	  they	  were	  in	  many	  ways	  reading	  society	  in	  order	  to	  modify	  their	  own	  attitudes.	  Policymakers,	  in	  this	  sense,	  were	  not	  necessarily	  seated	  at	  the	  “top,”	  from	  which	  they	  arbitrarily	  gave	  orders;	  rather,	  they	  too	  were	  
                                                8	  Telegram,	  Harry	  S.	  Truman	  to	  Douglas	  MacArthur,	  January	  14,	  1951,	  Douglas	  MacArthur	  Papers,	  RG	  6,	  Box	  1,	  Folder	  11,	  MacArthur	  Memorial	  Archives,	  Norfolk,	  VA;	  FRUS	  1951,	  Vol.	  VII,	  Korea	  and	  China,	  Part	  1,	  77-­‐78.	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parts	  of	  chains	  of	  actions	  and	  reactions	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  the	  way	  nameless	  ordinary	  people	  participated	  in	  politics,	  however	  their	  respective	  degrees	  of	  influence	  might	  have	  differed.	  This	  phenomenon	  is,	  of	  course,	  not	  particularly	  unique	  to	  the	  postwar	  period;	  rather,	  what	  appeared	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  imagined	  reality	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  a	  confirmation	  that	  the	  “reality”	  had	  developed	  in	  an	  era	  that	  had	  been	  evolving	  since	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century:	  an	  epoch	  characterized	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  social.	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  think	  about	  why,	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  such	  an	  era	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  social,	  the	  state	  system	  seemed	  to	  reach	  its	  zenith,	  than	  ever	  before.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  in	  China	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  a	  sense	  of	  trust	  toward	  the	  state	  (party)	  increased,	  and,	  in	  other	  places	  like	  Taiwan,	  South	  Korea,	  and	  the	  Philippines,	  the	  system	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state	  itself	  was	  built.	  In	  these	  places,	  what	  happened	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  restoration	  (creation)	  of	  a	  classical	  mode	  of	  state—classical	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  looked	  more	  like	  a	  conventional	  state	  than	  those	  observed	  in	  the	  age	  of	  globalized	  colonial	  empires	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  first-­‐half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	  century	  seemed	  more	  like	  a	  historical	  throwback,	  than	  a	  development	  of	  empire,	  more	  like	  partition	  than	  global	  unification.	  How	  did	  it	  happen?	  Why,	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  era	  of	  the	  social,	  did	  many	  people	  desire	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  restoration	  (creation)	  of	  a	  classical	  style	  of	  state	  order?	  	  Observing	  situations	  circa	  1950,	  one	  conclusion	  might	  be	  drawn.	  To	  put	  it	  simply,	  there	  was	  	  a	  need	  for	  order.	  Various	  kinds	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  conflicts	  had	  been	  evolving	  since	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  and	  domestic	  societies	  in	  many	  parts	  of	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the	  world	  had	  been	  turning	  into	  “battlefields.”	  Such	  domestic	  conflicts	  derived	  from	  diverse	  factors,	  such	  as	  the	  devastation	  of	  the	  war,	  social	  changes	  along	  with	  the	  war,	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  actors	  in	  society,	  effects	  of	  globalization	  within	  colonial	  empires,	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  disappearance	  of	  such	  empires.	  Many,	  though	  not	  all,	  societies	  shared	  similar	  problems,	  and	  such	  local	  conflicts	  flared	  up	  similarly	  and	  simultaneously	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  when	  it	  was	  interpreted	  as	  possibly	  sparking	  off	  another	  world	  war.	  	  It	  is	  no	  wonder	  that	  similar	  reactions	  appeared	  in	  these	  societies.	  With	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  Korean	  War,	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  wore	  more	  of	  an	  aura	  of	  truth	  than	  ever	  before,	  and,	  under	  that	  logic,	  diverse	  groups	  of	  dissenters,	  nonconformists,	  and	  elements	  of	  possible	  “disorder”	  were	  wiped	  out,	  and	  many	  social	  problems	  that	  had	  remained	  unresolved	  were	  quickly	  “settled,”	  bringing	  “order”	  and	  “harmony”	  to	  societies.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that,	  while	  similar	  phenomena	  occurred	  at	  the	  same	  time	  in	  different	  places,	  such	  were	  not	  of	  a	  coordinated	  nature.	  In	  effect,	  they	  developed	  separately,	  but	  did	  so	  in	  a	  way	  that	  pointed	  to	  a	  common	  pattern:	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  along	  with	  waves	  of	  domestic	  suppression.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  materialization	  of	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  on	  a	  worldwide	  scale	  exemplified	  one	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  characteristics	  of	  the	  modern,	  contemporary	  world—an	  epoch	  of	  simultaneity.	  What	  was	  shared	  in	  these	  simultaneous	  phenomenon	  was	  the	  function	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  restoring	  state	  order	  at	  the	  international	  level,	  recapturing	  and	  preserving	  social	  “harmony”	  at	  the	  national	  level,	  and	  “overcoming”	  diverse	  social	  and	  cultural	  wars	  at	  social	  and	  community	  levels—a	  mechanism	  that	  operated	  quite	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“well”	  for	  decades	  that	  followed.	  Viewed	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  geopolitical	  or	  ideological	  conflict	  between	  the	  two	  superpowers,	  but	  rather	  an	  imagined	  reality,	  which	  functioned	  as	  a	  social	  mechanism	  for	  tranquilizing	  chaotic	  situations	  of	  the	  postwar	  period	  and	  putting	  an	  end	  to	  diverse	  kinds	  of	  “wars”	  at	  home.	  When	  such	  an	  imagined	  reality	  habitualized	  and	  institutionalized	  worldwide,	  it	  became	  a	  realized	  imagining,	  perpetuating	  itself,	  so	  long	  as	  the	  act	  of	  imagining	  continued.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  a	  series	  of	  processes	  of	  creating,	  consolidating,	  and	  perpetuating	  such	  an	  imagined	  reality	  was,	  in	  many	  ways,	  conducted	  at	  the	  people’s	  initiative,	  along	  with	  the	  intentions	  of	  high-­‐ranking	  policymakers.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  actual	  participants	  who	  promoted	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  through	  various	  domestic	  purges	  in	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  were	  not	  necessarily	  state	  officials,	  but,	  often	  everyday	  people.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  crux	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  was	  not	  so	  much	  about	  an	  East-­‐West	  confrontation	  or	  balance	  of	  power,	  but	  about	  struggles	  within	  each	  society.	  In	  essence,	  it	  was	  people’s	  wars	  at	  home.	  	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  final	  point	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  studying	  the	  Cold	  War	  today.	  We	  usually	  think	  that	  the	  Cold	  War	  ended	  two	  decades	  ago.	  This	  is	  true	  when	  we	  view	  the	  Cold	  War	  as	  a	  geopolitical,	  ideological	  confrontation	  between	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  However,	  such	  is	  not	  the	  case	  if	  we	  see	  the	  “reality”	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  as	  a	  gigantic	  social	  construction	  of	  an	  imagined	  reality,	  in	  which	  many	  people	  participated	  in	  restoring	  state	  order	  and	  “harmony”	  through	  silencing	  disagreements	  at	  home.	  When	  we	  see	  the	  Cold	  War	  in	  this	  way,	  then,	  the	  phenomenon	  does	  not	  appear	  as	  a	  peculiar	  event	  in	  a	  time	  long	  passed.	  Rather,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  such	  a	  pattern	  has	  been	  reappearing	  and,	  in	  fact,	  reinforced	  in	  the	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so-­‐called	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  “Clash	  of	  Civilizations”	  and,	  in	  particular,	  in	  the	  decade	  of	  “War	  on	  Terror”	  following	  September	  11,	  2001.	  	  To	  think	  about	  the	  experiences	  of	  the	  Cold	  War—not	  so	  much	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  U.S.-­‐Soviet	  confrontation	  but	  as	  part	  of	  a	  social	  mechanism	  of	  restoring	  order	  at	  home	  on	  a	  global	  scale—is,	  thus,	  	  to	  think	  about	  the	  imagined	  and	  constructed	  nature	  of	  “reality”	  and	  “history,”	  and	  their	  functions	  on	  the	  ground	  and	  among	  people,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  forces	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  imagined	  nature	  of	  reality,	  beliefs,	  and	  common	  sense	  to	  which	  we	  adhere	  today.	  How	  did	  an	  imagined	  reality	  emerge	  and	  gain	  such	  verisimilitude?	  How	  did	  numerous	  people	  like	  us	  join	  in	  and	  play	  roles	  in	  the	  making	  of	  such	  an	  imagined	  reality,	  and	  why?	  Our	  experiences	  of	  the	  imagined	  reality	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  have	  provided	  warnings,	  but	  it	  seems	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  taken	  them	  seriously.	  In	  a	  sense,	  while	  this	  study	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time	  during	  the	  Korean	  War	  circa	  1950,	  it	  also	  intends	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  fundamental	  nature	  and	  problems	  of	  the	  contemporary,	  globalized	  world	  we	  live	  in	  today.	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